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2 dsldp sem3_session_04_leading in a global
- 2. Click the image below to launch Adobe Connect Once in, click the Enter as a Guest option and type in your name. Then click Enter Room .
- 9. Recall the trends that are shaping the global environment? Looking at Trends
- 19. The Changing Nature of Conflict That was then This is now
- 23. What other strategic trends did you identify from your pre-readings?
- 30. The U.S. Role Can we afford to get involved? Is it in our national interests to get involved? When should we intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state? What allies and organizations should be involved? Who should take the lead?
- 32. What Should Be the U.S. Role in Other Nations ’ Conflicts? Search for common ground to avoid conflict (NGOs) Our intervention only prolongs the conflict We must intervene—but at the right time
- 35. Frameworks for Considering the Question of When and How to Intervene Realist Liberal Constructivist
- 41. What is required to lead successfully in the global environment?
- 43. To what extent does the U.S. have the right to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign nation? And in what circumstances is it in the U.S. interest to do so?
Editor's Notes
- Time for this session: 2 hours
- In your pre-work and pre-readings, you got a lot of information about the global environment, building on what you already know. In this session, we ’ll work together to process all that information so you have a complete picture of the global environment. Then you’ll present your responses to the question of U.S. intervention in sovereign nations.
- In this session, you ’ll consider and answer these questions.
- Here ’s approximately how much time we’ll spend on each topic in this session .
- On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, killing him and the President of Burundi. The Hutu extremists and the Tutsi RPF blamed each other for the attack, but the source of the attack has never been determined. This event destabilized conditions in Rwanda, effectively ending the 1993 ceasefire.
- Within an hour of President Habyarimana’s assassination, elements of the Rwanda armed forces and extremist militia set up roadblocks and barricades and began systematically to kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus. To stop the killings and rescue their own troops in Kigali, the RPF, exiled in Uganda, pushed across the border and began to take control of the country. Click the link (RPF pushes into Rwanda) to see how the RPF methodically gained control over Rwanda.
- Some of the key factors in the Rwanda conflict included: The Akazu: They were the Hutu elite—family members and friends of President Habyarimana. They were willing to do anything to avoid losing political and economic power and prestige. Their ideology contributed to the Genocide of 1994. Also, their desire to retain power made the peace process difficult because they viewed any step toward peace as a loss of power. The Interahamwe: To fight the RPF, the Hutus established paramilitary organizations called Interahamwe, which means “those who stand/work/fight/attack together.” During the Genocide, these organizations slaughtered the Rwandan Tutsi population, as well as Hutu moderates. Propaganda: The Akazu had control over the Radio et Television Libres Milles Colines (RTLM), which spread ethnic hate messages, demonizing Tutsis as “cockroaches” infesting the country. Not a real coalition: Although Habyarimana technically represented the militias at the Arusha peace agreement, he did not have adequate control over the Akazu or Interahamwe to enforce their compliance with Arusha. Arusha did not address this internal opposition. Public office and law enforcement: Public office and law enforcement were disproportionately Hutu, dating back to the 1970s. Police/judicial officials/church officials all participated in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi population. Arusha did not attempt to alter judicial/police structure, just the military/government structure. UN Mission: The U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (USAMIR) failed to deploy according to the schedule laid out in Arusha. It did not have: Enough personnel to act as an impartial police force The equipment or the mandate to enforce the ceasefire The capacity to defend itself (Interahamwe targeted peacekeepers) No Intelligence capability: Since the UN had no Intelligence capability in Rwanda, the UNAMIR was unable to investigate the signals of impending violence.
- Rwanda was never considered important to U.S. national interests. So, while President Clinton and other Government officials decried what was happening in Rwanda, they chose not to commit U.S. resources to stopping it. Still reeling from bad experiences in Somalia, the Clinton Administration was hesitant to become embroiled in another such intervention. National Security Advisor Tony Lake explained the U.S. stance on Rwanda: “When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict. I want to work to save every child out there. And I know the President does, and I know the American people do. But neither we nor the international community have the resources nor the mandate to do so. So we have to make distinctions. We have to ask the hard questions about where and when we can intervene. And the reality is that we cannot often solve other people’s problems; we can never build their nations for them....” This philosophy was the underpinning of the lack of U.S. response to the Rwandan Genocide. Officials met daily throughout the crisis and collected information but ultimately chose not to act on that information. Overall, the response from the UN and the entire international community was minimal. Ultimately, the French took it upon themselves to enter Rwanda from Zaire and set up a “humanitarian zone” to provide a safe haven for civilians. The consequences of U.S. and UN inaction was that in 100 days, almost 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutus were slaughtered. Ultimately, the RPF defeated the Hutu government and set up an interim government, which still rules today. Click on the U.S. Response link for a more in-depth analysis of the U.S. and international response over the 100 days of the conflict.