OECD@100:
POLICIES FOR A
SHIFTING WORLD
Henrik Braconier
OECD Economics Department
New Approaches to Economic Challenges
Seminar on Project C6, 28 April 2014
– Illustrate some key economic challenges over
the coming 50 years
– Identify policies to address these challenges
and which trade-offs such policy action can
generate
– To do this, we have used and developed a suite
of models to illustrate trends and interactions,
and to identify risks and tensions
2
Introduction
3
The central scenario: tools
4
Key trends identified
1. Shifting patterns of economic growth
2. Rising global economic interdependence
3. Increasing global environmental costs
4. Continued increases in earning inequalities
5. Substantial fiscal challenges
6. Medium-term risks for rising current-
account imbalances
• Ageing will weaken labour supply
• Less room for technological catch-up
• Slowing improvements in educational
attainment
But:
• Increasing importance of fast-growing
economies mitigates the slowdown
Growth 2014-2030: 3.6% 2030-2060: 2.7%
5
Global growth set to slow
6
A shifting balance in the world economy
Share of global GDP (current PPPs)
7
Drivers of growth in GDP per capita
Contribution to growth in GDP per capita, 2000-2060
If:
• Global trade expands in line with the shifting
world economy, what happens to
interdependence?
• Global growth becomes even more reliant on
multifactor productivity and knowledge-based
assets, what happens to income equality?
• Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the
environmental consequences in a ‘business as
usual’ scenario?
• Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what
are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration?
8
Consequences of global growth patterns
If:
• Global trade expands in line with the
shifting world economy, what happens to
interdependence?
• Global growth becomes even more reliant on
multifactor productivity and knowledge-based
assets, what happens to income equality?
• Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the
environmental consequences in a ‘business as
usual’ scenario?
• Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what
are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration?
9
Consequences of global growth patterns
10
Global trade integration will rise
Exports as a share of GDP
11
Rising global interdependence
Exports as a share of GDP
If:
• Global trade expands in line with the shifting world
economy, what happens to interdependence?
• Global growth becomes even more reliant on
multifactor productivity and knowledge-based
assets, what happens to income equality?
• Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the
environmental consequences in a ‘business as usual’
scenario?
• Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what are
the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration?
12
Consequences of global growth patterns
13
Gross earning inequality are likely to rise
in the OECD
Gross earning inequality (D9/D1), 2010 and 2060
14
Sources of rising earning inequality
2010-60
Contribution to change in gross earning inequality (D9/D1), 2010-60
If:
• Global trade expands in line with the shifting
world economy, what happens to
interdependence?
• Global growth becomes even more reliant on
multifactor productivity and knowledge-based
assets, what happens to income equality?
• Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the
environmental consequences in a ‘business
as usual’ scenario?
• Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what
are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration?
15
Consequences of global growth patterns
16
Total greenhouse gas emissions, 2010
and 2060
Million tonnes, CO2 equivalent
48 700 million tonnes
99 500 million tonnes
17
Regional economic (GDP) impact of
climate change 2060, central scenario
as per cent of GDP
If:
• Global trade expands in line with the shifting world
economy, what happens to interdependence?
• Global growth becomes even more reliant on
multifactor productivity and knowledge-based assets,
what happens to income equality?
• Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the
environmental consequences in a ‘business as usual’
scenario?
• Incomes in emerging economies catch-up,
what are the consequences, e.g. in terms of
migration?
18
Consequences of global growth patterns
19
Will income convergence lead to a dry-
up of migration towards the OECD?
20
Potential labour force with modelled
migration flows
Per cent deviation from central scenario 2060
21
Policies to support growth
On a national level:
 Technological and managerial skills, combined with market
flexibility, are key to benefit from technological progress.
 Returns to skill will likely rise. Increasing demand for tertiary
education should mainly be met through more tuitions. Limited
public resources should be focused on early schooling and
(possibly) life-long learning.
 Retirement and labour market policies should encourage longer
working lives, while well-functioning labour markets can provide
better employment prospects and encourage immigration.
On an international level:
 The provision of global public goods - such as basic research,
intellectual property right protection rules, competition policies,
and multilateral trade agreements – could be supported by stronger
international coordination.
22
Policies to limit the rise in inequality
On a national level:
 Structural policies that can mitigate inequality in pre-tax earnings (e.g.
employment protection) have limited potential and are often costly in
growth terms.
 Policies that encourage employment will help to mitigate inequality in
disposable incomes.
 Redistributive policies can mitigate inequality in disposable incomes,
but have to be focused in a tight fiscal environment.
 Trade (and investment) integration will make some tax bases more
mobile. To maintain redistributive capacity, a shift towards less mobile
bases (e.g. housing, consumption and resource extraction) would be
beneficial.
On an international level:
 Further global economic integration combined with an increasing
importance of (mobile) intangible factors of production can lead to
excessive tax competition. Additional international tax coordination
could therefore be useful (environmental , corporate income taxes).
23
Addressing rising climate change costs
 Appropriate pricing of carbon is key to discourage
carbon emissions, but requires coordinated
international efforts.
 Further trade and investment integration will make
production-based taxes on emission-intensive activities
less efficient. Border carbon adjustments may therefore
become more attractive.
 Further trade and investment integration may also
improve risk-sharing of hard-to-predict regional climate
damages.
THANK YOU!
24

2014.04.28_NAEC Seminar_OECD@100

  • 1.
    OECD@100: POLICIES FOR A SHIFTINGWORLD Henrik Braconier OECD Economics Department New Approaches to Economic Challenges Seminar on Project C6, 28 April 2014
  • 2.
    – Illustrate somekey economic challenges over the coming 50 years – Identify policies to address these challenges and which trade-offs such policy action can generate – To do this, we have used and developed a suite of models to illustrate trends and interactions, and to identify risks and tensions 2 Introduction
  • 3.
  • 4.
    4 Key trends identified 1.Shifting patterns of economic growth 2. Rising global economic interdependence 3. Increasing global environmental costs 4. Continued increases in earning inequalities 5. Substantial fiscal challenges 6. Medium-term risks for rising current- account imbalances
  • 5.
    • Ageing willweaken labour supply • Less room for technological catch-up • Slowing improvements in educational attainment But: • Increasing importance of fast-growing economies mitigates the slowdown Growth 2014-2030: 3.6% 2030-2060: 2.7% 5 Global growth set to slow
  • 6.
    6 A shifting balancein the world economy Share of global GDP (current PPPs)
  • 7.
    7 Drivers of growthin GDP per capita Contribution to growth in GDP per capita, 2000-2060
  • 8.
    If: • Global tradeexpands in line with the shifting world economy, what happens to interdependence? • Global growth becomes even more reliant on multifactor productivity and knowledge-based assets, what happens to income equality? • Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the environmental consequences in a ‘business as usual’ scenario? • Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration? 8 Consequences of global growth patterns
  • 9.
    If: • Global tradeexpands in line with the shifting world economy, what happens to interdependence? • Global growth becomes even more reliant on multifactor productivity and knowledge-based assets, what happens to income equality? • Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the environmental consequences in a ‘business as usual’ scenario? • Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration? 9 Consequences of global growth patterns
  • 10.
    10 Global trade integrationwill rise Exports as a share of GDP
  • 11.
  • 12.
    If: • Global tradeexpands in line with the shifting world economy, what happens to interdependence? • Global growth becomes even more reliant on multifactor productivity and knowledge-based assets, what happens to income equality? • Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the environmental consequences in a ‘business as usual’ scenario? • Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration? 12 Consequences of global growth patterns
  • 13.
    13 Gross earning inequalityare likely to rise in the OECD Gross earning inequality (D9/D1), 2010 and 2060
  • 14.
    14 Sources of risingearning inequality 2010-60 Contribution to change in gross earning inequality (D9/D1), 2010-60
  • 15.
    If: • Global tradeexpands in line with the shifting world economy, what happens to interdependence? • Global growth becomes even more reliant on multifactor productivity and knowledge-based assets, what happens to income equality? • Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the environmental consequences in a ‘business as usual’ scenario? • Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration? 15 Consequences of global growth patterns
  • 16.
    16 Total greenhouse gasemissions, 2010 and 2060 Million tonnes, CO2 equivalent 48 700 million tonnes 99 500 million tonnes
  • 17.
    17 Regional economic (GDP)impact of climate change 2060, central scenario as per cent of GDP
  • 18.
    If: • Global tradeexpands in line with the shifting world economy, what happens to interdependence? • Global growth becomes even more reliant on multifactor productivity and knowledge-based assets, what happens to income equality? • Global GDP expands by 350%, what are the environmental consequences in a ‘business as usual’ scenario? • Incomes in emerging economies catch-up, what are the consequences, e.g. in terms of migration? 18 Consequences of global growth patterns
  • 19.
    19 Will income convergencelead to a dry- up of migration towards the OECD?
  • 20.
    20 Potential labour forcewith modelled migration flows Per cent deviation from central scenario 2060
  • 21.
    21 Policies to supportgrowth On a national level:  Technological and managerial skills, combined with market flexibility, are key to benefit from technological progress.  Returns to skill will likely rise. Increasing demand for tertiary education should mainly be met through more tuitions. Limited public resources should be focused on early schooling and (possibly) life-long learning.  Retirement and labour market policies should encourage longer working lives, while well-functioning labour markets can provide better employment prospects and encourage immigration. On an international level:  The provision of global public goods - such as basic research, intellectual property right protection rules, competition policies, and multilateral trade agreements – could be supported by stronger international coordination.
  • 22.
    22 Policies to limitthe rise in inequality On a national level:  Structural policies that can mitigate inequality in pre-tax earnings (e.g. employment protection) have limited potential and are often costly in growth terms.  Policies that encourage employment will help to mitigate inequality in disposable incomes.  Redistributive policies can mitigate inequality in disposable incomes, but have to be focused in a tight fiscal environment.  Trade (and investment) integration will make some tax bases more mobile. To maintain redistributive capacity, a shift towards less mobile bases (e.g. housing, consumption and resource extraction) would be beneficial. On an international level:  Further global economic integration combined with an increasing importance of (mobile) intangible factors of production can lead to excessive tax competition. Additional international tax coordination could therefore be useful (environmental , corporate income taxes).
  • 23.
    23 Addressing rising climatechange costs  Appropriate pricing of carbon is key to discourage carbon emissions, but requires coordinated international efforts.  Further trade and investment integration will make production-based taxes on emission-intensive activities less efficient. Border carbon adjustments may therefore become more attractive.  Further trade and investment integration may also improve risk-sharing of hard-to-predict regional climate damages.
  • 24.

Editor's Notes

  • #3 Forward-looking leg of NAEC, OECD@100 focusing on 2060(61) when the OECD becomes 100.Quantitative tools, but numbers are not key.Challenges identified are often interdependent. Policies to deal with challenges often have side effects, leading to trade-offs and these may be different in 2060. Joint work with ENV and CEPII
  • #4 Modelling tools combine existing tools (ECO LT-framework, ENV growth and linkages, CEPII Mage and Mirage) and newwage inequality module.Suite of additional models to identify tensions and risks in central scenario: Migration, investment in tertiary education, technology absorption and GDP impacts of environmental damages
  • #5 GrowthShift from OECD towards EM and later LIAgeing and the labour force (OECD and EM)Growing reliance on knowledge capital and technologyRising trade integration, (VA-chains, investment and skilled-labour?)GDP-effects focusKnowledge-based growth – SBTCLess on latter two
  • #6 OECD and EMEMOECD
  • #7 China – USNon-OECD – OECDAfrica and IndiaMultipolarity
  • #8 LT growth scenarios: Standard Solow-type production function, with (partial) convergence inMFP growth (to exogenous trend)Educational attainment convergencePopulation ageing is assumed to be mitigated through retirement reforms (already decided+ adjustment to rising longevity)Some institutional convergence (PMR, social spending, financial deepening)-> per capita income convergence and increasing reliance on MFP growth in OECDQuestions:What happens to the frontier? Gordon vsBrynjolfsonPolicies to benefit fully from technological progressInvestment in skills? Cf US stagnation and European publicly funded systemsRetirement reforms
  • #9 Consequences of convergence?Multipolarity (but preference convergence?) -> How will potential for global economic coordination develop as multipolarity increases and income levels converge?Increasing spillovers for OECD countries from EMEs (example migration)-> How should OECD economies adjust policies to rising impacts from emerging economies?Slowing growth and shifting sources ->What are the side effects of KBC-driven growth?How to create conditions for knowledge-based growth and which are the side effects of that? (Example: inequality)Rising environmental damages -> How big, how fast and what can we do?
  • #10 Consequences of convergence?Multipolarity (but preference convergence?) -> How will potential for global economic coordination develop as multipolarity increases and income levels converge?Increasing spillovers for OECD countries from EMEs (example migration)-> How should OECD economies adjust policies to rising impacts from emerging economies?Slowing growth and shifting sources ->What are the side effects of KBC-driven growth?How to create conditions for knowledge-based growth and which are the side effects of that? (Example: inequality)Rising environmental damages -> How big, how fast and what can we do?
  • #11 Global trade composition will shift in line with global GDP (gravity)Trade intensity will increase (transport costs and trade barriers)Integration in other dimensions less clear (FDI, global value chains)Rising global integration will affect the effectiveness of national policies in some areas (Technology support, taxation, stabilisation policies).
  • #12 Less need (and room for) national stabilisation policiesLarger international demand and supply spillovers
  • #13 Consequences of convergence?Multipolarity (but preference convergence?) -> How will potential for global economic coordination develop as multipolarity increases and income levels converge?Increasing spillovers for OECD countries from EMEs (example migration)-> How should OECD economies adjust policies to rising impacts from emerging economies?Slowing growth and shifting sources ->What are the side effects of KBC-driven growth?How to create conditions for knowledge-based growth and which are the side effects of that? (Example: inequality)Rising environmental damages -> How big, how fast and what can we do?
  • #14 MFP driven growth = Skill-biased technical change (skilled individuals benefit more from technology than less-skilled, although the latter may not lose in an absolute sense) since IR took off. In 2060 earning inequality in the OECD average at US current levels, Nordics at OECD average.Almost all between D9/D5 (high-medium)Further impact by rising capital shares?
  • #15 Extended Tinbergen-model (race between technology and education) or race between technology, education and per capita income. SBTC=Global trend + MFPPolicies:Stopping technological progress is futile. Little knowledge of whether policies could support a path of less skill-biased technological change without harming growth.Regulations and labour market institutions can at best mitigate the increase, but at severe costs for growth.Rising earning inequalities leads to higher pay-offs in education. Can education policies address rising inequalities? Which, how to fund, and labour market policies as complements?More redistributive policies may be needed, but how can they be pursued in a more integrated world economy with tight fiscal constraints?
  • #16 Consequences of convergence?Multipolarity (but preference convergence?) -> How will potential for global economic coordination develop as multipolarity increases and income levels converge?Increasing spillovers for OECD countries from EMEs (example migration)-> How should OECD economies adjust policies to rising impacts from emerging economies?Slowing growth and shifting sources ->What are the side effects of KBC-driven growth?How to create conditions for knowledge-based growth and which are the side effects of that? (Example: inequality)Rising environmental damages -> How big, how fast and what can we do?
  • #17 A doubling of emissionsShifting economic balances leads to shifts in emissions.A 1.5-4.5 degrees C increase in temperatures by 2060Locked-in further temperature increases and larger damages
  • #18 Global GDP -0.7 to – 2.5%Large regional variation (and uncertainty)Mainly lost output in terms of agriculture productivity, but also flooding, health, tourism)
  • #19 Consequences of convergence?Multipolarity (but preference convergence?) -> How will potential for global economic coordination develop as multipolarity increases and income levels converge?Increasing spillovers for OECD countries from EMEs (example migration)-> How should OECD economies adjust policies to rising impacts from emerging economies?Slowing growth and shifting sources ->What are the side effects of KBC-driven growth?How to create conditions for knowledge-based growth and which are the side effects of that? (Example: inequality)Rising environmental damages -> How big, how fast and what can we do?
  • #20 May rising income and wage levels in EMEs may slow and even reverse migration towards OECD?Demography is seen as “the only thing we know in the future”. This is only true if we “know” migration patterns.
  • #21 Gravity model analysis suggest that inflows may dry out (and even reverse?), with grave consequences for host countries (LF -20% e.g. in EA in 2060)Policy conclusions:Don’t make promises based on such projections (e.g. pension systems). Applies more generally to population uncertainty. E.g. DB pension systems may be better.More immigration friendly policies may be needed (immigration and labour markets)Recent OECD analysis show that work-related migration is sensitive to economic returns -> inward migration to the OECD may slow as GDP per capita differences vis-à-vis emerging economies diminishes? -> economic impacts in OECD and emerging economies -> policy responses:Migration and structural policies to encourage work-related migration?Structural reforms to make institutions and economies more resilient to migration-risk?