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Debra shushan monthly dialogue dec 1, 2010 slides


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Debra shushan monthly dialogue dec 1, 2010 slides

  2. 2. Jordan & Gulf War I (1990-91)  WHITE PAPER issued by Jordanian government after Gulf War I  17-page statement plus 15 “background documents”
  3. 3. Jordan & Gulf War II (2003+)  No similar effort in Gulf War II for transparency in Jordanian foreign policy  Underscores the difference between Jordan’s foreign policies in the two Gulf Wars
  4. 4. Outline of the Talk Background What is at stake? My Argument: Regime Survival Strategy and Foreign Policy Jordan in the Gulf Wars Conclusion / Implications
  5. 5. BackgroundThe Gulf Wars in Context
  6. 6. Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, August 2 1990•“This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.” – President George H. W. Bush•Bush recruits coalition to protect Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) and ultimately evict Iraqisoldiers from Kuwait (Desert Storm), emphasizing Arab participation
  7. 7. Jordan Does Not Join US-Led Coalition“Their strong personal bonds forged over  Unlike the majority of Arabnearly two decades had made the King’ssupport of Saddam Hussein during the League members, Jordanwar an act of personal betrayal that does not condemn Iraqicaused the President enormous anguish.” - Secretary of State James Baker invasion (abstains from Aug 10 vote)  King Hussein tries to remain neutral, pursue intra-Arab solution  Pres. Bush: King Hussein was “one of the worst offenders” and “almost a spokesman for his neighbor Iraq”
  8. 8. US Invasion of Iraq, March 20 2003• “You are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror.” – President George W. Bush•“We now have a coalition of the willing that includes some 30 nations who publicly said they couldbe included in such a listing and there are 15 other nations, for one reason or another, who do notwish to be publicly named but will be supporting the coalition.” – Secretary of State Colin Powell
  9. 9. Jordan as Tacit Coalition Partner Active efforts to dissuade Bush Administration from launching war, convince Iraq to adhere to UN resolutions Jordan hosts JOINT TASK FORCE-WEST out of Shaheed Muaffaq airbase near Azraq, home to 5,000+ US, coalition troops Extensive GID cooperation with CIA, including “There are many enablers that aren’t with gun in hand.” – “extraordinary renditions” Interview with State Dept official
  10. 10. What is at stake?Why study Jordanian foreign policy in the Gulf Wars?
  11. 11. The Broader Context Question: How do Supported Opposed authoritarian regimes make US-led US-led foreign policy? coalition in coalition in Political scientists have 2003+ 2003+ focused on democracies Supported My Project: draw insights US-led EGYPT SYRIA from comparing foreign coalition in policies of three Arab 1990-91 countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) in two Gulf Wars Opposed US-led JORDAN E, J, S forced to choose coalition in between: pleasing the US vs. 1990-91 following public opinion
  12. 12. How do authoritarian regimes make foreign policy? Structural Realists:  Allstates determine foreign policy based on calculations of external power and threats Norm-driven:  Leaders follow international norms/law or regional norms (e.g. Arab consensus) Autocratic Exceptionalism:  Non-democratic leaders follow personal preferences, unconstrained by domestic actors
  13. 13. My Argument1) Leaders care first and foremost aboutretaining power.2) They have regime survival strategies, basedon maintaining the support of key backers(“winning coalition”).3) Leaders choose foreign policies according totheir regime survival strategies, calculated tokeep them in power at home.
  14. 14. Focus on Domestic Politics Challenge to the conventional wisdom about the insignificance of domestic politics in non- democracies Assumption that leaders’ primary goal is retaining power  In democracy: focus is on winning coalition for next election  In autocracy: need to please winning coalition to maintain stable rule, prevent overthrow Key issues: ECONOMICS and PUBLIC OPINION
  15. 15. Possible Winning Coalition MembersPOPULIST VS.ELITIST nature  Elitesof strategydepends on military, finance,the extent towhich it relieson support community, technocraticfrom the masspublic.  Mass Public  Foreign Benefactor ($)
  16. 16. Regime Survival in the Gulf Wars Join US-led coalition? Do not join? RECEIVE AID: GAIN SUPPORT: Bolsters Especially from economic mass public interests of elites and mass public
  17. 17. Understanding Jordanian ForeignPolicy in the Gulf Wars
  18. 18. Gulf War I: Economic Considerations US, Gulf states held substantial financial leverage over Jordan:  Relied on Saudis, Kuwaitis, and US for remittances, aid, and trade  Saudis offered to grant Jordan half its oil needs in return for joining US-led coalition  Gulf aid went from over $400 million to zero Jordan was also economically dependent on Iraq:  Transit trade through the port of Aqaba  75% of Jordan’s industrial exports went to Iraq  80-90% of Jordan’s oil FREE from Iraq
  19. 19. GW1: Role of Mass Public Opinion Interviews with King Hussein’s advisors indicate that he feared domestic instability, overthrow, or civil war if he did not side with public opinion  Saddam’s appeal cut across parties and social strata: Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians, Muslim Brotherhood and Leftists  Liberalized domestic political structure (1989-1993) enables public to reach consensus, voice opinion  Populist regime survival strategy increases importance of mass public
  20. 20. GW2: Economic Considerations Cost-benefit analysis was clear, due to stronger aid, trade relations with US  Jordan signed FTA with US in 2000, making US #1 destination for Jordanian exports in 2003  Jordan has become 4th-largest recipient of US aid  US added $1.1 bn to Jordan’s annual aid ($450 mil) in 2003 as thanks for support in GW2 Post-GW1 Turning Point: King Hussein adopts less populist regime survival strategy, signs Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel  King Abdullah’s economic focus
  21. 21. GW2: Economic ConsiderationsAid to Jordan from US, Gulf States Jordan’s Exports to Iraq, US (as %(in USD million) of total exports)1600 251400 2012001000 15 800 Gulf States Iraq 600 US 10 US 400 5 200 0 0 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
  22. 22. GW2: Jordanian Public OpinionCSS Poll (Jan 2003) Government Poll (May 2003) Perceptions re: reasons for 67% report supporting looming US strike vs. Jordanian government’s Iraq: stance after the war  Control of Oil 83%  Government succeeds in  Saving Israel 63% hiding nature of itsShould Jordan aid US? policy from the Jordanian people?  No to facilities 88%  People afraid to report  Yes to facilities 2% true opinion in government poll?
  23. 23. GW2: Why was public opinion ineffectual? Change in winning coalition de-emphasizes importance of mass public Economic incentive trumps public opinion Political deliberalization since opposition around peace with Israel in 1994  Committee for Resisting Submission & Normalization  Demonstrations around 2000 Intifada, 2001 Afghan war led King Abdallah to deliberalize further  Changes in election laws hurt opposition, esp. Islamists  Restrictions on the press
  24. 24. Conclusion / Implications
  25. 25. Demystifying the Autocratic State Importance of domestic politics The key is to elaborate how they matter Differences among non-democratic states Centrality of economic interests in foreign policy Public opinion: How can we best gauge it? How do regimes estimate it? How often does the mass public feel strongly about foreign policy, and on what issues?
  26. 26. JORDAN IN THE GULF WARS: FOREIGN POLICY & REGIME SURVIVALDebra Shushan, CIRS, Georgetown University