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BBA3274 / DBS1084 QUANTITATIVE METHODS for BUSINESS

Game Theory
Game Theory

by
Stephen Ong
Visiting Fellow, Birmingham City
University Business School, UK
Visiting Professor, Shenzhen
Today’s Overview
Learning Objectives

After this lecture, students will be able to:
1.

2.

3.

4.

Understand the importance and use
of game theory in decision making.
Understand the principles of zerosum, two person games.
Analyse pure strategy games and
use dominance to reduce the size of
the game.
Solve mixed strategy games when
there is no saddle point.
Outline
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6

Introduction
Language of Games
The Minimax Criterion
Pure Strategy Games
Mixed Strategy Games
Dominance
Game Theory Models


5

A set of mathematical tools for
analyzing situations in which players
make various strategic moves and have
different outcomes or payoffs
associated with those moves.
Dominant Strategies and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma


6

This payoff matrix
shows the various
prison terms for Bonnie
and Clyde that would
result from the
combination of
strategies chosen when
questioned about a
crime spree.
Prisoner’s Dilemma –
Dominant Strategy


7

A dominant strategy
is one that results in
the best outcome or
highest payoff to a
given player no
matter what action
or choice the other
player makes.
Nash Equilibrium


8

Nash equilibrium is
a set of strategies
from which all
players are
choosing their best
strategy, given the
actions of the other
players.
Game Model Classification
 Number

of

players
 Sum of all
payoffs
 Number of
strategies
employed

 Two

person
(X, Y)
 Zero sum,
where sum of losses
by one player = sum
of gains by other
player
Example : Duopoly of 2 Stores








10

There are only 2
lighting fixture stores, X
and Y.
Owner of store X has 2
advertising strategies –
radio spots and
newspaper ads.
Owner of store Y
prepares to respond
with radio spots and
newspaper ads.
The 2x2 payoff matrix
shows the effect on
market shares when
both stores advertise.
Example : Duopoly Game
Outcomes
Store X
Strategy

Store Y
Strategy

Outcome
(% Change in Market
Share)

X1
(Use Radio)

Y1
(Use Radio)

X wins 3
And Y loses 3

X1
(Use Radio)

Y2
(Use Newspaper)

X wins 5
And Y loses 5

X2
(Use Newspaper)

Y1
(Use Radio)

X wins 1
And Y loses 1

X2
(Use Newspaper)

Y2
(Use Newspaper)

X loses 2
And Y wins 2
1- 11
Minimax Criterion
Used to find the strategy that minimises
the maximum loss, or maximizes the
minimum payoff (maximin approach).
 Locate the minimum payoff for each strategy.
 Select the strategy with the maximum number.
 The upper value of the game equal to the

minimum of the maximum values in the
columns.
 The lower value of the game is equal to the
maximum of the minimum values in the rows.
3-12
Minimax Solution
An equilibrium or saddle point condition exists if the
upper value of the game is equal to the lower value of
the game. This is called the value of the game.
Saddle Point

STRATEGIES
X1

Y1
3

Y2
5

X2

1

-2

MAXIMUM

3

5

Minimum of maximums

MINIMUM
3
-2

Maximum of minimums

3-13
Pure Strategy Game
When a saddle point is present, the strategy each
player should follow will always be the same
regardless of the other player’s strategy.
Saddle Point

STRATEGIES
X1

Y1
10

Y2
6

X2

-12

2

MAXIMUM

10

6

Minimum of maximums

MINIMUM
6
-12

Maximum of minimums

3-14
Mixed Strategy Game
When there is no saddle point, players will play each
strategy for a certain percentage of the time (P, Q).
To solve a mixed strategy game, use the expected
gain or loss approach.
STRATEGIES

Y1
(P)

Y2
(1 - P)

Expected
Gain

X1 (Q)

4

2

4P + 2(1-P)

X2 (1 - Q)

1

10

1P + 10(1-P)

Expected
gain

4Q + 1(1-Q) 2Q + 10(1-Q)
3-15
Mixed Strategy Game
The goal of this approach is for a player to play each
strategy a particular percentage of the time so that
the expected value of the game does not depend
upon what the opponent does. This will only occur if
the expected value of each strategy is the same.
For player Y,
4P + 2 (1 – P) = 1P + 10(1 – P)
P = 8/11
For player X,
4Q + 1(1 – Q) = 2Q + 10(1 – Q)
Q = 9/11

3-16
Dominance




17

The principle of
dominance can be used
to reduce the size of the
games by eliminating
strategies that would
never be played.
A strategy can be
eliminated if all its
game’s outcomes are
the same or worse than
the corresponding
game outcomes of
another strategy.
Example : Dominance
Y1

Y2

Y3

Y4

X1

-5

4

6

-3

X2

-2

6

2

-20
1- 18
Tutorial
Lab Practical : Spreadsheet

1 - 19
Further Reading






Render, B., Stair Jr.,R.M. & Hanna, M.E.
(2013) Quantitative Analysis for
Management, Pearson, 11th Edition
Waters, Donald (2007) Quantitative
Methods for Business, Prentice Hall, 4 th
Edition.
Anderson D, Sweeney D, & Williams T.
(2006) Quantitative Methods For
Business Thompson Higher Education,
10th Ed.
QUESTIONS?

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Bba 3274 qm week 5 game theory

  • 1. BBA3274 / DBS1084 QUANTITATIVE METHODS for BUSINESS Game Theory Game Theory by Stephen Ong Visiting Fellow, Birmingham City University Business School, UK Visiting Professor, Shenzhen
  • 3. Learning Objectives After this lecture, students will be able to: 1. 2. 3. 4. Understand the importance and use of game theory in decision making. Understand the principles of zerosum, two person games. Analyse pure strategy games and use dominance to reduce the size of the game. Solve mixed strategy games when there is no saddle point.
  • 4. Outline 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Introduction Language of Games The Minimax Criterion Pure Strategy Games Mixed Strategy Games Dominance
  • 5. Game Theory Models  5 A set of mathematical tools for analyzing situations in which players make various strategic moves and have different outcomes or payoffs associated with those moves.
  • 6. Dominant Strategies and the Prisoner’s Dilemma  6 This payoff matrix shows the various prison terms for Bonnie and Clyde that would result from the combination of strategies chosen when questioned about a crime spree.
  • 7. Prisoner’s Dilemma – Dominant Strategy  7 A dominant strategy is one that results in the best outcome or highest payoff to a given player no matter what action or choice the other player makes.
  • 8. Nash Equilibrium  8 Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies from which all players are choosing their best strategy, given the actions of the other players.
  • 9. Game Model Classification  Number of players  Sum of all payoffs  Number of strategies employed  Two person (X, Y)  Zero sum, where sum of losses by one player = sum of gains by other player
  • 10. Example : Duopoly of 2 Stores     10 There are only 2 lighting fixture stores, X and Y. Owner of store X has 2 advertising strategies – radio spots and newspaper ads. Owner of store Y prepares to respond with radio spots and newspaper ads. The 2x2 payoff matrix shows the effect on market shares when both stores advertise.
  • 11. Example : Duopoly Game Outcomes Store X Strategy Store Y Strategy Outcome (% Change in Market Share) X1 (Use Radio) Y1 (Use Radio) X wins 3 And Y loses 3 X1 (Use Radio) Y2 (Use Newspaper) X wins 5 And Y loses 5 X2 (Use Newspaper) Y1 (Use Radio) X wins 1 And Y loses 1 X2 (Use Newspaper) Y2 (Use Newspaper) X loses 2 And Y wins 2 1- 11
  • 12. Minimax Criterion Used to find the strategy that minimises the maximum loss, or maximizes the minimum payoff (maximin approach).  Locate the minimum payoff for each strategy.  Select the strategy with the maximum number.  The upper value of the game equal to the minimum of the maximum values in the columns.  The lower value of the game is equal to the maximum of the minimum values in the rows. 3-12
  • 13. Minimax Solution An equilibrium or saddle point condition exists if the upper value of the game is equal to the lower value of the game. This is called the value of the game. Saddle Point STRATEGIES X1 Y1 3 Y2 5 X2 1 -2 MAXIMUM 3 5 Minimum of maximums MINIMUM 3 -2 Maximum of minimums 3-13
  • 14. Pure Strategy Game When a saddle point is present, the strategy each player should follow will always be the same regardless of the other player’s strategy. Saddle Point STRATEGIES X1 Y1 10 Y2 6 X2 -12 2 MAXIMUM 10 6 Minimum of maximums MINIMUM 6 -12 Maximum of minimums 3-14
  • 15. Mixed Strategy Game When there is no saddle point, players will play each strategy for a certain percentage of the time (P, Q). To solve a mixed strategy game, use the expected gain or loss approach. STRATEGIES Y1 (P) Y2 (1 - P) Expected Gain X1 (Q) 4 2 4P + 2(1-P) X2 (1 - Q) 1 10 1P + 10(1-P) Expected gain 4Q + 1(1-Q) 2Q + 10(1-Q) 3-15
  • 16. Mixed Strategy Game The goal of this approach is for a player to play each strategy a particular percentage of the time so that the expected value of the game does not depend upon what the opponent does. This will only occur if the expected value of each strategy is the same. For player Y, 4P + 2 (1 – P) = 1P + 10(1 – P) P = 8/11 For player X, 4Q + 1(1 – Q) = 2Q + 10(1 – Q) Q = 9/11 3-16
  • 17. Dominance   17 The principle of dominance can be used to reduce the size of the games by eliminating strategies that would never be played. A strategy can be eliminated if all its game’s outcomes are the same or worse than the corresponding game outcomes of another strategy.
  • 19. Tutorial Lab Practical : Spreadsheet 1 - 19
  • 20. Further Reading    Render, B., Stair Jr.,R.M. & Hanna, M.E. (2013) Quantitative Analysis for Management, Pearson, 11th Edition Waters, Donald (2007) Quantitative Methods for Business, Prentice Hall, 4 th Edition. Anderson D, Sweeney D, & Williams T. (2006) Quantitative Methods For Business Thompson Higher Education, 10th Ed.