This document summarizes a presentation on aligning technological and institutional change in maritime transport infrastructure in the West Mediterranean Sea. The presentation discusses a framework for understanding how coherence between the technical and institutional systems governing infrastructure evolves over time. It then applies this framework in a case study of maritime transport infrastructure in France, Italy and Spain between the 1990s-2000s. Key findings include that actors had differing views of infrastructure performance and faced challenges increasing coherence due to protecting existing economic interests and unfavorable regulations. The presentation concludes by suggesting ways to improve the framework, such as more explicitly incorporating actors' perceptions of performance and conditions that enable investment and consensus building.

1. 4th Annual Conference of Competition and Regulation in Network Industries
Residence Palace, Brussels, Belgium
November 25, 2011
Aligning Technological and Institutional Change:
Maritime Transport in West Mediterranean Sea
Dr Alberto Asquer
Lecturer of Business Strategy and Policy
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali
Faculty of Economics
University of Cagliari, Italy

2. Introduction
The degree of coherence between technology and institutions
in infrastructure industries affects technical, economic, and social
performance of infrastructure, within given context conditions
such as sector-specific features and time-dependent constraints
(Finger and et al., 2005; Scholten, 2005; Finger and Künneke,
2009, 2006; Crettenand et al., 2010).
General issue: How is coherence between technology and
institutions in infrastructure industries achieved over time?
Attention to agency is needed, as agents (a) make investment
decisions concerning R&D and technology adoption and (b)
contribute advocating for, designing, and deliberating on the
redesign of the institutional governance of infrastructure.

3. Literature review: the technology-institutional coherence FW
Infrastructure governance arrangements determine the
allocation of the functions of coordinating activities and
synchronising tasks that are needed to manage infrastructure.
Infrastructure performance is disentangled into three dimensions
(Finger et al., 2005; Crettenand et al., 2010; Duthaler and Finger,
2010):
a) Economic performance (static, dynamic, and system efficiency);
b) Public value creation (quality, accessibility, affordability,
affordability, reliability, environmental preservation and protection);
c) Technical system integrity (interconnection, interoperability, and
system management).

4. Literature review: the technology-institutional coherence FW
Central argument of the FW: infrastructure performance is
affected by the degree of coherence between the technical
requirements for infrastructure system coordination and the
institutional governance of the infrastructure.
Static perspective: coherence depends on whether the technical
and institutional systems share the same coordination
mechanisms (i.e., centralised, decentralised, or peer-to-peer) over
comparable infrastructure network boundaries.
Dynamic perspective: the degree of coherence changes over
time; actors' perception of inferior performance should feed back
into informing actors' actions intended to improve the alignment
between technical and institutional systems.

5. Literature review: the technology-institutional coherence FW
Various issues are still open:
How do actors form their perceptions of infrastructure
performance?
How different perceptions are combined to form a shared sense of
performance gap?
How are actors mobilised to contribute changing the installed
technical systems or the rules of infrastructure governance?
In particular,
Why and how do actors collaborate with others in changing
technical and institutional systems, if they are satisfied with the
current state of technical and institutional arrangements and
perceive the threat of eroding rent positions within the industrial
organisation of the infrastructure network?

6. Literature review: the technology-institutional coherence FW
Rational-choice institutionalist perspective: actors may be
reluctant to invest if institution do not provide guarantee that actors
retain control of their assets and related income streams; and they
may be unwilling to change infrastructure governance rules if this
undermines the strategic value of actors' assets and threatens
future income streams.
Hence,
a) the legacy of past infrastructure network evolution (resulting
in the installed technical and institutional systems) places heavy
constraints on the possibility that actors stipulate agreements for
investing in technological systems and reformulating governance
rules for the sake of mutually beneficial outcomes.
b) (co)evolution of technical and institutional systems may
proceed through concerted efforts of actors that share a common
aspiration to fill the perceived infrastructure performance gap.

7. Research design
Case study of co-evolution of technical and institutional systems
in the maritime transport infrastructure in West Mediterranean Sea
in the decades 1990s-2000s.
Maritime infrastructure is a complex transport infrastructure
network primarily based on ports, vessels, and logistic systems
(Cullinane, 2011; Robinson, 2002).
General industrial trends in 1990s-2000s included:
a) growth of maritime transport demand at the world scale;
b) a stream of technological innovations (containerisation,
'unitisation' of goods, and IT for managing logistics) that called for
investments in capital-intensive assets;
c) a shift from public ownership and (often) direct public
management of port services to the 'landlord model', that includes
various forms of private participation to port activities.

8. Maritime transport infrastructure in West Mediterranean Sea
In West Mediterranean Sea, the maritime infrastructure is broadly
characterised by:
a) a shared perception of sub-satisfying performance, especially in
terms of marginalisation with respect to increasing maritime traffic
volume and value, especially with respect to North European
harbours;
b) multiplicity of actors that pursue partially conflicting objectives
(Port Authorities, port service providers, port users – e.g., carriers,
shippers, and tenants – and the maritime workforce);
c) difficulties encountered in realigning the institutional governance
of the infrastructure and the technical systems.

9. Maritime transport infrastructure in West Mediterranean Sea
Maritime infrastructure in France:
a) needs for investments to improve efficiency, reorganisation of
containers terminals, better integration of port-hinterland transport
networks, and more peaceful social climate among port
stakeholders (Cour des Comptes, 2008);
b) was considered afflicted by inefficient institutional governance
('autonomous port' or établissement public mixte), social unrest,
and constraining legal frameworks;
c) following some reforms (1992, 2004, 2008), is currently
regulated by Port Authorities that plan port infrastructure
development and maintenance, enforce security and safety
measures, and tender out port services through transparent and
non-discriminative selection procedures to private bidders.

10. Maritime transport infrastructure in West Mediterranean Sea
Maritime infrastructure in Italy:
a) enjoys a 'natural advantage' with carriers serving the Europe-
Asia 'pendulum route' with respect to Northern European harbours
(e.g., saving up to about five days' travel), but is afflicted by
inadequate hinterland infrastructure, inefficient bureaucracy, and
obsolete port infrastructure (e.g., shallow water, small storage
facilities and parking areas, and inadequate cranes);
b) was considered afflicted by inefficient institutional governance
('port management' organisations or organizzazioni portuali), that
enjoyed monopoly of port services;
c) following the 1994 reform, is currently regulated by Port
Authorities, that plan port infrastructure development and
maintenance, enforce security and safety measures, and tender
out port services through transparent and non-discriminative
selection procedures to private bidders (although still modest
competitive pressures and entrenched anti-competitive practices).

11. Maritime transport infrastructure in West Mediterranean Sea
Maritime infrastructure in Spain:
a) until 1992, it was regulated by four 'autonomous ports'
administrations (Barcelona, Bilbao, Huelva and Valencia) and
dozens of other public authorities (Juntas del Puerto) in a very
decentralised way;
b) following the 1992 reform, ports of national interest are
governed by Public Authorities subject to supervision by the
national Spanish State Port Agency (SSPA) named “Puertos del
Estado”, that coordinates the development and operation of
national ports;
c) at the local level, Port Authorities enjoy financial autonomy and
discretion in promoting commercial activities, while perform
regulatory functions and directly conduct port services with
'general public interest' status.

12. Maritime transport infrastructure in West Mediterranean Sea
Context of the EU maritime transport policy:
An explicit EU maritime transport policy position started to emerge
in the 1990s (1997 Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime
Infrastructure);
During the 2000s, a couple of EU directives ('port packages') were
proposed in 2001 and 2004, but they failed to gain consensus
among stakeholders and the European Parliament alike.
First proposal contained common rules for the free provision of port services,
the issue of concessions and authorisations for port services operation, the
limitation of the number of port service providers, self handling, duration of
individual concessions and authorisations, and procedures to be followed.
Second proposal contained stricter and mandatory regime of authorisations,
shorter maximum durations for each authorisation, and a new and broader
definition of self-handling.
Currently, just 'policy position' documents (e.g., the White paper on
a European Transport Policy for 2010).

13. Maritime transport infrastructure in West Mediterranean Sea
Policy positions of actors of the EU maritime transport industry:
Port Authorities: jointly represented by the European Sea Ports
Organisation (ESPO) but a very heterogeneous class, generally
discontent with the directives;
Federation of Private Port Operators (FEPORT): strongly
opposed the directives;
Shipowners: jointly represented by the European Community
Shipowners Association (ECSA), generally in favour of the
liberalisation of port services;
Shippers: generally in favour of 'full liberalisation' of port services;
Maritime workforce: exposed to the threat of losing most of its
traditional prerogatives and protections, strongly opposed the
directives;
Other actors: governments, consumers, freight forwarders, tug-
owners, European Maritime Pilots Association, European Boatmen
Association (various policy positions).

14. Discussion
How do actors of the maritime transport industry assess the performance of the
infrastructure itself?

15. Discussion
If there is a performance deficit, then what are the system relevant functions
that characterise the operation of maritime infrastructure and that could be
improved?

16. Discussion
Is there is any mismatch between the mechanisms of coordination, scope of
control, territorial resolution, and speed of adjustment of the technical and
institutional systems, that accounts for the difficulties to perform system
relevant functions?

17. Discussion
Do actors within the maritime infrastructure industry contribute increasing the
coherence between technical and institutional systems?
Marshaling consensus
among stakeholders
Infrastructure Redesigning
governance infrastructure
institutional governance
endowment institutions
Investing for
Installed technical Improvements of
infrastructure technical
(sunk costs) Attracting private infrastructure
capital financing
time

18. Discussion
Do actors within the maritime infrastructure industry contribute increasing the
coherence between technical and institutional systems?
Marshaling consensus
among stakeholders
Infrastructure Redesigning
governance infrastructure
institutional governance
endowment institutions
Hampered by the protection
of rent positions
Mutually
inhibiting
feedback
Hampered by unfavourable regulatory
and industrial arrangements
Investing for
Installed technical Improvements of
infrastructure technical
(sunk costs) Attracting private infrastructure
capital financing
time

19. Discussion
Do actors within the maritime infrastructure industry contribute increasing the
coherence between technical and institutional systems?
Marshaling consensus
among stakeholders
Infrastructure Redesigning
governance infrastructure
institutional governance
endowment institutions
Hampered by the protection
of rent positions Possible
escalation
of mutually
supportive
Hampered by unfavourable regulatory feedback
and industrial arrangements
Investing for
Installed technical Improvements of
infrastructure technical
(sunk costs) Attracting private infrastructure
capital financing
time

20. Conclusions
First, the technology-institutional coherence framework may more
explicitly incorporate the role of perceptions of infrastructure
performance.
In part, investment and policy-making decisions are affected by sound and
reliable measurement of infrastructure performance, but actors may make
decisions according to privately held performance assessment criteria that
differ from those that are generally shared in the public discourse;
Second, the technology-institutional coherence framework may
also include more explicit attention to the conditions that stimulate
and enable investments in the technological development of
infrastructure and help marshalling the consensus for redesigning
infrastructure governance institutions.

21. Thank you for your attention