The document discusses cryptography and security. It argues that most users want cryptography solutions that are simple, easy to use, cross-platform, and avoid common mistakes rather than new algorithms. It promotes the idea of "boring crypto" that just works without needing upgrades. It also discusses different options for implementing cryptography like crypto libraries, systems, and boxed solutions and how to choose the right approach for a given use case.

1. DON’T WASTE TIME ON
LEARNING CRYPTOGRAPHY:
BETTER USE IT PROPERLY
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

2. @vixentael Product Engineer
Feel free to reach me with any
mobile security questions.
I do check my inbox :)

4. We want to protect
our users’ data

5. We want
developers to
protect data

6. We want to protect
our users’ data
HOW?
We want
developers to
protect data

7. WE HAVE USER DATA.
WHAT SHALL WE DO?

8. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
1. DEFINING THE DATA SCOPE
sensitive user data
GDPR / HIPAA / PCI DSS
tech data (keys, logs)

9. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
1. DEFINING THE DATA SCOPE
sensitive user data
GDPR / HIPAA / PCI DSS
tech data (keys, logs)
mistake 1.
wrong scope definition

10. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
2. SELECTING ALGORITHM
twofish
sha1
des
md5

11. twofish
sha1
des
md5
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
2. SELECTING ALGORITHM
mistake 2.
bad algo selection

12. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
THINGS TO DECIDE ON
KEY LENGTHDATA SCOPE ALGORITHM

13. #owaspkyiv @vixentaelhttps://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Symmetric_Encryption_and_Decryption
3. USING ALGORITHM

14. #owaspkyiv @vixentaelhttps://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Symmetric_Encryption_and_Decryption
3. USING ALGORITHM

15. #owaspkyiv @vixentaelhttps://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Symmetric_Encryption_and_Decryption
3. USING ALGORITHM
mistake 3.
wrong params

16. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
THINGS TO DECIDE ON
PADDING
KEY LENGTH
MODE
DATA SCOPE ALGORITHM
IV

17. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
4. KEY MANAGEMENT
user password
keys
KDF

18. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
4. KEY MANAGEMENT
user password
keys
KDF
mistake 4.
bad key management

19. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
THINGS TO DECIDE ON
PADDING
KEY LENGTH
KEY ROTATION
MODE KEY DERIVATION
KEY STORAGE
KEY EXCHANGE
DATA SCOPE ALGORITHM
IV
KEY REVOCATION

20. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
5. INFRASTRUCTURE

21. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
PADDING
KEY LENGTH
KEY ROTATION
MODE KEY DERIVATION
KEY STORAGE
THINGS TO DECIDE ON
KEY EXCHANGE
BACKUPSPLATFORMS
DATA SCOPE ALGORITHM
IV
KEY REVOCATION

23. #owaspkyiv @vixentaelhttps://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/cryptobugs:apsys14.pdf
269 CVEs
from 2011-2014
17%
83%
bugs inside crypto libs
misuses of crypto libs
by individual apps

24. AS USERS WE WANT…
more ciphers?
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

25. AES
DES
3DES
CBC
CFB
SEAL
Salsa20
RSA
DSA
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

26. AES
DES
3DES
CBC
CFB
SEAL
Salsa20
RSA
DSA
OFB
SHARK
RC4
DSS
ECB
CTR
SEED
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
Blowfish

27. AES
DES
3DES
CBC
CFB
SEAL
Salsa20
RSA
DSA
OFB
Blowfish
SHARK
RC4
DSS
ECB
CTR
Twofish
Camelia
SEED
Rabbit
ECDSA
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

28. AS USERS WE WANT…
more ciphers!
more vulnerabilities!
more side channel attacks!
more attacks!
more constant time checks :)
more protocols!
more patches!
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

30. EXCITING, BUT FOR
CRYPTO RESEARCHERS ONLY

31. AS USERS WE WANT…
more ciphers!
BORING CRYPTO
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

32. BORING CRYPTO
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
— crypto that simply works, solidly
resists attacks, never needs any
upgrades
https://cr.yp.to/talks/2015.10.05/slides-djb-20151005-a4.pdf
Daniel J. Bernstein

33. BORING CRYPTO
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
PLUG & PLAY

34. WHAT DO WE WANT?
instead of adjusting
our resources
— SOLVE USE-CASES!

35. WHAT DO WE WANT?
— HIGH-LEVEL FUNCTIONS
I want to store data securely
I want to send data securely
I want to verify data integrity
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

36. WHAT DO WE WANT?
store data securely
send data securely
verify data integrity
key derivation
key exchange
key rotation
sign/verify ephemeral keys
encr / decr
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
— HIGH-LEVEL FUNCTIONS

37. NOBODY
READS DOCS
#owaspkyiv @vixentael

38. NOBODY
READS DOCS
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
“docs are for experts”
“I just want to try”
“gimme code!”

39. 1. HOW TO START?
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
pod try BoringSSL
cmake -DANDROID_ABI=armeabi-v7a
-DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../third_party/
android-cmake/android.toolchain.cmake
-DANDROID_NATIVE_API_LEVEL=16
-GNinja ..
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/HEAD/BUILDING.md

40. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
easy, architecture-independent
installation
1. HOW TO START?

41. 2. SUPPORTED PLATFORMS?
#owaspkyiv @vixentael
*nix
OSX
web browsers embedded
iOS
Android
Windows
minimum expected:

42. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
cross-platform is not an option anymore
cross-platform is a must have
2. SUPPORTED PLATFORMS?

43. OPTIONS WE HAVE

44. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
HSM

45. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE
key generation
provides cryptoprocessing
key storage
portable

46. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE
key management
disk protection
trust anchor
built-in
remote attestation
provides cryptoprimitives

47. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
HSM & TPM: PROS
fast hardware crypto!
trusted environment
known security guarantees
keys calculations

48. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
HSM & TPM: CONS
vendor lock / vendor trust
bad for interactive encryption
complicated to maintain
(install, upgrade, support,
not cross-platform)

49. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
HSM & TPM: PRO & CONS
HSM
app
plaintext
data
plaintext data is
far away from
the place it is used

50. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
SOFTWARE CRYPTO SYSTEMS
https://github.com/sobolevn/awesome-cryptography
any kind of encryption
plaintext data is closer
to its usage
cross-platform

51. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
SOFTWARE CRYPTO SYSTEMS
https://github.com/sobolevn/awesome-cryptography
any kind of encryption
plaintext data is closer
to its usage
cross-platform
NO DEVICE TRUST

52. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
WEBBROWSER CRYPTO: CONS
DOM, XSS,
NO CODE TRUST

53. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
HSM/TPM + SOFTWARE CS
keys calculations
TPM /
HSM
own
software
cross-platform
take best from both

55. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
cross-platform
easy to install
easy to use
USING CRYPTO SHOULD BE LIKE..
audited
open source
time proven
well-documented

56. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
crypto-libs
crypto-systems
boxed solutions

57. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
1. CRYPTO-LIBS
libsodium
themis
https://github.com/sobolevn/awesome-cryptography
implements single or multiple
security functions
keyczar
noise

58. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
EXAMPLE
https://github.com/cossacklabs/themis/wiki/Python-Howto
secure messaging with forward secrecy

59. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
2. CRYPTO-SYSTEMS
axolotl
hermes
combines security functions for
solving exact use-case
SSL/TLS
ZeroKit

60. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
EXAMPLE
https://github.com/cossacklabs/hermes-core/wiki/Python-tutorial
data access control based on crypto-keys
python docs/examples/python/hermes_client.py
--id user1
--config=docs/examples/python/config.json
--private_key user1.priv
--doc testfile
--read

61. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
3. BOXED SOLUTIONS
truecrypt
ssh
acra
vault
unites crypto-systems and user
functions for solving problems

62. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
EXAMPLE
https://github.com/cossacklabs/acra/wiki/Trying-Acra-with-Docker
database proxy for encrypting / decrypting
go run cmd/acra_genkeys/acra_genkeys.go
docker-compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml up -d

63. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
CAN I SOLVE MY USE-CASE
USING…
boxed solutions

64. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
CAN I SOLVE MY USE-CASE
USING…
crypto-systems
boxed solutions
no :(

65. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
CAN I SOLVE MY USE-CASE
USING…
crypto-libs
crypto-systems
boxed solutions
no :(
no :(

66. https://www.cossacklabs.com/choose-your-ios-crypto.html

67. THE WORLD DOESN’T HAVE
A PROBLEM WITH
NEW CRYPTO-ALGORITHMS.

68. THE WORLD DOESN’T HAVE
A PROBLEM WITH
NEW CRYPTO-ALGORITHMS.
PROBLEM IS THAT THEY ARE
NOT BORING ENOUGH

69. #owaspkyiv @vixentael

70. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
VS

71. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
make the light
controllable

72. #owaspkyiv @vixentael

73. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
make the crypto
security
controllable

74. #owaspkyiv @vixentael
make the crypto
security
controllable
and booooring

75. #owaspkyiv @vixentael

76. LINKS 1
Boring crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein
https://cr.yp.to/talks/2015.10.05/slides-djb-20151005-a4.pdf
Why does cryptographic software fail?
https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/cryptobugs:apsys14.pdf
API design for cryptography
https://2017.hack.lu/archive/2017/hacklu-crypto-api.pdf

77. LINKS 2
Encrypting strings in Android: Let’s make better mistakes
https://tozny.com/blog/encrypting-strings-in-android-lets-make-better-mistakes/
Awesome crypto papers
https://github.com/pFarb/awesome-crypto-papers
12 And 1 Ideas How To Enhance Backend Data Security
https://www.cossacklabs.com/backend-data-security-modern-ideas.html
Attestation and Trusted Computing
https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06wi/finalprojects/bare.pdf

78. MY OTHER SECURITY SLIDES
https://github.com/
vixentael/my-talks
…and more

79. @vixentael Product Engineer
Feel free to reach me with any
mobile security questions.
I do check my inbox :)