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Applying a Security Kernel Framework to Smart Meter Gateways
The document discusses applying a security kernel framework to smart meter gateways. It notes privacy and security are critical issues for smart metering given data from homes is communicated over the internet. The EU has directives requiring smart meters be installed in most homes by 2020 and specifying security and privacy protections. The talk describes security requirements for smart meter gateways set by German standards, and issues with existing approaches not meeting them. It then introduces the TURAYA security kernel framework as a way to address these issues and simplify developing secure smart meter gateways.
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Applying a Security Kernel Framework to Smart Meter Gateways
- 1. © 2012 SirrixAG Applying a Security Kernel Framework to Smart Meter Gateways Michael Gröne, Marcel Winandy 1
- 2. Introduction: The SmartGrid Household Computer Solar panel Thermostat Dish washer Hybrid / e-car Battery pack Hot water heater Sensors 2
- 3. Introduction: Smart MeteringInfrastructure Utility Provider Gateway Internet Gateway Gateway 3
- 4. Critical Issues • Privacy(individual power consumption, smart home communication) • Security (connection via Internet, different data and stakeholders) 4
- 5. Considerations by theEU • EU Directive 2009/72/EC: • 80% of households should be equipped with smart meters by 2020 • EU Task Force on Smart Grids, Expert Group 2 (February 2011): • “Smart Grid products and solutions should be designed from the start with appropriate levels of data privacy and security at their core” • EU Commission’s recommendation (March 2012): • Use “‘best available techniques’ to safeguard personal data and guarantee data security when data are processed in smart metering systems and smart grids” (cf. Tijmen Wisman: “The Transformation of the Home through the Internet of Things: the impact on the private sphere” at APC 2012) 5
- 6. This Talk Security requirementsfor smart meter gateways The TURAYATM High-Assurance Security Kernel Framework Applying the security kernel framework to smart meter gateways 6
- 7. Security requirements forsmart meter gateways 7
- 8. Smart Meter Gateway External Parties: - Utility provider (billing) - Gateway Admin Home Area Network: Local Metrological Network: - Controllable Local Systems (CLS) - Smart Meters (power, water, heat, etc.) - User Displays for consumers 8
- 9. Main Functions ofthe Smart Meter Gateway Meter Data Administration Management Receiving control Capturing, commands and processing, configuration data and billing CLS Proxy User Display Providing an Providing an interface for interface for controllable local display units in systems (CLS) to the HAN the WAN 9
- 10. Protection Profile forSmart Meter Gateways • Developed by German federal agency for information security (BSI) • All gateway vendors must have their products certified according the PP • PP comes along with Technical Specification regulating interoperability • Overall security objectives: • Protection of person-related data of consumers • Securing a reliable billing process • Protection of the smart meter systems and smart grid infrastructure 10
- 11. Required Security Functions • Providing secure communications channels between networks • Privacy protection: • Pseudonymization of consumer data • Gateway administrators should not be able to see consumer data • Confidentiality and integrity protection of content data • On the device • When transferred to external parties • User authentication for consumers • Secure execution environments for processing on the device • Secure remote update (firmware, policies) • Logging • Self Tests 11
- 12. Information Flow Control • WAN connection establishment only allowed by Gateway (!) • Exception: Wake-Up Call • CLS and Meters can call Gateway • CLS can communicate to authorized parties in WAN • Gateway acts as proxy • No communication between HAN and LMN allowed • External parties must use Gateway Admin to issue Wake-Up call • Gateway then calls pre-defined service in WAN 12
- 13. Problems • Smart meterand smart meter gateway vendors are no IT security experts • Unfamiliar with Common Criteria evaluation process • Need to develop new or adapt existing system software to comply • Need to demonstrate that their product protects data according PP • Simply using Embedded Linux OS + firewall functionality not enough • Protecting data on the device • Controlling information flow • Remote administrators should not be able to access consumer data 13
- 14. TURAYATM High-Assurance SecurityKernel Framework 14
- 15. TURAYATM High-Assurance SecurityKernel Framework • Security architecture based on functional requirements from Common Criteria • Platform independent: server systems (virtualization, cloud) end-user / embedded devices App App App 15
- 16. Experiences • Research &Development projects: • EMSCB: individual PCs, laptops • OpenTC: trusted infrastructures (PCs, servers, virtual data center) • TClouds: trusted cloud infrastructures • Emergent: information flow control in digital enterprises • RUBTrust/MediTrust: evaluation of certain application domains • TrustedMobile/BizzTrust: smartphones 16
- 17. Development Approach • HASK-PP:Common Criteria protection profile for the security kernel (EAL 5) • Main concept: isolated domains for data/execution, trusted computing • Approach: simplicity (only few main security requirements, implementation-independent) 17
- 18. Framework Approach: ReducedComplexity • Goal: Reduce size of trusted computing base • Easier to maintain and evaluate (e.g., Common Criteria) • Reduced attack surface • Approaches: microkernel, virtualization, code optimization (e.g., remove unneeded libraries) App App App Complex application logic (could also include device drivers) Basic security services Basic resource management Hardware security module (e.g., TPM) 18
- 19. Framework Approach: Modularity • Goal: Make security kernel applicable to several usage scenarios • Components could be added or removed (depending on need) • Components could be replaced by alternative implementations (depending on hardware capabilities or required security guarantees) • Examples: • Resource Management: L4 microkernel, Xen hypervisor, SELinux, etc. • Hardware Security Module: HSM, TPM, smartcard, etc. 19
- 20. Applying the securitykernel framework to smart meter gateways 20
- 21. High-Level Security Architecture(Gateway) 21
- 22. Meter Data Processingand Delivery 22
- 23. Remote Administration ofthe Gateway 23
- 24. Smart Meter Backend SmartMeter Gateways Backend Management System External Party ... Gateway Administrator 24
- 25. Outlook: Trusted SmartMetering Architecture 25
- 26. Conclusion • Smart gridneeds to address security & privacy requirements • Smart Meter Gateway is one important component • In Germany: regulatory requirement of Common Criteria evaluation • TURAYATM Security Kernel framework: • Modular security architecture • Common Criteria oriented development • Smart Meter Gateway realizable on top of the security kernel framework: • Gateway functions as isolated compartments • Information flow control by design 26
- 27. QUESTIONS? Sirrix AG Lise-Meitner-Allee 4 44801Bochum Germany Tel +49 234 / 61 00 71-0 Fax +49 234 / 61 00 71-500 Email info@sirrix.com Web www.sirrix.de Marcel Winandy Email: m.winandy@sirrix.com 27