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Jimmy Lim TWNOG 3
jhalim@cloudflare.com Taipei, 21 June 2019
BGP filtering best practice
Cloudflare in a glance
Protect and accelerate any website online
● Direct visitors to nearest entry point
○ Fast
■ Lesser hops
■ Reduced latency
● Save bandwidth
○ Lesser requests to origin
○ Mitigate DDoS
● Resiliency
○ 150+ locations
AS Path vs Prefix filtering
Different type of inbound filtering
● No filtering?
○ No inbound policy filtering
○ Not acceptable
● AS path filtering
○ Filtering based on AS path - a series of autonomous system (AS) numbers
with originator’s AS number at the end of the path
○ Using regular expression
● Prefix filtering
○ Filtering based on the matching prefixes defined in the prefix list or route
filter
Many local IXPs are still doing AS path filtering
● Allow all prefixes that are originated by the ASN
○ No proper validation
● Prone to accidental/wrong announcement
● High risk of prefix hijacking and blackholing
Sample of bad thing about AS Path filtering
ISP/IXP
AS65501
Originate 10.0.0.0/24
AS_PATH _65501$
Send packet to 10.0.0.1
Hijacking routerLegitimate router
AS65001
Originate 10.0.0.0/23
Sample of bad thing about AS Path
● What is so bad about the previous example?
permit _65501$
● That implies accept any prefixes that are originated by AS65501
○ High chance to create accidental hijacking
○ High risk to hijack or blackhole maliciously
Another sample of bad thing about AS Path
filtering
● RTBH feature by ISP/IXPs
○ Allow customers or participants to
remotely trigger blackhole to prefixes
under their own ASN
■ eBGP multihop blackhole peering with ISPs
■ Direct transit BGP session
■ Using ISP/IXPs blackhole BGP community
○ Accept up to /32
Internet ISPCustomer router
ISPCustomer router
eBGP multihop
IXP
Participants
Why AS Path filtering still exist?
● Difficult to maintain prefix filter
○ Troublesome to validate
● No expertise to configure, too complex?
● IXPs reluctant to do strict filtering
○ Not able to attract all traffic
■ Participants do not update filter regularly/properly
Prefix list filtering
● Prefix based filtering
○ More validation is done
● Allow up to /24 for IPv4 prefix
● Allow up to /48 for IPv6 prefix
● Automatic update via IRR database
IRR and RPKI
Internet Routing Registry
● Globally distributed routing information database
○ Ensure stability and consistency of Internet-wide routing
○ Sharing information between network operators
● Why use IRR?
○ Route filtering
○ Network troubleshooting
○ Router configuration
○ Global view of Internet routing
● List of IRRs
○ http://www.irr.net/docs/list.html
AS-SET information in IRR
as-set: AS-CLOUDFLARE
descr: Cloudflare, Inc
members: AS13335
members: AS3557, AS21556
members: AS132892, AS133877
members: AS202623, AS203898
members: AS394536, AS395747, AS14789
mnt-by: MNT-CLOUD14
source: ARIN
Route object information in IRR
route: 1.1.1.0/24
descr: Cloudflare, Inc.
origin: AS13335
mnt-by: MNT-CLOUD14
notify: rir@cloudflare.com
remarks: ---------------
remarks: All Cloudflare abuse reporting can be done via
remarks: https://www.cloudflare.com/abuse
remarks: ---------------
source: ARIN
Automation to generate prefix filter
IRRs have a very loose security model
● Some database maintainers do not check the authenticity of
the entry
○ Records exist within IRRs can be wrong and/or missing
● There are lots of IRRs
○ Mirrors are not always up to date
● No cryptographic signing of records
● Let’s talk about RPKI
Resource Public Key Infrastructure
● Cryptographic method of signing records
● Regional Internet Registry (RIR) has a root certificate
○ Generate a signed certificate for Local Internet Registry (network operator)
■ All resources they are assigned with (IPs and ASNs)
● LIR then signs the prefix containing origin AS that they intend to
use
○ ROA (Route Object Authorization) is created
Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Signing prefixes
● Each LIRs own and manage Internet resources has access to
RIR portal
○ Signing their prefixes through the portal or API of their RIR is the easisest
way to start with RPKI
● Cloudflare has resources in each of the 5 RIR regions
○ About 800 pefixes announcement over different ASNs
○ We need to ensure the first step is done
Automation to create ROA
Enforcing validated prefixes
● Signing the prefixes is one thing
● Ensuring the prefixes we receive match their certificates is
another
● Validation is done by synchronizing the RIR databases of ROAs
○ Check the signature of every ROA against the RIR’s certification public key
○ Once valid records are known, it is sent to the routers
● Major vendors support a protocol called RPKI to Router
Protocol (RTR)
○ A simple protocol for passing a list of valid prefixes with their origin ASN and
expected mask length
RPKI to Router Protocol is insecure
● Vendors implement
the insecure
transport methods
● Routes sent in clear
text over TCP can be
tampered with
Introducing GoRTR
● A lightweight local RTR
server
● Distribute it via our own
Content Delivery Network
● Fetch the cache file over
HTTPS and pass the routes
over RTR
Cloudflare enforcing validated prefixes
Cloudflare enforcing validated prefixes
Summary
Wrapping up
● No filtering and AS Path filtering is not acceptable
● Prefix filtering via IRR automation is required
○ Challenge to have this applied in all IXPs
● RPKI is not a replacement yet for IRR
○ Not many has signed their prefixes
○ Not many has enforced validating the prefixes
● Implementing RPKI is achivable
○ Plenty of efforts are needed
○ It is not a bullet proof solution on securing the routing in Internet, but the
impact of BGP attacks will be greatly reduced
Q&A
BGP filtering best practice

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BGP filtering best practice

  • 1. Jimmy Lim TWNOG 3 jhalim@cloudflare.com Taipei, 21 June 2019 BGP filtering best practice
  • 3. Protect and accelerate any website online ● Direct visitors to nearest entry point ○ Fast ■ Lesser hops ■ Reduced latency ● Save bandwidth ○ Lesser requests to origin ○ Mitigate DDoS ● Resiliency ○ 150+ locations
  • 4.
  • 5. AS Path vs Prefix filtering
  • 6. Different type of inbound filtering ● No filtering? ○ No inbound policy filtering ○ Not acceptable ● AS path filtering ○ Filtering based on AS path - a series of autonomous system (AS) numbers with originator’s AS number at the end of the path ○ Using regular expression ● Prefix filtering ○ Filtering based on the matching prefixes defined in the prefix list or route filter
  • 7. Many local IXPs are still doing AS path filtering ● Allow all prefixes that are originated by the ASN ○ No proper validation ● Prone to accidental/wrong announcement ● High risk of prefix hijacking and blackholing
  • 8. Sample of bad thing about AS Path filtering ISP/IXP AS65501 Originate 10.0.0.0/24 AS_PATH _65501$ Send packet to 10.0.0.1 Hijacking routerLegitimate router AS65001 Originate 10.0.0.0/23
  • 9. Sample of bad thing about AS Path ● What is so bad about the previous example? permit _65501$ ● That implies accept any prefixes that are originated by AS65501 ○ High chance to create accidental hijacking ○ High risk to hijack or blackhole maliciously
  • 10. Another sample of bad thing about AS Path filtering ● RTBH feature by ISP/IXPs ○ Allow customers or participants to remotely trigger blackhole to prefixes under their own ASN ■ eBGP multihop blackhole peering with ISPs ■ Direct transit BGP session ■ Using ISP/IXPs blackhole BGP community ○ Accept up to /32 Internet ISPCustomer router ISPCustomer router eBGP multihop IXP Participants
  • 11. Why AS Path filtering still exist? ● Difficult to maintain prefix filter ○ Troublesome to validate ● No expertise to configure, too complex? ● IXPs reluctant to do strict filtering ○ Not able to attract all traffic ■ Participants do not update filter regularly/properly
  • 12. Prefix list filtering ● Prefix based filtering ○ More validation is done ● Allow up to /24 for IPv4 prefix ● Allow up to /48 for IPv6 prefix ● Automatic update via IRR database
  • 14. Internet Routing Registry ● Globally distributed routing information database ○ Ensure stability and consistency of Internet-wide routing ○ Sharing information between network operators ● Why use IRR? ○ Route filtering ○ Network troubleshooting ○ Router configuration ○ Global view of Internet routing ● List of IRRs ○ http://www.irr.net/docs/list.html
  • 15. AS-SET information in IRR as-set: AS-CLOUDFLARE descr: Cloudflare, Inc members: AS13335 members: AS3557, AS21556 members: AS132892, AS133877 members: AS202623, AS203898 members: AS394536, AS395747, AS14789 mnt-by: MNT-CLOUD14 source: ARIN
  • 16. Route object information in IRR route: 1.1.1.0/24 descr: Cloudflare, Inc. origin: AS13335 mnt-by: MNT-CLOUD14 notify: rir@cloudflare.com remarks: --------------- remarks: All Cloudflare abuse reporting can be done via remarks: https://www.cloudflare.com/abuse remarks: --------------- source: ARIN
  • 17. Automation to generate prefix filter
  • 18. IRRs have a very loose security model ● Some database maintainers do not check the authenticity of the entry ○ Records exist within IRRs can be wrong and/or missing ● There are lots of IRRs ○ Mirrors are not always up to date ● No cryptographic signing of records ● Let’s talk about RPKI
  • 19. Resource Public Key Infrastructure ● Cryptographic method of signing records ● Regional Internet Registry (RIR) has a root certificate ○ Generate a signed certificate for Local Internet Registry (network operator) ■ All resources they are assigned with (IPs and ASNs) ● LIR then signs the prefix containing origin AS that they intend to use ○ ROA (Route Object Authorization) is created
  • 20. Resource Public Key Infrastructure
  • 21. Resource Public Key Infrastructure
  • 22. Signing prefixes ● Each LIRs own and manage Internet resources has access to RIR portal ○ Signing their prefixes through the portal or API of their RIR is the easisest way to start with RPKI ● Cloudflare has resources in each of the 5 RIR regions ○ About 800 pefixes announcement over different ASNs ○ We need to ensure the first step is done
  • 24. Enforcing validated prefixes ● Signing the prefixes is one thing ● Ensuring the prefixes we receive match their certificates is another ● Validation is done by synchronizing the RIR databases of ROAs ○ Check the signature of every ROA against the RIR’s certification public key ○ Once valid records are known, it is sent to the routers ● Major vendors support a protocol called RPKI to Router Protocol (RTR) ○ A simple protocol for passing a list of valid prefixes with their origin ASN and expected mask length
  • 25. RPKI to Router Protocol is insecure ● Vendors implement the insecure transport methods ● Routes sent in clear text over TCP can be tampered with
  • 26. Introducing GoRTR ● A lightweight local RTR server ● Distribute it via our own Content Delivery Network ● Fetch the cache file over HTTPS and pass the routes over RTR
  • 30. Wrapping up ● No filtering and AS Path filtering is not acceptable ● Prefix filtering via IRR automation is required ○ Challenge to have this applied in all IXPs ● RPKI is not a replacement yet for IRR ○ Not many has signed their prefixes ○ Not many has enforced validating the prefixes ● Implementing RPKI is achivable ○ Plenty of efforts are needed ○ It is not a bullet proof solution on securing the routing in Internet, but the impact of BGP attacks will be greatly reduced
  • 31. Q&A