Jordan pursued different foreign policy stances in the two Gulf Wars due to regime survival considerations. In Gulf War I, Jordan abstained from condemning Iraq due to economic dependence on Iraq and the need to appease public opinion. In Gulf War II, Jordan tacitly supported the US-led coalition due to stronger economic ties with the US and a less populist regime survival strategy that deemphasized public opinion. The document examines how domestic politics and economic interests shaped Jordan's shifting foreign policies in the two Gulf Wars in order to ensure regime survival.

1. JORDAN IN THE GULF WARS:
FOREIGN POLICY &
REGIME SURVIVAL
Debra Shushan, CIRS, Georgetown University

2. Jordan & Gulf War I (1990-91)
 WHITE PAPER
issued by
Jordanian
government
after Gulf War I
 17-page
statement plus
15 “background
documents”

3. Jordan & Gulf War II (2003+)
 No similar
effort in Gulf
War II for
transparency
in Jordanian
foreign policy
 Underscores
the difference
between
Jordan’s
foreign
policies in the
two Gulf
Wars

4. Outline of the Talk
 Background
 What is at stake?
 My Argument: Regime Survival Strategy and
Foreign Policy
 Jordan in the Gulf Wars
 Conclusion / Implications

5. Background
The Gulf Wars in Context

6. Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, August 2 1990
•“This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.” – President George H. W. Bush
•Bush recruits coalition to protect Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) and ultimately evict Iraqi
soldiers from Kuwait (Desert Storm), emphasizing Arab participation

7. Jordan Does Not Join US-Led Coalition
“Their strong personal bonds forged over  Unlike the majority of Arab
nearly two decades had made the King’s
support of Saddam Hussein during the
League members, Jordan
war an act of personal betrayal that does not condemn Iraqi
caused the President enormous anguish.”
- Secretary of State James Baker
invasion (abstains from Aug
10 vote)
 King Hussein tries to remain
neutral, pursue intra-Arab
solution
 Pres. Bush: King Hussein was
“one of the worst offenders”
and “almost a spokesman
for his neighbor Iraq”

8. US Invasion of Iraq, March 20 2003
• “You are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror.” – President George W. Bush
•“We now have a coalition of the willing that includes some 30 nations who publicly said they could
be included in such a listing and there are 15 other nations, for one reason or another, who do not
wish to be publicly named but will be supporting the coalition.” – Secretary of State Colin Powell

9. Jordan as Tacit Coalition Partner
 Active efforts to dissuade
Bush Administration from
launching war, convince Iraq
to adhere to UN resolutions
 Jordan hosts JOINT TASK
FORCE-WEST out of Shaheed
Muaffaq airbase near
Azraq, home to 5,000+ US,
coalition troops
 Extensive GID cooperation
with CIA, including “There are many enablers that
aren’t with gun in hand.” –
“extraordinary renditions” Interview with State Dept official

10. What is at stake?
Why study Jordanian foreign policy in the Gulf Wars?

11. The Broader Context
 Question: How do Supported Opposed
authoritarian regimes make US-led US-led
foreign policy? coalition in coalition in
 Political scientists have 2003+ 2003+
focused on democracies Supported
 My Project: draw insights US-led EGYPT SYRIA
from comparing foreign coalition in
policies of three Arab 1990-91
countries (Egypt, Jordan, and
Syria) in two Gulf Wars Opposed
US-led JORDAN
 E, J, S forced to choose coalition in
between: pleasing the US vs. 1990-91
following public opinion

12. How do authoritarian regimes make
foreign policy?
 Structural Realists:
 Allstates determine foreign policy based on
calculations of external power and threats
 Norm-driven:
 Leaders follow international norms/law or regional
norms (e.g. Arab consensus)
 Autocratic Exceptionalism:
 Non-democratic leaders follow personal preferences,
unconstrained by domestic actors

13. My Argument
1) Leaders care first and foremost about
retaining power.
2) They have regime survival strategies, based
on maintaining the support of key backers
(“winning coalition”).
3) Leaders choose foreign policies according to
their regime survival strategies, calculated to
keep them in power at home.

14. Focus on Domestic Politics
 Challenge to the conventional wisdom about the
insignificance of domestic politics in non-
democracies
 Assumption that leaders’ primary goal is retaining
power
 In democracy: focus is on winning coalition for next
election
 In autocracy: need to please winning coalition to
maintain stable rule, prevent overthrow
 Key issues: ECONOMICS and PUBLIC OPINION

15. Possible Winning Coalition Members
POPULIST VS.
ELITIST nature  Elites
of strategy
depends on military,
finance,
the extent to
which it relies
on support
community, technocratic
from the mass
public.  Mass Public
 Foreign Benefactor ($)

16. Regime Survival in the Gulf Wars
Join US-led coalition? Do not join?
RECEIVE AID: GAIN SUPPORT:
Bolsters Especially from
economic mass public
interests of
elites and
mass public

17. Understanding Jordanian Foreign
Policy in the Gulf Wars

18. Gulf War I: Economic Considerations
 US, Gulf states held substantial financial leverage
over Jordan:
 Relied on Saudis, Kuwaitis, and US for remittances, aid,
and trade
 Saudis offered to grant Jordan half its oil needs in
return for joining US-led coalition
 Gulf aid went from over $400 million to zero
 Jordan was also economically dependent on Iraq:
 Transit
trade through the port of Aqaba
 75% of Jordan’s industrial exports went to Iraq
 80-90% of Jordan’s oil FREE from Iraq

19. GW1: Role of Mass Public Opinion
 Interviews with King Hussein’s advisors indicate that he
feared domestic instability, overthrow, or civil war if
he did not side with public opinion
 Saddam’s appeal cut across parties and social strata:
Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians, Muslim Brotherhood
and Leftists
 Liberalized domestic political structure (1989-1993)
enables public to reach consensus, voice opinion
 Populist regime survival strategy increases importance of
mass public

20. GW2: Economic Considerations
 Cost-benefit analysis was clear, due to stronger aid,
trade relations with US
 Jordan signed FTA with US in 2000, making US #1
destination for Jordanian exports in 2003
 Jordan has become 4th-largest recipient of US aid
 US added $1.1 bn to Jordan’s annual aid ($450 mil) in
2003 as thanks for support in GW2
 Post-GW1 Turning Point: King Hussein adopts less
populist regime survival strategy, signs Wadi Araba
peace treaty with Israel
 King Abdullah’s economic focus

21. GW2: Economic Considerations
Aid to Jordan from US, Gulf States Jordan’s Exports to Iraq, US (as %
(in USD million) of total exports)
1600 25
1400
20
1200
1000 15
800 Gulf States Iraq
600 US 10 US
400
5
200
0 0
1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit

22. GW2: Jordanian Public Opinion
CSS Poll (Jan 2003) Government Poll (May 2003)
Perceptions re: reasons for 67% report supporting
looming US strike vs. Jordanian government’s
Iraq: stance after the war
 Control of Oil 83%  Government succeeds in
 Saving Israel 63% hiding nature of its
Should Jordan aid US? policy from the
Jordanian people?
 No to facilities 88%
 People afraid to report
 Yes to facilities 2% true opinion in
government poll?

23. GW2: Why was public opinion ineffectual?
 Change in winning coalition de-emphasizes importance
of mass public
 Economic incentive trumps public opinion
 Political deliberalization since opposition around peace
with Israel in 1994
 Committee for Resisting Submission & Normalization
 Demonstrations around 2000 Intifada, 2001 Afghan
war led King Abdallah to deliberalize further
 Changes in election laws hurt opposition, esp. Islamists
 Restrictions on the press

24. Conclusion / Implications

25. Demystifying the Autocratic State
 Importance of domestic politics
 The key is to elaborate how they matter
 Differences among non-democratic states
 Centrality of economic interests in foreign policy
 Public opinion: How can we best gauge it? How do
regimes estimate it? How often does the mass public
feel strongly about foreign policy, and on what
issues?

26. JORDAN IN THE GULF WARS:
FOREIGN POLICY &
REGIME SURVIVAL
Debra Shushan, CIRS, Georgetown University