This document provides an overview and instructions for an 11-part presentation on Japan's road to war and the Battle of Midway. It includes details about Japanese and American forces involved in the battle, as well as insights uncovered through code breaking. Key points covered include the size and organization of the Japanese fleet, the aircraft and defenses available on Midway Island, and how the US code breakers were able to deduce that Midway was the target by analyzing a message about its water purification problems. The document aims to educate viewers about the events and decisions that led to the pivotal Battle of Midway through a slideshow approach with questions and discussions.
Judging the Relevance and worth of ideas part 2.pptx
Battle of Midway planning (aka part 9 of 11)
1. Please preview in “Slide Show” mode.
Do not view in “edit” mode.
In “Slide Show” mode the single sentences are presented one at a
time according to the instructor’s timing. Each sentence
can lead to a discussion or question. If all sentences are
presented with one “click”, the class will be overwhelmed
with information.
In the “edit mode” there are too many sentences and too many
words to create interest-but would create boredom.
Do not advance to the next slide until the star appears in
the lower right portion of the slide.
Again, when the star appears in the lower right portion of the
slide then the next “click” will advance to the next slide.
For the instructor………………….
A indicates a multiple choice question with the range of choices listed.
2. Part 1 of 11: “Japan’s Road to War”
Introduction and suggestions
for slide display: slides 1-3
Introduction to “Japan’s Road to War”: 4-5
The Culture and history to 1900 : 6-13
Admiral Perry’s Visit
Westernization
Washington Naval Conference-1922: 14-17
Earthquake of 1923: 18-23
The Conspiracy and the Courts: 24-26
Gekokujo-Assassination and the courts: 27-30
Depression and control of government: 31-35
The rise of the Hot-Heads: 36-40
Projects and Questions: 41-42
Part 2 of 11: “Japan’s Road to
War” .Introduction and suggestions for slide
display: slides 1-2
Outline: 3
Manchuria Railway : 9
Mukden: 11-13
Occupation of Manchuria: 14-18
May 15th
1932 Incident: 19-20
February 25th
1936 Incident: 21-28
Courts decisions: 29-33
Part 3 of 11: “Japan’s Road to War”
Intro and the “blame” list: slides 4-5
Review: 5-8
Desire for Expansion: 9-16
Manchuria and China: 17-19
Japanese and American relations: 19-24
Japanese brutality: 25-27
The Emperor: 28-29
Control of the military: 30
Conclusion: 31,32
Instructions
Outlines
Yamamoto
Expansion plans
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of influence
Plans for Pearl Harbor
The Japanese soldier
Comparing Japanese virtues
to American virtues.
Part 4 of 11: “Japan’s Road to War”
Part 5 of 11: “Japan’s Road to War
Who to blame
Pearl Harbor planning
The Warnings
Destruction
Results
Part 6 of 11: “Japan’s Road to War”
Results of December 7th
, 1941
Evaluate Militaries of Japan and USA
The Battleships
Japan expansion into Southwest Pacific
Doolittle Raid
Plan for Port Moresby
Part 7 of 11: “Battle of Coral Sea”
Part 8 of 11: Plan for Midway
Study the carriers-
Study the sailors-
Industrial Tsunami
Part 9 of 11
Pre-Battle
planning:
Battle of
Midway
• The Opposing Forces
• Carrier strength
• Broken Code
5. KIDO BUTAIThe Japanese Combined Fleet for Midway Operation
Combined Fleet Commander: Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto
Chief of Staff: Matome Ugaki
1st
Midway Strike Force:
Adm. Chiichi Nagumo
2 battleships: Hiei, Kongo
4 cruisers: Atago, Chukai,
Haguro, Myoko
8 destroyers
4 tankers
Invasio n Fo rce :
Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo
15 transports (5000 men) under
RearAdm. Raizo Tanaka
5 cruisers
10 destroyers
3 seaplane tenders
Carrier Divisions- 2nd
Attack Force
Adm Chiichi Nagumo
Chief of Staff: Ryunosuki Kusaka
Chief of Flight Ops: Tamora Genda
Carrier Div 1: Nagumo with two carriers
Akagi: Com Taijiro Aoki
Flight Com. Shogo Masuda
Kaga: Com Jisaku Okada
Flight Com. Takahisa Amagai
Carrier Div 2: Com Tamar Yamaguchi with two carriers
Hiryu: Com Tomeo Kaku
Flight Com. Susumo Kawaguchi
Soryu: Com Ryasaku Yanaginoto
Flight Com. Ikuto Kusumoto
3 cruisers; 12 destroyers; 8 tankers
This list should
impress you.
And there is more!
6. Cruiser Division 7(fire support group): Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita
4 Heavy Cruisers :Kumano, Suzuga, Mikuma, Mogami,
a mine-sweeper and an ammunition ship.
Screening Group: Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura
including heavy carrier Zuiho
Main Body in backup: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
(to follow behind Nagumo’s carrier fleet.)
2 Battleships: Musashi, Yamato
Fire Support Group: ViceAdm Takeo Kurita
4 heavy cruisers: Kumano, Suzuga, Mikuma, Mogame
mine sweeper, ammunition ship
Screening Force: RearAdm Shintaro Hashimoto
1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 3 oilers
The IGHQ in Tokyo
had added to the Midway plan with an invasion of two
islands in the Aleutian chain. Yamamoto had disagreed with the plan
but made a deal with Tokyo to approve his Midway Operation.
ICHQ is the military leader’s headquartered in Tokyo-usually at odds with Yamamoto.
9. Advance Question-only for experts
Match the carrier with the commander:
USS Enterprise Adm Frank Fletcher
USS Yorktown Radm Raymond Spruance
USS Hornet Captain Marc Mitscher
USS Enterprise:
Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance
USS Yorktown:
Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
USS Hornet:
Captain Marc Mitscher
10. On Midway Island 19 677
And..
B-17s 17
B-26s 4
PBYs 31
Guess the numbers in the three columns for Midway Island.
Your goal should be to get within five in each column.each column.
NUM
BERS
86 128 49
11. Transports
Destroyers
oilers
Battleships
Cruisers
Light Cruisers
Giant battleships
Carriers
231 attack planes
227 attack planes
Plus
5000 troops
MIDWAY
ISLAND
Many planes
key
The numbers of symbols for
the ships will correlate with
earlier lists!
Curious? Check it out.
Be a champion of the brutally honest……………………………
does this appear to be a fair fight?
You now know the Japanese and US Fleet strengths.
Look at them now as “game pieces”
If you commanded the US Fleet could you develop a plan that
might win?
It is a chess game; a board game; an electronic game…..
12. Midway Islands29 Wildcat fighters
16 Dauntless dive bombers
17 Devastator torpedo
bombers
4 Army B-26 bombers
23 PBY scout planes
US FLEET
Japanese Fleet.
17 B-17 heavy bombers
Aware of a possible
move by the
Japanese on
Midway, the US
Army and Navy
send more planes
to the island.
13. Nagumo’s strike force was ahead of Yamamoto and the giant
battleship Yamato as they neared Midway.
Question: Why did Yamamoto keep the Yamato and its
screening ships in the rear , letting Nagumo’s smaller fleet
lead the move toward Midway and the US carriers?
a.They weren’t “in the rear”, they were only one mile behind and
could quickly get to the action within a few minutes.
b.In order to “trap” the American carriers he had to sacrifice
Nagumo’s force.
c.If he put the Yamato in the lead the Americans would probably
not sortie out into the open.
d.If the Yamato was in the lead and was sunk, Yamamoto would
not be able explain the loss to the Emperor.
16. MIDWAY
JAPAN
Transport Group-
Tanaka
Strike Force: Nagumo
CarDiv 1,2,and 5: 6 aircraft carriers
2 Battleships; 2 heavy cruisers; 11 destroyers
Air attack on the island followed by landing of troops;
1500 on Sand Island, 1000 on Eastern Is.
Main Body Invasion force;
- Kondo
battleships:
heavy cruisers:
Screen Group- Nishimura
including heavy carrier Zuiho
Screen Group- Nishimura
including a heavy carrier
The Japanese Midway Operation Totals:
aircraft carriers 6, battleships 11, submarines 13,
cruisers many, destroyers many
oilers, supply ships, transports, scouting sea planes, midget submarines.
Main Body in backup-
Yamamoto
17. Yamamoto’s
Entire
Plan
The decisive battle, as Yamamoto
envisioned it, would be fought
somewhere off Midway,
with the main Japanese forces
arrayed so as to intercept the
incoming Americans.
After pounding Midway, Nagumo
would withdraw and wait some 500
miles north-northeast of Midway,
with Yamamoto's main Body
supporting him 300 miles to the
west.
Draw the Americans out of
hiding at Pearl Harbor
and lure them west,
with the Japanese heavy
forces lurking out of range of
American reconnaissance
aircraft and submarines.
Question: What is the importance of “500miles”?
a.None, just a random distance.
b.Out of range of Allied aircraft from Midway.
c.Within air range of their own invasion fleet.
d.300 miles from Yamamoto, who would provide
protection if needed.
19. Criticism of Yamamoto’s plan
for the Battle of Midway
Check off any or all from the following list that would be considered a fair and justifiable criticism of Yamamoto’s plan.
a. The plan was too complicated
. b. The Aleutians operation was a waste of energy;
the US would pay little attention to it.
c. The Japanese leadership believed the Americans were too
demoralized and exhausted to defend Midway.
d. Yamamoto would not place his heavy battleships at the front of the battle.
e. Splitting his fleets between the Alaska operation and the Midway operation
would weaken both fleets.
f. Holding back the Yamato is sign of cowardice.
g. Only one month after the Battle of Coral Sea
h. The crews and the pilots are exhausted from the last six months of effort.
8 choices, a-h.
Answer:
a
b
g
h
21. Q: What weapon was the KEY for
USA to holding on in the Pacific?
b. Island Air Bases
c. Tanks d.
Battleships
e.
Submarines
a. Aircraft
Carrier
s
f.
Bombers
g.Nuclear
Bomb
22. U.S. Navy Torpedo Squadron Six (VT-6) aircraft are prepared for launching on USS Enterprise (CV-6) at about 0730-
0740 hrs, 4 June 1942.
Eleven of the fourteen TBDs launched from Enterprise are visible. Three more TBDs and ten F4F fighters must still be
pushed into position before launching can begin.
Live on the Enterprise!
23. a. They were still on the west coast.
b. Not enough sailors available.
c. Too slow.
d. Not enough guns to help.
The remaining cruisers
were WW I vintage, too
slow and couldn't keep up
with the carriers. C.
24. There are just
7
US Aircraft
Carriers.
Which of the 7 are available for the Midway
Operation?
LEXINGTON-
SARATOGA-
ENTERPRISE-
HORNET-
?
25.
26. Another key to the outcome of the midway confrontation was the successful
code breaking of the Japanese naval code (JN 25) by the code breakers in Hawaii.
Colonel Joe Rochefort led the group of 120 code breakers.
? % of the Japanese messages were being intercepted? GUESS!
Answer: 60%
Only ? % of those were analyzed as there just wasn’t enough time and not enough
personnel. GUESS!
Answer 40%
Only ?% to ?% made any sense, but when combined with scouting and spy network
reporting of traffic by the Japanese ships led to success. GUESS!
Answer 10% to 15%
Review.
How
do we
arrive at
10%
to 15%?
27. Breaking
the
Japanes
e
Code
Ed Layton
Joe Rochefort
Pearl
Harbor
Code
Breakers
These two men and
their crews had a
major part in not just
the victory at Midway,
but in the total victory
effort over Japan
itself.
Layton and Rochefort
are true heroes of the American
effort in the war in the Pacific
Their exploits and discoveries were kept in secret,
classified, even after the war ended.
It might be interesting to discuss why their efforts were
kept from the public, and how the lack of recognition
might have troubled Layton and Rochefort.
28. Thepreviously broken Japanesecode
hasrevealed intentionsof amajor move
somewherein thePacific.
Question: List the Japanese “intentions”.
That is, …….where might they be headed?
The answer, according to the cryptologists:
1. Philippines
2. Australia
3. Midway
4. Pearl Harbor, again.
5. Port Moresby, again.
5 choices
29. Midway sent a broadcast in the open that they were having
trouble with their desalinization plant that makes drinking
water.
Question: can you put the pieces together and figure out how the
message would help us discover the Japanese target?
Try. Any Ideas? Any?
The code-breakers, led by Layton and Rochefort, have found the location of the
Japanese “intention”. In code, it is “AF”.
But where is “AF”?
We know that “AL” is Port Moresby, but no clue as to where “AF” is.
They had to find out and soon.
Question: How did they discover the location of the Japanese major move?
a. Believing the Japanese knew we had broken their code, we
gave up trying to determine where “AF” was. We will
discover the location by other means.
b. Assuming “L” represents a longitude, and “L” notes Port Moresby, then
“F” is a longitude that notes Midway.
c. Send a message in the clear (not in code) to Hawaii from Midway
ordering a new water distiller to replace their broken one.
d. Send a message in the clear (not in code) that we have broken their
code and now “know” that the target is Midway.
The logic is exquisite .
One of you must see it, maybe more.
You must try.
30. The code-breaker’s group discovered the location of the major Japanese
attack……………………………………………………………”AF”,
…but they didn’t know where “AF” was.
Now for the answer:
A coded Japanese message was intercepted,
broken and read in English…………………………………….
“ ‘AF’ hAving trouble with their
desAlinizAtion plAnt.”
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Confirmed; the Japanese will attack
MIDWAY!
31. Q: Why would the Japanese even care if Midway was
having trouble with their water purification plant?
a. They didn't care, but every message intercepted was to be sent to Tokyo.
b. If the invasion was successful they would need water.
c. Counter espionage- they were trying to fool American intelligence
knowing that they had found out what “AF” means.
d. Water trouble for the Americans meant the invasion would be easier to
accomplish.
And………the answer is…..
The Japanese who occupy Midway will need fresh water too!