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Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress
Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
I. — General Provisions
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

2. Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a systemof initiative and referendum to directly propose,enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances,or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative
body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.It
may be of two classes,namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories.It shall be in a form
to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod,Sangguniang Bayan, and
Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may
be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country,
autonomous regions,provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number
of the registered voters,of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

3. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) o f
the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents ortext of the proposed law sought to be enacted,approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures ofthe petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous
region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent um
(3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative
district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition
therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum(3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration.— The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a
scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verificationof Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters,
voters'affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
II. — National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or
referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of t he petition,
publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative
or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

4. Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition.— (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or
rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the
Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast,the national law proposed
for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the
proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast,the said national law shall be deemed repealed
and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the
certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaperof general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and
effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose s hall
become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution,
cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative.— Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives,and other legislative bodies.The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes
and contents ofthe bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of
Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal.— The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative
or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
III. — Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative.— (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous
regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of
barangays,may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption,en actment,
repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation,the proponents
through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the
local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated
representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

5. (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of
provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays,from notice
mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative,in the presence of a
representative of the proponent,and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a
public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in
as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local government
unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the
required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which th e
proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety
(90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous
regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days
in case of barangays.The initiative shall then be held on the date set,after which the results thereof shall be certified and
proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast,it shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and
local executive concerned.If it fails to obtain said number of votes,the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitationson Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented,t he
initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner
herein provided.
Section 16. LimitationsUpon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system
of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned
within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three
(3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays,the period shall be
one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the
registered voters of autonomous region, provinces,cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held underthe control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities,
forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the
said measure.
IV. — Final Provisions

6. SECTION 19. Applicability ofthe Omnibus ElectionCode. — The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes ofthis Act.
Section 21. Appropriations.— The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged
against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the
full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional,the otherparts or provisions
thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Approved:August 4, 1989
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list systemof registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors,organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party systemin order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or g roup interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.

7. Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list systemis a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies fo r
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/orelection purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the
Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than
ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes ofthe party -list
systemby filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secret ary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list systemas a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall includ e labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,women, youth,veterans,overseas workers, and
professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/orCancellation ofRegistration.The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral part y, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

8. (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum(2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list systemin the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified
list of national, regional, or sectoralparties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to
participate underthe party-list systemand distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day.
The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC
not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall
be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The
list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately
preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been
submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitate d
in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list systemshall not be considered resigned.
Section 9. Qualificationsof Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immed iately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector,he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
the election. Any youth sectoralrepresentative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to contin ue in office
until the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Mannerof Voting. Every votershall be entitled to two (2) votes:the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House
of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second,a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the
house of Representatives:Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not
be counted:Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list systemshall be held in May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes ofeducating the electorate on the matter of the
party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those underthe party-list.
For purposes ofthe May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in th e House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party -list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.

9. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seatsfor Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis,rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as ag ainst the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representativesare Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the
list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shallbe elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6)
months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy.In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives,the vacancy shall be automatically filled by
the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or
coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit
additional nominees.
Section 17. Rightsof Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as
regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes ofthis Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations
for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and otheravailable funds for purposes ofits information
campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional,the other parts or provisions thereof shall
remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaperof general circulation.
Approved,March 3, 1995.
CASES:
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

10. ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS,
JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong,herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute,the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressionalrepresentative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill wh ich
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked
whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No.
7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted
"no." By virtue of these results,R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutionalfor being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage ofthis Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shallbecome the new legislative district of San Juan with its first
representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as
enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution,to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressionaldistrict of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats
of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats
of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution,which provide, to wit :
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,and on the basis of a

11. uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list systemof
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressionaldistricts underSection 49 of the assailed
law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion ofMandaluyong in to a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city -one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,oreach province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutionalmandate that the creation of a separate congressionaldistrict for the City
of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion,the creation of a separate congressionaldistrict for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence ofits conversion into a
highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly
Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated underSection 49 regarding the creation of
a separate congressionaldistrict for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutionalrequirement as now expressed
in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction.It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]),
to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutionaldemand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation"
(emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutionalissues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any
census to showthat Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressionalprocesses,including due consideration by the members of Congress
of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws
emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution,a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not

12. absolute.The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressionalrepresentation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus,in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section
49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative dis tricts, the
said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated
upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to
itself.
Aside from the constitutionalobjections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in th e plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus,the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of
status ofneighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating
legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it
should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the authorof the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district,having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong,Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla,Regalado,Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,Kapunan and Mendoza,JJ., conc ur.
Feliciano,J., is on leave.
Case Digest on Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with the national elections. One
hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed
thirteen party-list representatives from twelve parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system.
Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for their own proclamations. Hence,
COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved,the
proclaimed parties asked the SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats,so that each of them wo uld
have three party-list reps.
HELD:
1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? SC: The 20% allocation is only a ceiling
and not mandatory.
2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? SC: Yes.
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system.

13. 3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? SC: As to the method of allocating additional seats,
the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes
as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list systemis then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the
total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives.Thereafter, those garnering more than two percent
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.The formula for additional s eats of other
qualified parties is: no.of votes of concerned party divided by no.of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated
to the first party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. ( 5% = 2 seats ). The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees
with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719)
FACTS:
The COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list elections.
April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted
from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sectoral Parties/Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses,and that
latter’s nominees not be proclaimed
April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents.
April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution no. 3785
May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list elections2.Whether or not the party- list systemis exclusive to
‘marginalized and underrepresented’sectors and organizations3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
HELD:
This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings
on the qualifications of the party- list participants.
BANAT VS. COMELEC
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’snational board of canvassers to declare the petition moot
andacademic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved
using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

14. (3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political
parties participate in the party-list elections?
Held:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in
the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House
of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the
available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party -list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided tocontinue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Aquino III V. Comelec
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutionalof Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts.
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutionals tandard
that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely
on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.The provisio n reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional,because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

15. Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutionalrequirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no otherconclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only re quired
for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and up on
creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus,Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; o r
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable
income requirement.
Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC
July 16, 2008
Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054,
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district
of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to
“clarify the status ofCotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under
MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 “maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City
as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.”
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May
10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as “Shariff Kabunsan Province withCotabato City”.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City” prayed for the nullification of Resolution
No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing ofvotes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsu an is
entitled to one representative in Congress underSec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.

16. Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,cities,
municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created underSec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
“No province,city, municipality,or barangay may be created,divided,merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the v otescast
in a plebiscite in the political unitsdirectly affected.”
Thus,the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions:First, the creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the
Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional,
provided the criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, “only x x x anAct of Congress” can create provinces, cities,
or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
“Each City with a population ofat least 250,000,or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the House of
Representatives.”
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
“Any province that may hereafter be created,or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member”.
Thus,only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the Constitution and Sec.3of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives,and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law
the Congress itself enacts,not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative bodies. The “power of redistricting xxx is
traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress)to make laws”, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC,
242 SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created it. Congress is a
national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercisedby Congress
itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall
have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution
expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only “within its territorial jurisdiction.” (Nothing
in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)

17. It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus,MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan,is void.
G.R. NO. 203818-19: AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (“AKB”) VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC
FACTS: Petitioner AKB is a regional political party with three incumbent partylist representatives in the 15th Congress. On October
10, 2012, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution cancelling the accreditation of petitioner as a partylist candidate in the 2013
elections. AKB filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Injunction to assail the same COMELEC Resolution.
ARGUMENTS:
1. COMELEC has no power to determine the qualifications of party list representatives;
2. COMELEC ignored petitioner’s evidence showing that it represents marginalized and underrepresented constituencies;
3. COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled
petitioner’s accreditation as a party list on the arbitrary assumption that to be qualified as a PARTY-LIST, petitioner must
represent financially poor and destitute constituents
4. The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” does not necessarily refer to sectors mentioned in the Constitution or to
LGBTs but to those who are unable to win in district elections but in a different arena and with different constituency, can
compete in the part list system
5. COMELEC’s questioned resolution does not show that petitioner violated the provisions of RA 7941, sec. 6, so as to warrant
the cancellation of its accreditation as a PARTY-LIST
6. Chairman Brillantes’ opinion that because petitioner does not represent any of the sectors mentioned in the constitution or
RA 7941, it is an ordinary political party that would duplicate the function of the district representative and will give the
districts in the Bicol Region greater representation in the House, is without any basis
PRAYER/S:
1. Immediately issue a TRO and/or Writ of Injunction, enjoining the COMELEC and those acting for and/or under it from
implementing the Resolution dated 10 October 2012, from continuing any further proceedings relevant to, arising out of, or
in connection with the same
2. After further proceedings, grant the petition (a) declaring respondent COMELEC to have acted without jurisdiction in issuing
its 10 October 2012 Resolution; (b) declaring the assailed Resolution null and void and of no force and effect, for having
been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction; (c) ordering the respondent COMELEC to reinstate petitioner’s accreditation
as a party list qualified to participate in the 13 May 2012 elections; (d) ordering the COMELEC to include the petitioner in
the List of Candidates and in the official ballots and other materials to be used in the conduct of the 13 May 2013 elections;
and (e) declaring the injunction permanent. Petitioner prays for such further and other reliefs as may be just and equitable
under the premises.
WHEREFORE, 54 petitions are granted.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On
March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the
petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29,

18. 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in
said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a
resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Marcos.
Held:
For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner,
despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the
following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Taclobanbecame petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal orchange of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the
absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife
does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new
one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice.
AQUINO vs COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementio ned district
for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days.The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May.
Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration on the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue.On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutionalqualification of residence.
Issue:
Whether“residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the
position in the electoral district.
Held:
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes ofelection law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate
of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium
unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac
and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative fo the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
En Banc

19. Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electo ral
Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressionalelection for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent,Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
Ratio:
The records showthat in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established
his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent,Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices . He
was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love
and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitu des of
life in Samar.

20. The business prospered.Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was s et-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose
Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First
Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly,a certificate of naturalization was issu ed to him.
During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent)was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local p opulace were
concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent,in search for better education,went to Manila in order to acquire
his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities we re
better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business ofhis family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural
born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely
amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be d eemed
natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after Februa ry 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was
enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status ofa natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary.He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old.

21. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusualand unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s fatherof his citizenship after his death. An attackon a
person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to respondent’s fatheras null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already
been laid to rest
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON.
CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza,Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressionalelections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rig hts and
privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speakerand Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, A rticle
IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which states that the
Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the
regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative
act, did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election
Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states:Any elective official whether national or local running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is
defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic)
filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of
Representatives; and,therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future
Rolls of the House....
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not ind icate

22. what action was taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this
petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the
House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites
were occupied by other persons.In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his
rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Mus lim Mindanao. He, however,
maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under
the present Constitution,being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention,petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives,as well as the
grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened,are provided for in the Constitutio n. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators,Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states:"The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on th e thirtieth
day of June next following their election." On the otherhand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized
as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision,agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that underthe rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius,Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutionalprovisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the
Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among
the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened,it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the
present Constitution.They did not do so.On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previous ly
found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the
present Constitution,petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted without authority.He further maintains that
respondents'so-called "administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can
it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret
laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds anotheroffice or
employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding anotheroffice or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the
negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.

23. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY
ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still
operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within th e term
"voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.That the grou nd provided in Section
67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in
addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction
of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming
otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere
ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been
lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office.— Any elective provincial,municipal or city official running for an office, other
than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office.— Any elective provincial,sub-provincial,city,municipal or municipal
district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or within ten days after
his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day.His failure to take his oath of office as herein
provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is
for a cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidatesholding political offices.— Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians,orbarangay
officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials who
are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for anotheroffice, except for

24. President and Vice-President. The advocates ofCabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the
rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to be
different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing these
provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to
change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people
must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for
anotheroffice. However, because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices,
but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with
the mandate of the people.They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature,and they want
to run for mayor or for governorand yet when the people give them that mandate, they do not comply with that
lattermandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe,Mr. Speaker,that the
people'slatest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill
No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Spe
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga,Jr. for plaintiffsand appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associatesand V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T.
Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly
libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication . This motion having
been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and,if not, (2) whether it is libelous
or not.

25. The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representat ives and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,felony, and breach of the peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions ofthe Congress,and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any otherplace. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,while the same is in session,as well as bills introduced in Congress,whether
the same is in session or not,and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing it s offices,
in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session,and defendant caused said
letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that,in thus
causing the communication to be so published,he was not performing his official duty,either as a member of Congress or as o fficer or
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication began with the
following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-
mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which,
under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious s tudy by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph.The first plan is said to be "an
insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to
"have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the
P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and
Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose
Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. CarlosAlbert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the
Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this
control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe,
he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office,
DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to
relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the
intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they
may have absolutely no knowledge.(Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "otheroperational technique the fo llowing:

26. (a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics
on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters only" — to Editors of
magazines and newspapers,extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several
branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people
or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat",in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stag e,although
the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in
connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress,in an effort to rally the
officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced abso lutely
from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be
appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence
agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the
letter, be reassigned,considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they
belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnelnow serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those
holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by
batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should
disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that
plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners",and that, having been handpicked by Secretary
Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise,
added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge".
In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of
the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this stateme nt is
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces,
that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the let ter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,knowing that it is false and with the
intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonorand ridicule, and to alienate them fro m
their associates,but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail
over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said commun ication is
false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly
tools of the "planners".Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the
"planners" of said coup d'etat,for, otherwise, they could not be "tools",much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,Bengzon,J.P., Zaldivar,Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

27. Footnotes
1Vera vs.Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant,Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts [1] is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege
in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant’s "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the
grounds that –
1. Accused-appellant’s reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling,
giving priority to any right or interest – not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removaland mocks the renewed
mandate entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions ofthe U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to
respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his
mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.Having been re-elected by his constituents,he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of t he State.
He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cas es.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits.However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first taskis to ascertain the applicable law.