This document discusses individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and their impacts on fisheries sustainability and ecosystems. It notes that while ITQs can prevent stock collapse by providing incentives for sustainable harvest, they may lead to quota accumulation by non-fishery companies. The document also examines the impacts of bottom trawling on fish stock productivity and ecosystems, noting scientific evidence shows very low trawling intensities can slightly increase fish food production, but higher intensities negatively impact benthic habitats and species composition. In conclusion, it questions how ITQs can balance economics, society and ecosystems, and how scientists can best communicate the subtle effects of seafloor disturbance to fishermen.

1. Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research
www.ilvo.vlaanderen.be
Agriculture and Fisheries Policy Area
Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research
From right-based catch shares
to benthic impacts
ALTER-NET Target 4: Ensure the sustainability of fisheries
Gent, Belgium
18 april 2013
Jochen Depestele

2. Statement 2: Rights-based catch shares can
provide incentives for sustainable harvest that is
less prone to collapse. It can, however, lead to
accumulation of fishery property rights in non-
fishery related companies.
Statement 3: Bottom trawling and the seafloor
disturbance resulting from it enhances fish stock
productivity and is essential for productive fish
stocks and economically viable fisheries.
2 statements: first
ALTER - Net 2

3. ALTER - Net 3(c) Costello et al. (2012a - Nature)

4. ITQ management
prevents stock collapse
Why ITQs in fisheries?
 World fisheries with biomass below MSY:
63 – 64%
(c) Costello et al. (2012b - Science)
(c) Worm et al. (2009 - Science)
Unassessed stocks
Assessed stocks
Median B/BMSY
(c) Costello et al. (2008 - Science)

5. Why ITQs in CFP? (1)
Jo’burg WSSD 2002: Fishing at MSY by 2015
Decrease in nr of vessels since ITQs (1996: cod trawlers;
<1996: indirect quota trading via boat licenses)
(c) Hannesson et al. (2013)
Assessed EU stocks (2008) outside ‘safe’ limits
(c) EEA
Reduce overcapacity
5
Past policies did NOT work:
(e.g. €2.7 billion for scrapping)
still 3% ↑ in fishing capacity
Self-regulating
mechanism (ITQ)
91% of EU stocks will not meet
the MSY target by 2015 under
current fishing pressure
(Froese & Proelb, 2010)

6. Why ITQs in CFP? (2)
Plan fishing along market developments
Increase responsibility
of fishermen
Flexibility to comply
with discard ban
O:overfishedspecieswithrestrictiveallowablecatches
Q:speciesunderITQmanagement
R:speciesthatcannotbelanded
(c) Branch et al. (2006)

7. Prevention of stock collapse is not guaranteed !
ITQs reduce variability in exploitation rate
ALTER - Net 7
So, what’s the catch?
Yes! I want to be a
fisherman...
What’s the catch? Maybe an ITQ red
herring . . . ?
(A) BC petrale sole; (B) SE Australia school whiting; (C) New Zealand red rock lobster.
(c) Essington et al. (2012)
ITQ ITQ ITQ

8. Strong effect in multi-species fisheries with full
observer coverage! enforcement!
ITQs reduce variability in exploitation rate
IF
 EXCLUSIVITY and
 DURABILITY/SECURITY
Take care of your babies, fishermen!
ALTER - Net 8
So, what’s the catch?

9. It’s not all roses there... 1) evaluation?
What about ITQs in EU?
 NS Beam trawlers in NL and B (target: PLE/SOL)
Licensing
max days@sea
...
B+NL
max fishing
capacity
NL Biesheuvel
informal
NL ITQ
Official?
NL ITQ
B+NL: schemes for
decommissioning, ...
B: IQs, based on kW
209 (1990) > 107 (2006)
Fish capacity ↓ slightly
NL: fleet reduction
from days@sea

10. It’s not all roses there... 1) evaluation?
What about ITQs in EU?
 NS Beam trawlers in NL and B (target: PLE/SOL)
Licensing
max days@sea
...
B+NL: fleet reduction
B+NL
max fishing
capacity
(c) ICES
informal
NL ITQ
NL Biesheuvel
Official?
NL ITQ

11. It’s not all roses there... 2) relative stability?
NS Beam trawlers in NL
 Fleet rationalisation quota-hopping
(c) Hatcher et al. (2002); Van Hoof (2013)
1988 > 1998
+ 133 vessels
- 161 decommissioned
- 176 withdrawals (UK flag)
0
20
40

12. ALTER - Net 12
It’s not all roses there...
(c) Arnason (2005);
(c) Benediktsson and Karlsdóttir (2011)
3) Social equity
4) active fishermen

13. ALTER - Net 13
What can catch shares accomplish?
Q-value: Quality of property rights
 Durability
 Security
 Exclusivity
 Transferability
(c) MRAG (2009)
BUT!
social issues
. . .

14. ALTER - Net 14
But again, it’s not all roses there...
What about the ecosystem?
(besides overfishing)
Ecosystem objectives:
 ‘fishy’ ITQs:
• limits on fishing capacity
• =~ limits on effort
• = insufficient to meet ecosystem objectives
 How can the fishing industry be involved in
achieving GES? Incentive-based management?

15. ALTER - Net 15
Ideas for incentive-based EAFM?
Expand ITQs for all species?
TAC adjustment based on trade-offs,
interactions with non-target species
 Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery
Create Individual Habitat Quota? Real-Time
Incentives?
 Holland & Schnier (2006);
 Kraak et al. (2012)
with bycatch penalties2009 ETBF fishing effort
(c)Bax,2010

16. Statement 2: Rights-based catch shares can
provide incentives for sustainable harvest that is
less prone to collapse. It can, however, lead to
accumulation of fishery property rights in non-
fishery related companies.
Statement 3: Bottom trawling and the seafloor
disturbance resulting from it enhances fish stock
productivity and is essential for productive fish
stocks and economically viable fisheries.
2 statements: second
ALTER - Net 16

17. Seafloor impacts
ALTER - Net 17
Seafloor impacts Fishermen’s perspectives
Plaice box failed, from
‘90s onwards...
“Farming the sea!”
Question 1:
How can science assess
the influence of sea floor
disturbance on fish stock
productivity and the
marine ecosystem?

18. ALTER - Net 18
From short-term to long-term monitoring…
1) BACI-experiments:
Short-term mortality, scavenging, etc.
2) Modelling
Combination of short-term empirical data
through algorithms
3) Effort comparisons
Long-term, historical data
Spatially
Seafloor impacts Scientific assessments

19. ALTER - Net 19
Differences in direct mortality
Differences in recovery potential
Shift in species composition, abundance &
productivity
~ gear
~ habitat
~ traits
TotalproductionTurnoverrate
(c) Jennings et al. (2001)
Seafloor impacts Scientific assessments

20. Food dependence of fish productivity?
(c) Rijnsdorp & Vingerhoed (2001)
Slight increase in fish food
production at very low trawling
intensities
(c) Hiddink et al. (2008)
Seafloor impacts ~ fish stock productivity?

21. Plaice length ~ age + food + density + effort
(c) Shephard et al. (2010)
74% otter and 26% beam47% otter and 53% beam
Plaice: polychaetes as foodPlaice: <3% polychaetes as food
Seafloor impacts ~ fish stock productivity?

22. Statement 2: How can ITQs be used to combine
economics, society and ecosystems?
 ITQs = economic efficient
 ITQs = social drama?
 ITQs = What about other ecosystem objectives
besides overfishing?
Statement 3:
 Ploughing the seafloor:
How can we communicate the subtle effects and
the (sometimes contradicting) and ‘difficult’
scientific results on the effects of seafloor
disturbance with fishermen?
2 questions in ‘conclusion’
ALTER - Net 22

23. Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research
www.ilvo.vlaanderen.be
Agriculture and Fisheries Policy Area
Institute for Agricultural and Fisheries Research
From right-based catch shares
to benthic impacts
Jochen.Depestele@ilvo.vlaanderen.be