Migration policies are generally restrictive due to public opposition to immigration based on concerns about impacts on the labor market, welfare state, and national culture/identity. However, some interest groups lobby for more open policies to gain access to immigrant workers. While individuals are opposed to increased immigration, business groups support higher levels to meet workforce needs. The political power of unions, which oppose immigration, has also influenced more restrictive policies in some industry sectors. More research is needed on migration policies in developing countries that are becoming major destinations for migrants.

1. OECD Perspectives on Global Development
Experts’ meeting on international migration and
development
Paris, February 25, 2015
“The impact of policy on migration”
Anna Maria Mayda
Georgetown University, CEPR and IZA

2. International Migration:
Supply and Demand Determinants
Figure 1: International M igration Flow s: Supply and Dem and D eterm inants
m igrants' decision to
m ove
(according to economic and
non-economic incentives)
"supply side”
of international
immigration
host country's dem and for
im m igrants
(im migration policy )
“demand side”
of international
immigration
International M igration Flow s

3. Relative importance of migration policy compared withRelative importance of migration policy compared with
other long-term determinants ofother long-term determinants of international migrationmigration
• While migration flows have increased in the last decades, they are
relatively small in scale compared with other dimensions of
globalization - such as trade and capital flows – and relative to the past
(Faini 2002, Findlay and O'Rourke 2002, Obstfeld and Taylor 2002).
For example, at its peak in 1910, almost 15% of the US population
was foreign born. In 2000, after years of sustained inflows of
immigrants, just over 10% of the US population was foreign born.
• Yet incentives on the supply side of international migration flows are
particularly strong at this point in time: High wage differentials across
countries as well as reduced transport and communication costs,
demographic pressures and political conflicts in the world have
increased the incentive of migrants to move.
• Restrictive migration policies, then, are most likely the answer to the
surprisingly small size of international migration (Mayda 2005).
• Increasing importance of illegal immigration, which rises as the
disequilibrium between supply and demand grows.

5. Migration policies are restrictive
• Most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining
the status quo or at lowering the level of migration.
year Lower Maintain Raise No intervention Total Total # obs.
1976 6.67 86 7.33 0 100 150
1986 20.12 76.22 3.66 0 100 164
1996 40.63 30.21 4.17 25 100 192
2007 19.49 58.46 5.64 16.41 100 195
Total 22.68 60.77 5.14 11.41 100 701
income Lower Maintain Raise No intervention Total Total # obs.
high income37.08 53.93 7.87 1.12 100 178
upper middle income21.8 67.67 6.02 4.51 100 133
lower middle income16.76 63.78 5.95 13.51 100 185
lower income16.84 58.42 1.05 23.68 100 190
Total 23.03 60.5 5.1 11.37 100 686
Data source: dataset of migration policy decisions reported by governments to the
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs between 1976 and 2007
Governments' policy on the level of immigration, by year and income
Policy on immigration
Policy on immigration

6. Why are destination countries’ migration policies restrictive?
• Immigration policy is endogenous.
• Immigration policy can be thought of as the outcome of a
political-economy model where demand and supply factors
interact with each other giving rise to an immigration-
policy outcome
Figure 2: Determination of immigration policy
median voter, interest
groups, political parties
(B)
individual preferences on
immigration policy
(A)
institutional structure of
government
(D)
policymaker preferences
(C)
Immigration policy outcomes
“demand side”
of immigration
policy
“supply side”
of immigration
policy

7. Individual attitudes towards immigrants
• Individual attitudes can
explain why migration
policies are so restrictive.
• Voters across countries are,
on average, very opposed
to immigration.
• In 1995 (in 2003), only
7.39% (10.84%) of
individuals – who gave an
opinion about migration –
agreed with the statement
that the number of
immigrants to their
countries should be
increased either a little or a
lot.
Canada 0.21
Ireland 0.19
Japan 0.16
New Zealand 0.12
Philippines 0.11
Poland 0.09
Spain 0.08
Russia 0.08
USA 0.08
Norway 0.07
Sweden 0.07
Bulgaria 0.06
Netherlands 0.05
Great Britain 0.04
Austria 0.04
Italy 0.04
Slovak Republic 0.03
Germany 0.03
Czech Republic 0.02
Slovenia 0.02
Hungary 0.01
Latvia 0.00
Overall 0.07
Data Source: ISSP 1995
fraction
pro-
migration
Country Canada 0.29
Israel 0.27
South Korea 0.25
Finland 0.24
Australia 0.23
Uruguay 0.20
Philippines 0.19
New Zealand 0.15
Japan 0.13
Slovak Republic 0.12
Sweden 0.11
Denmark 0.10
USA 0.10
Spain 0.09
Ireland 0.09
France 0.07
Czech Republic 0.07
Poland 0.07
Venezuela 0.07
Chile 0.07
Norway 0.07
Austria 0.07
Switzerland 0.06
Great Britain 0.06
Bulgaria 0.05
Taiwan 0.05
Russia 0.04
Germany 0.04
Netherlands 0.04
Portugal 0.03
Slovenia 0.03
Latvia 0.03
Hungary 0.02
Overall 0.11
Data source: ISSP 2003
fraction
pro-
migration
Country

8. Why is public opinion so hostile to immigrants?
• Immigration can give rise to income distribution effects and public opinion
is aware of them:
o through the labor market channel (immigrants are likely to compete in the
labor market with similarly skilled native workers)
o through the welfare state channel (immigrants can be either a net contribution
or a net cost for the destination country’s welfare state, depending on their
socio-economic characteristics; the welfare state will adjust through changes in
tax rates and/or per capita benefits, which in turn will produce income
distribution effects)
• Immigration introduces uncertainty from a political point of view
(especially in jus soli countries): if immigrants or their kids become
citizens and vote, they can affect the political equilibrium in the destination
country.
• Immigration has an impact on the culture and identity of the destination
country.
• Perceived crime and security impact of migration has an effect on attitudes.

9. Individual attitudes towards immigrants (cont.)
• Policymakers seem to take public opinion into account
as they formulate migration policy.
Figure 3: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration policy (ISSP 1995 and 2003, United Nations 2007)

10. Is there any force at work in the political economy
model in favor of free migration?
• Yes, indeed there is a discrepancy between voters' opinions
and the actual size of migration flows (public opinion gap).
• This discrepancy is likely to be explained by domestic interest
groups, many of which are pro-migration (for example,
business groups).

11. Do interest groups shape migration policy?
• There exists abundant anecdotal evidence which suggests that
interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy.
o During the “dot com” boom, high tech firms have successfully lobbied
the US Congress to increase the number of H1-B visas. “During the
annual debate on H1-B visas two years ago, Silicon Valley executives
trooped before Congress, warning of a Y2K computer disaster unless
the number of H1-B visas was increased.” (Goldsborough 2000)
o More recently, hospitals and healthcare providers have been able to
secure an increase in H1-C visas awarded to foreign nurses.
o Similarly, in the UK, business associations have issued pro-migration
statements in the eve of the discussion on introducing a cap on
migration from Bulgaria and Romania.
o Of course, not all pressure groups favour more open migration policies.
Historically, US labour unions have been a very influential anti-
immigration lobby, starting from the very birth of organized labour.

12. Systematic evidence on interest groups
In the United States, barriers to migration are higher in sectors
where (anti-immigration) labor unions are more important, and
lower in those sectors in which (pro-immigration) business
lobbies are more active (Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2011, JIE)

13. Figure 3. Top 10 Spenders for Immigration, 2001-2005
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Agriculture
Office
machinesand
computermanu
Foodand
related
products
Miscellaneous
business
services
Air
transportation
Telephone
Telegraph
Hospitals
Educational
services
Engineering
andcomputer
services
thousands
US$

14. Figure 4. Top 10 Sectors with the Highest Number of Visas, 2001 - 2005
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Medicaland
otherhealth
services
Welfareand
religious
services
Miscellaneous
entertainment
Radio
broadcasting
andtelevision
Theatersand
motion
pictures
Miscellaneous
professional
andrelated
services
Forestry
Agriculture
Engineering
andcomputer
services
Educational
services
thousands

15. Figure 5. Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Visas

16. Figure 6. Union Membership Rates and Visas

17. New frontier of migration policy research
• The entire literature on the political economy of
migration policy focuses on high-income countries as
destination of migration flows.
• Yet, low and middle-income countries are becoming
more and more important destinations of migration
flows (for example, South Africa, see Facchini,
Mayda and Mendola 20015).
• Low and middle-income countries as destinations of
migration flows are the new frontier of migration
policy research.

18. Conclusions
• International migration flows are driven by both supply
and demand factors.
• The demand side, i.e. migration policy, is likely to be
the most important determinant.
• International migration gives rise to aggregate gains
which are unevenly distributed within the destination
country (income distribution effects).
• Income distribution effects, as well as other impacts of
migration on the destination country’s economy and
society, produce political opposition to migration.
• Destination countries’ governments are not as restrictive
as public opinion, due to the pressure of pro-migration
interest groups.