1. Original Problem Statement
Chinese literatures have revealed how
drones can be used as an surprise
element in an amphibious assault to
overwhelm defenses. In a potential
Taiwan Strait Crisis, there is a need for a
low-cost and survivable counter-drone
system to defend Taiwan.
Final Problem Statement
Taiwan needs a robust and survivable
C2 system to effectively and quickly
bring the right asset to the right place
at the right time during an invasion.
Tom Liang
- MS Mechanical
Engineering ‘22
- BS Mechanical
Engineering
Josh Stelwagen
- MA East Asian
Studies (China
Concentration) ’21
Felipe Calero
- BS Computer
Science (AI Track)
‘23
Team Drone
Total interviews: 17

7. Kinetic cUAS
Drone
swarms

8. Kinetic cUAS
Detection
Drone
swarms

9. Kinetic cUAS
Detection
C2 disruption
Drone
swarms

10. Drone
swarms
Kinetic cUAS
Detection
C2 disruption
Network of
sensors

11. Drone
swarms
Kinetic cUAS
Detection
C2 disruption
Network of
sensors
Command
and Control

13. Proposed Solutions
Cultivate Indigenous EM
Expertise
Sharing Best Practices
with Allies and Partners
Smart Fortress Defence

14. Geographical Space Defense Budget Overall Defense Concept
Smart Fortress Defense for Robust C2
Layered, decentralized
modular network of
sensors
Get right things to the
right place at the right
time

15. Taiwan is not allowed in many
international institutions with current
geopolitical constraints
GCTF is a platform for Taiwan to
share their expertise and strengthen
connections with international experts
Vigorously expand the scope of GCTF to include the sharing of information
about emerging threats in the Electromagnetic Environment (EME) as well
as best practices in defensive Electromagnetic Operations (EMO).
Recommendation
Expand GCTF to Share Defense Practices

16. Offer scholarships to Taiwan
high school students to pursue
undergraduate STEM education
at top colleges in the US
Students required to work for the
Taiwan government for six years
upon completion of their studies
Cultivate Domestic Taiwan EM Expertise

17. Questions?
Questions?
Photo: Zhuhai Airshow 2020, China breaks world record for most drones

18. APPENDIX

20. What:
How:
Drones + AI
Amphibious Assault
Taiwan’s Overall Defence Concept + Geographical/Political/Economic Constraints
Potential
Solutions:
Taiwan Straits Crisis
UAV/UUV swarms
Finding, tracking
and neutralizing
drone swarms
Disrupt C2 networks
Robust & survivable C2
architecture
Electronic Warfare
(EW)
Buoys network for
detection &
communication
EW for cUAS
Search & destroy
drone mothership

21. Where we started
Use of drone swarms for
kinetic offense during an
amphibious invasion
How can Taiwan bring
down enemy drones?

22. What constraints
exist?
1. Economic
2. Political
3. Geographic
4. Overall Defense
Concept (ODC)

23. Uncertainty about where drone swarms would be utilized,
and if effective solutions even existed
At this point in the quarter, we began to feel more deeply the uncertainty about
where drone swarms would be utilized.
What exactly was the problem Taiwan should be most concerned about?
Additionally, many of the kinetic cUAS we looked into were either in very early
stages or impractical, and it did not seem like Taiwan would be able to know
where to deploy them during an invasion.
Should this problem not be framed in terms of kinetic defenses?

24. Key Problem = Detection
Software + C2I

25. Key Insight - Importance of EW for China, and how
Taiwan’s current defense plan thinks about EW.
China wants to disrupt Taiwan’s command and control, and prevent it from using
the assets it has (e.g. surface-to-air missiles) effectively
Drone swarms may represent a unique threat to Taiwan’s C2, and may be an
attractive option for China.
Taiwan’s current defense plan neglects EW, and essentially assumes it will lose
access to any advanced communication systems.
Ryan Fedasiuk - CSET

26. Key Insight - Drone swarm encompasses not only
detecting and tracking drone swarms over land, but also
incoming ships
As small drones cannot cross Taiwan Strait, they would need to be deployed
from a ‘mothership’ or some other source nearby.
Problem is: Taiwan cannot effectively target vulnerabilities like the mothership
or command nodes for drones.
Zak Kallenborn - freelance analyst

27. Buoys network for detection & communication
Could provide improved operational awareness during
invasion, help find targets (e.g. mothership)
Decentralized, difficult to jam or spoof
Considered this as potential solution for the problem of
targeting vulnerabilities like motherships or command
nodes, but did not solve other aspects of the problem.

28. Final insight: Underlying problem is Command and Control (C2)
Detecting & tracking drone swarms, defending against EW, and being able to
target drone swarm vulnerabilities are all symptoms of the same problem - C2.
Drone swarms are concerning in large part because of the weaknesses of
Taiwan’s current C2 architecture.
In the longer term, Taiwan needs to learn to compete in EW and cyber
warfare, or it will not be able to use the assets it has accumulated.
The problem is: Taiwan cannot defend it’s C2 architecture from EW and
cyberattacks, and losing situational awareness would hamper its ability to
impose costs on an invading force.
Dr. Chen-Yi Tu - INDSR (Taiwan’s version of RAND)

29. What:
How:
Drones + AI
Amphibious Assault
Taiwan’s Overall Defence Concept + Geographical/Political/Economic Constraints
Potential
Solutions:
Taiwan Straits Crisis
UAV/UUV swarms
Finding, tracking
and neutralizing
drone swarms
Disrupt C2 networks
Robust & survivable C2
architecture
Electronic Warfare
(EW)
Buoys network for
detection &
communication
EW for cUAS
Search & destroy
drone mothership

30. Future work
● Validating solutions with stakeholders of the proposed solutions

32. Aerial drone swarms
for kinetic offense
Aerial drone swarms for:
- Kinetic offense
- Reconnaissance
- EW
Underwater drone
swarms for:
- Reconnaissance
- Minesweeping

33. Key Insight - Using the kill web concept to emphasize
importance of detection and tracking
Mrinal Menon (Anduril Industries) & DoD interviewees
Kill web process: Detection, Tracking, Classification, Mitigation
Current thinking in this space neglect the first links of the kill web,
and actually it is very difficult currently to detect and track incoming
drones
Problem is not just bring down drone swarms, but rather detecting
and having the situational awareness to know where to deploy
assets.

34. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) - Current Practice
In 2018, the Industrial Development Bureau of MOEA established a cybersecurity
integrated service platform called Security Platform as a Service (SecPaaS), in
which more than 51 domestic companies that independently develop
cybersecurity systems participate.

35. Indigenous EM Expertise
Current Practices:
● Supporting and recruiting high-caliber R&D talents to forge stronger science
and technology capacity and industry R&D capacity
○ Accelerate higher education reform and increase higher education funding to strengthen the
innovation and R&D capacity of higher education institutes
○ develop high-caliber talent databases to keep track of the whereabouts of PhD graduates and
the supply and demand for PhD graduates
○ provide scholarships to PhD graduates to motivate Taiwanese and foreign students to further
their study
● Cultivating and recruiting professionals to facilitate industrial transformation
○ industry-academia cooperation PhD talent cultivation systems
○ actively recruit high-profile talents from Taiwan and overseas

36. Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
● Focus on academic research that caters to the needs of industry
○ Taiwan relies on science and technology innovation as a key driver of economic growth and
national progress.
● Three national science park - Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI),
National Applied Research Laboratories and Institute for Information Industry
○ ITRI - helped to set up TSMC & United Microelectronics

37. Geographical Space Defense Budget Overall Defense Concept
Smart Fortress

38. President Tsai Ing-Wen’s Five Plus Two Industrial Innovation
Program

39. President Tsai Ing-Wen’s Five Plus Two Industrial Innovation
Program
● Smart Machinery Industry
○ Boost development of smart machineries
● National Defense Industry
○ Provide support to information security industry cluster in Taiwan
○ Promote dual-use technology

40. Current Schemes
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology (NTUST) Scholarship for
international graduate students [1 - 4yrs / tuition and stipend]
https://www.studyintaiwan.org/university/scholarship/136
Ministry of Education Taiwan-Caltech Scholarship

41. What:
How:
Drones + AI
Amphibious Assault
Taiwan’s Overall Defence Concept + Geographical/Political/Economic Constraints
Potential
Solutions:
Taiwan Straits Crisis
UAV/UUV swarms
Finding, tracking
and neutralizing
drone swarms
Disrupt C2 networks
Robust & survivable C2
architecture
Electronic Warfare
(EW)
Buoys network for
detection &
communication
EW for cUAS
Search & destroy
drone mothership

42. Slide Templates

43. Smart Fortress
Who: Joint Taiwan NCSIST and US Defense
Industry venture.
What: The Smart Fortress complements
Taiwan’s existing “ODC” by establishing a
defense in-depth featuring layered,
decentralized constellations of sensors
capable of rapidly cueing electronic, cyber,
information, and directed energy capabilities. This
framework not only promotes shared awareness
but enables multi-domain targeting
synchronization across all echelons of
command, thereby presenting adversaries with
additional dilemmas and risks.
Where/How: Use Taiwan’s condensed
geography to its advantage: incorporate urban
terrain, mountains, outer islands, and harbors into
sensor network that is nested with Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.

44. Sharing Best Practices
● Due to current geopolitical constraints, Taiwan is not allowed to participate in
many international institutions.
● Global Cooperation & Training Framework (GCTF) is a platform for Taiwan
to share their expertise and strengthen connections with international experts
on different topics via workshops and events.
● Vigorously expand the scope of GCTF program to include the sharing of
information about emerging threats in the Electromagnetic Environment
(EME) as well as best practices in defensive Electromagnetic Operations
(EMO).

45. Indigenous EM Expertise
● Taiwan should invest in education and aim to produce world-leading
electromagnetic scholars.
● Offer scholarships to Taiwan high school students to pursue
undergraduate STEM education at top universities in the US and UK. The
condition of the scholarship is for the students to return back to work for the
Taiwan government for six years upon completion of their studies.

49. Tom Liang
- MS Mechanical
Engineering ‘22
- BS Mechanical
Engineering
Josh
Stelwagen
- MA East Asian
Studies (China
Concentration) ’21
Felipe Calero
- BS Computer
Science (AI Track)
‘23
Final Problem Statement
Taiwan’s Ministry of National
Defense needs robust and survivable
C2 architecture for decision-makers
to effectively visualize and
understand the operating
environment during a crisis, rapidly
deploy the right asset to the right
place at the right time, and efficiently
mass firepower across multiple
domains thus enhancing unit
lethality.
Original Problem Statement
In order to strengthen credible deterrence by
denial and protect against asymmetric People’s
Republic of China (PRC) AI and swarm
technologies in a potential Taiwan Strait crisis,
Group 5 analyzes the PRC’s joint service (联合
作战样式) operational concept for the future of
amphibious warfare (两栖登陆作战), as
described in open source official Chinese
publications, and develops low-cost, survivable,
and lethal solutions
Team Drone
Total interviews: 17

50. Indigenous EM Expertise
Offer scholarships to Taiwan high school
students to pursue undergraduate STEM
education at top universities in the US.
Students to return back to work for the
Taiwan government for six years upon
completion of their studies.

51. LOREM IPSUM
Proposed Solutions
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Smart Fortress
Memorandum of
Understanding
Promote Indigenous
Expertise