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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
for Risk Management
“
“To design systems that work correctly
we often need to understand and
correct how they can go wrong.”
Dan Goldin, NASA Administrator, 2000
INTRODUCTION
◎ FTA identifies, models and evaluates the unique
interrelationship of events leading to :
o Failure
o Undesired Events / States
o Unintended Events / States
FTA - DESCRIPTION
TOOL:
◎ Evaluate complex system
◎ Identify events that can cause
an Undesired Event
◎ Safety, reliability,
unavailability, accident
investigation
ANALYSIS:
◎ Identifies root causes
◎ Deductive (general to the
specific)
◎ Provides risk assessment
o Cut sets (qualitative)
o Probability (quantitative)
4
FTA - DESCRIPTION
MODEL:
◎ Visual
◎ Displays cause-consequence
relationships
◎ Fault events, normal events,
paths
◎ Probability
METHODOLOGY:
◎ Defined, structured and
rigorous
◎ Easy to learn, perform and
follow
5
EXAMPLE FT
System:
System Undesired Event: Light Fails Off
FT Model:
Cut Sets:
Event combinations that can cause Top Undesired Event to occur
6
FTA APPLICATIONS
◎ Root Cause Analysis
o Identify all relevant events and conditions leading to Undesired Event
o Determine parallel and sequential event combinations
o Model diverse/complex event interrelationships involved
◎ Risk Assessment
o Calculate the probability of an Undesired Event (level of risk)
o Identify safety critical components/functions/phases
o Measure effect of design changes
◎ Design Safety Assessment
o Demonstrate compliance with requirements
o Shows where safety requirements are needed
o Identify and evaluate potential design defects/weak links
o Determine Common Mode failures
7
FTA COVERAGE
◎ Failures
◎ Fault Events
◎ Normal Events
◎ Environmental Effects
◎ Systems, subsystems, and components
◎ System Elements
o Hardware, software, human, instructions
◎ Time
o Mission time, single phase, multi phase
◎ Repair
8
FT STRENGTH
◎ Visual model -- cause/effect relationships
◎ Easy to learn, do and follow
◎ Models complex system relationships in an
understandable manner
o Follows paths across system boundaries
o Combines hardware, software, environment and
human interaction
◎ Probability model
◎ Proven technique
9
FTA TIMELINE
◎ Design Phase
o FTA should start early in the program
o The goal is to influence design early, before changes are too
costly
o Update the analysis as the design progresses
o Each FT update adds more detail to match design detail
o Even an early, high level FT provides useful information
◎ Operations Phase
o FTA during operations for root cause analysis
o Find and solve problems (anomalies) in real time
10
FTA TIMELINE
11
CONCEPTUAL
DESIGN
PRELIMINARY
DESIGN
FINAL DESIGN DEPLOYMENT
Initial FTA Update FTA Update FTA Final FTA Operation FTA
FT BUILDING BLOCKS
NODE TYPE:
◎ Basic Events (BE)
◎ Gate Events (GE)
◎ Condition Events (CE)
◎ Transfer Events (TE)
FT NODE TYPES
Basic Event (BE)
◎ Failure Event
o Primary Failure - basic component failure (circle symbol)
o Secondary Failure - failure caused by external force (diamond symbol)
◎ Normal Event
o An event that describes a normally expected system state
o An operation or function that occurs as intended or designed
o The normal event is usually either On or Off, having a probability of either 1 or 0
o House symbol
◎ The BE’s are where the failure rates and probabilities enter the FT
13
FT NODE TYPES
Gate Event (GE)
◎ A logic operator combining input nodes
◎ A gate that permits or inhibits fault logic up the tree
◎ Five basic types
o AND, OR, Inhibit, Priority AND and Exclusive OR
◎ Represents a fault state that has further causes to be
developed
14
FT NODE TYPES
Condition Event (CE)
◎ A condition attached to a gate event
◎ It establishes a condition that is required in order for the
gate event to occur
◎ Three basic types
o Inhibit, Priority AND and Exclusive OR
15
FT NODE TYPES
Transfer Event (TE)
◎ A pointer to a tree branch
◎ Indicates a subtree branch that is used elsewhere in the tree (transfer
in/out)
◎ A Transfer always involves a Gate Event node on the tree, and is
symbolically represented by a Triangle
◎ The Transfer is for several different purposes:
o Starts a new page (for plots)
o It indicates where a branch is used numerous places in the same tree,
but is not repeatedly drawn (Internal Transfer) (MOB)
o It indicates an input module from a separate analysis (External Transfer)
16
OR GATE
Causality never passes through an OR gate
◎ The input faults are never the cause of the output fault
◎ Inputs are identical to the output, only more specifically
defined (refined) as to cause
17
AND GATE
Specifies a causal relationship between the inputs and the
output
◎ The input faults collectively represent the cause of the
output fault
◎ Implies nothing about the antecedents of the input faults
18
INHIBIT GATE
◎ Both C and Y1 are necessary
to cause D
◎ Y1 is a condition or
probability
◎ Pass through if condition is
satisfied
◎ Essentially an AND gate
19
TRANSFER SYMBOL
20
Transfer IN
Transfer OUT
FAILURE/FAULT
◎ FAILURE
o The occurrence of a basic component failure.
o The result of an internal inherent failure mechanism, thereby
requiring no further breakdown
◎ FAULT
o The occurrence or existence of an undesired state for a
component, subsystem or system.
o The result of a failure or chain of faults/failures; can be further
broken down.
o The component operates correctly, except at the wrong time,
because it was commanded to do so.
21
FAILURE/FAULT EXAMPLE
22
All failures are faults, but not
all faults are failures
PRIMARY, SECONDARY, COMMAND FAULT
◎ Primary Fault/Failure
o A component failure that cannot be further defined at a lower level.
o Example – diode inside a computer fails due to material flaw.
◎ Secondary Fault/Failure
o A component failure that can be further defined at a lower level, but is not
defined in detail (ground rules).
o Example – computer fails (don’t care about detail of why).
o A component failure that is caused by an external force to the system, can be
further defined.
o Example – Fuel tank ruptures due to little boy shooting it with an arm or
piercing bow and arrow.
◎ They are also important when performing a Common Cause Analysis 23
PRIMARY, SECONDARY, COMMAND FAULT
◎ Command Fault/Failure
o A fault state that is commanded by an upstream fault / failure.
o Normal operation of a component, except in an inadvertent or
untimely manner.
o The normal, but, undesired state of a component at a particular
point in time.
o The component operates correctly, except at the wrong time,
because it was commanded to do so by upstream faults.
o Example – a bridge opens (at an undesired time) because
someone accidentally pushed the Bridge Open button.
24
CUT SETS
27
END OF SESSION
28

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(2020) FAULT TREE ANALYSIS.pdf

  • 1. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS for Risk Management
  • 2. “ “To design systems that work correctly we often need to understand and correct how they can go wrong.” Dan Goldin, NASA Administrator, 2000
  • 3. INTRODUCTION ◎ FTA identifies, models and evaluates the unique interrelationship of events leading to : o Failure o Undesired Events / States o Unintended Events / States
  • 4. FTA - DESCRIPTION TOOL: ◎ Evaluate complex system ◎ Identify events that can cause an Undesired Event ◎ Safety, reliability, unavailability, accident investigation ANALYSIS: ◎ Identifies root causes ◎ Deductive (general to the specific) ◎ Provides risk assessment o Cut sets (qualitative) o Probability (quantitative) 4
  • 5. FTA - DESCRIPTION MODEL: ◎ Visual ◎ Displays cause-consequence relationships ◎ Fault events, normal events, paths ◎ Probability METHODOLOGY: ◎ Defined, structured and rigorous ◎ Easy to learn, perform and follow 5
  • 6. EXAMPLE FT System: System Undesired Event: Light Fails Off FT Model: Cut Sets: Event combinations that can cause Top Undesired Event to occur 6
  • 7. FTA APPLICATIONS ◎ Root Cause Analysis o Identify all relevant events and conditions leading to Undesired Event o Determine parallel and sequential event combinations o Model diverse/complex event interrelationships involved ◎ Risk Assessment o Calculate the probability of an Undesired Event (level of risk) o Identify safety critical components/functions/phases o Measure effect of design changes ◎ Design Safety Assessment o Demonstrate compliance with requirements o Shows where safety requirements are needed o Identify and evaluate potential design defects/weak links o Determine Common Mode failures 7
  • 8. FTA COVERAGE ◎ Failures ◎ Fault Events ◎ Normal Events ◎ Environmental Effects ◎ Systems, subsystems, and components ◎ System Elements o Hardware, software, human, instructions ◎ Time o Mission time, single phase, multi phase ◎ Repair 8
  • 9. FT STRENGTH ◎ Visual model -- cause/effect relationships ◎ Easy to learn, do and follow ◎ Models complex system relationships in an understandable manner o Follows paths across system boundaries o Combines hardware, software, environment and human interaction ◎ Probability model ◎ Proven technique 9
  • 10. FTA TIMELINE ◎ Design Phase o FTA should start early in the program o The goal is to influence design early, before changes are too costly o Update the analysis as the design progresses o Each FT update adds more detail to match design detail o Even an early, high level FT provides useful information ◎ Operations Phase o FTA during operations for root cause analysis o Find and solve problems (anomalies) in real time 10
  • 11. FTA TIMELINE 11 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PRELIMINARY DESIGN FINAL DESIGN DEPLOYMENT Initial FTA Update FTA Update FTA Final FTA Operation FTA
  • 12. FT BUILDING BLOCKS NODE TYPE: ◎ Basic Events (BE) ◎ Gate Events (GE) ◎ Condition Events (CE) ◎ Transfer Events (TE)
  • 13. FT NODE TYPES Basic Event (BE) ◎ Failure Event o Primary Failure - basic component failure (circle symbol) o Secondary Failure - failure caused by external force (diamond symbol) ◎ Normal Event o An event that describes a normally expected system state o An operation or function that occurs as intended or designed o The normal event is usually either On or Off, having a probability of either 1 or 0 o House symbol ◎ The BE’s are where the failure rates and probabilities enter the FT 13
  • 14. FT NODE TYPES Gate Event (GE) ◎ A logic operator combining input nodes ◎ A gate that permits or inhibits fault logic up the tree ◎ Five basic types o AND, OR, Inhibit, Priority AND and Exclusive OR ◎ Represents a fault state that has further causes to be developed 14
  • 15. FT NODE TYPES Condition Event (CE) ◎ A condition attached to a gate event ◎ It establishes a condition that is required in order for the gate event to occur ◎ Three basic types o Inhibit, Priority AND and Exclusive OR 15
  • 16. FT NODE TYPES Transfer Event (TE) ◎ A pointer to a tree branch ◎ Indicates a subtree branch that is used elsewhere in the tree (transfer in/out) ◎ A Transfer always involves a Gate Event node on the tree, and is symbolically represented by a Triangle ◎ The Transfer is for several different purposes: o Starts a new page (for plots) o It indicates where a branch is used numerous places in the same tree, but is not repeatedly drawn (Internal Transfer) (MOB) o It indicates an input module from a separate analysis (External Transfer) 16
  • 17. OR GATE Causality never passes through an OR gate ◎ The input faults are never the cause of the output fault ◎ Inputs are identical to the output, only more specifically defined (refined) as to cause 17
  • 18. AND GATE Specifies a causal relationship between the inputs and the output ◎ The input faults collectively represent the cause of the output fault ◎ Implies nothing about the antecedents of the input faults 18
  • 19. INHIBIT GATE ◎ Both C and Y1 are necessary to cause D ◎ Y1 is a condition or probability ◎ Pass through if condition is satisfied ◎ Essentially an AND gate 19
  • 21. FAILURE/FAULT ◎ FAILURE o The occurrence of a basic component failure. o The result of an internal inherent failure mechanism, thereby requiring no further breakdown ◎ FAULT o The occurrence or existence of an undesired state for a component, subsystem or system. o The result of a failure or chain of faults/failures; can be further broken down. o The component operates correctly, except at the wrong time, because it was commanded to do so. 21
  • 22. FAILURE/FAULT EXAMPLE 22 All failures are faults, but not all faults are failures
  • 23. PRIMARY, SECONDARY, COMMAND FAULT ◎ Primary Fault/Failure o A component failure that cannot be further defined at a lower level. o Example – diode inside a computer fails due to material flaw. ◎ Secondary Fault/Failure o A component failure that can be further defined at a lower level, but is not defined in detail (ground rules). o Example – computer fails (don’t care about detail of why). o A component failure that is caused by an external force to the system, can be further defined. o Example – Fuel tank ruptures due to little boy shooting it with an arm or piercing bow and arrow. ◎ They are also important when performing a Common Cause Analysis 23
  • 24. PRIMARY, SECONDARY, COMMAND FAULT ◎ Command Fault/Failure o A fault state that is commanded by an upstream fault / failure. o Normal operation of a component, except in an inadvertent or untimely manner. o The normal, but, undesired state of a component at a particular point in time. o The component operates correctly, except at the wrong time, because it was commanded to do so by upstream faults. o Example – a bridge opens (at an undesired time) because someone accidentally pushed the Bridge Open button. 24