Position Paper- Mauritius Labour Party

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MAURITIUS LABOUR PARTY
POSITION PAPER No. 1
Legal Commission
1. Constitutional Amendment Bill
2. The Good Governance and Integrity Reporting Bill
3. The Asset Recovery (Amendment) Bill
“ENHANCING AND ENLIGHTENING THE DEBATE IN THE INTERESTS OF
THE REPUBLIC”
November 2015

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“No punishment may be inflicted other than for a breach of the law…irrespective of rank and
status all are equal under the law…rights and freedoms are best protected under the
common law” – AV DICEY
WHAT IS A POSITION PAPER?
It is simply a tool to enhance debate on a parliamentary subject in order for the
Republic to come to the right conclusion
CAUTION: A position paper is not a document which is anchored in partisan politics.

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Table of Contents:
1. CONSTITUTION 4-23
2. CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER EXISTING LAWS 24-44
3. ANALYSIS OF THE GOOD GOVERNANCE & INTEGRITY REPORTING BILL 46-67
4. ASSETS RECOVERY – BRIEF ANALYSIS 68
5. PROPOSALS 69-71
6. CONCLUSIVE NOTE 72
7. ANNEXURES:
a. THE CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT) BILL
b. THE GOOD GOVERNNANCE AND INTEGRITY REPORTING BILL
c. THE ASSET RECOVERY (AMEMDMENT) BILL
THE CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT) BILL
1. ‘A Constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government is only the
creature of a Constitution … A Constitution is not the Act of a government, but of a

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people constituting a government, and government without a Constitution, is power
without a right.’1
2. A Constitution has been referred to as the document, which has special legal
sanctity that in turn outlines the legal framework and the principle functions of the
organs of government within the State, and declares the principles by which those
organs must operate. The Constitution, therefore, governs the relationship among
the various organs of the State, circumscribe the powers of the various organisations
and distribute the powers among them. It regulates the relationship among the
different organs of the State and the individuals while it also lays down the
fundamental rights of the citizens.
3. Since the first Constitutional Conference of Mauritius in 1831, it was only in 1936 that
for the first time the Mauritius Labour Party, founded by Dr Maurice Cure and
supported by E. Anquetil and Pandit Sahadeo, fought for the working class people to
be represented in Parliament and that was the first time in the Constitutional history
of Mauritius that the issue of class-struggle crept in Mauritian politics.
4. Followed the elections of 1967 that were won by the Independence Party
(spearheaded by the Labour Party and strongly supported by the Muslim Action
Committee and the Independent Forward Block).
5. The Mauritius Independence Order 1968 came into force on 12th March 1968 and
Mauritius became independent and a Sovereign Democratic State with its
Constitution as its Supreme law.
6. The present government has proposed to amend Section 8 of the Constitution as per
the provisions of The Constitution (Amendment) Bill (No. XXIX of 2015).
7. Section 8 of the Constitution (under Chapter II – Protection of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms of the Individual) provides;
Section 8- Protection from deprivation of property:

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(1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no
interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, except where –
(a) The taking of possession or acquisition is necessary or expedient in the interests of
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the
development or utilization of any property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit or the
social and economic well-being of the people of Mauritius; and
(b) There is reasonable justification for the causing of any hardship that may result to any
person having an interest in or right over the property; and
(c) Provision is made by law applicable to that taking of possession or acquisition-
(i) For the payment of adequate compensation; and
(ii) Securing for any person having an interest in or right over the property a right of
access to the Supreme Court, whether direct or an appeal from any other authority, for the
determination of his interest or right, the legality of the taking of possession or acquisition of
the property, interest or right, and the amount of any compensation to which he is entitled, and
for the purpose of obtaining payment of that compensation.
(2) No person who is entitled to compensation under this section, other than a resident of
Mauritius, shall be prevented from remitting, within a reasonable time after he has received any amount of
that compensation, the whole of that amount (free from any deduction), charge or tax made or levied in
respect of its remission) to any country of his choice outside Mauritius.
(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be
inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (2) to the extent that the law in question authorizes-
(a) The attachment, by order of a Court, of any amount of compensation to which a
person is entitled in satisfaction of the judgment of a Court or pending the determination of civil
proceedings to which he is a party;
(b) The imposition of reasonable restrictions on the manner in which any amount of
compensation is to be remitted; or
(c) The imposition of any deduction, charge or tax that is made or levied generally in
respect of the remission of money from Mauritius and that is not discriminatory within the meaning of
section 16 (3).
(4) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be
inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) –
(a) To the extent that the law in question makes provision for the taking of possession or
acquisition of property-
(i) In satisfaction of any tax, rate or due;
(ii) By way of penalty for breach of the law or forfeiture in consequence of a breach of
the law or inconsequence of the inability of a drug-trafficker or a person who has enriched

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himself by fraudulent and/or corrupt means to show that he has acquired the property by lawful
means;
(iii) As an incident of a lease, tenancy, mortgage, charge, sale, pledge or contract;
(iv) In the execution of judgments or orders of Courts;
(v) By reason of its being in a dangerous state or injurious to the health of human beings,
animals, trees, or plants;
(vi) In consequence of any law with respect to the limitations of actions or acquisitive
prescription;
(vii) For so long only as may be necessary for the purposes of any examination,
investigation, trial or inquiry or, in the case of land, the carrying out on it-
(A) Of work of soil conservation or the conservation of other natural resources; or
(B) Of agricultural development or improvement that the owner or occupier of the land
has been required, and has, without reasonable and lawful excuse, refused or failed to
carry out.
Except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under its authority is shown not to be
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society; or
(b) To the extent that the law in question makes provision for the taking of possession or
acquisition of-
(i) Enemy property;
(ii) Property of a person who has died or is unable, by reason of legal incapacity, to
administer it himself, for the purpose of its administration for the benefit of the persons entitled
to the beneficial interest in it;
(iii) Property of a person adjudged bankrupt or a body corporate in liquidation, for the
purpose of its administration for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt or body corporate
and, subject thereto, for the benefit of other persons entitled to the beneficial interest in the
property; or
(iv) Property subject to a trust, for the purpose of vesting the property in persons
appointed as trustees under the instrument creating the trust or by a Court or, by order of a
Court, for the purpose of giving effect to the trust; or
(c) To the extent that the law in question –
(i) Makes provision for the payment of the amount for which the property is to be
compulsorily taken possession of, together with interest at the legal rate in equal yearly
instalments, within a period not exceeding 10 years;
(ii) Fixes the amount for which the property is to be compulsorily taken possession of or
acquired or makes provision for the determination of that amount in accordance with such
principles as may be prescribed.
(4A) (a) Notwithstanding subsection (1) (c), section 17 or any other provision of the Constitution, no law relating to
the compulsory acquisition or taking of possession of any property shall be called in question in any Court if it has
been supported at the final voting in the Assembly by the votes of not less than three quarters of all members of the
Assembly.

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(b) No law under paragraph (a) shall be amended or repealed otherwise than by a Bill which has been
supported at the final voting in the Assembly by the votes of not less than three quarters of all members of the
Assembly.
(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the making or operation of any law so far as it
provides for the vesting in the State of the ownership of underground water or unextracted minerals.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the making or operation of any law for the
compulsory taking of possession in the public interest of any property, or the compulsory acquisition in the
public interest of any property, or the compulsory acquisition in the public interest of any interest in or right
over property, where that property, interest or right is held by a body corporate established by law for public
purposes, in which no money has been invested other than money provided from public funds.
(S. 8 amended by Act 14 of 1983; Act 33 of 1986; Act 48 of 1991)
8. The proposed amendment of The Constitution (Amendment) Bill (No. XXIX of 2015)
provides;
A BILL To amend the Constitution ENACTED by the Parliament of Mauritius, as
follows –
1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Constitution (Amendment) Act 2015.
2. Section 8 of Constitution amended Section 8 of the Constitution is amended,
in subsection (4), by inserting,
after paragraph (a), the following new paragraph –
(a) to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the taking of
possession of property –
. (i) under the ownership of a person to an extent which is disproportionate to
his emoluments and other income;
. (ii) the ownership, possession, custody or control of which cannot be
satisfactorily accounted for by the person who owns, possesses, has custody
or control of the property; or
. (iii) held by a person for another person to an extent which is
disproportionate to the emoluments or other income of that other person,
by way of confiscation; or

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9. However, The above proposed amendment carries, inter alia, fundamental social,
economic, political and most importantly legal consequences. The more so in the
case of Duval v. Commissioner of Police 1974 MR 131 the Court observed, “… It
is implied in every administrative power conferred upon any law that the person shall
exercise that power without contravening the provisions of the Constitution,
especially those protecting fundamental rights and freedom of the citizen.
10.A priori it must be clear that the Constitution is legally amendable provided the
provisions of Section 47 of the Constitution is strictly followed and Section 47 of the
Constitution provides;
Section 47-Alteration of Constitution
(1) Subject to this section, Parliament may alter this Constitution.
(2) A Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter any of the following provisions of this
Constitution-
(a) This section;
(b) Sections 28 to 31, 37 to 46, 56 to 58, other than 57 (2), 64,65,71,72, and 108;
(c) Chapters II, VII, VIII and IX;
(d) The First Schedule; and
(e) Chapter XI, to the extent that it relates to any of the provisions specified in paragraphs (a) to (d)
Shall not be passed by the Assembly unless it is supported at the final voting in the Assembly by the
votes of not less than three quarters of all the members of the Assembly.
(3) A bill for an Act of Parliament to alter the provisions of section 1 or 57 (2) shall not be passed by
the Assembly unless-
(a) The proposed Bill has before its introduction in the Assembly been submitted, by referendum, to
the electorate of Mauritius and has been approved by the votes of not less than three quarters of
the electorate;
(b) It is supported at the final voting in the Assembly by the votes of all the members of the Assembly.
(4) A Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter any provision of this Constitution (but which does not alter
any of the provisions of this Constitution as specified in subsection (2) shall not be passed by the
Assembly unless it is supported at the final voting in the Assembly by the votes of not less than two
thirds of all members of the Assembly.

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(5) In this section, references to altering this Constitution or any part of this Constitution include
references to-
(a) Revoking it, with or without re-enactment or the making of different or inserting additional
provisions in it or otherwise; and
(b) Suspending its operation for any period, or termination any such suspension.
(S. 47 amended by Act 2 of 1982; Act 48 of 1991)
11.Section 8 as quoted above is embodied under Chapter II of the Constitution and
Chapter II in turn embodies the protection of all the Fundamental Rights of an
individual.
12. In order to be able to legally amend any of the provisions of Chapter II it is
paramount that the government must take into considerations the implications not
only of the wordings and the tenor of the provisions of Chapter II but also the
importance that the provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution has vis-a-vis the other
provisions of the Constitution and the implications of the provisions of Section 1 of
the Constitution over all the provisions of the Constitution.
13.The Privy Council judgment in the case of State v. Khoyratty Abdool Rachid 2004
PRV 59 is considered in as much as the ratio of the decision of the Board of the
Privy Council is fully relevant and applicable to the present proposed amendment of
Section 8 of the Constitution.
14.The Board stated that in ‘1986 by ordinary legislation Parliament passed the
Dangerous Drugs Act (Act No 32 of 1986) which contained a prohibition on the grant
of bail in respect of specific offences. In Noordally v Attorney General [1986] MR 204
the Supreme Court held that this statute was inconsistent with the Constitution. The
court observed that the trial of persons charged with criminal offences and all
incidental or preliminary matters pertaining thereto are to be dealt with by an
independent judiciary. [Addressing the matter of bail], the court concluded (at
p 208) that it was not in accord with the letter or spirit of the Constitution, as it
then stood, to legislate so as to enable the executive to overstep or bypass the
judiciary in its essential roles […]’.
15.The Board noted that ‘subsequently an attempt was made to curtail the jurisdiction of
the court to grant or withhold bail. It was sought to be accomplished by a two-fold
legislative method viz an amendment to the Constitution made in 1994 and a re-

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enactment of the Dangerous Drugs Act in 2000.’ And the Board explained that the
‘constitutional amendment was contained in section 5(3A) of the Constitution, as
inserted by section 2 of the Constitution of Mauritius (Amendment) Act 1994 (Act No
26 of 1994). The setting of section 5(3A) was the existing section 5(3) which reads:
“(3) Any person who is arrested or detained
(a) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court;
(b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit a
criminal offence; or
(c) upon reasonable suspicion of his being likely to commit breaches of the peace,
and who is not released, shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult a legal
representative of his own choice and shall be brought without undue delay before a
court; and if any person arrested or detained as mentioned in paragraph (b) is not
tried within a reasonable time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that
may be brought against him, he shall be released either unconditionally or upon
reasonable conditions, including, in particular, such conditions as are reasonably
necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings
preliminary to trial; and if any person arrested or detained as mentioned in paragraph
(c) is not brought before a court within a reasonable time in order that the court may
decide whether to order him to give security for his good behaviour, then, without
prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him, he shall be
released unconditionally.”
16.The Board then considered the proposed amendment and stated the ‘new section
5(3A)(a) and (b) as amended by section 2 of the Constitution of Mauritius
(Amendment) Act 2002 (Act No 4 of 2002) reads:
“(3A)(a) Notwithstanding subsection (3), where a person is arrested or detained for
an offence related to terrorism or a drug offence, he shall not, in relation to such
offences related to terrorism or drug offences as may be prescribed by an Act of
Parliament, be admitted to bail until the final determination of the proceedings
brought against him, where-

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(i) he has already been convicted of an offence related to terrorism or a drug offence;
or
(ii) he is arrested or detained for an offence relating to terrorism or a drug offence
during the period that he has been released on bail after he has been charged with
having committed an offence relating to terrorism or a drug offence.
(b) A Bill for an Act of Parliament to prescribe the offences relating to terrorism or
drug offences under paragraph (a) or to amend or repeal such an Act shall not be
passed by the Assembly unless it is supported at the final voting in the Assembly by
the votes of not less than three quarters of all the members of the Assembly.”
17.Then Section 32 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 2000 (Act No 41 of 2000) was
considered and the Board found that it ‘contains a restriction of bail in certain classes
of cases. It provides:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other enactment, where a person is arrested or detained for
an offence under sections 30, 33, 35, 36 or 39 of this Act, he shall not be admitted to
bail until the final determination of the proceedings brought against him where-
(a) he has already been convicted of any drug offence; or
(b) he is arrested or detained whilst on bail in relation to a drug offence.
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘drug offences’ includes an offence under the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
18.Following a provisional information lodged against the respondent under the
Dangerous Drugs Act 2000 as amended by the Dangerous Drugs Act (Amendment)
Act 2003, a motion for bail was lodged with the District Court. The police objected to
bail on the ground that under the new dispensation the court had no power to grant
bail. A District Magistrate took the view that questions of constitutional interpretation
under section 84 of the Constitution had been raised and he therefore referred the
following questions to the Supreme Court:
“(a) whether by amending section 5 of the Constitution through the addition of the
new sub-section 5(3A) Parliament in its constituent capacity has not altered the
fundamental tenet of the Constitution; the Separation of Powers, to wit: the check

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and balance aspect?
(b) by what majority can Parliament in its constituent capacity alter the separation of
powers; the argument being that if a Constitutional (Amendment) Act is not
supported at the final voting by the prescribed majority of votes, then it cannot be
read as one with the Constitution; the alteration it purports to make cannot become
part of the Supreme Law and that Act is void to all intents and purposes;
(c) is it constitutional to allow the Executive to detain a citizen indefinitely on a
provisional charge of ‘drug dealing’ for instance without the judiciary being in a
position to control the Executive and afford protection to the citizen as regards his
personal liberty and his fundamental human right of being protected from inhuman or
degrading or other such treatment as prohibited by section 7 of the Constitution?”
19.The Board then stated that the principle questions posed were whether the new
regime was consistent with section 1 and section 7 of the Constitution and it
considered the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Mauritius where the Board stated,
‘after a careful review the Supreme Court came to the following conclusions:
“In the particular context of our Constitution, more specially in the light of our
notion of democracy as is contained in section 1, we are of the opinion that
section 5(3A), although it is compliant with section 47(2), [having admittedly
been voted with three-quarters majority] is in breach of section 1 since the
imperative prohibition imposed on the judiciary to refuse bail in the
circumstances outlined therein amounts to interference by the legislature into
functions which are intrinsically within the domain of the judiciary […]. Where
the Court made the following order; “We declare that section 32 of the DDA and
section 5(3A) of the Constitution, insofar as regards drug offences, are void since
they infringe sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution […].”
20.The State challenged the decision of the Supreme Court before the Privy Council
and the issues were; ‘The Privy Council must consider whether section 5(3A) of
the Constitution and section 32 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 2000 are
consistent with sections 1 and/or 7 of the Constitution. The Board designedly
uses the inelegant expression “and/or”. The reason is that it must not be
assumed in advance of analysis, that the two questions can be treated entirely

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separately […]’. The Board proposed in the first instance to examine the impact of
section 1 of the Constitution, interpreted in context.
21.Before the issue could be directly addressed the Board deemed it ‘necessary to set
out the constitutional background in more detail. That can conveniently be done by
citing the decision of the Privy Council in Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions
[1999] 2 AC 294, 302-303’, when the Board concluded that ‘the following
propositions can be deduced. First, Mauritius is a democratic state constitutionally
based on the rule of law. Secondly, subject to its specific provisions, the Constitution
entrenches the principle of the separation of powers between the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary. Under the Constitution one branch of government may
not trespass upon the province of any other. Thirdly, the Constitution gave to each
arm of government such powers as were deemed to be necessary in order to
discharge the functions of a legislature, an executive and a judiciary.’
22.The Board stated that ‘while the judgment in Ahnee does not afford the answer
to the question under consideration it is relevant in emphasizing from it that
(a) that Mauritius is a democratic state based on the rule of law; (b) that the
principle of separation of powers is entrenched; and (c) that one branch of
government may not trespass on the province of any other in conflict with the
principle of separation of power.’
23.The Board proposed to ‘analyse the question in a number of steps. The idea of a
democracy involves a number of different concepts. The first is that the people must
decide who should govern them. Secondly, there is the principle that
fundamental rights should be protected by an impartial and independent
judiciary. Thirdly, in order to achieve a reconciliation between the inevitable
tensions between these ideas, a separation of powers between the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary is necessary.’
24.The Board considered the case of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica v Mollinson
[2003] 2 AC 411 where Lord Bingham of Cornhill examined the separation of powers
under a Westminster constitution, viz the Jamaican Constitution. In a unanimous
judgement of the Board Lord Bingham observed [at para 13]; “Whatever overlap
there may be under constitutions on the Westminster model between the exercise of
executive and legislative powers, the separation between the exercise of judicial
powers on the one hand and legislative and executive powers on the other is

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total or effectively so. Such separation, based on the rule of law, was recently
described by Lord Steyn as ‘a characteristic feature of democracies’: R
(Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837, 890-891,
para 50.”
25.Lord Steyn stated that ‘the observation cited from Anderson was expanded in my
judgement in that decision. I observed [at para 50];“In R v Trade Practices Tribunal,
Ex p Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 394 Windeyer J explained
the difficulty of defining the judicial function as follows; ‘The concept seems to me to
defy, perhaps it were better to say transcend, purely abstract conceptual analysis. It
inevitably attracts consideration of predominant characteristics and also invites
comparison with the historic functions and processes of courts of law.’
26.He said, ‘nevertheless it has long been settled in Australia that the power to
determine responsibility for a crime, and punishment for its commission, is a
function which belongs exclusively to the courts: G F K Santow, ‘Mandatory
Sentencing: A Matter For The High Court?’ (2000) 74 ALJ 298, 300 […]. It has been
said that ‘the selection of punishment is an integral part of the administration of
justice and, as such, cannot be committed to the hands of the executive’: Deaton v
Attorney General and Revenue Comrs [1963] IR 170, 183: see also In re Tracey; Ex
p Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local
Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27; Nicholas v The Queen (1998)
193 CLR 173, 186-187, per Brennan CJ. The underlying idea, based on the rule of
law, is a characteristic feature of democracies.”
27.Lord Steyn went on to say, ‘the third case on the general approach to be adopted is
even more important. In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2
AC 68 Lord Bingham gave the leading judgment. He stated at para 42; “. . . It is also
of course true . . . that Parliament, the executive and the courts have different
functions. But the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the
law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a
cornerstone of the rule of law itself […]. “
28.Lord Steyn admittedly said, ’while not conclusive of the issue presently before
the Board, these decisions give important colour to the words of section 1 of
the Constitution, viz that Mauritius shall be a democratic state’.

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29.He stated, ‘these factors are however, transcended in importance by two
special features. First, section 1 of the Constitution is not a mere preamble. It is
not simply a guide to interpretation. In this respect it is to be distinguished from many
other constitutional provisions. It is of the first importance that the provision that
Mauritius “shall be . . . a democratic State” is an operative and binding
provision. Its very subject matter and place at the very beginning of the
Constitution underlies its importance. And the Constitution provides that any law
inconsistent with the Constitution is pro tanto void: section 2.’
30.He said, ‘secondly, as already pointed out, in 1991 section 47(3) of the Constitution
was amended (by Act No 48 of 1991) to make provision for a deep entrenchment of
sections 1 and 57(2). It reads as follows; “A Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter the
provisions of section 1 or 57(2) shall not be passed by the Assembly unless-
“(a) the proposed Bill has before its introduction in the Assembly been submitted, by
referendum, to the electorate of Mauritius and has been approved by the votes of not
less than three quarters of the electorate;
(b) it is supported at the final voting in the Assembly by the votes of all the members
of the Assembly.”
31.Lord Steyn thenn pointed out that, ‘these are two of the most fundamental
provisions of the Constitution, respectively making provision that Mauritius
shall be a democratic state and for quinquennial Parliaments. This is an
exceptional degree of entrenchment. By its clear intendment it militates
against a right to bail, qualified as it is, being abolished by ordinary legislation
or by a constitutional provision which does not comply with the requirement of
deep entrenchment of section 1.’
32.He went further to consider the Parliamentary debate which preceded the enactment
of section 1and he said, ‘it may also be permissible to have regard to the mischief to
which the deeply entrenched section 1 was directed. The overriding purpose was
made crystal clear in the Parliamentary debates as reported in Hansard on 9
December 1991. The Prime Minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth stated [Col 1363]; “Mr
Speaker, Sir, the opportunity has also been taken to make some other amendments
to the Constitution. Members of the House will recall that a number of legislative
measures have been introduced over the past twelve months in order to consolidate
the democratic foundations of our society. Today, we are taking that exercise a little
further. . . the present Government also wants to establish firmly the democratic

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basis of our Constitution by making it practically impossible to amend Section 1 of
the Constitution. Let it not therefore be said that this Government does not cherish
democratic principles.”
33.He even considered what the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Mr Alan
Ganoo stated [Cols 1487-1488], “Mr Speaker, Sir, I will now come to a last point of
my intervention. It concerns the first section of the Constitution, Sir. If the prospect of
acceding to the status of Republic arouses, as I just said, a feeling of pride and
dignity in all of us today. I think the thought of amending section 1 of our Constitution
to render this clause practically unamendable should rejoice all of us who are true
democrats in this House. On a philosophical level, Sir, and globally, if you look at all
the proposed amendments, you will see that the common feature, the thread which
ties most of those principal amendments to our Constitution today is the
consolidation of the democratic foundation of our country. Now, as regards section 1
of our Constitution, Sir, it will mean that to amend that section, it will necessitate a
referendum and it will mean that there should be no dissentient voice in the
Assembly. I should perhaps congratulate the Prime Minister for that very bold
decision, Sir. I think that there are very few countries in the Third World with a written
Constitution like ours which have achieved what we are achieving, Sir. We are
deciding that to amend the democratic nature of the State, you will need a
referendum and you will need the approval of all the Members of the House. I do not
know of any other country which has done this!”
34.He said, ‘if necessary the objective mischief as spelt out in the debates reinforces
the fundamental nature of the entrenchment of section 1. […]Cumulatively, all these
factors compel the conclusion that the Constitution could only have been amended in
the manner provided by section 47(3). The failure to comply with this deeply
entrenched provision renders section 5(3A) and section 32 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act void.’
35.Lord Rodger in turn concurred with the judgment of Lord Steyn but he made some
pertinent observations. He said, ‘ because of the importance of the constitutional
issue, however, I wish to spell out the reasoning which has led me to the same
conclusion.’
36.He said, ‘on 12 March 1968 Mauritius became an independent constitutional
monarchy. The independence Constitution, which was on the familiar Westminster-
style model, was set out in the Schedule to the Mauritius Independence Order 1968.
At that time section 1 of the Constitution provided that “Mauritius shall be a sovereign

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democratic State.” Section 3 recognised and declared certain fundamental rights and
freedoms, including the right of the individual to life, liberty and security of the person
and to the protection of the law. Section 5(3) was in the form set out in Lord Steyn’s
judgment. Section 47 prescribed the way in which provisions of the Constitution
could be amended. In 1982 Parliament passed, in due form, the Constitution of
Mauritius (Amendment) Act 1982, section 3 of which amended section 47 in several
respects. These included the insertion of a new subsection (3) which provided that
an Act of Parliament for the amendment of section 57(2) (providing for quinquennial
Parliaments) was not to be passed unless the proposed Bill had first been approved
by three-quarters of the electorate in a referendum and had then been supported at
the final voting in the Assembly by all the members of the Assembly. In terms of
subsection (4) of section 47 as then amended, section 1 of the Constitution could be
altered by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Assembly but, by virtue of
section 47(2)(c), amendment of section 5 required a vote of not less than three-
quarters of all the members of the Assembly.’
37.He added, ‘in 1991 the Assembly passed the Constitution of Mauritius (Amendment
No 3) Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”) which made extensive changes to the Constitution.
There is no challenge to the validity of any of these changes which took effect from
12 March 1992. Prominent among them was the change from a constitutional
monarchy to a republic. In consequence, section 1 was altered. As amended by
section 3 of the 1991 Act, section 1 of the Constitution now provides; “The State of
Mauritius shall be a sovereign democratic State which shall be known as the
Republic of Mauritius.”
38.‘At the same time, by section 9 of the 1991 Act, the Assembly amended section
47(3) of the Constitution by inserting a reference to section 1. Thus amended,
section 47(3) now provides that section 1 can be amended only if the proposed Bill
has first been approved by three-quarters of the electorate in a referendum and has
been supported at the final voting in the Assembly by all the members of the
Assembly. The effect is to entrench section 1 very deeply indeed […].’
39.He stated that the ‘critical question is whether, by purporting to insert section 5(3A)
into the Constitution, section 2 of the 1994 Act had in substance sought not only to
amend section 5, […] but also to alter the form of democratic state guaranteed by
section 1 of the Constitution. Admittedly, the 1994 Act had been passed in a manner
which would allow the amendment of section 5. But section 1 can be amended only
after the proposed Bill has been approved by three-quarters of the voters in a

18. 18
referendum and supported by a unanimous vote of the members of the Assembly
[…].’ More particularly, it was designed to alter one of the well-understood
components of a democratic state as envisaged in section 1, viz the separation of
executive and judicial powers. Since, however, section 2 of the 1994 Act had not
been passed by the necessary special mechanism, the guarantee in section 1 stood
unamended. Section 2 of the 1994 Act sought to introduce a provision which
was inconsistent with the concept of a democratic society as guaranteed in
section 1 of the Constitution[…].’
40.He stated, ‘giving content to the term “democratic state” in section 1 is part of the
task of judges who are called upon to interpret the Constitution. Garrioch SPJ, giving
the judgment of the Supreme Court recognised this, for instance, in Vallet v
Ramgoolam [1973] MR 29, 40. Having regard, in particular, to the specially
entrenched status of section 1, in my view it would be wrong to say that the concept
of the democratic state to be found there means nothing more than the sum of the
provisions in the rest of the Constitution, whatever they may be at any given
moment. Rather, section 1 contains a separate, substantial, guarantee. On the other
hand, what matters is the content of the concept of a democratic state as that term
as used in section 1 and not just generally. That said, the Constitution is not to be
interpreted in a vacuum, without any regard to thinking in other countries sharing
similar values. Equally, experience in Mauritius is likely to prove of value to courts
elsewhere. Therefore, the decisions cited by Lord Steyn do indeed “help to give
important colour” to the guarantee that Mauritius is to be a democratic state. In
particular, it is a hallmark of the modern idea of a democratic state that there should
be a separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, on the one
hand, and the judiciary, on the other […].’
41.Before dismissing the appeal he stated; ‘of the Constitution and the idea of a
democratic state which it contains remain unamended. Section 2 of the 1994
purported to introduce a provision for bypassing the courts which violated the
separation of powers guarantee that is one of the hallmarks of that concept of a
democratic state. To that extent section 2 of the 1994 Act was inconsistent with
section 1 of the Constitution and, accordingly, void. It follows that section 5 of the
Constitution remains unamended […]’.
42.Lord Mance also concurred with the reasoning of Lord Steyn and lord Rodger while

19. 19
he added that, ‘[…] The present issue concerns the nature and extent of the inroad
which must occur into such principles to infringe the entrenched provision that
Mauritius shall be a “democratic” State.’
43.Lord Mance said, ‘on the one hand, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice
made clear that chapter 2 (sections 3 to 19) of the Constitution was not in the same
situation as chapter 1 (sections 1 and 2). This is evident from the confined nature of
the entrenchment achieved by section 47(3). So many amendments of the
“fundamental rights and freedoms” of the individual spelled out in detail in chapter 2
of the Constitution are possible with a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. On the
other hand, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice also made clear that section
1 was not envisaged as an empty general statement, but as a real bastion to “protect
and perpetuate” among other things “the rule of law” and “the existence of an
independent judiciary”, that is independent of inter alia the executive and legislature.
These are basic principles themselves not expressly spelled out elsewhere in the
Constitution.’
44.And he finally added, ‘it was these basic principles that were in my opinion infringed,
even though only in a limited sphere, by the purported constitutional amendment in
1994 of section 5 to insert subsection (3A)(a). The effect was to remove from the
judiciary any responsibility for and power in respect of the liberty of any individual,
prior to any trial for a prescribed drug offence upon reasonable suspicion of which
the prosecuting authorities might arrest and detain him. The scheme of section 5
prior to such amendment permitted a person to be arrested upon reasonable
suspicion, and then required him or her to be brought without delay before a court,
for remand in custody or on bail pending trial as the court determined. To remove the
court’s role - and in the process to prescribe automatic detention in custody pending
trial whenever prosecuting authorities have reasonable grounds to arrest for a
prescribed drug offence - is not merely to amend section 5, it is to introduce an
entirely different scheme. The new scheme contradicts the basic democratic
principle of the rule of law and separation of judicial and executive powers which
serves as a primary protection of individual liberty and is entrenched by the
combination of sections 1 and 47(3).’
45.In line with the above reasoning and the conclusions of the Board it is, therefore,
argued that by virtue of section 1 of the Constitution Mauritius is a democratic State.

20. 20
Chapter 2 of our Constitution which provides for fundamental rights is based on the
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (EC). The Supreme Court
has always resorted to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR).
46.Among the fundamental rights protected in Chapter 2 of the Constitution there are
the presumption of innocence (section 10(2)(a)) and the right against self-
incrimination (section 10(7)). The other important concept is that the burden of proof
in a criminal offence rests on the prosecution though that burden may be shifted to
an accused but this proposition rests on the premise that some facts are first proved
by the prosecution as there cannot be a presumption of guilt. In the case of Velle
Vindron in 1973 the Supreme Court held that section 5(2) of the Forest Mountain and
River Reserve Act that requires an accused to prove particular facts by placing on
him the burden of proving a general, conditional innocence without first calling on the
prosecution to prove any suspicious or sinister circumstances was contrary to the
Constitution. The ECHR has also held 6thgat the public interest cannot be invoked to
justify the use of answers compulsorily obtained in an investigation to incriminate an
individual.
47.Section 8 of the Constitution deals with the protection of property and an individual
can only be deprived of property in limited circumstances. Seizure by the revenue
authority or by the State is permissible so long as the power is reasonable in a
democratic society and so long as that seizure is the result, in the case of a n
offence, of a conviction. It cannot permissible in a democratic society for the State to
deprive an individual of property on the mere allegation of a whistleblower that that
individual has illegally amassed wealth for which he has to explain.
48.Moreover an amendment of Section 8 of the Constitution cannot be considered
independent of Section 3 of the Constitution which provides;
3. Fundamental rights and freedoms of individual
It is hereby recognised and declared that in Mauritius there have existed and shall continue to exist without
discrimination by reason of race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for
the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, each and all of the following human rights and
fundamental freedoms –
(a) The right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of
the law;
(b) Freedom of conscience, of expression, of assembly and

21. 21
(c) association and freedom to establish schools; and
(d) The right of the individual to protection for the privacy of his home and other property
and from deprivation of property without compensation,
And the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to those rights and
freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations
designed to ensure that the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the
rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
49.As regards the provision in the Good Governance Bill that requires an individual to
explain the provenance of his property on the mere report of one of the persons
listed in section 9 of the Bill, this simply amounts to an administrative finding of guilt
as opposed to a judicial finding of guilt. This encroaches dangerously on the powers
of the courts which alone are vested with the power to convict. In the case of Norton
v PSC the Privy Council held that the PSC had no power to impose a fine on a civil
servant as this power under the PSC Regulations was unconstitutional. This
provision is also a dangerous incursion on the concept of separation of powers
between the executive and the judiciary.
50.When there is an allegation that an individual has allegedly amassed wealth illegally
this is an offence. When an offence is committed the machinery of the criminal
justice is set in motion. Such machinery clearly delineates the powers of the
investigators, that is the police as well the rights of the suspect. By just putting the
burden on an individual suspected of possessing alleged ill-acquired wealth to
explain on pain of seizure of his property without a court decision, presumption of
innocence that is guaranteed by the Constitution is being replaced by presumption of
guilt. In the case of DPP v Kohealle in 1999 the Supreme Court held that the
presumption created by section 188 of the Road Traffic Act to the effect that a
conveyance of persons in motor vehicle is for reward, in the absence of any
evidence of sinister or suspicious conduct by the accused offended the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A suspect must be treated as not having committed any
offence until the State, through the prosecuting authorities, adduces sufficient
evidence to satisfy an independent and impartial tribunal that he is guilty. The
presumption of innocence requires that even a court should not start with the
preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged. There
should be no judicial pronouncement of his guilt prior to a finding of guilt by a court.
What the Good Governance Bill is seeking to do is to come to a finding of guilt

22. 22
behind the back of the courts of law by putting the burden of proving innocence on
an individual.
51.In the green paper published in 2006 the European Communities had this to say
“The presumption of innocence includes the privilege against self-incrimination which
is made up of the right of silence and not to be compelled to produce inculpating
evidence. The maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum , (“no person is to be
compelled to accuse himself”) applies. The accused may refuse to answer questions
and to produce evidence. The ECHR inthe case Heaney and McGuiness v. Ireland in
2000 held that, although not specifically mentioned in the ECHR, the privilege
against self-incrimination is a generally recognised international standard which lies
“at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure”. It protects the accused against
improper compulsion by the authorities, thus reducing the risk of miscarriages of
justice and embodying the equality of arms principle. The prosecution must prove its
case without resort to evidence obtained through coercion or oppression. Security
and public order cannot justify the suppression of these rights[Heaney and
McGuiness v. Ireland in 2000 .They are linked rights, any compulsion to produce
incriminating evidence being an infringement of the right of silence. The State
infringed an accused’s right of silence when it sought to compel him to produce bank
statements to customs investigators [Funke v France 1993)]. Coercion to co-operate
with the authorities in the pre-trial process may infringe the privilege against self-
incrimination and jeopardise the fairness of any subsequent hearing.
52.The offence of possession of illegal wealth is predicated on offences like corruption,
money laundering, trafficking in illicit drugs or weapons and the like. When there is
suspicion that an individual has acquired illegal wealth the prosecution must prove
beyond any reasonable doubt that the provenance of the wealth is illegal and not for
the suspect to prove that he acquired that wealth lawfully. By shifting the burden of
proof on a suspect the Bill is aiming at destroying the whole fabric of the rule of law
that is the hallmark of our democracy.
CONCLUSION OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS
• The present government is proposing to amend Section 8 of the Constitution as per
Bill No. XXIX of 2015 (as quoted above).

23. 23
• Section 8 of the Constitution cannot be considered independent of the provisions of
Section 3 of the Constitution and accordingly Section 8 cannot be amended without
considering Section 3 of the Constitution.
• Following the above proposed amendment and the implications of the Good
Governance and Integrity Bill the provisions of Section 10 of the Constitution in as
much as the fundamental rights of an individual pertaining to the presumption of
innocence and the right to silence without incrimination are directly impeached upon.
• Furthermore, it is argued Section 8 of the Constitution cannot be amended by a mere
two third majority of the members of the parliament in as much as it is a fundamental
right of an individual under Chapter II of the Constitution and it has direct implications
upon the provisions of Section 1 of the Constitution and, in line with the full bench
opinion of the Privy Council in the case of Khoyratty (as cited above), a proposed
amendment of Section 8 must take into consideration the provisions of Section 1 of
the Constitution.
• The proposed amendment of Section 8 has direct implication upon Section 3 of the
Constitution and in turn the implications of the other Bills proposed by the
government in this connection will have serious implications upon the provisions of
Section 10 of the Constitution; thus expressly and impliedly impeaching upon the
very fundamentals of the rights of an individual protected under the Constitution and
such extensive implications calls into question the provisions of Section 1 of the
Constitution which has to be invoked and duly amended as per the provisions of
Section 47(3) of the Constitution in order to be able to carry out the amendment of
Section 8, Section 3 and in turn Section 10 of the Constitution.
CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER OUR EXISTING LAWS
International law – Relevant Treaties signed by Mauritius

24. 24
Through the international initiatives to combat the laundering of the proceeds of illegal
activities (esp. Drug Trafficking), the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (“Vienna Convention) was adopted on 19 December 1988
and Mauritius signed that Convention on 20 December 1988 and ratified it on 6 March 2001,
without any reservations.
Subsequently, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (“Strasbourg Convention”). It is to be
noted that the term “proceeds” is defined in Article 1 of the Strasbourg Convention as “any
economic advantage, derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal offences”.
The Strasbourg Convention was followed by an ECC Council Directive on June 1991 on
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering
(91/308/EEC) – “money laundering” is thus defined as:
“the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from
criminal activity or from an act of participation is such activity, for the purpose of
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person
who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences
of his action, the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that
such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity,
the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that
such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in
such activity,
participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting,
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the
foregoing paragraphs”.

25. 25
Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in
paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
Domestic law
FIAMLA
In our domestic law, the offence of “money laundering” is provided for under Section 3 of the
FIAMLA 2002:
(1) Any person who –
(a) engages in a transaction that involves property which is, or in whole or in part
directly or indirectly represents, the proceeds of any crime; or
(b) receives, is in possession of, conceals, disguises, transfers, converts,
disposes of, removes from or brings into Mauritius any property which is, or in whole
or in part directly or indirectly represents, the proceeds of any crime,
where he suspects or has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property is
derived or realized, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly from any crime, shall
commit an offence.
(2) A bank, financial institution, cash dealer or member of a relevant profession
or occupation that fails to take such measures as are reasonably necessary to
ensure that neither it nor any service offered by it, is capable of being used by a
person to commit or to facilitate the commission of a money laundering offence shall
commit an offence.
FIAMLA also provides for the offence of “conspiracy” in relation to money laundering.
One of the leading international authority on the prosecution of money laundering offences
is the case of R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18. Applying the reasoning of Saik and other
authorities :-

26. 26
a) The property subject matter of money laundering must be the proceeds of a crime.
This “safeguard” is provided for under Section 3 of FIAMLA and ALSO UNDER THE
TREATIES mentioned above – To hold otherwise would be tantamount to a
“significant departure from what had been asked for by the international instruments:
R v Montila & Other [2004] UKHL 50”
b) The “criminal provenance” of the property is a fact necessary for the commission
of the offence of money laundering
c) The purpose must achieve or attempt to achieve one or more of the following:
engaging engaging; possessing; concealing; disguising; transferring; converting;
disposing of; removing from or bringing into Mauritius the property that is the
proceeds of a crime partly or wholly, directly or wholly. Montila: converting or
transferring property which a defendant has reasonable grounds to suspect
represents another person’s proceeds of crime is not an offence, unless it is also
proved that that the property is the proceeds of crime”.
MRA Act
By virtue of Section 15 of the MRA Act, the Director-General or any officer assigned to the
Fiscal Investigations Department of the MRA, may, for the purposes of ascertaining the tax
liability of a person…
(a) make such enquiries as he thinks necessary;
(b) require any person to produce any record, bank statement or other document or
article or provide any information orally or in writing relating to his business and, for
that purpose, at all reasonable times, enter any premises where such business is
carried out;
(c) make a similar request to an agent or employee of a person referred to in
paragraph (b) or to a person found on any premises referred to in paragraph (b) who
appears to be involved in the business

27. 27
(d) make a copy of any record, bank statement or other document found on any such
premises;
(e) retain or seize any record, bank statement or other document or article; or
(f) by written notice require any person referred to in paragraph (b) or (c) to appear
before him.
The powers of the MRA to investigate into the assets (and the “unexplained wealth”) of an
individual is wide-ranging and information and particulars sought by the MRA include, inter
alia:
a) Statement of Assets and Liabilities –
b) Bank statements/passbooks, deposit certificates or any other documentary
evidence in respect of all bank accounts (including those held abroad); fived deposit,
current/savings accounts including credit cards account held either solely or jointly
with any other person
c) Cheque stubs for the period under which the person in being
investigated/assessed
d) Details of all loans taken and the interest payable, and security offered
e) Overseas Travelling, including those of the spouse and children – countries visited
and cost of air ticket and amount spent abroad for each trip.
f) Immovable Properties – Source of finance enabling the acquisition of each
property
g) If self-employed and/or VAT registered – Listing of input tax claimed for the period
under review, supported by VAT Invoices; and listing of supplies together with VAT
Invoice in support thereof.
Moreover, it is a criminal offence (Section 25 of MRA Act) for any person who refuses to
give information orally or in writing, or gives any false or misleading information to an MRA
officer entitled to require such information under Section 15 [see para. 7] or in any manner
obstructs an officer in the performance of his duties – Rs 200,000 fine and imprisonment for
a term not exceeding 5 years.

28. 28
POCA 2002
POCA was enacted in 2002 and albeit the ambit of the Act is to curb “corruption”, “money
laundering” and tackle other related offences which may be committed by “public officials”,
the Act already provides for wide-ranging powers to track “unexplained wealth”…of public
officials AND non-public officials (i.e, any other persons.
Section 2 of POCA: “act of corruption”
"act of corruption" -
(a) means an act which constitutes a corruption offence; and
(b) includes -
(i) any conduct whereby, in return for a gratification, a person does or neglects
from doing an act in contravention of his public duties;
(ii) the offer, promise, soliciting or receipt of a gratification as an inducement or
reward to a person to do or not to do any act, with a corrupt intention;
(iii) the abuse of a public or private office for private gain;
(iv) an agreement between 2 or more persons to act or refrain from acting in
violation of a person's duties in the private or public sector for profit or gain;
(v) any conduct whereby a person accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or
attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any
gratification for inducing a public official, by corrupt or illegal means, or by the
exercise of personal influence, to do or abstain from doing an act in the exercise
of his duties to show favour or disfavour to any person;
Sections 43-45 provides for:

29. 29
a) Notification of corruption offences
b) Duty to report acts of corruption
c) Referrals to the commission
Section 46: Investigation by the Commission
(1) (a) Where, under sections 43, 44 or 45 or on its own initiative, the
Commission becomes aware that a corruption offence or a money
laundering offence may have been committed, it shall notwithstanding the
Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002 and subject to
subsection (4), refer the matter to the Director of the Corruption Investigation
Division who shall
forthwith make a preliminary investigation of the matter.
(b) The Director of the Corruption Investigation Division shall, within 21 days
of a referral under paragraph (a) or within such other period as the
Commission may direct, report to the Commission on the matter.
(2) The Director of the Investigation Division shall, within 14 days of a referral to him
of an information referred to the Commission by the FIU under section 13 of the
Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002, investigate and report to
the Commission on the matter.
(3) Upon receipt of a report under subsection (1)(b) or 2, the Commission shall -
(a) proceed with further investigations; or
(b) discontinue the investigation.
(4) The Commission shall forthwith notify the FIU of the nature of every case relating
to a money laundering offence investigated on its own initiative.
Note: Section 47 provides for “further investigation by the Commission”
Section 50 of POCA: Powers of the Commission to examine person

30. 30
(1) Where the Commission decides to proceed with further investigations under
section 46 or 47, the Director-General may -
(a) order any person to attend before him for the purpose of being examined orally in
relation to any matter;
(b) order any person to produce before him any book, document, record or article;
(c) order that information which is stored in a computer, disc, cassette, or on
microfilm, or preserved by any mechanical or electronic device, be communicated in
a form in which it can be taken away and which is visible and legible;
(d) by written notice, order a person to furnish a statement in writing made on oath or
affirmation setting out all information which may be required under the notice.
(2) A person on whom an order under subsection (1) has been served shall -
(a) comply with the order;
(b) attend before the Director-General in accordance with the terms of the order;
(c) continue to attend on such other days as the Director-General may direct until the
examination is completed; and
(d) subject to subsection (3), answer questions and furnish all information,
documents, records or statements, including certified copies thereof as ordered by
the Director-General.
(2A) Where the Director-General has reasonable grounds to believe that any book,
document, record or article produced under subsection (1)(b) may provide evidence
relevant to an investigation being conducted by the Commission, he may –
(a) where the book, document, record or article is not reasonably required for the
purpose of performing any duty under any enactment, retain the book, document,
record or article, as the casemay be, until its production in Court or until such earlier
time as may be required; or
(b) make certified copies of, or take records from, the book, document or record.
(3) A person may refuse to answer a question put to him or refuse to furnish
information, documents, records or statements where the answer to the question or
the production of the document or class of documents might tend to incriminate him.
(Note: the safeguard against “self-incrimination”)

31. 31
(4) Subsection (3) shall not apply where the Director-General, after consultation with
the Director of Public Prosecutions, gives an undertaking in writing to a person that
any answer given or document or class of document produced will not be used in
evidence in any criminal proceedings against him for an offence other than
proceedings for perjury.
(5) Where an undertaking has been given under subsection (4), no court of law shall
admit the answer or document or class of documents referred to in the undertaking
in any criminal proceedings against the person to whom the undertaking was given,
except in proceedings for perjury. (Note: another safeguard)
(6) A person who after having been served with an order under subsection (1) -
(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any of the terms of the order;
(b) conceals, destroys, alters, tampers with, removes from the place where it is
habitually kept, or otherwise disposes of, a book, document, record or article referred
to in the order, shall commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.
Section 51 of POCA: Order to search premises
(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), where, upon notification or after consultation
with the FIU, the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that –
(a) a bank, financial institution or cash dealer has failed to keep a business
transaction record as required under section 17 of the Financial Intelligence and
Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002;
(b) a bank, financial institution, cash dealer or a member of a relevant profession or
occupation, has failed to report any suspicious transaction as required under section
14 of the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002; or
(c) a bank, financial institution, cash dealer or a member of a relevant profession or
occupation is in possession of documents, books or records or other information
which may assist the Commission in an investigation, the Commission may apply to

32. 32
a Judge in Chambers for an order allowing the Commission, or any officer delegated
by it, to enter premises belonging to, or in the possession or control of, the bank,
financial institution, cash dealer or member of a relevant profession or occupation
and to search the premises and remove therefrom any document or material.
(2) An application under subsection (1) shall be supported by an affidavit by the
Director-General disclosing the reason why an order is sought under this section.
(3) No order shall issue under subsection (1) with respect to a law practitioner unless
the Judge is satisfied that, having regard to the need to protect legal professional
privilege, it is in the public interest that the order be made without requiring the law
practitioner to show cause why the order should not be made.
Section 52 of POCA: Power of entry and search
(1) Where the Commission has reasonable ground to believe that there is, on
specified premises or in any place of business, evidence which may assist it in its
investigation, it may issue a warrant to an officer authorising him to enter and search,
at all reasonable times, the said premises or place of business and remove
therefrom any document or material which may provide evidence relevant to an
investigation being conducted by the Commission.
(2) A search under subsection (1) shall, so far as is practicable, be conducted in the
presence of the occupier of the premises or his duly authorised agent.
(3) Prior to a search under subsection (1), the Officer shall deliver a photocopy of the
warrant to the occupier of the premises or his duly authorised agent against receipt
acknowledged by a signature on the original of the warrant.
(4) Where a search is effected under subsection (1), the officer effecting the search
may -

33. 33
(a) seize and take possession of any book, document, computer disk or other article;
(b) inspect, make copies of, or take extracts from, any book, record or document;
(c) search any person who is on the premises, detain him for the purpose of the
search, and seize any article found on such person;
(d) break open, examine, and search any article, safe, container or receptacle.
Powers of arrest
(1) Where the Director-General is satisfied that a person who may assist him in his
investigation -
(a) is about to leave Mauritius;
(b) has interfered with a potential witness; or
(c) intends to destroy documentary evidence which is in his possession and which he
has refused to give to the Commission, the Commission may, in writing, direct an
officer to arrest that person
(2) Where a person is arrested under subsection (1), he shall-
(a) forthwith be brought to the office of the Commission;
(b) be explained his constitutional rights and given the right to contact his lawyer;
(c) be allowed prompt access to his lawyer;
(d) not be questioned unless a video recording is made of the proceedings;
(e) unless the Commission is satisfied that it is necessary that his detention be
prolonged, be released immediately upon furnishing such surety in a reasonable
amount as the Director-General may determine; and
(f) be brought before a Magistrate, who may impose such conditions as he considers
necessary for his release.
Section 54: Property tracking and monitoring order
(1) Where, for the purposes of an investigation under section 46, the Commission -
(a) needs to determine whether any property belongs to, is in the possession or
under the control of, a person; or

34. 34
(b) has reasonable ground for suspecting that a person has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offence which the Commission has power to
investigate, the Commission may issue a directive under subsection (2) to the
Director of the Corruption Investigation Division.
(2) A directive under subsection (1) may direct-
(a) that any document relevant to the -
(i) identification, location or quantification of any property; or
(ii) identification or location of any document necessary for the transfer of any
property, belonging to, or in the possession or under the control of, the person
named in the directive be delivered forthwith to the Director of the Corruption
Investigation Division;
(b) that a bank, financial institution, cash dealer or member of a relevant profession
or occupation forthwith produces to the Director of the Corruption Investigation
Division, all information obtained by it about any business transaction conducted by
or for that person with it during such period before or after the date of the order as
the Judge may direct.
Section 55: Enforcement of property tracking and monitoring order
A Judge in Chambers may, on good cause shown by the Commission that any
person is failing to comply with, is delaying or is otherwise obstructing a directive
made in accordance with section 54, order that the Commission or any officer
authorised by it may enter any premises of the bank, financial institution, cash dealer
or member of a relevant profession or occupation, search the premises and remove
any document, material or other thing therein for the purposes of executing such
order.
Section 56: Application of Attachment order
(1) Notwithstanding any other enactment, where a Judge in Chambers, on an
application by the Commission, is satisfied that the Commission has reasonable
ground to suspect that a person has committed an offence under this Act or the

35. 35
Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002, he may make an
attachment order under this section.(Note: Section is not limited to public officials)
(2) An order under this section shall-
(a) attach in the hands of any person named in the order, whether that person is
himself the suspect or not, all money and other property due or owing or belonging to
or held on behalf of the suspect;
(b) require the person named in the order to declare in writing to the Commission,
within 48 hours of service of the order, the nature and source of all moneys and
other property so attached;
(c) prohibit the person from transferring, pledging no or otherwise disposing of any
money or other property so attached except in such manner as may be specified in
the order.
(3) Where an order is make under this section, the Commission shall -
(a) cause notice of the order to be published in the next issue of the Gazette and in
at least 2 daily newspapers published and circulated in Mauritius; and
(b) give notice of the order to -
(i) all notaries;
(ii) all banks, financial institutions and cash dealers; and
(iii) any other person who may hold or be vested with property belonging to or held
on behalf of the suspect.
Section 58: Seizure of moveable property
(1) Where in the course of an investigation under this act, the Director-General is
satisfied that movable property is the subject-matter of or relates to an offence under
this Act, the Director-General may seize that property.
(2) The Director-General shall keep a record of property seized under subsection (1)
and shall cause a copy of that record to be served on the person from whom the
property was seized.

36. 36
(3) A seizure effected under subsection (1) shall be effected by placing the property
seized under the custody of such person and at such place as the Director-General
may determine.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), where the Director-General considers that it is
not practicable to remove the property, he may leave it at the premises on which it is
found under the custody of such person as he may direct for that purpose.
(5) Where movable property seized under subsection (1) is under the custody of a
third party, the Director-General may direct that third party not to dispose of the
property without his consent in writing.
Section 84: Possession of unexplained wealth
(1) The Commission may -
(a) order any public official or any person suspected of having committed a
corruption offence to make a statement under oath of all his assets and liabilities and
of those of his relatives and associates;
(b) investigate whether any public official or any person suspected of having
committed a corruption offence -
(i) has a standard of living which is commensurate with his emoluments or other
income;
(ii) owns, or is in control of, property to an extent which is disproportionate to his
emoluments or other income; or
(iii) is able to give a satisfactory account as to how he came into ownership,
possession, custody or control of any property.
(2) Where, in proceedings for an offence under this Act, it is established that the
accused -
(a) was maintaining a standard of living which was not commensurate with his
emoluments or other income;
(b) was in control of property to an extent which is disproportionate to his
emoluments or other income;

37. 37
(c) held property for which he, his relative or associate, is unable to give a
satisfactory account as to how he came into its ownership, possession, custody or
control, that evidence shall be admissible to corroborate other evidence relating to
the commission of the offence.
Asset Recovery Act 2011
Under the ARA, there are 2 “agencies”, namely the Enforcement and the Investigative
agency, both falling under the ambit of the DPP office – Sections 4 & 5.
Definitions under the ARA:
- “instrumentality” means any property used or intended to be used in any manner in
connection with an unlawful activity;
- “property” –
(a) means an asset of any kind, whether tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, moveable or immovable, however acquired;
(b) includes a legal document or instrument in any form, including electronic or
digital, evidencing title to or interest in such asset, including but not limited to
currency, bank credits, deposits and other financial resources, travellers’ cheques,
bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts and letters of credit,
wherever situated; and
(c) includes a real or equitable interest, whether full or partial, in any such
asset;
Part III of the ARA makes provision for “Conviction-based asset recovery” and Section 9
stipulates that:
Where a person has been charged with or convicted of an offence or a criminal
enquiry is ongoing, the Enforcement Authority may apply to a Judge for a
Restraining Order in

38. 38
order to protect –
(a) property that is reasonably believed to be proceeds or an instrumentality of the
offence, or terrorist property; or
(b) any other property in which the person has an interest other than a lawful
interest.
The Act also makes provision for granting a “Restraining Order” (from a Judge) and likewise
contains several safeguards – Section 10:
(1) Where the Enforcement Authority applies to a Judge for a Restraining Order, and
the Judge is satisfied, having regard to any relevant evidence, that there is
reasonable ground to believe that –
(a) the alleged offender is the subject of a criminal enquiry or has been charged with
or convicted of an offence; and
(b) the property the subject of the application is proceeds or an instrumentality or
terrorist property, or the alleged offender derived a benefit from the commission of an
offence and has an interest in that property,
the Judge may order that –
(i) the property shall not be disposed of, or otherwise dealt with, by any person,
except in such manner and in such circumstances as are specified in the Order;
(ii) the property, or such part of the property as is specified in the Order, shall be
seized, taken into possession, delivered up for safekeeping or otherwise secured by
a named law enforcement agent; or
(iii) a Trustee shall be appointed to take custody of and manage the property in
accordance with any direction from the Judge.
(2) Where a Judge makes a Restraining Order, the Enforcement Authority shall,
within 21 days of the making of the Order, or such other period as the Judge may

39. 39
direct, give notice of the Order to every person known to the Enforcement Authority
to have an interest in the property and to such other person as the Judge may direct.
So as to prevent undue prejudice to a person whose property is the subject of a Restraining
order, by virtue of Section 16, a judge (upon an application made by the offender) may
discharge a Restraining Order if the alleged offender is not charged with that offence within
12 months of the date on which the said order was made.
The Act also provides for a civil “device” by which a trustee (as per the meaning to trustee
under the Act) may “preserve and protect” a property subject matter of a Restraining Order
– Section 11: Powers of Trustee:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a Trustee may do anything which he considers
reasonably necessary or appropriate to preserve or protect the property to which
the Restraining Order applies and its value, and may, in particular –
(a) become a party to any civil proceedings that affect the property;
(b) ensure that the property is insured;
(c) realise or otherwise deal with the property if it is perishable, subject to wasting or
other forms of loss, its value is volatile or the cost of its storage or maintenance is
likely to exceed its value;
(d) with a Judge’s approval, incur any necessary capital expenditure in respect
of the property;
(e) where the property consists of a trade or business –
(i) employ persons in the business or terminate their employment;
(ii) do any other thing that is necessary or convenient for carrying on the trade or
business on a sound commercial basis; and
(iii) with the Judge’s approval, sell, liquidate or wind up the trade or business if it is
not a viable, going concern or it is otherwise commercially advantageous to do so; or
(f) where the property includes shares in a company, exercise rights attaching to the
shares as if he was the registered holder of the shares.
Confiscation Order under Section 17 of ARA:

40. 40
(1) (a) Where a person is convicted of an offence, or from any other unlawful activity
which the Court finds to be sufficiently related to that offence the Enforcement
Authority may apply to the Court for a Confiscation Order in respect of the benefit
derived or likely to be derived by the person from that offence.
Under Section 19 (1):
Where the Enforcement Authority makes an application under section 17, and the
Court is satisfied that the defendant has benefited from an offence or any other
unlawful activity which the Court finds to be sufficiently related to that offence, it
shall, subject to section 21, make a Confiscation Order, ordering him to pay to the
State, within such time as it may determine, an amount equal to the value of his
benefit.
ARA also makes provision for “Civil Asset Recovery” - Section 27:
(1) (a) Where property is reasonably believed by the Enforcement Authority to be
recoverable under Sub-Part B of this Part and to be proceeds or an instrumentality or
terrorist property, it may apply to a Judge for a Restriction Order in respect of that
property.
(b) It shall be sufficient for the purposes of paragraph (a) for the Enforcement
Authority to show that the property is proceeds or an instrumentality or terrorist
property, without having to show that the property was derived directly or indirectly
from a particular offence or that any person has been charged in relation to such an
offence.
(c) The Enforcement Authority may make an application under paragraph (a) even
where the act which is the subject of the application was committed by a person who
is deceased at the time of the application.
(d) Where the Enforcement Authority is of opinion that, for any reason, it is
necessary to appoint an Asset Manager in respect of the property, it shall state the
reason in its application and nominate a suitably qualified person for appointment.

41. 41
(2) The Judge shall, where he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the property referred to in the application is proceeds or an
instrumentality or terrorist property, make a Restriction Order which may –
(a) authorise, require or secure the delivery up, seizure, detention or custody of the
property; or
(b) appoint an Asset Manager who shall be authorised or required to take –
(i) custody and control of the property and to manage or otherwise deal with it as the
Judge may direct; or
(ii) steps which the Judge considers appropriate to secure the detention, custody or
preservation of the property or for any other purpose.
(3) The Judge may make a Restriction Order where a person is not in Mauritius or
was acquitted of the offence, the charge was withdrawn before a verdict was
returned or the proceedings were stayed.
(3A) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), the Enforcement Authority may apply
to the Judge for an order that, instead of appointing an Asset Manager, the person in
whose possession the property is found shall exercise the powers referred to in
subsection (2)(b).
Recovery Order, under Section 34 of ARA:
Where any property has come to the notice of the Enforcement Authority, or property
is found by a law enforcement agent to be in the possession of any person, and the
property is reasonably believed by the Enforcement Authority to be worth more than
500,000 rupees and to be proceeds, an instrumentality or terrorist property, the
Enforcement Authority may, unless it would not be in the interests of justice, make
an application to the Court for the grant of a Recovery Order in respect of the
property.

42. 42
1. Tracing of Asset – Under Section 40:
(1) Subject to section 42, where any property which constitutes proceeds or an
instrumentality or terrorist property has been disposed of since it was used or
obtained in connection with the commission of an offence, it is recoverable pursuant
to Sub-Part A or B of this Part if it is held by a person into whose hands it may be
followed in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) Property may be followed into the hands of a person obtaining it on a disposal by
-
(a) the person who used or intended to use the property as an instrumentality or
through the offence obtained the property or terrorist property; or
(b) a person into whose hands it may, by virtue of this subsection, be followed.
Search and Seizure Order under Section 46 of ARA:
(1) A Judge may, on the application of the Enforcement Authority, make a Search
and Seizure Order which authorises a law enforcement agent to –
(a) search for, examine or seize any property or other material referred to in
subsection (2); and
(b) for the purposes of paragraph (a), enter any premises in which he has
reasonable ground to believe the property or material may be found.
(2) (a) Property to which subsection (1) applies is any property which –
(i) Repealed by [Act No. 24 of 2012]
(ii) is the subject of an Investigation; or
(iii) is reasonably believed by the Enforcement Authority to be proceeds, an
instrumentality or terrorist property.
Section 47 – Power to require production or disclosure

43. 43
(1) The Enforcement Authority may, by written notice, require any person to produce
or disclose any information or material, other than privileged material or customer
information, where there is reasonable ground for suspecting that —
(a) any property in the possession or under the control of a person is proceeds, an
instrumentality or terrorist property or the person has derived a benefit from any
unlawful activity;
(b) the person is in possession of the material which is required to be produced or
disclosed;
(c) the material is likely to be of substantial value to an application or an
Investigation; and
(d) it is in the public interest that the material be produced or disclosed.
International co-operation – Under Section 53 and 54:
53. International co-operation agreements
The Attorney-General or the Enforcement Authority may enter into an agreement
with any Ministry, Department, public authority or body outside Mauritius for the
collection, use or disclosure of information, including personal information, for the
purpose of exchanging or sharing information outside Mauritius or for any other
purpose under this Act.
54. Foreign request in connection with civil asset recovery
(1) Where a foreign State requests the Enforcement Authority to obtain the issue of
an order against property believed to be proceeds, an instrumentality or terrorist
property which is located in Mauritius, the Enforcement Authority may apply to a
Judge for a Restriction Order under section 27.

44. 44
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR CLAUSES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND INTEGRITY
REPORTING BILL
1. The main objects of the Bill are to:
(a) Promote a culture of good governance and integrity reporting in Mauritius.
(b) Stimulate integrity reporting in the public and private sectors.
(c) Encourage positive reports of acts of good governance and integrity.
(d) Disclose malpractices and recover unexplained wealth.
(e) Protect and reward persons making disclosures and reports

45. 45
2. Objects (a), (b) and (c) have no link to the Bill. Apart from the fact that the Integrity
Reporting Services Agency, hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”, shall act as the
focal point for receiving reports and disclosures of positive acts of good governance
and integrity, acts of malpractices and unexplained wealth, and evaluating, and
processing any such report, and disclosure – vide part 11 Clause 4 of the Bill.
3. Note that there is no mechanism which has been set up to require the Government
or the private sector to report on acts of good governance and integrity. How will the
Agency be aware of acts of malpractices within the private sector if no mechanism is
set up for the Auditor to inform the Agency of acts of malpractices which necessitate
corrective actions?
4. The Bill also does not cater for acts of good governance and integrity apart from the
fact that, as per Clause 10, the Agency will make a report to the Board and
recommend a reward if it is of the opinion of the Agency that a public of private body
has stimulated integrity reporting or encouraged a culture of good governance and
integrity reporting in Mauritius.
5. Furthermore, there is no proposed amendment to the Companies Act. There is no
amendment to the Companies Act. Such amendments should have been included in
the Bill to impose mandatory duties on the Directors and Auditors to report annually
on acts of good governance and integrity; how they are promoting a culture of good
governance and integrity and what is being done to stimulate integrity reporting with
a view to promote a culture of good governance, and what malpractices, which are
alien to the objects of the Bill, have been addressed.
6. Moreover, Clause 11 does not in any way whatsoever encourage local and foreign
investors to report any malpractice or any act which jeopardizes the integrity of
Mauritius. This reporting would have been of much help to make Mauritius a centre
of excellence of unimpeachable integrity.
7. The short title does not reflect the thrust of the Act which is about “Unexplained
Wealth Order” and in fact the aim of the Bill could be misleading in as much as it
addresses only the issue of promotion of a culture of good governance and integrity
reporting whereas the main plank of Unexplained Wealth Order is under the umbrella
of “related matters”.
Clause 2
8. We note with concern that the following key words are not defined:

46. 46
(a) Good governance.
(b) Integrity.
(c) Property.
(d) Integrity reporting.
(e) Positive reports of acts of good governance and integrity.
(f) Malpractices.
(g) Protect.
(h) Disclosures.
Clause 3
9. The Bill shall apply only to citizens of the Republic of Mauritius which is quite baffling
as all the laws of good governance and integrity reporting have as main aim to
combat organized crime, be it human trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking,
money laundering and have chosen the strategy of seizing proceeds of crime as a
way to deter ‘would be’ criminals and to curtail organized crimes.
10.The Bill, by limiting it only to the citizens of Mauritius, we have failed to take into
consideration: (a) The Palermo/United Nations Conventions Against Transnational
Organized Crimes And The Protocols Thereto, more particularly Article 7 of Palermo;
(b) The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And
Psychotropic Substances signed in 1998 in Vienna: Article 7 and; (c) The United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), more importantly Article 20,
establishing illicit enrichment when committed intentionally. Illicit enrichment is a
significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably
explain in relation to his or her lawful income.
11.Clause 3(6) of the Bill – “This Act shall apply to any property acquired at any time not
more than 7 years before the commencement of this Act. What is the rationale of “7
years”?
12.The rationale for “7 years” is based on Section 66 of the Bank of Mauritius Act which
stipulates that “every record of the Bank shall be kept in written form, or on microfilm,
magnetic tape, optical disk or any form of mechanical or electronic data storage and
retrieval mechanism for a period of at least 7 years after the completion of the
transaction to which it relates or the record, as the case may be.
13.Furthermore a Notary’s right of action to recover fees due to him shall be barred after
7 years.

47. 47
14.“Not more than 7 years before the commencement of this Act”. The Act shall come
into operation on the 1st of January 2016. Seven years as per the Interpretation and
General clauses Act will have as starting time the 1st of January 2008.
15.So the Act shall be in the future in relation to unexplained wealth at least deemed to
have started on the 1st of January 2008.
16.So in 2028, the Inquiry will still hold good for any property acquired as from 1st of
January 2008. More than twenty years and so on. So the rational of Bank of
Mauritius does not hold water.
17.Clause 3(6) is retrospective.
Retrospective Laws
18.Retrospective laws are simply laws that prosecute people for an offence which were
not laws at the time of the alleged offence.
19.The English common law on retrospective law making was markedly influenced by
the Roman law.
20.The Magna Carta of 1215 also mirrors the Roman Law against retrospective
legislation. CL 39 of the Magna Carta prohibited imprisonment or prosecution of a
person “except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land”.
However some authors have a different view on that Clause of the Magna Carta
which they believe is more to do with placing limits on the exercise of executive
power. (see Ben Juratowitch – Retroactive and The Common Law – Bloomsburg
2008)
21.In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes wrote that “Harm inflicted for a fact done
before there was a law that forbade it, is not punishment. But an Act of Hostility: For
the law there is no transgression of the law”.
22.For laws to be effective, they must be certain. Retrospective laws make the law less
certain and therefore unreliable. Lord Diplock said in Black Clawson International
Ltd v Papierweke Valdhof Aschaffenburg (1975) AC 591 that “the acceptance of the
Rule of Law as a Constitutional principle requires that a citizen before committing
himself to any course of action should be able to know in advance what are the legal
consequences that will flow from it”.

48. 48
23.In his Book the Rule of Law, Lord Bingham wrote: “Difficult questions can sometimes
arise on the retrospective effect of new statutes, but on this point the law is and has
long been clear: you cannot be punished for something which was not criminal when
you did it, and you cannot be punished more severely that you could have been
punished at the time of the offence”.
24.It is clear that the criminal law should be certain and its reach ascertainable by those
who are subject to it.
25.Bennion on Statutory Interpretation was quoted approvingly in the case of the DPP v
Keating (2013) 248 CLR 459: “A law that is altered retrospectively cannot be
predicted. If the alteration is substantive, it is therefore likely to be unjust. It is
presumed that Parliament does not intend to Act unjustly”.
26.The big question is; is the “Good Governance and Integrity Reporting” a criminal law
or a civil law matter? Is it not a law that expropriates property obtained prior to the
passing of the law? What are the effects?
27.A man, when he is prosecuted and is convicted, will face the sentence in person.
Surely his family will be affected. But the deprivation of his liberty will be limited to
himself and any other consequences on his family will be the result of the deprivation
of that liberty, and the Magistrate or the Judge when sentencing, does take into
consideration the effect of a custodial sentence upon the family. Whenever a
Magistrate or a Judge allows more time for a convicted person to pay his fine, he
does take into consideration the effect that the fine will have on the family (section
90. District and Intermediate Courts, (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1888). But one
can say that if a person is suddenly deprived of all his property, is it not a criminal
offence?
28.A person whose house and property inside the house have been confiscated will not
be the only one to suffer. What about his wife or/and kids who were in no way
whatsoever involved in his alleged shady business? What happens if in a given
situation, the spouse or the kids who have benefitted from the ill gotten gains of
husband and/or the father, had invested and fructified same?
29.In a small country like ours we shall see that the said spouse and/or children will
considered as outcasts in the event the relevant property is confiscated.

49. 49
30.Therefore the Bill, in our opinions, has criminal ramifications and can be qualified as
quasi criminal.
31.Article 15 of the International Covention on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR provides:
“
a. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.
b. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person
for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community or nations.
”
32.In other countries, bills of rights or human rights statutes provide some protection
from statutory encroachment. There are prohibitions on the creation of offences that
are applied retrospectively as in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and
New Zealand. For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides
that any person charged with an offence has the right “not to be found guilty on
account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it
constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or was criminal according
to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.”
33.The right not to be charged with a retrospective offence is also protected in the
Victorian and human rights statutes. Same is protected under the laws in Mauritius.
34.Section 10(4) of the Constitution of Mauritius deals with the provisions to secure
protection of law and states the following: “No person shall be held to be guilty of a
criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took
place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal
offence that is severer in degree or description than the maximum penalty that might
have been imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed”.

50. 50
35.But the argument which is used by proponents of the Bill is that it does not create a
criminal offence and the present bill creates a civil liability towards the State. But
when one is facing the risk of losing one’s property.
36.A mere change in the classification cannot change the characteristics of the
“creature”.
37.Therefore creating restrospective criminal offences and in the present bill a quasi
criminal offence is more difficult to justify than other retrospective laws. In all other
countries where the “UWO” has been introduced the aim was to combat organized
crimes.
38.In Mauritius the target is (the way of life) of any person and the state does not have
to make a minimal linkage with crime.
39.So the retrospectivity of the law cause much to law abiding citizen who has been
careless in keeping any record of any property he has acquired.
40.The clause as it is drafted will show surely cause untold harm to many Mauritians
even in the absence of malice by the agency.
41.It is apposite to note what was written by Maurice Lemoine in “Maniere de Voir” No.
130 (August –September 2013) Le monde diplomatique:
Rien de nouveau souls le soleil? Des organisations hors la loi existait déjà dans
l’Antiquité, au Moyen Age, durant L’Ancien Régime et les décennies passes. Mais,
depuis la fin du XXe siècle, les abandons de souveraineté et la mondialisation
libérale ont permis aux capitaux de circuler sans frein d’un bout à l’autre de la
planète. Et favorisé ainsi l’explosion d’un marché de la finance hors de contrôle,
auquel s’est connectée cette grande truanderie.
COMPARISON CHART

51. 51
CIVIL LAW CRIMINAL LAW
DEFINITITON Disputes between:
(2) two persons
Or
group compensation
Deal with :
Crime
Punishment
Fine
Prison
PURPOSE Between :
Individuals
Or
Organisations
To maintain the Stability of :
The State and Nation
Punish & Deter
CASE FILE BY Private
Parts
State
Mainly lodged by DPP
STANDARD
OF PROOF
Balance of Probabilities Beyond reasonable doubt
TYPE OF
PUNISHMENT
Damages
Or
Order to Rectify or Do
Guilty:
Imprisonment
Fine
Suspended Sentence
C.S.O
JURY TRIAL NO YES