Abuja City Profile

Abuja City Profile
Abstract
Abuja, the most rapidly growing city in Africa, is not just a modern capital city of Nigeria. It is a
city that is being contested by the elites who desire to realize their modernist vision of an orderly
and beautiful city and the poor who struggle to stitch together a living largely in the informal
sector. Abuja is also the destination of innumerable unemployed people who migrate to the city
in search of perceived employment opportunities and of those who see the city as much safer
than other parts of the country. It is within this context, coupled with limited resources, that the
city administration is struggling to cope with the increasing challenges of providing housing,
basic public services and an efficient transportation system. The key issue is whether the
government's partnership with the private sector in the development of Abuja in the last decade
can meet these challenges.
Key words: Abuja; capital city; housing; infrastructure development; services; transportation;
informal sector; exclusion; urban planning; Nigeria
Introduction
Like many major cities in developing countries, Abuja is experiencing an astronomical rate
of population growth. Indeed its urbanization rate of 8.32% per annum makes it the fastest
growing city in Africa (Myers, 2011). While the current population of the city is estimated at
over 3 million people, its day-time population often reaches up to 7 million (Iro, 2007). This
makes Abuja the fourth largest urban area in Nigeria after Lagos, Kano and Ibadan. Moreover,

the city’s rapid rate of urban growth is more astounding in its satellite settlements which are
growing at about 20% per annum (Abubakar & Doan, 2010). Even though natural population
increase is part of this growth, the major force underlying this overwhelming growth is in-
migration due to perceived better economic opportunities in Abuja, rural people’s quests for
urban life, lack of investment in Nigeria’s smaller towns and villages, and the believe that the
city is much safer than other parts of the country.
The results of this explosive growth is the acute shortage of housing (Abdullahi & AbdAziz,
2010; Umoh, 2012), the proliferation of informal settlements (Amba, 2010; Jibril, 2006),
occupation of uncompleted buildings (Abubakar & Doan, 2010), water scarcity (Abubakar,
2012), dilapidated sewer systems (Ilesanmi, 2006; Ojo, 2011) and traffic congestion (Benna
Associates, 2009). Amid these challenges, and coupled with limited resources, the city
administration is surprisingly trying to realize its elitist vision of an orderly and beautiful modern
city. However, this vision is constantly being thwarted by hordes of poor people that are trying to
make a living mainly in the city’s informal sector.
This article, therefore, analyses the three and a half decades of urban development in Abuja
with particular emphasis on recent initiatives aimed at meeting these challenges. The specific
objectives of the paper are to: (a) review Abuja’s geography, historical development, and
planning and urban form in order to best understand the context within which these challenges
occur; (b) discuss the major challenges facing the city and critically evaluate how its recent
partnerships with the private sector private sector in housing provision, garbage collection and
public transportation services is attempting to meet these challenges; and (c) to offer some
recommendations on the way forward.

Geographical Background
Abuja city is located in the central part of Nigeria north of the confluence of the Niger and
Benue Rivers (Figure 1). The city is part of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) whose land area
of about 8,000 km2
makes it almost two and a half times the size of Lagos State, the former
capital territory of Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa and the sixth most populated in
the world. The geography of the area is defined by two renowned rock formations— the Zuma
Rock from whose base the FCT begins and the Aso Rock that is located to the east of the city.
Abuja lies at latitude 9.07o
N and longitude 7.48o
E, and at an elevation of 840m (2,760 ft)
above sea-level. This elevation and tropical location gives Abuja a mild weather which contrasts
sharply with the humid weather of Lagos, which is located on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean at
35 m (11 ft) above sea-level. The Abuja area has two distinct seasons: the rainy season that lasts
from April to October with rainfall ranging from 305-762 mm (12-30 inches) and temperatures
raising up to 40o
C in May; and the dry season that lasts from November through March with dry
winds lowering the temperature to as low as 12o
C. Because of its abundant rainfall, rich soil and
the location within the Guinea-Savanna vegetation zone, the region is agriculturally productive,
with maize and tubers as the dominant crops.
Abuja’s situation at the geographical center of Nigeria (Figure 1) and its strategic position at
the intersection of two highways linking the northern and southern parts of the country make it
more accessible than Lagos. For example, while the road distance from Maiduguri in Borno State
in the northeastern part of Nigeria to Lagos is about 1,609 km (1,000 miles), in contrast, the
distance from Abuja to all parts of the country is less than 965 km (600 miles). This centrality
and accessibility is actually one of the reasons why the new capital city was created.

Figure 1: Abuja is more centrally located and accessible from all parts of Nigeria than
Lagos
Historical Development
Abuja is a young city that begun its existence on 3rd February 1976 when the federal military
government established the FCT after accepting the recommendation that Lagos – the Nigerian
capital since 1914 and also the country’s major port and commercial and industrial center– could
no longer effectively perform the dual role of state and federal capital. The Lagos’ main
problems were shortage of land for expansion, chronic housing and traffic congestion,
overstretched and dilapidated infrastructure, unhygienic environment and poor drainage (the city

being only 10 feet above sea-level) and domination by one ethnic group – the Yoruba (IPA,
1979; Morah, 1993; Schatz, 2003). In addition, though Nigeria was not facing any war threat
when Abuja was created, Obateru (2004) believes that Lagos is vulnerable to attacks in the event
of military aggression from other countries and hence unsuitable to be Nigeria’s capital.
In order to create a new capital city that is free from Lagos’ problems, the federal territory
that contains Abuja city was carved out of Plateau, Kwara, Niger and Kaduna states in the
middle of the country (Figure 1) and an agency, Federal Capital Development Authority
(FCDA), was established to plan and develop the city and the entire FCT. As such, FCDA
selected and commissioned an American planning consortium, International Planning Associates
(IPA), to prepare a master plan for Abuja City, which was completed in 1979 and the
development of the city began the following year. At that time, there were about 300,000 people
from indigenous tribes residing in 500 to 600 villages without access to roads and basic services
within the FCT. Those villages located on the sites earmarked for the capital city, the game
reserve area, the reservoir watersheds and Abuja airport were recommended for relocation while
the rest were to be upgraded and integrated into the satellite settlements (IPA, 1979).
In terms of administration, there are six local area councils created within the FCT – Abuja
Municipal, Abaji, Bwari, Kuje, Gwagwalada, and Kwali (Figure 2). While Abuja city is sited
within the Abuja Municipal area, the city is directly administered by the Federal Capital
Territory Administration (FCTA), which is headed by a minister appointed by the president. The
FCTA has several departments and agencies, supervised by directors, including the Abuja Water
Board, the Abuja Environmental Protection Board that is responsible for solid and liquid waste
management, the Abuja Geographic Information System that is responsible for land
administration, and the Transportation Secretariat.

Planning and Urban Form
The Abuja Master Plan of 1979
The development of Abuja is the product of the implementation of the provisions of the
Abuja Master Plan, which consist of the capital city and the regional plans and manuals
specifying design and development standards. According to IPA (1979), the development of
Abuja is based on seven important principles: equal access, equal citizenship, environmental
conservation, the garden city, functional city, effective regional development, and rapid national
economic growth. Likewise, the master plan provides the reasons for the relocation of the federal
capital city from Lagos to Abuja as:
- Availability of adequate land and natural resources that can provide a promising base for
urban development;
- A new capital at a more central location where it can provide equal access to Nigeria's
diverse ethnic and cultural groups; and
- A modern capital to serve as a symbol of national integration and unity (p. 27).
The plan’s projections envision a capital city of 3.2 million inhabitants with an average
household size of between 5 and 6 persons to be accommodated within the city boundary of 256
km2
and thereafter any additional population would be settled in satellite settlements. The master
plan divides the development of Abuja city into four Phases that form a crescent-shaped urban
form with Phases II, III and IV radiating outward from Phase I located at the center (Figure 2).
This centrally-oriented plan focuses on Phase I, which is now fully developed and home to
federal government agencies like the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the central
business district (CBD) and the cultural center that contains the National Mosque, National

Ecumenical Centre, National Theatre and library as well as the International Conference Center
(IPA, 1979).
Phase I also consists of the residential districts of Maitama, Wuse, Garki, Asokoro and
Guzape for Abuja’s who-is-who, as well as several foreign embassies, international agencies,
and multi-national corporations. With the concentration of these activities in Phase I, the
decision makers in Abuja tend to bias investment in amenities and infrastructure to the fully
developed area to the detriment of other developing areas that need far more investments. Thus,
it is not surprising that some people refer to this area as ‘the city’ and the suburbs where the
junior civil servants and the poor reside as ‘villages’. However, one disadvantage of this
concentration of activities is crowdedness and traffic congestion as workers who live in other
areas commute daily to their offices there.
Figure 2: The area councils within the FCT and four phases of Abuja’s development

(Source: www.abujagis.org.ng)
In Phase II, which was expected to accommodate about half a million people in fifteen
residential districts, only the five districts of Kado, Jabi, Utako, Wuye, and Gudu/Apo are nearly
fully developed. The rest are at different stages of development because of the sluggish pace of
infrastructural development. Phase III, which has nineteen residential districts was meant to
bring the total population of Abuja to 1.64 million when completed by 2000 (IPA, 1979, p. 74).
However, this dream is yet to be realized as only two districts (Gwarimpa I and Life Camp) have
been fully developed and Nbora and Lokogoma are currently underway, while the remaining
districts are in their infancy. Phases II and III radiate outward from Phase I while Phase IV which
is proposed to house about 1.6 million people in twenty-nine districts is located at the two ends
of the Abuja city crescent (Figure 2).
After approving the Master Plan, some indigenous communities were compensated and
resettled within the FCT (Iro, 2007), still majority are yet to be provided with alternative land
(Amba, 2010). Thereafter, construction of federal ministries and staff housing in Phase I started
in 1980 with the intention of relocating to the new capital city in 1985. With the completion of
some of these projects, federal agencies gradually moved and the federal government finally
relocated to Abuja in December, 1991.
Although no comprehensive review of Abuja Master Plan was ever undertaken, between
2006 and 2008 the central area urban design was reviewed by Albert Speer & Partner (n.d);
ideally the plan should have been reviewed at least every ten years as far as good planning
practice is concerned. Instead of focusing on how to deal with Abuja’s challenges of rapid
urbanization, poverty, informality and scarcity of basic services in the suburban areas, the review

largely focused on redesigning the central district, reviewing land use plans, and the
development controls. This is not surprising as the city elites desire to realize their modernist
vision of an orderly and beautiful Abuja city.
Urban Form
The design of Abuja, similar to other modernist cities, is clearly based on the garden city
concept of low density development and landscaping as the master plan dedicated a whopping
32% of land area to open space and parks. Specifically, the land use allocation is as follows:
33.2% for residential, 21.9% for commercial and services, 25% for open spaces, 19.9% for
roads, and 7% for parks (IPA, 1979). We can see that this kind of urban form is undeniably a
Western concept that is alien to African culture, which encourages neighborliness and high level
of interaction (Abubakar & Doan, 2010). Another disadvantage of such low density development
is the high cost of infrastructure provision, especially for a city relying heavily on federal
budgetary allocations.

Figure 3: A sector consisting of four districts and residential neighborhoods (IPA,
1979)
The envisaged city structure is based on the creation of hierarchies of development that serve
as the main framework for organizing social and economic activities. At the top of the hierarchy
are the four phases that each consists of 3-4 sectors. Each sector, which serves as a mini-city of
between 100,000 to 250,000 people, is subdivided into four residential districts surrounding the
sector center, which provides secondary employment and a variety of non-residential land uses
such as governmental offices, secondary school and recreational activities (Figure 3). On the
other hand, the residential district consists of local residential communities around the district
center, which comprises of primary schools, a health clinic, a library, parks, a retail market,
informal service job centers and restaurants. The decision to concentrate commercial activities at
the district centers, rather than to allow them to develop into strips similar to other Nigerian
cities was aimed at minimizing their impact on traffic and adjacent residential areas (Benna

Associates, 2009). In terms of layouts, Abuja city is dominated by curvilinear and grid iron
patterns.
The city’s local residential neighborhoods are not defined for a specific population or area of
land. Rather, they are planned by the local planners in order to provide a range of housing
alternatives within the framework allowed by service and transportation systems and specified
residential densities. In each neighborhood, a center provides facilities such as a kindergarten, a
shopping center and a park.
Key Challenges and Recent Initiatives
Land Administration
Land in Abuja is subject to all types of speculation. Thousands of serviced and unserviced
plots allocated to individuals by the government at well below market prices have been sold and
resold on the open market for significantly higher returns. To low-income citizens, land in the
city is unaffordable because obtaining a parcel of land entails the initial payment of an
application fee of ₦100,000 or US$ 6501
(Daily Trust, 2009, August 17) followed by expensive
land premium if the land is eventually allocated (Abuja Geographic Information Systems, 2013).
Given that the land premium is currently ₦20,000 (US$ 125) per square meter in Phase I, a
450m2
-plot costs about USD 5,625, which exceeds the annual salary of over 95% of households
in Abuja, since according to 2007 figures only 4.4% of households in Abuja have monthly
income above ₦80, 000 or US$ 500 (Adama, 2012, p. 997). Apart from the prohibitive land
premium, there is also the bureaucratic hurdle of obtaining building permits not to mention the
1
Based on exchange rate of US$1.00 equivalent to ₦160 (Nigerian Naira)

high cost of labor and construction materials in the city. Moreover, the land allocation process is
marred by corruption, politics and personal interests that undermine land allocation according to
the stipulated guidelines (Daily Trust, 2010, April 15). Consequently, low-income residents
resort to buying land from the natives at the outskirt of the city. However, this is a risky endeavor
as only the government legally owns all the land within the territory and can (at any moment)
demolish any erected structures on lands purchased informally.
An attempt to address these land issues began when Nigeria elected a democratic government
in 1999. The government expressed interest in Abuja’s development after a prolonged period of
master plan distortion and abuse of land records through forgery of land certificates, multiple
allocations, appropriation of lands earmarked for infrastructure and recreation for personal use,
encroachment into public lands, and unauthorized construction and land use changes (Iro, 2007).
Accordingly, in 2003 the Abuja Geographic Information System (AGIS) was created to replace
the previous system of land management through a manual land registry. The AGIS, a
completely computerized cadastral system, restored most land uses to the original master plan
(Akingbade et al, 2012). Despite this reform, land speculation and corrupt allocation of land
persist. For instance, while land allocation is supposedly based on applicant’s state of origin and
position on a waiting list, some applicants get allocations within months of registering while
others are on the waiting list for several years (Daily Trust, 2010, April 15).
Housing
Though there is no available data on housing demand or supply in Abuja, the city is facing an
acute housing shortage. This is partially because of the relocation of federal government
employees from Lagos to Abuja started in the 1980s without adequate provision for their

accommodation through public or private sector channels (Ikejiofor, 1998; Morah, 1993). The
city’s housing shortage has been fuelled by constant in-migrants since 1991 when the federal
government finally relocated from Lagos to Abuja. This rapid population growth has
overwhelmed a range of public housing schemes including the government’s construction of
22,000 housing units in Phase I in the 1980s and the 1990s construction of the Gwarimpa
Housing Estate in Phase III (Ukoha & Beamish, 1997). While most of these houses were
intended for junior public employees, they were eventually occupied by senior officers who later
owned them through the federal government’s monetization program. In the process, this initial
housing policy that was based on the master plan’s aim of prioritizing public provision of
affordable housing for government employees failed because of inadequate housing supply,
occupation of the housing by senior employees, and its exclusion of non-state employees.
On the other hand, the housing units produced by the private sector have proved to be
unaffordable for the city’s poor as building codes and planning standards have ensured that the
units’ rents are well beyond their reach. This situation is exacerbated by the difficulty of getting
housing mortgages given most people’s lack of collateral and the high mortgage interest rates of
over 20% (Abubakar & Doan, 2010). In addition, the current housing scarcity is also caused by
the inability of private developers to obtain land from the government beyond that allocated to
individuals.
One reason why most people cannot afford housing inside Abuja city is because according to
a demographic survey by FCTA, about 47% of Abuja households earn ₦360, 000 (US$ 2,250)
annually (Punch Newspaper, 2012, November 8) while renting a one-room apartment in the city
costs at least three times that amount. Moreover, rent must be paid one or two years in advance.
However, in the satellite towns, a similar apartment is more affordable —renting around ₦250,

000 (US$ 1,560) per annum— although roads are dilapidated and water and sanitation are often
grossly inadequate in these communities. In such areas, people make do by sharing dwelling
units with other families or by squatting on undeveloped land here or at the periphery (Ikejiafor,
1998).
By 2004 when the city’s housing shortage had become severe, the city administration was
compelled to enter into a public-private partnership (PPP) to provide mass housing in Phase III
(Umoh, 2012). According to the guidelines of the PPP, the city was to provide serviced land,
while private developers were to construct housing units and tertiary infrastructure within the
housing estates according to specifications agreed in the partnership. After three years, the
developers were to finish the development, sell the houses and pay for the public site and
services provided (Abdullahi & AbdAziz, 2010). Since the inception of the scheme, 314 sites
have been prepared and allocated to private developers by 2010 (Thisday Online, 2010, June 20).
Even though the actual quantity of houses supplied is not known, this initiative has
undoubtedly eased housing shortages to some extent and it seems that more of these PPPs would
substantially reduce the existing housing shortages in Abuja. Despite the fact that the developers
that obtained serviced land cheaply from the FCDA under this scheme, they built houses whose
cost was way beyond the means of the average Abuja resident. For example, the cost of a
cheapest bungalow in Lokogoma district is ₦15 million (US$ 94,000) notwithstanding
bungalow’s low quality finishing, plumbing and other fittings that frequently break down
(Abubakar, 2012). To ease the housing problem, there is thus a need to adopt a new policy that
can support low-income people’s own efforts to build their own houses. This could include
providing affordable mortgages, easing some zoning regulations (like increasing residential

density) and encouraging the use of local building materials and technology (Abubakar & Doan,
2010; Myers, 2011).
Basic Public Services
Abuja also faces many challenges when it comes to the delivery of basic infrastructure like
water, garbage collection and disposal and sanitation services. According to the master plan,
“next to housing and the availability of employment opportunities, the most important element of
a city is the quality and access of a wide variety of public services” (IPA, 1979, p. 117). In spite
of this affirmation, several neighborhoods in Durumi, Gwarimpa and Nbora in Phase III and
Kado and Utako districts in Phase II are yet to be connected to the central sewer system or with
tap water although they are fully inhabited. Residents of these areas therefore rely on septic tank
systems and alternative sources of water. Complicating the situation further is the unauthorized
subdivision of houses into smaller apartments, which further stretch the capacity of any available
infrastructure. Below is a brief discussion of the city’s challenges in meeting its water, garbage
management, and sanitation needs.
 Piped Water: Since only about 34% of households in Abuja municipal area reported to have
piped water connection in 2009 (FCT MDG Office, 2009a), residents in satellite settlements
have little hope of getting piped water in the near future. Thus water vendors and boreholes are
the main source of water in these areas. Improved water supply in Abuja would require
overcoming formidable problems that include: (a) a chronic water shortage that necessitate water
rationing for several hours or days; (b) dirty water and low pressure in high-rise apartments and
hilly residential areas such as Asokoro district, (c) dilapidated infrastructure; and (d) an

inefficient billing system that charges users a flat (estimated) rate or where several houses share
a single meter that undermines billing and repair (Abubakar, 2012; Benna Associates, 2009; Ebo,
2006; Ojo, 2011). Another issue is that payments often take months to show in the water
agency’s accounts thereby leading to frequent wrongful disconnections and interruption of
services (Abubakar, 2012).
Since 2009, a project to expand the capacity of the city’s water treatment and supply plants at
Usuman Dam has been underway and is nearing completion. While this is a laudable effort,
there is also the need to pay equal attention to the quality aspects of water delivery by improving
water purity and pressure, billing systems and the maintenance of facilities. Replacing steel
pipes that easily get rusty with PVC pipes, for instance, could reduce leakage and prevent
contamination.
 Garbage Collection: The garbage collection situation in Abuja has started resembling that of
Lagos where garbage is dumped alongside roads, inside drainage channels or on empty lots
and/or incomplete buildings throughout the city and its suburbs and satellite settlements
(Abubakar, 2012; Adama, 2012). As an official survey in 2009 revealed 48% of the households
in Abuja municipal area dispose of their garbage through some of the means noted above (FCT
MDG Office, 2009a).
To improve solid waste management in the city, a partnership between Abuja Environmental
Protection Board (AEPB) and a number of private companies began in 2003. The companies
were assigned to various districts and contracted to pick up and transport garbage to various
disposal sites a number of times per week. On its part, the city collects user charges that it uses to
pay the companies (Imam et al, 2008; Solomon, 2009). Although this initiative has significantly

improved garbage collection in Abuja, it suffers from two main problems: (i) some companies
use open trucks thereby littering the pick-up sites and their trucks are inadequate and often break
down; (ii) residents are often unable to hold the companies accountable as they have no direct
contract with them and have no clear idea who to contact when garbage has not been picked up:
the companies or the utility agency (Abubakar, 2012).
Addressing these issues as well as constructing a standard garbage treatment and disposal
facility that could enable garbage sorting and recycling could greatly improve solid waste
management in the city rather than using the existing dump sites and landfills where different
kinds of waste including hazardous substances are dumped together without sorting. When
informal garbage collectors were in operation in the city, they were earning livelihoods by
scavenging for some recyclable materials before the city banned them in order to maintain the
image of a modern city.
 Sanitation Services: The city is also struggling to extend the sewer system to districts like
Mabushi, Wuye, Utako in Phases II and Gwarimpa, Lokogoma and Nbora in Phase III. The
wastewater treatment plants located at Gudu, Utako and Wuye and the one under construction in
Wupa district that were meant to serve the first phase of Abuja are now serving the entire city.
Ilesanmi (2006) argued that the city administration is not giving adequate priority to wastewater
management because some treatment facilities are non-functional or are operating below
capacity. Other issues with the system include frequent blockage of sewer lines and leakage of
untreated sewage into local streams and rivers.
Although there are no current plans to tackle these problems, the city should (i) routinely
maintain the sanitation infrastructure, (ii) adequately respond to users' complaints about sewer-

related problems and (ii) encourage citizens not to flush solid objects down the sewer lines as
such objects contribute to problem of sewer blockage, and (v) be more serious in enforcing
existing environmental laws. Similarly, the city should partner with the private sector to
construct public restrooms in order to curb the problem of open air defecation and the common
use of "flying toilets" or the widespread dumping of polythene bags with feces in the city’s
garbage dumps or bins (BBC News, 2007, February 13). This unsanitary disposal of human waste
is a major health hazard in the city.
Transportation System
In order to limit traffic congestion in Abuja city, the Abuja Master Plan proposed a range of
express ways and arterial roads, light rail, and bus transit systems to connect the various district
centers and to also link the city with satellite settlements like Bwari, Gwagwalada, Kubwa, Kuje,
Nyanya, Karu, Lugbe and Suleja (Figure 4). Abuja now stands out among other African capital
cities for its high level of expressway length and quality. However, driving through the city
center is still a nightmare and commuting from the satellite settlements during peak hours is a
stressful experience, especially on the three major routes leading to the city: Kaduna-Abuja
Expressway, Abuja-Lafia Expressway, and Umaru Musa Yaradua Expressway (Airport Road).
For many Abuja residents, a daily commute of between two to three hours in overcrowded roads
is the norm.

Figure 4: Abuja Metropolitan Public Transport Concept (Source: Ministry of FCT)
A better transportation system in Abuja will require not just expanding the lanes of these
highways from 3 to 5, as the way the city administration is currently doing, but also an efficient
public transport system. As demonstrated by the endurance of traffic congestion, road expansion
is only a short-term fix as long as automobiles dominate Abuja’s transport system. While the
public mass transit buses operated by the city are insufficient, rickety and overcrowded: the
city’s various supplementary private bus systems have generally failed to address this issue. For
example, an attempted agreement between the city and some private transport companies to

provide bus transit services on some selected routes failed due to disagreements on route
allocations and the needed number of buses.
In order to fill the gap created by the inadequacy of public transportation, some “London”
taxis (so-called because they resemble the London cabs) were introduced by a former FCT
minister in 2004. These taxis, nevertheless new, beautiful, and perfect for upholding the elite
vision of a modern city, have started disappearing from Abuja streets as the minimum fare of
₦500 (US$3.25) they charge is way beyond the affordability of the common man who can ride a
bus for about one-fifth of that amount. As such, the green mini-buses (10-passenger capacity
buses that characterize public transportation in Lagos) operated by the informal sector remained
the main mode of public transportation in Abuja until they were banned in mid-2013 for lack of
safety, contribution to traffic congestion, and use of very old vehicles that pollute the air
(Premium Times, 2013, January 28). As a survival tactic, the operators of the banned mini-buses
have now procured taxis that they operate like the old mini-buses. Ironically, the taxis, which are
often overloaded, not only pick and drop off passengers by the roadside but they also pollute the
air, unsafe, and are major contributor to traffic congestion in the city.
The latest initiative to tackle Abuja’s transportation problem is the commencement of a light
rail project in 2007 which will link the city with the Airport before extending to Kuje and
Gwagwalada satellite settlements (Figure 4). It will convey about 700,000 passengers daily
(FCTA, 2013, July 23). The first phase of the project which covers a distance of 45 km is
scheduled for completion in 2015 (Oyetomi, 2012). Another rail project that is designed to link
Abuja with Kaduna and Lagos is also going on. While the light rail transit is expected to
significantly reduce traffic congestion in the city, it remains to be seen whether the project would
be completed on time.

Light rail is a major mass transit solution in many largest cities in the world. As such, to ease
Abuja’s transportation bottleneck, its government should partner with the private sector to build
the remaining phases of the rail network that would provide transit services to the city and its
satellite settlements. This will make commuting much more comfortable, faster, and cheaper
besides reducing the pressure on the existing roads. In addition, the provision of pedestrian paths
along its roads and zebra crossings at major road intersections would encourage walking and
improve road and passenger safety.
Squatter Settlements
Squatter settlements and slums have proliferated in several parts of the city especially in the
suburbs despite the fact that the city’s master plan called for modern housing and urban
development. These communities, while unplanned, overcrowded, and lacking in basic amenities
and infrastructure, are the visible expression of the poor people’s side of the contest with the elite
on ‘who lives’ in Abuja city. Even though there is no statistics on the number or size of squatter
settlements in Abuja, there were 24 squatter settlements and informal markets measuring about
2,193 hectares within the city boundary in 2006 (Jibril, 2006). However, it is worth noting that
while these squatter areas constitute only 8% of the city, they form most of the settlements
outside the city boundary. Some squatter areas like Utako, Mabushi and Maitama villages are
actually pre-existing native settlements that have not been resettled yet. This uneven mixture of
housing types, Myers (2011) argued, was created by the disorganized treatment of pre-existing
settlements in the FCT.
Despite the difficulty of accessing affordable housing, the management’s response to squatter
settlements and informal trading in Abuja has always been on eradication rather than upgrading

and integration. This policy causes undue hardship to the poor that ranges from disruption of
livelihoods in the informal sector to loss of assets and even lives. In some demolition incidents
there were cases of violence between police and residents when homes were destroyed while
their owners watched, often before they had a chance to clear out their belongings (Ishaku &
Obasanya, 2012; Jibril, 2006). In 2006, for instance, over 800,000 people were left homeless in
the city and its environs through squatter settlement demolition by the development control unit
of FCDA (SERAC, 2008) and mostly without compensation (Leadership Newspaper, 2012,
October 28). Likewise some 12,728 illegal structures were demolished in 2012 in the FCT in
order to conform to “the dreams of the founding fathers of Abuja” (FCTA, 2013, May 22). Some
of the displaced households have since moved into nearby overcrowded satellite towns while
others have returned to the sites where their homes were demolished and have rebuild again.
Employment and Informal Trading
As shown by a survey data in Table 1, the informal sector employs 66% of the residents of
Abuja municipal area while 30% earn their living in public and private sector formal jobs (FCT
MDG Office, 2009b). The dominance of the informal sector is even higher in the FCT where it
accounts for 78% of all employments of the respondents (Table 1). Although Abuja was
conceived solely as an administrative city, the Master Plan anticipated the informal sector to
provide 2 out of every 5 predicted jobs in the city (IPA, 1979). As such, informal businesses like
clothing and grocery stores, car and electronic repair shops, tailoring, and hair salon are allowed
in designated markets and shopping centers in the city. However, because these markets/centers
are unaffordable to small-scale traders they resort to hawking or using road sides to sell their
goods.

Table 1: Employment by sector in Abuja city and the FCT, 2009
Source: FCT MDG Office (2009b).
The authorities’ response to informal trading outside the stipulated areas is similar to the
response to squatter settlements. The Abuja Environmental Protection Agency has banned water
vending, hawking and roadside trading. Those that are caught violating this law are sentenced by
a tribunal to whipping, imprisonment or fines. In some government raids in the city, vendor stalls
have been demolished and goods confiscated or burnt (Daily Trust, 2010, September 01).
Nevertheless, the informal sector persists as it supports the majority of Abuja residents.
Social Exclusion
Contrary to the dream of Abuja being a city that would provide equal access to Nigeria’s
diverse population (IPA, 1979), only the rich and political elite lives in Maitama, Asokoro and
Wuse II districts’ exclusive houses. While the middle-income and other senior government
employees often reside in Garki and Wuse I districts in Phase I and in Phases II and III, the poor
live in the city’s squatter and satellite settlements. This exclusion stems from the spatial

differentiation of residential districts by the Master Plan as well as its designation of a central
area in Phase I that serves as the seat of the Federal Government. This area receives top priority
in the provision of adequate infrastructure and amenities. As Figure 5 shows, the city center has a
skyline that is dotted with modern architecture, wide roads with streetlights, and beautiful
landscapes.
Figure 5: Abuja city center (Source: http://www.nairaland.com/356775/abuja-city-videos-
photos/10, Retrieved: 24/Nov./2013)
On the other hand, the poor are systematically excluded from the city by a housing policy that
denies them affordable housing, thus they have to live in squatter and satellite settlements that
are not significantly different from slums at the edge of the city. Development of infrastructure in
Abuja is lopsided because, unlike in the city center, in most of the sub-urban settlements, roads
are unpaved and basic infrastructure and social amenities like piped water, garbage collection,
and sanitation are either absent or in a deplorable state (Abubakar & Doan, 2010; Adama, 2012; Ebo,

2006; Ilesanmi, 2006). As a comparison of central Abuja (Figures 5) and Nyanya (the satellite
settlement near Abuja in Figure 6) shows, there is a stark disparity in roads and living conditions
between the two areas; between elites in central Abuja and the poor in the outskirts.
Figure 6: Central Nyanya, a satellite settlement of Abuja (Source: Adama, 2012, p. 995)
Rapid Growth with Slow Pace of Urban Development
Since 1991, federal agencies, state government offices, international diplomatic missions,
and many large firms and businesses have relocated or established branches in Abuja.
Consequently, the city has experienced population growth at an unprecedented rate. Everyone
wants to be in Abuja because it is where the country’s wealth is being shared. As such, the pace
of urban development in the city lags behind its rate of population growth. While the Abuja

master plan targeted the completion of Phases I through III by the year 2000 (IPA 1979), only
eleven districts had been fully developed by 2011 with a further seven under development
(FCTA, 2011): a situation due mainly to lack of infrastructure. Despite investing ₦1,300 billion
(US$ 8.13 billion) on infrastructure alone (FCTA, 2013, April 29), the city has inadequate
infrastructure and housing due to improper use of resources. Consequently, the city suffers from
overcrowded housing and overstretched infrastructure.
Moreover, overpopulation is manifest in inadequate employment opportunities for most city
residents. Unemployment stands at 21.1%, which is close to the national average of 23.9%
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2012), social apathy and crimes like armed robbery are therefore
widespread. In a nutshell, the city management is finding it increasingly difficult to contain the
city’s growth, with incessant overcrowding and proliferation of slum and squatter settlements in
spite of their recurring demolition. Part of this housing shortage is due to the initial policy of
letting the public sector alone to own FCT, land, deliver housing, and develop infrastructure.
While there has been a policy change on housing and infrastructure development that has
brought in the private sector, housing and infrastructure delivery has been clogged by the
government’s continued ownership and control of all urban lands in Nigeria.
To address this challenge, an initiative named “land-swap” was introduced in late 2012 to
facilitate partnerships with private investors in the development of the city’s housing and
infrastructure through site and services schemes. Under this arrangement, the FCDA has
allocated residential districts to some selected private developers who are expected to develop
infrastructure in their districts in return for FCDA allocation of land that is commensurate in
value to the cost of their investment (FCTA, 2013, May 15). All of Phase IV and a newly created
Phase V, through the extension of the city limit along the airport road, have been earmarked for

this scheme. This initiative is intended to avoid a repeat of the problem of undeveloped plots in
some districts in Phases II and III due to the inability of the government and allottees to provide
the requisite infrastructure. It remains to be seen whether this new arrangement will work well.
An interesting and enduring question is how to deal with the native settlements in the areas
earmarked for the public-private land swap scheme and the fate of an industrial park and a
sewage treatment facility proposed by the master plan in the area that is now Phase V.
Conclusion
Abuja’s three-and-a-half decades worth of urban development have been under constant
challenge by the city’s rapid population growth due to in-migration of people in search of a
better livelihood. This in-migration is partly due to urban bias in Nigeria’s development, lack of
investment in Nigerian smaller towns and villages, and dwindling employment opportunities in
other parts of the country. The consequences of this rapid urbanization include housing
shortages, traffic congestion, unemployment, informality, social exclusion, and an overburdened
water and sanitation infrastructure. These challenges are exacerbated by over-reliance on the
public sector for urban development, mismanagement of the available resources, and the city’s
inadequate financial support allocation caused by the federal government and its agencies.
Over the course of its development, Abuja city has come to epitomize the stark contrast
between the worlds of prosperity and poverty partly due to the national elite’s desire to fashion
Abuja into a modern capital city. Thus, the central city consists of low density developments
with spectacular high-rises, many fine neighborhoods, beautiful landscapes and comfortable
places to shop and play that are powered by the countries oil wealth. Conversely, the city’s
suburbs and satellite settlements, including Dutse, Bwari, Kubwa, Durumi, Karu, Maraba,

Karmo and Nyanya, consist mainly of slums and squatter settlements that house the city’s
majority poor that are condemn to a miserable life in these communities that are characterized by
rubbish heaps, fetid smells, blocked drains, open sewers, and unlit and un-tarred roads
(Abubakar & Doan, 2010; Eerd, 2008).
The government’s responses to most of these challenges have been wanting. Its policies and
actions have always been anti poor – including squatter settlement demolitions, allocation of
low-cost public houses meant for the poor to the elites, and the banning of mini-buses and the
road-side informal businesses that are owned by the poor. When a former minister was
questioned about the suffering caused by the demolitions, he controversially noted that Abuja
was "not a city for the poor" (BBC News, 2007, February 13). Thus, demolitions continue with
no end in sight (Vanguard Newspaper, 2013, March 02). These anti-poor policies and actions
corroborate the assertion that planning is used as a tool to chase away the poor from the
modernist cities of developing countries (Watson, 2009). While the poor have been resilient in
devising survival strategies in the city’s informal sector, one wonders if there is a better way.
While the recent PPPs have certainly eased the city’s housing shortages and improved its
garbage collection and infrastructure, these initiatives should be pursued with due appreciating
for the poor and the informal sector as important stakeholders in the city. For the poor are the
junior civil servants, school teachers, the police, drivers, artisans, construction workers, market
women, and house servants of the elites and their families. In place of the unproductive contest
‘who should live in Abuja’, there should be a policy shift towards creating an inclusive city that
fosters public involvement in decision-making, especially now that Nigeria is a democracy. A
critical first step towards achieving this is to recognize the rights of the poor people that live in
and contribute to the wealth of Abuja’ urban life. Next is to pursue a policy of selectively

upgrading the city’s slum and squatter settlements and providing affordable market shops for
informal sector traders. There is also a definite need for the city administration to commit to the
development of not just the city but also the satellite towns in order to decongest Abuja and
make it more prosperous and enjoyable.
In short, the proper development of Abuja will succeed not only by focusing on the physical
environment, but also by addressing the contemporary challenges of the city’s entire population
(UN-Habitat, 2009). Only then will Abuja continue to function as a melting pot for Nigerians
and foreigners alike, as well as a home, business and tourism destination for millions of people.
Whether it succeeds in its ambition of becoming a modern world-class city and “Africa’s best
capital city” (FCTA, 2011) is not only dependent on how well Abuja addresses its daunting
housing, infrastructural, and socio-economic problems, but also on how well it tailors its future
urban development to ensure the needs of the majority of its citizens.
Acknowledgement
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