The Yom Kippur War of 1973 arose from ongoing territorial disputes between Israel and neighboring Arab states since Israel's formation. Egypt and Syria, still reeling from losses in the 1967 Six Day War, launched attacks supported by other Arab allies to regain lost territory like the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. Both sides received military support from allies like the Soviet Union for Arab states and United States for Israel. After initial gains by Arab forces, Israel gained the upper hand with US aid. A ceasefire was eventually brokered by the US and Soviet Union in October 1973, but tensions and conflicts have continued between Israel and some Arab states like Syria over disputed territories.

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Kayla Ebarb
POS 467
Professor Wright
The Yom Kippur War of 1973

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In October 1973, an Arab alliance came together to attack Israel in an attempt to regain
lost territory and also as a part of ongoing conflicts between Israel and Arab states since the
formation of the modern Israeli state. Within the Middle East, the various states have long been
entangled in issues that often seem impossible to ever resolve. Countless attempts at mediation
have occurred and while a few have ostensibly worked, most solutions reached have proved to be
temporary at best. State and non-state actors have often taken uncompromising stances on issues,
specifically over contested territorial disputes. This has resulted in continual failures of
negotiation subsequently leading to recurrent conflicts. Moreover, with a violent and contentious
history between Israel and its Arab neighbors, many issues often seem to be indivisible and the
actors refuse to make any concessions. Both sides share a long-lasting history of violence and
hatred, which make compromise seem unattainable. To a large extent, the Yom Kippur War of
1973 came about through political actors taking stances of legitimization that do not allow room
for negotiations and subsequent failure to negotiate, as well as a history of frequent conflicts and
wars in a multipolar region that is dominated by unstable regimes and subcomplexes.
The Yom Kippur War did not arise out of a sudden decision, but rather was borne from
previous conflicts within the region of the Middle East, and specifically from a recent, disastrous
loss for Arab states in the Six Day War. Many of the Arab states were still reeling over the loss
of the Suez Canal, the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights. For two of the major players against
Israel, Egypt and Syria, there was the loss of the Suez Canal and Golan Heights, respectively;
both of which were significant strategic territories for the two actors (Allen 1982). Despite
neither Egypt nor Syria having sufficient resources to defeat Israel on their own, they still
pursued conflict. They received aid from allies and subsequently found the resolution to attack
Israel. Senese and Vasquez (2005, 631) found that states with territorial disputes have higher

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chances for going to war and “…[when] both have politically relevant outside allies this greatly
increases the probability of war.” The existing circumstances appeared favorable for Egypt and
Syria and with outside allies they were determined to attack. With the development of these
alliances against Israel, Egypt and Syria were certain in their ability to swiftly defeat Israel and
win back the territories that the Arab states had previously lost in the Six Day War. They were
meticulous in their planning and according to Allen (1982), Egypt had reviewed and practiced
every detail of their plan numerous times and had even the smallest details prepared so that they
might easily secure a victory. More than anything, Egypt and Syria with the support of the Arab
coalition behind them were determined not to repeat the Six Day War.
Primarily, Egypt and Syria were motivated by territorial losses from the Six Day War
that Israel had won six years before. Additionally, since the creation of the modern Israeli state
various conflicts have occurred between Israel and other Arab states due to religious and
historical factors. In addition, Syria was especially concerned with the loss of the Golan
Heights, which is important strategically for Syria and Israel, as well as holding some historical
importance for Israel. Egypt also felt deeply the territorial loss of the Suez Canal, which was
strategic for them in military regards and also held historical connections (Allen 1982). Indeed,
much of the territory in the Levant region holds identity attachments for the actors involved,
ties that are based on ethnic groups living in disputed land as well as historical and religious
ties for various Arab and Jewish groups. On account of this, other Arab states had a united
front against Israel due to identity ties to the land between Israelis and Palestinians and were
willing to join in on the assault.
By and large, Egypt and Syria were the primary actors pursuing conflict, and they
believed they had solidified their position for victory with the inclusion of other Arab states and

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additional help from outside the region. Egypt knew it could not defeat Israel alone, but with
the aid of secondary actors as outside allies they assumed they had a certain victory (Safran
1973). Most Arab states had ongoing rivalries or conflicts with Israel and this allowed for Arab
states to at least have a united front against Israel. Egypt counted on support from Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq and other states within the Arab League. Moreover, Egypt also expected help from
the Soviet Union despite a somewhat shaky alliance with them at the time (Allen 1982). Like
Egypt and Syria, Jordan had an advantage with contiguity to Israel, and shared the largest border
with Israel. King Hussein of Jordan was able to at least provide indirect support to Egypt and
Syria, although some Arab sources had maintained that Hussein promised an attack on Bet She’
an in Israel, after the Syrians regained the Golan Heights (Allen 1982). What is more, Arab states
were able to provide quick support due to proximity and could provide assistance with fighting
on the ground. In addition, the Soviet Union, as a superpower, was undoubtedly counted on for
supplying weapons to the region. On the other side, Israel received much of its help from the
United States. By October 17, A-4 Skyhawks were sent to Israel as well as other aircraft from the
United States Air Force, including Phantoms which were armed with electronic devices to give
Israel the ability to pick up and counter enemy radar through jamming signals (Allen 1982).
Support from the United States was vital for Israel to be able to continue and have any chance at
successful defense. Despite help from the United States, many NATO allies refused to supply
Israel, including Britain though they declared an embargo on supplies to all combatants and
France who was supplying Libya and Saudi Arabia with arms (Allen 1982). Unquestionably, the
United States provided aid that saved Israel from a precarious chance at victory or at least
survival.

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Adhering to the Regional Security Complex Theory of Buzan and Waever (2003), the
Middle East is made up of a standard complex with no great power, rather it is multipolar, and
has formed three subcomplexes of which there are the Levant, the Gulf, and a final one in the
Maghreb. The Levant is focused on Israel and its Arab neighbors, which is emphasized by Israeli
and Palestinian conflicts, the Gulf is centered amongst Iran, Iraq, and Gulf Arab states with
Saudi Arabia leading the way, and the Maghreb is focused on relations between Libya, Tunisia,
Algeria, Morocco and has pushed into nearby areas (Buzan and Waever 2003). The security
complex that makes up the Middle East is a major factor in domestic and international decisions
for each state, and it considerably affected the states involved in the Yom Kippur War, and
continues to do so to this day. Buzan and Waever (2003) reason that the conflicts in the Middle
East were driven by territorial disputes among other contentions and power struggles, as well as
religious factors. All of these elements lend themselves toward insecurity in regimes, which in
turn become particularly prone to conflict in an effort to better ensure their own security. These
fears combined with regional alliances within the region and frequent territorial disputes
increased the chances for war, and continue to do so today (Senese and Vasquez 2005). For the
most part, the environment of a multipolar region with regimes unsure of their own security and
frequent territorial disputes provided the circumstance and motive for the Arab states to attack in
the Yom Kippur War.
Though territorial disputes may be associated with higher risks of conflict, Senese and
Vasquez (2005) found that while states that turn to threat or the use of force for territorial
disputes may be headed toward war, they do have the opportunity to keep the chances of war
moderately low if they are able to prevent regular disputes. However, this was not possible with
Israel and many of its Arab neighbors, as they were demonstrably not been able to avoid

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recurring skirmishes over territorial disputes, which accounts in part for the existence of
continual war between Israel and Arab states. Regular conflict is also a discernible sign of either
collapse in bargaining or a failure to bargain at all. Part of the failure can be found in
legitimization theories and the position an actor takes within legitimation strategies that keeps
them from bargaining. Goddard (2006) asserted that legitimacy is fundamental to bargaining in
view of the fact that making issues indivisible may lock an actor into a certain position where
they can no longer hold talks let alone come to a resolution. It is a powerful political tool and one
that is often used by Israel and its adversaries in the Middle East. When Israel and various Arab
states followed a discourse that turned the territory into an indivisible issue and used that as their
strategic means of legitimacy, they backed themselves into a corner where that was the only
position the actors could stand firm in. Israel, Egypt, and Syria wanted to maintain legitimacy
and authority over their constituents, and any potential change in strategy could weaken that
(Goddard 2006). Indisputably, the frequent conflicts between Israel and Arab states and the lack
of success in bargaining due to legitimization and issue indivisibility are constant factors in a
failure to come to any solutions and to avoid war.
Following a realist line of thinking, it would appear that Egypt and Syria were taking the
necessary steps to achieve what they wanted. That is, they wanted to regain the territory and war
was the way to do it. Senese and Vasquez (2005, 608) noted, “Realpolitik tactics and strategies
of resolve within the larger context of coercion are seen as the hallmarks of getting what you
want.” Egypt and Syria did not deem bargaining as a credible tool any longer and viewed war as
a more effectual route. Likewise, Israel was reluctant to give any territory up, and the Arab states
viewed an attack as the best, if not only, way to get what they wanted. For Egypt and their allies
there was comprehensive planning on how to overcome Israeli defenses and plans for potential

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conflicts, and an essential part of that was the act of taking them completely by surprise, which
did initially work in favor of the Arab side. As it was a surprise by the Arab coalition, Israel and
its allies had no chance for preparation in any steps to war. Neither Israel nor the United States
perceived any imminent threat despite intelligence showing changes in troop concentration,
which was later acknowledged as an intelligence failure (Allen 1982). As well as planning to
take Israel by surprise, Egypt and Syria ensured help from other sources within the Arab League,
and Arab forces were resupplied during the war by the Soviet Union (Safran 1973).
Undoubtedly, the Arab coalition against Israel professed confidence in their chances for success.
As a result of constant territorial disputes and identity ties to the land, actors have been
led to make claims of territorial indivisibility. Opposing sides claim the right to the land and
some would argue that there are no solutions acceptable to both sides and subsequently war is
inevitable. States and other political actors use a means of political legitimization to solidify
their positions and often to gain sympathetic outside allies. Goddard (2006) disagrees that
issues, including territorial ones, have to be indivisible at all and that in fact indivisibility is a
constructed phenomenon. However contentious an issue may be, there can still be solutions to
problems but solutions depend upon the willingness of the actors involved. For many actors
there are often various issues that are seen to have intangible salience, which can include
psychological attachments that have to do with religious and identity ties to a land. Goddard
(2006) defines issues as indivisible when an actor takes a stance on an issue so that there no
possible divisions and the bargaining range is reduced to “0”, but rather than truly making this
indivisible Goddard argues that this actually locks the actor into a claim where there is no
bargaining room. Actors make the issue indivisible when it does not have to be. With Israel
and its Arab neighbors, the issues they faced did not have to be indivisible and lead to war, but

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yet in the circumstances did result in the Yom Kippur War. These issues that are perceived by
both as indivisible have created bargaining situations where the actors feel they cannot make
any concessions and thus resort to war.
Furthermore, when issues are perceived to have high intangible salience there may be a
greater chance for war. Senese and Vasquez (2005, 608) point that often leaders may accept
principles of “realist folklore”, that is when a highly salient security issue emerges, one may
need to use force to defend themselves or threaten force if a viable solution is not found
through means of politics. Diplomatic measures had failed to result in an acceptable solution to
appease everyone and actors became impatient. If one does follow a realist line of thinking
where war is inevitable because of anarchy, it may appear to be the only option particularly
when one is dealing with issues that seem to hold high intangible salience and negotiation has
failed. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) found that conflicts involving intangible salience
concerning territory might be the most common and violent, but that those issues are also the
ones where actors might be more willing to find solutions. Conflicts between Israel and its
Arab neighbors over territory certainly have been frequent and bloody, but there have also been
more frequent attempts at bargaining that could possibly occur in part due to the efforts of third
parties. Eventually, Israel and the Arab states entangled in these conflicts may find a viable
resolution, but they will not as long as the actors involved maintain positions that do not allow
for compromise and utilize violence as the only way to achieve one’s goals.
Nearly as fast as the war seemed to start and had appeared to be in favor of the Arab
coalition, Israel was able to turn the tide with outside help, and alongside secondary actors
taking the role of mediators there was a possibility for an end to the war. By October 20, Henry
Kissinger, former Secretary of State to the United States, was making various trips to Moscow

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in a bid to find a solution to reach a cease-fire. He was adamant that any settlement would
involve both Arab and Israeli negotiations, which would happen simultaneously with the cease-
fire; finally, a United States and Soviet agreement was made which was forwarded to Tel Aviv,
where the Israeli government accepted and subsequently on October 22 President Sadat
accepted for Egypt, and Syria on October 23 (Allen 1982). The Soviet Union and the United
States had seemingly brought a potential end to the war, yet even with the cease-fire accepted
on all sides, conflict continued. October 22, fighting flared up once more as Israeli forces broke
past Egyptian lines seizing airfields and cutting access to roads, all while the United Nations
(UN) tried to implement the cease-fire; soon the Russians were threatening to send troops to
enforce the cease-fire themselves until October 26, when the pressure between states had
subsided and a new agreement was reached and approved by the Security Council of the UN
(Allen 1982). With a cease-fire ending the war there was no definitive winner or loser, but
there were a few positive outcomes and many negative factors to come out of the resolution.
On the Arab side they had been defeated again, though not nearly as easily as in the Six Day
War. Still, they had suffered great losses in population and physical resources. Though tension
remains to this day, Egypt and Israel were able to establish diplomatic relations in 1980 and
have been for the most extent been able to avoid the recurring conflicts they were previously
used to; relations between Syria and Israel have remained as difficult as ever and riddled with
conflict as they continue to fight for control over the Golan Heights (Allen 1982). Throughout
the Middle East, Israeli-Arab relations remain fraught with instability and Israel has been
involved in numerous conflicts and wars with Palestine and Lebanon.
In a multipolar standard security complex with convoluted subcomplexes, the Middle
East is filled with insecure regimes and unstable relations not only between Israel and Arab

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states, but also amongst allies and friendly states. War appears to be a reality for nearly every
region, though for many it seems a more distant memory than the constant violence that
confronts states in the Middle East. In attempting to understand what goes in on in the region,
it is critical to understand that actors are facing off on issues that they have deemed to be
indivisible. Territorial disputes often escalate to war or some type of conflict and when actors
use legitimization tools that prevent them from bargaining over territory, war is viewed as the
only option. With a refusal to yield or compromise one’s position, states are backing
themselves into a place where nothing more than a temporary peace will last and conflict will
continue into the foreseeable future. When all is said and done, Israel and its Arab neighbors
cannot expect to find permanent solutions without coming to a place where their issues can be
seen and treated as divisible.

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Bibliography
Allen, Peter. 1982. The Yom Kippur War. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Goddard, Stacie E. 2006. “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of
Legitimacy.” International Organization. 60 (1): 35-68.
Hensel, Paul R. and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2005. “Issue Indivisibility and territorial
claims.” GeoJournal. 64 (4): 275-285.
Senese, Paul D., and John A. Vasquez. 2005. "Assessing the Steps to War." British Journal of
Political Science. 35 (4): 607-633.