Bonn Juego Postdoctoral Researcher University of Jyväskylä, Finland Presentation Notes for the Open Seminar co-organized by the Forum on Asian Studies – Department of Political Science, Stockholm University; ABF Stockholm – Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund; and Olof Palme International Center Stockholm, 8 May 2017

1. THE PHILIPPINES:
A YEAR AFTER THE DUTERTE PHENOMENON
1
Bonn Juego
Postdoctoral Researcher
University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Presentation Notes for the Open Seminar co-organized by
the Forum on Asian Studies – Department of Political Science, Stockholm University;
ABF Stockholm – Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund;
and Olof Palme International Center
Stockholm, 8 May 2017

2. AGENDA
I. Duterte-style Populism
– strengths and contradictions of a catch-all, cross-class politics
II. Duterte’s War on Drugs
– police-centric, wanting in socio-economic reforms
III. Duterte’s Philippines in the Current Geopolitical Game
– opportunities and risks of ’hedging’ with Great Powers
IV. ASEAN@50 under PH Duterte’s Chairmanship
– continuity in ASEAN political economy, difference in geopolitics
V. Peace Negotiations with Armed Communist Rebels and the Bangsamoro Peace
Process
– Limits of political will vis-a-vis the deep structural history of conflicts
VI. Dutertenomics
– PH economy’s path-dependence, challenges, and prospects
2

3. Rodrigo Duterte: a Heterodox Politician
Elected: 9 May 2016; President: 30 June 2016
partly TRADITIONAL
• veteran local political boss
• exposed to Filipino political
wheeling and dealing
• from a local and regional political
family in Davao City, Mindanao,
and the Visayas
partly UNORTHODOX
• anti-establishment rhetoric
• uncouth public behavior
• vulgar speech
3

4. Duterte’s Electoral Victory and Popularity
39 % popular votes; 91 % initial trust rating
performance rating: from 83% (Dec 2016) to 78% (March 2017)
MAJOR FACTORS THAT STOOD OUT
1. AGENTIAL
– better campaign strategy and execution
2. INSTITUTIONAL
– plurality voting system; presidential rather than parliamentary
3. STRUCTURAL
– ’protest vote’ against socio-political hypocrisy and economic
developmental shortcomings of the 30-year liberal-democratic
regime
– Duterte phenomenon: a legacy of the failings of the ’EDSA Republic’
4

5. Duterte-style Populism: catch-all, cross-class politics
[cuts across classes, generations, genders, and the political spectrum]
5

6. Duterte’s Left- and Right-wing Populism
LEFT-wing Populism
• Self-proclaimed ”leftist” and ”socialist”
– but without a socialist program, no
socialist party, does not belong to a
leftist social movement
• Anti-established institutions in the
Philippines
– US imperialism
– Landed oligarchy
– Catholic Church
• Peace with long-running ’ideological’
armed communist rebels and Islamic
separatist groups
RIGHT-wing Populism
• Prominence in governance style
and in speech:
– Authoritarianism
– Military mind
– Police action
• Fascination with Marcos era
Martial Law
• War or state violence against
criminality and illegal drugs
problems
• So far, Duterte has shown more right-wing, than left-wing, populism.
• Much better for Duterte and the Philippines to swing to left-wing populism.
6

7. Duterte-speak:
Messianic and Dominant Discourses
MESSIANIC COMPLEX and motherhood
statements
• Fatherly image: ’Tatay Digong’
• Simple solutions to complex problems
• ’Egotism’: That he is the only one with the
political will; that he is the only one who can
do ’it’.
• Binaries: ’good citizens and bad criminals’;
’elites and ordinary people’
DISCOURSES (Prevailing psyche in PH society
and culture)
• Machismo
• Sexism
• Violence
• Disregard for human rights
• Desire for social order
• The need for discipline among citizens
LANGUAGE
• street language (”salitang kalye”)
• anti-intellectualism; smart-shaming
• sound bites and one-liners
• witty, humorous comments
• jokes
• expletives, cuss words, dirty finger
• vulgar, cursing, swearing
• political incorrectness, uncouth, undiplomatic
• crazy quotes (e.g., rape, Hitler, Viagra)
• hyperbole, exaggerations
• doublespeak
7

8. Duterte’s Slogan: ”Change is coming.”
#partnersforchange
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE
Objectives and Promises
• Criminality and Illegal drugs
• Poverty and inequality
• Oligarchy
• Corruption, red tape, and
government inefficiencies
Dominant discourses where
SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE must also come
1. CULTURE OF VIOLENCE
 Conflicts dealt with through violence, physical
harm, or death
2. CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
 The rich, the influential, the politically-
connected, and the powerful can get away
from their crimes, if not exempted from
punishment
3. CULTURE OF MACHISMO AND SEXISM
 Misogyny; victim-blaming
4. DISREGARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
 The problem is not human rights in principle,
but it is the 'absence' of human rights in
practice.
8

9. Two Most Divisive, Controversial, Unpopular
Issues and Political Positions of Duterte
Extrajudicial Killings
• ~ 2,000 – 8,000 killed (since 1 July 2016)
Undermine:
 Human rights
 Due process
 Rule of law
– Condonation of these killings?
– But even if those killings are not
state-sponsored or state-
orchestrated, Duterte’s
government must do something
to stop it!
Hero’s Burial for dictator Marcos
MARCOS IS NOT A HERO!
• Perpetuating ”culture of impunity”
• The Marcoses’ long-term project to re-
write history. (Historical revisionism)
• Failure of ”people power” and the
EDSA Republics
– Revolutions must be both ’political’ and
’economic’
– Southeast Asian elite families: their
economic wealth easily regenerates into
political power
• A divided, or co-opted, left movement
EFFECTS:
1. re-activating the opposition
2. dividing groups of supporters
9

10. Duterte Supporters from Different Groups
DUTERTE-MARCOS DUTERTE-CAYETANO DUTERTE-ROBREDO DUTERTE-FAR LEFT
• Most aggressive
• Marcos loyalists
• Anti-Yellow
• Right-wing
authoritarian,
dictatorial
tendencies
• Aggressive
support for
Duterte
• Critical of
Marcos
• Critical of Yellow
• Moderate
Duterte
supporters
• Anti-Marcos
• Yellow sympathy
• Tactical alliance
(if not, co-opted)
• Anti-Marcos
• Anti-Yellow
10

11. Balance of Political Forces since 2016:
the same - continuity of ’Dutertard’ vs ’Dilawan’
• SOCIAL MEDIA AND POPULISM
– PRO-DUTERTE’S AGGRESSIVENESS: not just created by
themselves, but largely triggered by black propaganda-laden
campaign strategy and often condescending tone of the rival
Mar Roxas camp during the 2016 election
• GROUPTHINK
– We (the good allies) versus They (our evil enemies)
– Online: tribalistic; gangsterism; cyber-bullying
– Bandwagon effect and peer pressure to be ”in”, and to
belong to the popular
• CONFIRMATION / COGNITIVE BIASES
– blind and deaf to evidence and facts
– selective information in support of preconceived beliefs
and loyalties, including ’fake news’
– personality-based argumentation and other logical
fallacies (especially ad hominem)
– Online trolling
– Charisma, fanaticism, idolatry, or personality cult:
obsessive admiration to a leader
– Bigotry and demagoguery
RELATIVE POLITICAL STABILITY
so far after a year of Duterte’s
government:
• despite impeachment
complaint
• despite ICC case
(International Criminal Court)
• Threat may be external??? 11

12. Public Debate in ”a Populist Moment”:
from EXIT to VOICE and LOYALTY
A REFLECTION AND ARTICULATION OF REALITY:
 the state of people’s sociopolitical
consciousness
 quality of education and level of public
discourse
POSITIVE EFFECTS:
 increasing awareness and participation of
people in public debate through social media
 actively informing themselves about political
and economic issues and concepts
NEGATIVE EFFECTS:
 ’groupthink’ and ’confirmation bias’ behavior
 gutter level exchanges, fake news, trolling,
bullying, character assassinations,
misinformation, lies, regime of mendacity
”LIBERAL” OPPOSITION’S COMPLAINTS
AND CONTRADICTIONS:
 before: EXIT - political apathy of
citizenry
 liberal response: dialogue; debate;
popular education; AMO – arouse,
mobilize, organize
 now: populist political VOICE and
LOYALTY boldly articulated through
social media
 liberal response: ranging from fire-
against-fire to condescenscion and
censorship 12

13. The Duterte-Robredo Tiff
• Better-off for society if P-Duterte and VP-Robredo:
– stop playing the old ”Red vs Yellow” political game
– alternative to the old politics of the Marcoses versus Aquinos
• Duterte has the answer: ”I AM BEYOND POLITICS.” (Thus, focus on governance mission and
implement grand promises for socio-economic reforms.)
– easier to do for Duterte as President with all state powers
– more difficult for VP Robredo not to rely on Yellow allies: when she is attacked, she also
has to defend herself, especially against the Marcos machinery
• Duterte-Robredo relationship:
– rather than demanding ’unity’;
– better see the tandem as ’check-and-balance’ engaged in ’constructive critique’
13
 True Duterte supporters: must not play the Marcoses’ game using the ’Red’ card.
(Election is over. Marcoses becoming a liability to Duterte.)
 Impeachment proceedings and electoral protests shall consume the time, energy,
and resources of government institutions and active citizens that Duterte should
have been using to do difficult socio-economic reform programs for the country

14. Turf War in the Bureaucracy
Particularities of Duterte’s populism:
• Strength: broad cross-class
coalition
• Weakness: objective contradictions
of political-business class interests
• Long-term success and physical
survival may necessitate:
– sacrificing his own political
friends, and
– favoring the correct faction at
the right time
14

15. Real Test on Duterte’s Anti-Elite and Pro-Change Populism:
Discipline the Elite Class
to Address Social Injustice and the Culture of Impunity
• CLASS perspective – missing in Duterte as a self-proclaimed ’leftist’ and ’socialist’
– Criminality: his view based on ’methodological individualism’ – indignant at the unfortunate
individual drug addict, rather than at the socio-economic and historical-institutional conditions
that create the possibility for drug addiction and for the commitment of crimes
– War on Drugs: a war against the poor; rather than a war against the structures of inequality,
poverty, and mal-development
• as President: mentality must be larger than ’the individual’ – in the affairs of societal ’governance’:
– Attack the structures of poverty and inequality that breed and reinforce criminality and drug
addiction. Attack poverty; do not attack the poor.
15
• Thus far, whose side has Duterte been on? The faces and institutions of the ’culture of impunity’….
 the Marcoses, the Arroyos, the police and military, etc.
 Opposition Senator Leila de Lima does not really come from the elite political class.
 Filipino political elites have the capacity for violence and resistance – they can shoot back (which
includes Senator Antonio Trillanes with a network of military support base.)
 [ In contrast, albeit incomplete, the Aquino III administration was able to arrest, prosecute, or detain the
Arroyos, Enriles, Estradas, Revillas, including the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. ]

16. Old Wine in a New Bottle?
(Slightly) Different Multi-level Structures
During the Philippines’ Populist Moment
• ’Change’ has not yet come. But slightly different in discourse
and governance emphasis:
– Populism discourse: only at the Presidential and Cyberspace scales
ignited by the Duterte phenomenon
• Practices in the rest of the political spheres remain the same:
– old political families and their patronage-clientelist relations in the
Senate, House, and Local Government Units
– corruption in the bureaucracy, judiciary, police and military
• Inequality: Economy, market, and lands
– owned and captured by the 0.1% wealthy Filipino families
16

17. War on Drugs: Locally Popular, Globally Controversial
Multiple PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS why
the popular support on the drug war:
 Fear of individuals for themselves
and for their families to be
victimized by illegal drug abuse and
drug-related crimes
 For some, hatred by those
personally victimized by illegal drug
traffickers and users
 Popular frustration and anger
against failure of previous
administrations to seriously address
illegal drugs and criminality
 Priority given to sense of public
security and personal safety vis-a-
vis crimes
 High trust given to the perception of
strongman Duterte’s political will
17

18. Duterte’s Policing Approach to
the Supply and Demand Problem of Illegal Drugs
• Duterte’s war on drug:
a supply-side approach
– Simple, quick solutions
to complex problems
• The law of the instrument:
– ”If all you have is a
hammer; everything
looks like a nail.”
– If all the government
has is the police, all
socio-economic issues
look like police
problems.
18

19. Police-centric approach to illegal drugs….
Problematic:
• Attacking the poor
• Why let the police
address socio-
economic causes of
the drug problem:
 Poverty and
inequality
 Unemployment
 Homelessness
 School problems
 Addiction
 Loneliness
 Family problems
 Migration
Secret to success of Duterte’s war on drugs:
• If socio-economic reform programs take the
leading role in this war, rather than the police!
19

20. Different approaches to different substances
• Differentiate between users
and pushers.
 Drug users who only
harm themselves are
and should not be
treated as criminals.
• Police- and criminal-based
approach to illegal drug
trafficking and peddling.
• Rehabilitative and health-
based approach for victim-
less users.
• Different
approaches/penalties to
different substances:
 Between synthetic
(shabu) and organic
(marijuana)
Solutions must be based on:
 Evidence and rationality
 Medical science
 Local PH needs, capacities, and capabilities
20

21. Populism and Human Rights
• Populism’s dichotomy: between good and bad citizens
– i.e., only criminals should fear an iron-fist law and order regime
– (But human rights violations are indiscriminate!)
• Human lives and human rights: biggest casualties in the war on drugs
• Mal-education of Filipinos about human rights principles.
– Human rights have been wrongly associated with the defense of criminals, rather than
the protection of the weak, the vulnerable, and the victims against the capacity of state
and non-state entities for abuse of power.
• The problem is not human rights principles, but the absence of human rights!
– Anger must be directed at ’hypocritical liberals’, not on the virtues of human rights.
21
Forgotten in public consciousness:
Human rights institutions (CHR) have been continuously made
inutile and worthless even by three decades of liberal-democratic
EDSA republics.

22. 3H to Du30’s Sensitivity
1. Hypocrisy
– ranging from issues of personal lifestyle to the guilt of local
liberal elites and colonial/imperialist history
2. Human Rights
– issues of human rights violations and allegations of
summary executions since he was Mayor of Davao City
3. Health
– rumors about physical and mental fitness
22

23. Dialogue, rather than debate:
may be a plausible way
how to deal with Duterte on critical social issues
• Trajectory of populism: open-ended, various tendencies
– Avoiding ’civil war’, or further deepening social conflict, in the emotionally-charged
populist moment
– ’Ouster’ of a popular and democratically-elected leader would be extremely harmful
for PH society, economy, and people-to-people relations
• Duterte [context and observation – so far]:
– still (less than) a year as President, as of 8 May 2017
– shown some capacity and tendency to change his mind
• Government as an arena of struggles, of competing interests
• DIALOGUE, rather than debate, with Duterte may work on some critical social issues (e.g., on
juvenile justice, or on scientifically-proven non-violent approaches to the anti-drug campaign)
– can be done by civil society, academics, and other cause-oriented groups
– cannot be expected from the political opposition whose main job really is to criticize and
debate
• Giving and receiving CRITIQUE is part of feedback mechanism in democratic governance
]
23

24. Duterte’s Foreign Relations Strategy:
Some observed elements, so far….
1. ”Neocolonial analysis” prominent in the 1970s
– may have influenced Duterte’s view on PH underdevelopment and critique against
dependency relations and US imperialism
2. ”Hedging” between geopolitical rivals US and China to advance PH national interests
– but many flip-flopping statements (including strong rhetoric against US during meetings
with China and Russia)….
3. Elements of Cold War ”non-aligned” strategy of a Third World country
– in practice: not zero-sum, not totally anti-US, nor totally anti-EU;
– but also sounded to ”lean to one side” (i.e., to China and Russia)
4. ”Look East”
– friendlier to Asian neighbors China, Japan, and ASEAN member states
5. Pragmatic economic cooperation (with China, without ceding favorable PCA ruling)
– Foreign policy for domestic economic development
• While Duterte understands that the US is the most important partner of China, his understanding of Russia-
China relationship is passe,if not wrong. China has always had uncertain, if not problematic, relationship
with Russia.
24

25. Duterte’s ’Look East’
foreign relations and development policy
POTENTIALS:
• South-South relations may be good.
• But be careful of giant ’Southern’ economies like China.
• Attract ’good’ investments in line with national
development goals.
25

26. Different PH Foreign Relations Strategies for US and China
(Context: SCS territorial and maritime disputes)
ARROYO,
2001– 2010
AQUINO III,
2010–2016
DUTERTE,
2016– xxxx
US friendly strongly pro-US
• EDCA – Enhanced
Defense Cooperation
Agreement
critical (verbal) of Obama’s US
admin
• Continuity of military
exercises
• friendly start with Trump
China • Friendly
• Bilateral
• JMSU – joint marine
seismic undertaking (CN,
VN, PH)
• Investments, business,
trade
• Bellicose
• Multilateral
• Legal case (UNCLOS)
against CN’s nine-
dashed line
• Friendly
• more economic
pragmatism, than hard
geopolitics
Consequences • Controversy - corruption
and bribery cases re
Chinese investments
(NBN-ZTE, Northrail)
• Unconstitutionality of
JMSU
• Scarborough Shoal
standoff
• Missed on Chinese
capital for
investments
• PCA ruling win
• USD 24b from China
(infrastructure
investments)
• Filipino fishers’ access to
Scarborough Shoal
• Unintended
consequences??? 26

27. Philippine Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics???
(pragmatic economic cooperation)
• Contemporary global
political economy:
– Old capitalist centers of US,
EU, and Japan on prolonged
economic crises
– Duterte’s only 6-year term,
and vision for “golden age of
infrastructure” which only
Chinese capital appears able
and willing to provide at this
time….
• Search for new [sub-
imperialist?] allies:
– During the APEC 2016, Xi
Jinping invited Duterte to
observe the BRICS
18-21 October 2016: Duterte’s state visit in China
• USD 24 billion = 9b soft loans and credit line
+ 15b investments
CRITICAL AREAS FOR THE PHILIPPINES WHEN
DEALING WITH CHINESE STATE-CAPITAL:
1. Labor (ensure local content)
2. Environment (renewables and green tech )
3. Corruption and Bribery (both from the PH-
CN government and private sectors)
27

28. Tensions and Risks of Duterte’s critical approach to US,
and new friendship with China and Russia
• Americanized socialization of
Filipinos:
a) military and police
b) diplomatic corps
c) social, political, economic,
and cultural institutions
d) scholars and academics
e) the general population
• Sino-phobia
• Russo-phobia
(Charismatic populist politician’s
effect on his followers’ psyche….)
POLITICS can change a culture,
mentality and worldview….
28

29. Mapping Duterte’s Foreign Policy Statements
about US and China
Election Period
(populist campaign)
Governance
(populist in power)
Consequences
(intended and
unintended)
• Nationalist rhetoric
 ’jet ski’
hyperbole to
PH waters and
territories in
the disputed
areas
• Friendlier to China
 also, to Russia
• Critical of the US, while
continuing PH-US military
exercises
• Friend/Enemy statements
about the US
• Friendly reaching out to US
President-elect Donald Trump
• Effect: too early to
tell
• Intended: assume
’in good faith’
• Unintended: ???
29

30. ’Populist Peace’
A peaceful coexistence among populisms?
Points of similarity and unity between
populists:
 non-interventionism in (inter)national
affairs
 anti-Elite / anti-Establishment rhetoric
 criticism of liberalism, or critique of
liberal democracy
 political incorrectness in speech
 crisis and change discourse
 law and order platform
• (ethno-nationalism appeal applies to Trump and
European populism; but to Duterte only during the
election campaigns )
30

31. Hedging as a viable PH geopolitical strategy today
(Third World’s policy choices in-between great power rivals)
PH DUTERTE’S KEY CARDS IN HIS GEOPOLITICAL PROJECTION
GAME (context):
- not only because of:
1. Duterte’s bold personality and character
- but also because of:
2. Permanent Court of Arbitration’s favourable ruling for PH
3. Reputation of the PH as solid and strategic ally of the US in Asia
4. PH market opportunities and economic growth potentials
31

32. Understanding Different
Perspectives and Interests
Great Powers
• a zero-sum game
Third World
• can hedge
• pressures of under-
development
32

33. PH Duterte as ASEAN@50 Chair
CONTINUITY
in ASEAN Political Economy
• Democratization and human rights:
expected not priority areas
– ”a peaceful coexistence among
authoritarianisms”
• ASEAN Economic Community (ASEAN
Vision 2025)
– towards one neoliberal capitalist
regional economy embedded in ten
different political-cultural regimes
• Open-ended future of ASEAN regionalism
– largely depends on national
bourgeoisies , or domestic political
economy
– state-capital relations (national state
- domestic capitalists – foreign
capital): coercion, cooptation, or
consent?
DIFFERENT
in ASEAN Geopolitics
• South China Sea maritime
and territorial disputes
– more advances for China;
– US being kept at bay
• a friendlier China???
• a more aggressive US???
33

34. Peace Negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF
• More than a question of sincerity and
political will from both parties
• But, a more fundamental long history
of institutionalized problems:
– ’armed struggle’ as tactical and
ideological framework the CPP-
NPA-NDF
– anti-communist orientation and
training of the AFP military, police
– absence of involved military
stakeholders in the government
panels
– continued military operations in
the countrysides, despite ceasefire
declarations
– vicious cycle of violent feud
between NPA and AFP 34

35. Peace Process with the MILF
and for Muslim Mindanao on the Bangsamoro Question
• BTC: Bangsamoro Transition
Commission appointed by
Duterte
• Federalism
– a campaign platform of Duterte
– the ideal policy intention: for
wealth redistribution and
address regional uneven
development
– But, in PH realpolitik: first-mover
advantages of entrenched local
warlords and provincial/regional
elites
35

36. 36

37. Lesson-drawing from, and possibly build on,
the past peace processes with Moro and
Islamic rebel groups
• GPH-MNLF: 1976 Tripoli Agreement
• MNLF: 1996 Final Peace Agreement
– GPH failure to fully implement the FPA
– Moro leaders’ failings: from counter-elites
to becoming ruling elites themselves after
reintegrating into mainstream society
• MILF: BBL (Bangsamoro Basic Law) and the
2014 CAB (Comprehensive Agreement on
the Bangsomoro)
– a structural-relational issue with long history
of conflicts , including sincerity
(Mamasapano incident possibly involving US
intelligence)
– Peace process needs to be more ’inclusive’
and ’participatory’ involving all ethnic,
indigenous, or interest groups among
Muslim Filipinos
37

38. DUTERTENOMICS
 Law & Order regime for progress and business stability
 War against Drugs and Criminality of the underground economy
 Peace process with communist rebels (CPP-NPA-NDF), Islamic separatists (MILF, MNLF)
 Philippine Capitalism with Chinese characteristics
 on top of existing FDIs and ODAs from Japan, US, South Korea, and the EU
 neoliberal policy continuity (i.e., capitalist market-oriented governance)
 industrialization
 coal-powered?; ”national champions” from the Filipino business oligarchy?
 ”golden age of infrastructure”
 human capital investment (education gets the highest budget priority)
 rhetoric to end labour contractualization practices
 AmBisyon 2040
38

39. PATH-DEPENDENCE of economic performance
Good ‘market signals’ and ‘initial conditions’ for Dutertenomics
 Political capital (solid government institutional
support; ‘clean’ government perception)
 Economic capital (6 -7 % GDP projection and
credit ratings upgrade: “path-dependence” of
growth, development, FDI)
 Social capital (popular mass support and
legitimacy)
+ new Chinese capital for infrastructure investments (active AIIB
membership, OBOR role)
+ continuity of Japanese ODA and investments
+ US BPOs most likely to stay (cost and risk analysis from the point of
view of business)
+ EU’s GSP+ grant
+ OFW remittances’ counter-cyclical effect
+ rising entrepreneurship: MSMEs
+ promising sectors like CARS program, shipbuilding, etc.
The Challenge:
• Translate all these asap
to increasing
employment, real
wages, and the general
standards of living of
the Filipinos.
39
??? Agriculture modernization ??? (political will for genuine
land reform + need for technological innovation to manage
law of diminishing returns)
??? Opportunities to pursue national industrialization:
prospective ‘national champions’; peso depreciation;
imminent protectionism in the US and EU; diversify away
from rice monoculture production; appointing a new central
bank governor active in industrial policy coordination; etc.

40. REALITY CHECK
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ASIAN CAPITALISMS
(To what extent will Duterte’s human rights issues impact on
Philippine economic, trade, and investment relations?)
• Emergent ’Authoritarian Neoliberalism’ in Asia
 Capitalist enterprises and investments can tolerate ’authoritarianism’ (discipline),
but not ’totalitarianism’ (control)
 Capital is not always a socio-political force for democracy and human rights.
 Profitable opportunities: key requirement of capitalists and investors
• Capital can tolerate an ’authoritarian’ Duterte
 so long he provides their accumulation activities and properties with high degree of
predictability and security
 so long his disciplining does not extend to their business operations and profitability
40
RECENT FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN/FOR THE PHILIPPINES
 US and China: ’political’ affairs crucial, especially for their geopolitics
 EU – including Sweden, Denmark and rest of Scandinavia: focused on
’economic diplomacy’ (entrepreneurship, investments, private sector
development, commercial and trade relations)

41. Post-Duterte Philippines
• Focus on the present
• Learn from the past
• But also start thinking,
planning, and working for
the future:
– What the PH society and
economy will, can, or
should be, after the
Duterte-led populist
moment???
41
”The crisis consists
precisely in the fact that
the old is dying and the
new cannot be born;
in this interregnum a
great variety of
morbid symptoms
appear.”
(Antonio Gramsci)

42. Tack.
Kiitos.
Salamat.
Thank you.
Bonn Juego
bonn.juego@jyu.fi / bonnjuego@yahoo.com
8 May 2017, Stockholm
42