SAMPLE 1Working title Personal essay The rise of inequality in.docx

SAMPLE 1
Working title: Personal essay: The rise of inequality in South
Florida
Working Thesis: Similar to @my family’s experience in South
Florida, many Americans have fought against various forms of
#inequality. Two examples that stand out when studying the
[[specify year(s)]]-period of US history are #income inequality
and #gender inequality.
Topic sentence #1: @ family experience with #inequality [[a
sentence about these things will help the author establish their
POV about the essay themes]]
Evidence 1: [[specific examples from the current period can
illustrate relationship between local experience or observation
and the theme of #inequality as discussed in Module 2-4]]
Evidence 2: [[need at least one additional piece of evidence, can
be specific to the family experience OR to the modules]]
Topic sentence #2: #Income inequality [[notice how the first
sub-topic in the thesis discussed]]
[[now that theme of focus of this paragraph identified, the topic
sentence must state what it is about income inequality will be
discussed in the paragraph]]
Evidence 1: and discussion that supports your point: Andrew
Carnegie, “Wealth,” North American Review 148 (June, 1889),
653–665. Ch.16
[[now that evidence related to the particular theme identified,
the sentences must state what the evidence highlights about
income inequality that directly pertains to the topic sentence]]

Evidence 2: and discussion that supports your point.
Topic sentence 3: gender inequality
Evidence 1:
Evidence 2:
Conclusion
...
SAMPLE 2
Working Thesis: The [[specify dates]]-period was one during
which Americans of diverse backgrounds pushed for their
rights. This is apparent in the long struggle for civil rights,
women's rights, and labor rights.
Topic Sentence 1: civil rights
Evidence 1:
Evidence 2:
Topic Sentence 2: women's rights
Evidence 1: local example of NOW
[[now that evidence related to the particular theme identified,
the sentences must state what the evidence highlights about the
rights struggle that directly pertains to the topic sentence]]
Evidence 2:
Topic Sentence 3: labor rights
Evidence 1:
Evidence 2:
Conclusion
…
SAMPLE 3
Working Titles: Topic Essay: Capitalism and the Growth of the
American Economy OR

Capitalism and the Foundation of the Modern Economy How
Industrial Capitalism laid the groundwork for the modern
economy.
Working Thesis: The @industrial capitalists of the @late 1800’s
and @early 1900’s laid the groundwork and created the
#modern American economy. The formation of @large
corporations, @injection of capital, and @government
intervention were the #building blocks of capitalism in
America. The #effects of this revolution are still @visible today
in @every city, on @every street corner and in @every
shopping mall. This was the beginning of the America we live
in today.
[[reference to current day, local example needs to be more
precise and below, needs to be incorporated somewhere into the
essay]]
·
Topic Sentence 1:
The @railroad industry was the start of the #rapid growth of
@large corporations and @industrialization.
-
@Ch. 16 Sec. II pg.3- The revolution of Taylorism
-
@Ch. 16 Sec. II pg.6- Markets got competitive, mergers caught
on and the
monopoly was born.
·
Topic Sentence 2:
The @injection of capital into large businesses would not have
been possible if it were not for favorable #government
intervention.
-
@Ch. 16 Sec II pg.5- After the Civil War laws were passed that
made it possible
for enterprises to get large amounts of capital

-
@Ch. 18 Sec. V pg. 59- Legal innovations protected
shareholders from losses,
government gave hearty handouts to titans of industry
·
Topic Sentence 3: @Large corporations cannot survive without
@capital, the money used to run the businesses, in the @early
days of #industrialization only the @wealthiest of individuals
could buy a piece of the pie. [[later two examples of evidence
need more precise definition]]
-
@Ch 16 Sec. II pg.5- wealthy individuals were the only ones
that could bear the
risk of capital
-
@Ch. 16 Sec II pg.6- The wealthy earned back enormous
returns
Conclusion:
Large corporations, banks and manufacturing companies are
flooded with capital, and have the backing of our federal
government to do as much business as possible. The framework
of the industrial and market revolution is still very much at
work today.
Topic Essay: The Power Struggle and Desire for Freedom
toward Independence in the Caribbean
Daniela Fierro
February 23, 2020
Thesis: Despite widespread inspiration of the Haitian
Revolution across the Caribbean, history narratives regarding

such have been produced in a way that presents the struggle for
power, freedom and independence among the people.
These are my three supporting points: Struggle for power, for
freedom, and for independence.
· Power struggle; competition among rules from the greatest
empires. Between Empires (Module 4)
· Independence; inconsistencies in narratives about
independence. Revolution Across the Americas (Module 3)
· Freedom/ Liberty; the idea of liberty that caused many
revolutionaries to fight against colonial rule such as Haitians at
the Haitian Revolution. Revolution Across the Americas
(Module 3)
Evidence
· In the article “All would be equal in the effort”, Eller argues
that during the early nineteenth-century in the Caribbean, Santo
Domingo was a significant bridge for “common wind” of
revolutionary thought; mainly because it was Haiti’s neighbor.
[footnoteRef:1] [1: Anne Eller, “ 'All would be equal in the
effort': Santo Domingo’s “Italian Revolution”, Independence,
and Haiti, 1809-1822,” Journal of Early American History 1
(2011) 105–141. (Change to Chicago style; still working on) ]
· “The Reconquista campaign for the restoring of Spanish rule
brought conflicts over sovereignty and independence in Santo
Domingo.” [footnoteRef:2] [2: “same as above, still working
on” (Change to Chicago style; still working on) ]
· Trouillot’s, the contemporary inability to understand the
events of the Revolution, specially, the actions and aspirations

of slave revels, helps to explain the relative absence of Haitian
Revolution in historical knowledge. [footnoteRef:3] [3: Michel
Rolph Trouillot, “North Atlantic Universals” (20 pages);
(Change to Chicago style; still working on)
]
1
The Power Struggle and Desire for Freedom toward
Independence in the Caribbean
Daniela Fierro
Journal of Early American History 1 (2011) 105–141
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 DOI
10.1163/187707011X577432
brill.nl/jeah
J O U R N A L
O F E A R LY
AMERICAN
H I S T O R Y
* Socrates Barinas Coiscou, “La Revolución de los
italianos”, in Boletín del Archivo General
de la Nación (hereinafter, “ BAGN ”) 58 (1948), pp. 215-89 at
252. ! e research for this article
was conducted with the aid of a Merriwether-Sattwa Grant from
New York University and a

Fulbright-Hays Fellowship. Special thanks to Ada Ferrer,
Michael Gomez, Aldo Lauria Santiago,
Graham Nessler, Richard Turits, Elena Schneider, Harvey
Neptune, and the anonymous review-
ers for their helpful comments and critique of di" erent pieces
and versions of this article. ! anks
to Rachel Lang for her work on the images accompanying this
article.
** Anne Eller is an advanced Ph.D. Candidate in the History
of the African Diaspora and
Latin America at New York University and a Fulbright-Hays
scholar. Her dissertation, tenta-
tively entitled “Let’s Show the World We are Brothers: the
Dominican War of Restoration and
Caribbean Worlds of the Nineteenth Century”, deals with the
popular participation of
Dominicans and Haitians in the War of Restoration (1861-5)
against Spain.
“All would be equal in the e! ort”: *
Santo Domingo’s “Italian Revolution”,
Independence, and Haiti, 1809-1822
Anne Eller **
New York University
E-mail: [email protected]
Received 5 February 2010; accepted 2 November 2010
Abstract
! is article explores the colony of Santo Domingo just after it
had passed from French back to
Spanish hands in 1809. Although impoverished and at the very
margins of the Caribbean planta-
tion system, revolutionary winds were nonetheless bu" eting the

colony. Using the testimony of
a failed 1810 conspiracy known as the “Italian Revolution”, the
article explores the enduring
inequalities present in Santo Domingo, the immediate infl uence
of the Haiti to the west, and the
beginnings of Latin American independence more generally.
Whereas Spanish authorities and
other Caribbean elites might have dismissed the colony as
marginal to the political events, there-
fore, the conspiracy sheds light on its importance to subaltern
travelers and migrants from neigh-
boring islands. Finally, it shows the tremendous concrete and
symbolic importance of the
Haitian Revolution on the neighboring colony, complicating a
historiography that often argues
for confl ict, and not interrelation, between the two sides of
Hispaniola.
Keywords
Santo Domingo ; Haitian Revolution ; Independence ;
Conspiracy ; Spanish colonialism ; Subaltern
thought
106 A. Eller / Journal of Early American History 1 (2011) 105–
141
I. “Foolish Spain”: " e Rebellious, Forgotten Colony of
Santo Domingo
Ayer Español nací
A la tarde fuí Francés
Hoy, dicen que soy Inglés
No sé qué será de mí. 1

Sometime in the hot summer months of 1810, a group of
unlikely conspira-
tors hatched an independence plot in Santo Domingo’s
beleaguered capital
city. 2 By all the varying accounts, it was a daring plan: the
conspirators plotted
to seize the city center, declare de jure independence, and then
cling to politi-
cal control until military reinforcement from Haiti arrived to
secure it. ! e
scheme was similar in form to the coup-like independence e"
orts of the short-
lived “First Republic” in nearby Venezuela, which had been
declared just
months before. In fact, pamphlets from Caracas were seized
from multiple
suspects detailing the revolutionary events in neighboring
colonies. Unlike
in Caracas, however, the Hispaniola conspiracy was not an
elite-led e" ort.
In the impoverished port city of Santo Domingo, the
conspirators in the
so-called “Italian Revolution” were fairly regular folk, artisans
and veterans of
the various confl icts of the last decade. Evidently, they
assumed that the masses
of people, beginning with free people of color in the capital
itself, would read-
ily support them. ! e apparent aims were multiple and
heterogeneous, a dis-
parate collection of interests that refl ected both the political
fragmentation
and desperation of the colony itself in the wake of several
particularly di# cult
decades. Most signifi cantly, they looked to neighboring
revolutionary Haiti

for help.
Despite its turbulent history—three independence e" orts in
1821-2, 1844,
and 1863-5—Santo Domingo does not fi gure prominently in
literature about
independence movements in Latin America. While its
complicated trajectory
from empire to independence embodied the “broad array of
possibilities …
improvised and reactive” of the independence period,
nationhood was far
1 “Yesterday I was born Spanish / In the afternoon I was
French / Today they say I am
English / I do not know what will become of me”, Antonio del
Monte y Tejada, Historia de Santo
Domingo , Tomo III (Santo Domingo: Imprenta de Garcia
Hermanos, 1890), p. 192 (capitaliza-
tion in original). ! e quintilla was reported to have been
written by a priest in Santiago, Don
Juan Vasquez, around 1804.
2 At some point, the historian has to decide whether or not a
conspiracy actually existed.
I think that it did, given the context of Santo Domingo at the
time, the relative consistency of
the testimony (including multiple confessions), and in interests
of less stilted prose for this article
(although its form and scope is much more open to
interpretation).
A. Eller / Journal of Early American History 1 (2011) 105–141
107

from a foregone conclusion. 3 Compared with the
contemporary 1810 inde-
pendence e" orts in Venezuela and Mexico, the impoverished
colony of Santo
Domingo seemed to lack cohesive class actors so relevant in the
continent’s
struggles; there was neither a prospering Creole class in Santo
Domingo nor a
consolidated landless peasantry. 4 Consideration of Santo
Domingo has even
largely escaped scholars of the Haitian Revolution, despite its
relevance as
a staging ground and immediate neighbor to the struggle.
Because Santo
Domingo was not an entrenched plantation society by the time
of the initial
uprisings, there is simply not the sorts of evidence for which
researchers often
look, the titillating archival trail of revolutions spreading:
massive defensive
e" orts on the part of an elite to restrict the fl ow of
information, an easily docu-
mentable change in subaltern political discourse citing the
Revolution as an
inspiration, or in fact any major uprisings at all. For the next
decade or so, the
colony limped along through the period of “España Boba”
(1809-21), as if
dooming it to historiographical oblivion. By the time the
Haitian Unifi cation/
Occupation occurred, uniting the whole island under President
Jean-
Pierre Boyer from 1822-44—surely this would be a ripe fi eld to
study the
Haitian revolutionary state in action?—scholars have, so far,

not shown much
interest.
Within Dominican historiography, the 1809-21 period is often
referred to
as “España Boba”, or “Foolish Spain”, a moniker that refl ects a
certain
degree of retrospective disdain. Indeed, historians tend to
conceive of the
di# cult period—the colony’s last direct connection with Spain,
save a four-
year re-occupation in 1861—as one of tragic metropolitan
neglect, disrup-
tive revolutionary circumstances, and relative isolation.
Scholars from the left
and right lament the downfall of local elites that resulted from
the tumult:
“History snatched the Dominican fruit from its tree before the
sap of life
3 Jeremy Adelman, “Iberian Passages: Continuity and Change
in the South Atlantic”, in
David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), ! e Age of
Revolutions in Global Context,
c. 1760-1840 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 59-
82 at 59. Santo Domingo is an
exemplary case, similarly, for Adelman’s arguments about
independence struggles emerging as
products of imperial tension and crisis in, e.g., “Age of Imperial
Revolutions”, American Historical
Review 113, no. 2 (2008), pp. 319-40.
4 Deive writes about a rancher class whose conservatism and
hispanofi lia are analogous in
sentiment, if not at all in wealth, to latifundistas elsewhere in
the Spanish empire, Carlos Esteban

Deive, “Santo Domingo, las Cortes de Cádiz, y los primeros
intentos separatistas”, in Rebeldes y
Marginados: ensayos históricos (Santo Domingo, República
Dominicana: Banco Central de la
República Dominicana, Departamento Cultural, 2002), p. 122. !
e merchant class of Santo
Domingo, on the other hand, bore much less resemblance,
selling only small-scale agricultural
exports (mahogany, tobacco) and often so lacking in capital that
they were unable to make pur-
chases in return.
141
5 Pedro L. San Miguel, ! e Imagined Island: History,
Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola , Jane
Ramírez, trans. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina
Press, 2005 [1997]), p. 30.
! is refrain in e" ect laments the downfall of the modest
plantation economy that the small elite
maintained, essentially echoing the pro-slavery pleas of Antonio
Sánchez Valverde in the 1780s.
As Silvio Torres Saillant observes, “[t]heir ardent love for
Spain and their nostalgic languor for
the early colonial days sprinkles the discourse of traditional
Dominican critics with plaints and
lamentations”. ! is lamentation refl ects hidden and not-so-
hidden racist undertones, especially
when writing of the emigration of white families in the period;
“[c]onvinced that Dominicans
are (or should be) white, traditional literary scholars have made
a link between moments of
decay in the colonial past and a reduction in the number of

white families living in Santo
Domingo”, Silvio Torres-Saillant, “Dominican Literature and its
Criticism: Anatomy of a
Troubled Identity”, in Albert James Arnold, et al (eds.), A
History of Literature in the Caribbean
(New York: John Benjamins, 2004), pp. 49-64, at 51-4.
6 Ciriaco Landolfi , Evolución Cultural Dominicana, 1844-
1899 (Santo Domingo: Editora de
la UASD, 1981), p. 62.
7 Carlos Esteban Deive, “ Los mitos del tema negro en la
historiografi a” in Comisión Nacional
Dominicana de la Ruta del Esclavo, La Ruta del Esclavo
(Santo Domingo: Editora Búha, 2006),
pp. 471-98. ! e Spanish slavemaster displayed “supreme
benevolence, great charity, and
much tenderness”, Pedro Francisco Bonó wrote (quoted in San
Miguel, ! e Imagined Island ,
pp. 13-14). Trujillista Angel S. Rosario Pérez sought to
discredit historian Jean Price-Mars by
claiming that African slaves were only brought into Santo
Domingo between 1510-50, e.g.
Ernesto Sagás Ernesto, Race and Politics in the Dominican
Republic (Gainesville, Fla.: University
of Florida Press, 2000), p. 53.
8 Samuel Martínez, “Not a Cockfi ght: Rethinking Haitian-
Dominican Relations”, Latin
American Perspectives 30, no. 3 (2003), pp. 80-101.
9 San Miguel, ! e Imagined Island , p. 3.
could ripen it as Nature intended”, the Marxist historian Juan
Bosch writes. 5
Revolutionary republican culture had a “desolate” impact on the

patriarchal
and insular colony, scholars argue. 6 Because of the crushing
poverty—and
in eagerness to distinguish the colony from neighboring Saint-
Domingue—
historians also tend to characterize the period as one of relative
equality, albeit
an impoverished one. ! e myth of benign slavery in Santo
Domingo—and as
a corollary, the alleged quiescence of the enslaved—plagues
Dominican histo-
riography. 7 Finally, the relationship between the Dominican
Republic and
Haiti in the nineteenth century is almost always treated as the
historical back-
ground to what the Dominican anthropologist Samuel Martínez
has termed
“the fatal-confl ict model” of Haitian-Dominican relations. 8 !
e sheer magni-
tude of anti-Haitian historiography produced during the Trujillo
dictatorship
in Santo Domingo—“massive, majestic” in its profusion—has
long overshad-
owed accounts that acknowledge cross-island linkages and
exchange. 9 For
decades a “historical taboo … constrained our historians not to
touch any
aspect of our relations with the Haitians that might be
considered positive”,
109
10 Ismael Hernández Flores, Luperón, héroe y alma de la

Restauración & Haití y la Revolución
Restauradora (Santo Domingo: Lotería Nacional, 1983), p. 14.
11 Many important exceptions exist, of course, such as
Emilio Cordero Michel, La revolucion
haitiana y Santo Domingo (4 th ed.) (Santo Domingo: Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias
Sociales, 2000 [1968]). ! roughout the period of the Trujillato ,
however, historians such as
Manuel Arturo Peña-Battle and Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi
focused only on the most negative
incidents between the two states—Dessalines’ retreat in 1805
being a favored topic, but even
hyperbolic accounts of Louverture’s brief sojourn in Santo
Domingo—to the almost total exclu-
sion of more careful analyses of the revolution’s impact. ! eir
unrelentingly negative tone echoes
the elites of the nineteenth century—including otherwise liberal
historians like José Gabriel
García—but does not satisfactorily refl ect common
perspectives of the period.
12 Sybille Fischer, Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the
Cultures of Slavery in the Age of
Revolution. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), p.
182; Christina Violeta Jones,
“Revolution and Reaction: Santo Domingo during the Haitian
Revolution and beyond,
1791-1844” (Ph.D. diss., Howard University, 2008), p. 1.
13 San Miguel, ! e Imagined Island , p. 126.
14 Julius S. Scott, “! e Common Wind: Currents of Afro-
American Communication in the
Era of the Haitian Revolution” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University,
1986).

Ismael Hernández Flores has observed. 10 Even the Haitian
Revolution itself—
freeing as it did hundreds of thousands of people from
bondage—rarely
receives positive treatment in Dominican historiography. 11
As the general nar-
rative holds, the “trauma” of the Haitian revolution caused
loyalism and reac-
tion in the Dominican side; “[n]owhere in the Greater Caribbean
did the
Haitian Revolution … leave a deeper and more warped trace”,
concludes one
account; “nowhere did it leave a deeper [or] more distorted
view” reports
another. 12 Many traditional narratives echo some form of
this argument, that
the revolution caused some sort of “Dominican historical
arrhythmia” and
casting subsequent Dominican nationalism as all things anti-
Haitian. 13
! is article argues against an isolationist view of the colony,
asserting that
Santo Domingo was another important port through which
“common wind”
of revolutionary thought was blowing in the early nineteenth-
century
Caribbean, especially from neighboring Haiti. 14 First, it
gives a brief overview
of the economic and political trajectory of the colony from
1795-1809. While
plantation slavery had virtually disappeared from the colony, I
argue that rac-
ism continued to govern the lives of many residents, a fact that
compounded

the insecurity of the capital city’s unstable and revolutionary
climate. Next,
the article explores the intensely international nature of the
city; the very vir-
tue of the colony’s secondary economic status, I argue, made it
an important
crossroads for neighboring islands. ! e mobility of free and
enslaved people of
color from neighboring colonies (especially Puerto Rico), while
slow to emerge
from archival sources, refl ects Santo Domingo’s importance in
subaltern
141
networks of migration and freedom that have yet to be explored.
Finally, the
article details the events of the “Italian Revolution” itself, the
persistent
inequalities within the struggling Spanish colony, and the
widely varying aspi-
rations of the conspirators and city residents. In fact, the
conspiracy was not
really Italian at all; troubled o# cials seem to have been eager
to minimize its
much more immediate links to Pétion’s republic in southern
Haiti. It is these
important connections to revolution in Haiti—both concrete and
symbolic—
that have too long been e" aced.
II. Background: A Colony in Crisis, 1801-1809

Multiple changes in sovereignty, almost-constant fi ghting on
the island,
disruption of agriculture, and signifi cant emigration
characterized the
years leading up to the so-called “Italian Revolution” in the
impover-
ished capital city of Santo Domingo. It is beyond the scope of
this article—
indeed, out of the scope of the extant secondary literature—to
craft a
thorough analysis of the popular sentiment about the
vicissitudes of the 1795-
1809 period, but certain prefatory statements can be made about
the impact
of the changes in sovereignty that prefaced the 1810 conspiracy.
Santo
Domingo’s residents were bu" eted by changing imperial
fortunes: they had
been turned over to France in 1795, occupied briefl y by
Louverture (1801-
02), reclaimed by France (1802-08), blockaded by the British
navy (1809)
and only in 1808-09 reclaimed for the Spanish, who were at that
exact
moment a kingdom without a king. 15 ! e siege and bloody
retreat of Dessalines
in 1805, the continuing instability between the neighboring
Haitian states
(King Christophe’s kingdom in the North, President Pétion’s
constitutional
republic in the South), and perpetual threats of French invasion,
combined
with European confl icts to forge a volatile mix of poverty and
insecurity in the
eastern part of Hispaniola, but its political direction was far
from clear.

15 Fray de Utrera writes dramatically that a “cry of pain”
rose collectively from people as they
heard the proclamation ceding the colony to Spain in 1795, and
furnishes poetry that questions
the cession despairingly, in the voice of the desperate and
feminized capital city: “Shall I leave for
a convent?”, Juan Sánchez Ramírez , Diario de la Reconquista
(Ciudad Trujillo [Santo Domingo]:
Editora Montalvo, 1957), pp. viii, x. Nor did they particularly
want to fi ght with the French
against Louverture in 1801, General Kerverseau complained,
Philippe R. Girard, “ Liberté,
Égalité Esclavage : French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure
of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-
Domingue”, French Colonial History 6 (2005), pp. 55-78 at 69.
111
16 Deive writes that the “spirit of most of the enslaved was
greatly moved by the agitation
and chaos” of the period, and indeed it seems many enslaved in
the east actively fought for
emancipation during the revolutionary years, Guerrilleros , p.
204. Some took inspiration from
Saint-Dominguen fi ghters—like Jean-François, of the negros
auxiliares fi ghting with Spain—and
added their own interpretations and allegiances. While Jean-
François himself remained loyal to
Spain, therefore, others invoked his name as part of plans to
revolutionize the east. One such
man, a slave named ! omas, was apprehended with a note
referring to “San Fransuá” before his

plans could be realized, at p. 206. Others doubtless drew
inspiration from the fi ghting as well,
even as allegiances were at times shifting and contradictory.
17 Cordero Michel, Revolución haitiana , p. 71, Deive,
Emigraciones , p. 92. Numerous travelers’
accounts corroborate the story of Louverture’s joyful initial
reception in Santo Domingo, e.g., James
Franklin, ! e Present State of Hayti (London, 1828), pp. 130-1;
Marcus Rainsford, A Memoir of
Transactions that Took Place in St. Domingo in the Spring of
1799 (London, 1802), p. 256.
18 Cordero Michel, Revolución haitiana , p. 140. He
suggests that the rural sectors accustomed
to rural lifestyles then “turned their back”, on Louverture, and
his only remaining base of
support were the urban middle and lower classes (who had
artisanal and small commercial
enterprises) and the population of Cibao (which had
commercialized production of tobacco).
Nevertheless, French General Kerverseau reported that even the
wealthy members of the capital
city did not want to send reinforcements for the French fi ghting
Louverture, quoted in Gustavo
Mejía Ricart, Historia de Santo Domingo , p. 14.
19 Sánchez Ramírez, Diario , p. xix; Cordero Michel,
Revolución haitiana , p. 136. Some
Santiago de los Caballeros o# cials actually moved to Port-au-
Prince, for example, from where
they continued to lobby the Spanish crown on various subjects,
e.g. Regidor Perpetuo de
Santiago de los Caballeros to Secretario de Estado, 29 April
1813, Archivo General de Indias
(hereinafter, “AGI”): Audiencia de SD 1017, Expte. s/n.

! e popular impact of the fi rst years of the revolution on the fl
ounder-
ing colony of Santo Domingo brought considerable chaos and
ferment. 16
During Toussaint Louverture’s brief occupation of the capital
city in 1801, he
immediately proclaimed slavery abolished. ! e abolition decree
and the open-
ing of the ranks of eastern troops to former slaves evidently
gained the sympa-
thy of much of Santo Domingo’s population, and Louverture
continued to
make special appeals to people of color in Santo Domingo after
Napoleon
proposed a “regression” to 1789 slavery statues. 17 Support
may have fl agged,
however, particularly among those submitted to Louverture’s
forced labor
projects; nor could the burden of continuing defense costs to
ward o" the
French have been popular to eastern residents. ! e 1802 French
reoccupation
of Santo Domingo restored slavery to the province, and
abolition became
legally moot, ending the brief unifi cation entirely. 18 French
General Kerverseau
observed that he could not count on the loyalty “of blacks and
the rest of the
people of color” in the commercial town of Santiago de los
Caballeros, and
some historians suggest that Dessalines was in fact welcomed
when he fi rst
arrived there several years later, indicating continuing
sympathies for Haiti in
the east. 19 Dessalines’ brutal tactics upon his retreat

alienated the Dominican
141
people, however, and his violence at Moca and Santiago accrued
a “debt of
blood”. 20 For their part, eager as they must have been to
drive aggressive
French authorities from the island, Haitian authorities must not
have been
pleased at the return of the Spanish to Santo Domingo in 1808-
09. Internal
turmoil on both sides of the island complicates the picture of
these fi rst revo-
lutionary years further. More research is necessary (and
forthcoming). 21
It is similarly di# cult to parse out exactly what sentiments for
the subse-
quent French government were (1802-09)—perhaps because the
French
General Kerverseau and his successor, General Ferrand,
attempted to keep
something of a low profi le with the populace. “Spaniards of the
east part of
St. Domingo, you are all become Frenchmen; or rather French
and Spaniards,
we form together one band of brothers and friends”, General
Ferrand
insisted. 22 It seems that liberalization of trade, for example,
was relatively
popular. Other actions, such as the replacement of Spanish
bishops with

French and moves to secularization and prohibitions on cattle
trading, were
clearly less popular generally. 23 Punctuating the period of
French government
was Dessalines’ invasion in 1805, which wrought more
destruction, from the
northern part of the island to the capital city. 24 Most signifi
cantly, however,
20 Cordero Michel, Revolución haitiana , p. 136.
21 Graham Nessler’s forthcoming University of Michigan
doctoral dissertation, “A Failed
Emancipation? ! e Struggle for Freedom in Hispaniola during
the Haitian Revolution,
1789-1809”, and Antonio Jésus Pinto Tortosa’s “Una colonia en
la encrucijada: Santo Domingo,
entre la revolución haitiana y las ambiciones francesas (1791-
1809)” (Ph.D. diss., Universitad
Complutense de Madrid, forthcoming 2011) join recent work
like Jones’ “Revolution and
Reaction”; they promise to elucidate much about the impact of
the revolutionary period in the
Spanish colony as well as its role in shaping the events of the
revolution itself.
22 Quoted in Captain ! omas Southey, Chronological History
of the West Indies , 3 vols.
(London, 1880), 3: 415. A contemporary British observer
claimed that French o# cers were
encouraged to intermarry in Santo Domingo “in order to extend
[their infl uence] over the
Spanish inhabitants of the country” and also wrote of alleged
French military abuses and robber-
ies in Santiago and other cities, William Walton, Present State
of the Spanish Colonies (London,

1810), pp. 197, 201.
23 Deive, “Las Cortes”, p. 123; Frank Moya Pons, Historia
colonial de Santo Domingo
(Santiago, D.R.: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1976),
p. 382; Franco Pichardo, Los
negros, los mulatos, y la nación dominicana (Santo Domingo:
Editora Manatí, 10th ed., 2003),
p. 114.
24 According to historian Franklin Franco Pichardo,
Dessalines’ advance, though undoubt-
edly spurred by General Ferrand’s provocations (he had issued
an ordinance authorizing eastern
colonists to capture and sell Haitian youth into slavery), was
also the result of an invitation of
the people of Santiago—free people of color who opposed the
encroachment of plantation-
minded Ferrand in the region, Franco Pichardo Los negros , p.
111. Some, like José Tavares,
113
slavery was restored with the return of the French. A
preliminary exploration
into Domin ican archives reveals that despite the tremendous
economic depres-
sion—or perhaps because of it—the price of slaves barely
decreased when
tra# cking resumed again with French occupation. 25 By the
time slavery was
defi nitively abolished in 1822, some 24,000 were still
enslaved, according to

some estimates. 26
! e Reconquista and the Beginning of “España Boba”
Spurred in part by indignation at the news of the Napoleon’s
overthrow of
the Spanish king—all semblance of a French-Spanish alliance
then collapsed—
a restoration e" ort known as the Reconquista erupted in Santo
Domingo in
1808. 27 With the support of the Spanish governor of Puerto
Rico, Dominican
loyalists launched a campaign to restore Spanish rule. Signifi
cantly, they
sought aid from Pétion and Christophe, who were also eager to
see the aggres-
sive French kicked o" of the island. ! e Reconquista fi ghting,
although ini-
tially dismissed by French authorities as “two or three hundred
scoundrels
from Puerto Rico”, mobilized many in the southeastern part of
the island. 28
Juan Sánchez Ramírez, a Dominican who had immigrated to
Puerto Rico
several years before, traveled extensively in the colony and was
able to gener-
ate much popular support. 29 ! ey were successful after
months of siege at
the capital city—its second prolonged siege in fi ve years—
realized by the
British Navy. ! e toll on the city was high. “Perhaps the annals
of no wars …
a" ord examples of more cruelty and horror, than those to which
the Spaniards
were exposed in this occasion”, one British o# cial empathized.
30 Sánchez

Ramírez, the hero of the decisive battle of Palo Hincado, was
named acting
governor of the embattled colony. “Born with a friendly spirit
and accessibil-
ity, he knew how to win the hearts of the island’s inhabitants,
who saw him
lent Dessalines their lasting support, José Gabriel García,
Compendio de la Historia de Santo
Domingo (Tomo I) (Santo Domingo: Imprenta de Garcia
Hermanos, 1893), pp. 298, 313.
Dessalines’ sojourn in the colony, particularly the legacy and
memory production around his
bloody retreat, is again ambiguous and deserves exploration in
further detail.
25 AGN-RD Archivo Real de Higüey …
&XED�EHWZHHQ�(PSLUHV��
$XWKRU�V��/RXLV�$��3«UH]��-U�
5HYLHZHG�ZRUN�V��
6RXUFH��3DFLILF�+LVWRULFDO�5HYLHZ��9RO��
��1R��1RY��SS��
3XEOLVKHG�E��University of California Press
6WDEOH�85/��http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638697 .
$FFHVVHG��
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the
Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,
researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information
technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new
forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please
contact [email protected]
University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Pacific
Historical Review.
http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638697?origin=JSTOR-pdf
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
Cuba Between Empires,
1898- 1899
Louis A. Perez, Jr.
The author is a member of the history department in the
University of South Florida, Tampa
I
As THE BATTLESHIP Maine steamed toward Havana harbor
in February 1898, insurgents in Cuba prepared to commemo-
rate the third anniversary of the renewed war for independence,
a struggle launched first in 1868 and thereafter continuing
intermittently in various parts of the island. By 1898, Cubans
had fought nearly thirty years against Spain for the inde-
pendence of the island.l If an appeal to arms as the means
of independence enjoyed general endorsement among Cuban
patriots, the precise meaning of independence failed to achieve

comparable consensus within insurgent ranks. Beyond a com-
monly shared notion that independence involved minimally
separation from Spain, the final structure of "Cuba Libre"
remained vaguely if not often incompatibly defined by the
various sectors of the separatist movement.
For many separatists independence from Spain signified only
the preliminary act of a larger drama in which Cuba would
ultimately find fulfillment in union with the United States.
Indeed, for the better part of the first decade of the thirty-
year struggle, annexationist sentiment occupied a central
position within the body of separatist thought.2 Annexationism
1This theme is skillfully developed in Emilio Roig de
Leuchsenring, La guerra
libertadora cubana de los treinta ahos (2nd ed., La Habana,
1958).
2Francisco J. Ponte Dominguez, Historia de la guerra de los
diez anos (La Habana, 1944),
27-29, 184- 189; Jose Ignacio Rodriguez, Estudio historico
sobre el origen, desenvolvimiento
473
O 1979, by the Pacific Coast Branch,
American Historical Association
Pacific Historical Review
PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW
received most support from patrician separatists, creoles for
whom annexation offered the most practical resolution of con-

tradictions arising from Cuba's growing economic dependence
on the United States while it remained politically dependent
on Spain. Detecting in the social heterogeneity of the Liber-
ation Army the sources of future unrest, moreover, annex-
ationists sought in union with the United States the salvation
of a socio-economic system now threatened by the political
forces released by the armed struggle against Spain. United
States sovereignty, many reasoned, promised at once to fill
the vacuum created by the expulsion of metropolitan Spain
and to guarantee the preservation of the status quo.3 In the
end, annexationists questioned the ability of Cubans to manage
the responsibilities of self-government successfully. "Cuba
Libre" raised for many the spectre of the apocalypse and
evoked images of race war, civil strife, and chronic political
instability. Both as precursors of the thirty-year separatist
struggle and later as leaders of the movement, such wealthy
planters as Miguel de Aladama, Jose Morales Lemus, and
Francisco de Frias (Count of Pozos Dulces) emerged as leading
advocates of annexation.
Other separatists shared many of the fundamental assump-
tions of the annexationists but refused to disavow the indi-
viduality of Cuba or renounce the vision of ultimate inde-
pendence. Like their conservative counter-parts, moderate
separatists acknowledged the perils attending premature
independence. Independence in this instance functioned as a
future goal attainable only through preparation and guidance.
In this view, moderate separatists contemplated a period of
apprenticeship in self-government during which Cuba would
submit itself to the United States as a protectorate for an
unspecified period of time. Special treaty arrangements, more-
over, promised to guarantee a market for Cuban products
while allowing the island to advance toward complete political
y manifestaciones prdcticas de le idea de la anexidn de la isla
de Cuba a los Estados Unidos de

America (La Habana, 1900), 220-235.
3Herminio Portell Vila, "Anexionismo," Humanismo, VII
(Enero-Abril de 1959),
28-42; Pedro Garcia Valdes, La idea de la anexidn de Cuba a los
Estados Unidos (Pinar del
Rio, 1947), 39-40; compare Jorge Ibarra, Ideologia mambisa (La
Habana, 1967), 44-50.
474
Cuba Between Empires 475
sovereignty. Only supervised training in self-government under
controlled conditions, moderates argued, offered any reason-
able likelihood of success at nationhood. Tomas Estrada Palma,
a former president of the republic in arms during the Ten
Years War (1868-1878) and the ranking Cuban diplomat
in the United States between 1895 and 1898, gave clearest
expression to the protectorate tendencies within the separatist
movement. "Associated" with the United States, Estrada Palma
predicted confidently in 1878, Cuba would after a short period
of time be fully prepared to assume the full responsibilities
of statehood.4
Separatist ranks included, lastly, those patriots for whom the
ideal of independence represented an inviolate absolute. For
the independentista sector of the separatist movement, sover-
eignty necessarily involved independence from the United
States as much as it required separation from Spain. Indepen-
dence as an uncompromising ideal moved into a position of
central importance within insurgent ranks during the late
1880s and early 1890s largely as the result of the efforts of Jose
Marti.5 Passionately devoted to the cause of independence,

Marti worked tirelessly to forge the politico-military agencies
necessary to renew the armed struggle against Spain. These
efforts culminated in the 1890s with the organization of the
Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC), the appointment of the
command hierarchy of the Liberation Army, and, in February
1895, the renewal of the separatist struggle.
The death of Marti early in the war consecrated the cause of
independence. The renewal of armed struggle in 1895 and the
definition of its goals were linked mainly if not exclusively, to
the efforts of Marti. Marti's martyrdom and the doctrines he
4Tomas Estrada Palma to Benigno and Placido Gener, 13 de
enero de 1878, in Tomas
Estrada Palma, Desde el Castillo de Figueras. Cartas de Estrada
Palma (1877-1878), ed.
Carlos de Velasco (La Habana, 1918), 72-75; Panfilo D.
Camacho, Estrada Palma, el
gobernante honrado (La Habana, 1938), 93.
SJose Marti, Ideario separatista, ed. Felix Lizaso (La Habana,
1947). The literature on
Marti is voluminous. The best biographies in English are Jorge
Manach, Marti, Apostle of
Freedom, trans. Coley Taylor (New York, 1950) and Felix
Lizaso, Marti, Martyr of Cuban
Independence, trans. Esther Elise Shuler (Albuquerque, 1953).
A general sampling of
Marti's writing can be found in Jose Marti, The American ofJose
Marti, ed. Juan de Onis
(New York, 1953). Richard Butler Gray, Jose Marti, Cuban
Patriot (Gainesville, Fla.,
1962), provides an excellent study of the impact of Marti on the
Republic.

had forged over a lifetime all but silenced the advocates of
anything less than the cause for which Marti had offered his
life. Public discussion of annexation and protectorate schemes
ceased. Not that these sentiments disappeared; on the contrary,
discredited and largely banished from patriotic forums, annex-
ationists and advocates of the protectorate sought alternate
means through which to influence the course of events.
The "Grito de Baire" found Cuban patriots united around
little more than an unsettled notion of independence. By 1895,
moreover, the ideological diversity within the separatist move-
ment had acquired generational dimensions. Marti had sum-
moned to the cause of independence a new generation of
patriots, typically without experience in previous separatist
struggles, and for whom the idea of independence had been
shaped by the currents of the 1890s. By late 1898, finally, a
peculiar distribution tended to fix the location of the various
sectors of the separatist movement. The advocates of annex-
ation and the protectorate, financially capable of sustaining
exile, tended to serve the separatist cause abroad; often diplo-
matic representatives of the republic in arms and typically
spokesmen of the various patriotic organizations established
in New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Tampa, Paris, and
London, these exiled separatists came to exert a powerful
influence on public opinion abroad. Moderate separatists
remaining on the island tended to locate in the cities or remain
on their large estates, surreptitiously subsidizing the revolution
through periodic financial contributions. Independentista senti-
ment, on the other hand, came to reside largely in the politico-
military agencies of the armed struggle in Cuba.6
By late 1895 and early 1896, the war in Cuba had assumed
distinct anti-annexationist qualities. The army command had

organized a military campaign around the destruction of the
6Much more research is required on the important but
complicated subject of Cuban
emigrations between 1868 and 1898. Three distinct separatist
exile centers emerged
and attracted three different social groups: cigar workers in
Tampa and Key West,
middle class professionals in New York, Philadelphia, and
Washington, and property
owners in Paris. Most of the literature is confined to the Tampa-
Key West group. See
Manuel Deulofeu y Lleonart, Marti, Cayo Hueso y Tampa. La
emigraci6n. Notas historicas
(Cienfuegos, 1902) and Fanny Azcuy, El Partido Revolucionario
y la independencia de Cuba
(La Habana, 1930).
476
Cuba Between Empires
sugar estates.7 In attacking the agricultural wealth of Cuba the
insurgent command sought to destroy the economic base of
annexationist strength; it hoped thereby to neutralize annexa-
tionist influence in the separatist ranks and to deprive the
Spanish treasury of the funds traditionally derived from Cuban
sugar. Indeed, by 1896, the insurgents directed the struggle as
much against the sources of Spanish wealth in Cuba as against
the military sources of Spanish political authority.8 The in-
vasion of the sugar producing provinces of the west gave
dramatic form to insurgent strategies. By 1898, the insurgents
had effectively disrupted and almost completely destroyed the
foundations of the colonial economy.

II
By 1898, separatists in the United States had little to show for
their labors to secure support from Washington. Two succes-
sive administrations had viewed the Cuban insurgency with
disfavor. Only the prospect of a Cuban victory over Spain
seemed to trouble Washington more than the possible prolon-
gation of the war. Both Grover Cleveland and William McKin-
ley plotted a Cuban policy around efforts to exact from Madrid
reforms designed simultaneously to placate partisan leaders
and guarantee Spanish sovereignty over the island. Indeed, for
both administrations, Cuban independence represented some-
thing of an anathema if not an outright threat to U.S. national
interests. "There are only too strong reasons to fear," Secretary
of State Richard Olney wrote, "that, once Spain were with-
drawn from the island, the sole bond of union between the
different factions would disappear; that a war of race would be
precipitated, all the more sanguinary for the discipline and
7See Cuartel del General del Ejercito Libertador, "Circular,"
noviembre 6 de 1895,
enclosure number 1, in Ramon Williams to Edwin Uhl, Nov. 27,
1895, Despatches from
United States Consuls in Havana, 1783-1906, U.S. Dept. of
State, Records, National
Archives.
8See Jose Antonio Lanuza to Tomas Estrada Palma, julio 14 de
1896, in Partido
Revolucionario Cubano, La revolucion del 95 segun la
correspondencia de la delegacion
cubana en Nueva York, ed. Le6n Primelles (5 vols., La Habana,
1932-1937), V,
198-199.

477
478 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW
experience acquired during the insurrection." Olney offered
"to cooperate with Spain in the immediate pacification of the
island on a plan as, leaving Span [sic] her rights of sover-
eignty . . . yet secure to the people of the island all such rights
and powers of local self-government as they can reasonably
ask."9
United States preparation for war with Spain in 1898, hence,
included scrupulous disregard for the politico-military author-
ity advanced by the insurgent republic in arms. Washington
feared that recognition of the Cuban government promised to
limit American freedom of action during the war and, ul-
timately, to commit the United States to Cuban independence
after the war. A "neutral intervention," the State Department
reasoned, offered the United States the opportunity to "dictate
the terms of peace and control the organization of an inde-
pendent government in Cuba."'0 McKinley rejected recog-
nition for similar reasons. "In case of intervention," the Presi-
dent explained, "our conduct would be subject to the approval
or disapproval of such government. We would be required to
submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a
friendly ally."" Indeed, the intervention outlined by McKinley
on April 11, 1898, was not designed to assist the Cubans with
independence but functioned as a maneuver of "the United
States as a neutral to stop the war."12
III
The imminence of United States intervention in 1898 evoked
mixed reactions among Cuban separatists. American silence on

the question of Cuban independence had a generally dis-
9Richard Olney to E. Dupuy de L6me, April 4, 1896, U.S. Dept.
of State, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897
(Washington, D.C., 1898),
541-544. See also Stewart L. Woodford to William McKinley,
March 18, 1898, in
Private Correspondence-General Woodford to the President,
Aug. 1897 to May 1898,
John Bassett Moore Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress. Cleveland's
opposition to Cuban independence is well developed in John A.
S. Grenville and
George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American
Diplomacy (New Haven, 1966),
179-200, and Ernest May, Imperial Democracy (New York,
1961), 85-92.
'0Alvey A. Adee to William R. Day, April 7, 1898, William R.
Day Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
"Congressional Record, XXXI (April 11, 1898), 3701.
12Ibid.
Cuba Between Empires
quieting effect on all separatist spokesmen. Indeed, when
confronted with the prospect of an American intervention
which might be deaf to Cuban pleas for independence, separa-
tists publicly repudiated Washington's "neutral" intervention.
"In the face of the present proposal of intervention without
recognition," the Cuban Junta in New York proclaimed, "it is

necessary for us .. .to say that we must and will regard such
intervention as nothing less than a declaration of war by the
United States against the Cuban revolutionists. If intervention
shall take place on that basis, and the United States shall land
an armed forced on Cuban soil, we shall treat that force as an
enemy to be opposed, and, if possible, expelled."13
In Cuba, insurgent chieftains received news of the im-
pending intervention with similar misgivings.14 From the very
outset of the insurrection, military leaders shared little of the
enthusiasm displayed by their diplomatic counter-parts for
American recognition of belligerency. For many insurrectos, the
energy directed toward securing recognition represented mis-
placed, if not counter-productive efforts. The premium placed
abroad on recognition tended to confuse the issues, often
obscuring among separatists the sharp distinction between
recognition as a short-run tactic and as an end result. "Recog-
nition is like the rain," General-in-Chief Maximo G6mez often
mused; "it is a good thing if it comes and a good thing if it
doesn't come."'5 Nor did Cuban separatists in the field seek
foreign assistance. Supremely confident in the ultimate tri-
umph of Cuban arms, Gomez asked from his colleagues abroad
only weapons, ammunition, and supplies for the men already
in the field.'6 The news of the war between the United States
and Spain generally had an unsettling impact in many insur-
gents camps across the island. Several army chieftains confided
to diaries their concern for the ability of Cuban independence
to survive the "Spanish-American war."17
13The State (Columbia, S.C.), April 7, 1898, p. 1. See also
"Bulletin," April 6, 1898,
Day Papers.
'4Gen. Jose Mir6 Argenter to Bartolome Mas6, 3 de junio de
1898, in Rufino Perez
Landa, Bartolome Mas6 y Mdrquez. Estudio biografico

documentado. (La Habana, 1947), 244.
5 In Grover Flint, Marching with Gomez (Boston, 1898), 189.
'Ram6n Infiesta, Mdximo Gomez (La Habana, 1937), 203-204.
"See, for example, Manuel Piedra Martel, Mis primeros treinta
anos: memorias (La
Habana, 1944), 487.
479
The Joint Resolution of Congress on April 20, 1898, recog-
nizing that the "people of Cuba are and of right ought to be
free and independent" and disclaiming any disposition to
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the island
except for its pacification,18 tended to calm separatist mis-
givings.19 Satisfied that the intervention made common cause
with separatist goals, Cubans from all sectors of the insurgent
movement pledged support to their new allies. In Cuba the
Council of Government promised complete cooperation and
ordered army chieftains to submit themselves to the authority
of the American army command.20 In the United States, exiles
participated actively in preparations for war. Scores of Cubans
offered the War Department their services as guides, trans-
lators, navigators, and pilots.21
Beyond the congressional pledge of April 20, however,
officials in Washington declined to make any further com-
mitment to the separatist cause. Indeed, the Joint Resolution
notwithstanding, McKinley's preparation for war conformed
entirely to the spirit of the broader policy constructs outlined in
the presidential message of April 11. Washington continued to

disregard official agencies of the insurgent government. Amer-
ican commanders coordinated military policy with individual
army chieftains in Cuba, thereby ignoring the civil authority of
the republic represented by the Council of Government and
the military command in the person of General-in-Chief
Maximo Gomez.
Separatists accepted the anomalous alliance uneasily. Many
made no effort to conceal their displeasure at being ordered to
cooperate with a government that denied in policy and practice
the existence of the Cuban republic. Only confidence in the
stated American pledge, outlined in the Joint Resolution,
encouraged Cubans to believe that the intervention shared
aims in common with their struggle. No matter that the
'8Congressional Record, XXXI (April 16, 1898), 3988.
'9Manuel Arbelo, Recuerdos del la ultima guerra por la
independencia de Cuba, 1896 a
1898 (La Habana, 1918), 303-305.
20Joaquin Llaverias y Martinez and Emeterio S. Santovenia,
eds., Actas de las Asambleas
de Representantes y del Consejo de Gobierno durante la guerra
de independencia (6 vols., La
Habana, 1927-1933), IV, 54-57.
21The Tampa Tribune, March 29, 1898, p. 1.
Americans refused to recognize the republic, as long as Wash-
ington endorsed the goals for which the republic stood. What-
ever else may have separated the Cubans and Americans, the

Joint Resolution, in the end, established the common ground
upon which war-time collaboration rested.
The fragile alliance did not survive the first weeks of joint
operations. At the front lines of eastern Cuba and in the
trenches outside El Caney, San Juan, and Santiago de Cuba,
tensions between the allied armies mounted. For many in-
surrectos, first contact with the Americans confirmed deep-
seated fears. Far too many American officers, the Cubans
sensed uneasily, moved in their midst brusquely, preemptively,
and, worst of all, unsympathetic to the separatist cause.22
Cuban
officers balked at assignments that would have converted the
soldiers of the Liberation Army entirely into messengers, pack-
carriers, and trench-diggers.
Nor was the United States command prepared for its first
encounter with the most intransigent independentistas in the
field. Insurgent soldiers, Americans quickly discovered, de-
parted radically from the mold of separatists known in New
York and Washington. These Cubans were not neatly attired,
well-educated white diplomats; on the contrary, insurgent
soldiers in eastern Cuba were often virtually unclad, typically
illiterate, and largely black. Weary after some three years of
war and wary of the American purpose in Cuba, the insurgents
conveyed little of the gratitude their would-be deliverers
deemed appropriate to the circumstances. Conscious of the
self-proclaimed role of liberators, Americans took umbrage in
the reception greeting their arrival in Cuba. "The American
soldier... ," war correspondent Stephen Crane observed,
"thinks of himself as a disinterested benefactor, and he would
like the Cubans to play up to the ideal now and then... He
does not really want to be thanked, and yet the total absence of
anything like gratitude makes him furious."23
By mid-summer, outright contempt for Cubans had become

commonplace behind American lines. "The Cubans are a dirty
2Stephen Bonsai, The Fightfor Santiago (New York, 1899),
532-534.
23New York World, July 14, 1898, p. 3. R. W. Stallman and E.
R. Hageman, eds., The
War Dispatches of Stephen Crane (New York, 1964), 181.
filthy lot," one American officer complained.24 Cuban insur-
gents "hear nothing but words of scorn from our men as they
pass," the Associated Press correspondent in Santiago de Cuba
reported. "Even our officers," the correspondent continued,
"no longer conceal their disgust for their allies, and it is
understood that the warm friendship displayed toward them at
first has now turned into contempt."25 Sensing hostility from
the people they had apparently come to liberate, enthusiasm
among American commanders for "Cuba Libre" and their
affection for its advocates in the field waned noticeably.
The capitulation of Santiago de Cuba dramatically under-
scored the contradictions of the alliance. By the terms of the
surrender, the United States assumed control of key cities and
towns in the province.26 Much to the dismay of General Calixto
Garcia, the ranking commander of Cuban forces in eastern
Cuba, the capitulation ratified incumbent Spanish civil officials
in their positions. The American army command, moreover,
prohibited Cuban soldiers from entering the eastern capital.
Disappointed with the terms of the capitulation and angered by
the disregard the United States had displayed for Cuban
sensibilities, Garcia protested directly to General William R.
Shafter, the American commander, and thereupon forwarded

his resignation to Cuban authorities. Events in Santiago de
Cuba, Garcia wrote, had made any further cooperation with
the United States impossible; rather than disobey government
directives ordering Cuban officers to submit to American
orders, Garcia chose to resign.27
Shafter, too, sensed the compelling implications underlying
the dispute. The "trouble with General Garcia," Shafter wrote
with some impatience, "was that he expected to be placed in
24Lt. Col. Clinton Smith to Col. Augustus R. Francis, July 31,
1898, published in
New York Times, Aug. 12, 1898, p. 1.
2sThe State (Columbia, S.C.), July 20, 1898, p. 1.
26Jose Miieller y Teijeiro, Battles and Capitulations of Santiago
de Cuba, Office of Naval
Intelligence, War Note No. 1, Information From Abroad, in U.S.
Senate, Notes on the
Spanish-American War, 56th Cong., 1st sess., document no.
388, ser. 3876 (Washington,
1900), 145.
27Cuba, Ejercito Libertador, Parte oficial del Lugarteniente
General Calixto Garcia al
General enjefe Mdximo Gdmez el 15 dejulio de 1898 sobre la
campaia de Santiago de Cuba (La
Habana, 1953), 22-23. Calixto Garcia Iniguez, Palabras de tres
guerras (La Habana,
1942), 98-99.
482

command at this place; in other words that we would turn over
the city to him." The American commander reported that he
had "explained fully that we were at war with Spain, and that
the question of Cuban independence would not be considered
by me."28
The dispute surrounding the disposition of Santiago de
Cuba brought the developing estrangement between allied
leaders into sharp relief. The peace protocol a month later
further heightened the anomalous features of the alliance.
Cuban denunciation of United States policy in Santiago de
Cuba served to fix in the minds of American leaders the view of
the Cubans as ungrateful rabble. Between the capitulation of
Santiago de Cuba and the protocol of August 12, moreover,
the scorn of Cuban insurrectos assumed increasingly political
dimensions.
After the August 12 peace protocol, the central issue turned
on sovereignty over the island. Alluding to the Cubans' claim of
sovereignty over the occupied regions, General William Shafter
stressed to Washington that "a dual government can't exist
here; we have got to have full sway of the Cubans." Other-
wise, Shafter predicted, there would inevitably be a war be-
tween the former allies to resolve competing claims of sover-
eignty.29 Indeed, the prospect of war between the Americans
and Cubans loomed as a real possibility in the minds of many
American officials. Only days after the protocol, General H. L.
Lawton, the American commander in Santiago de Cuba, ap-
pealed urgently for instructions from Washington about the
policy to be pursued toward the Cuban army. Cuban troops still
maintained their organization, Lawton explained, and were
"threatening in their attitude," keeping the "inhabitants stirred
up and panicky by threats and acts of violence."30 Washington
telegraphed its response within hours. Interference in the

"8Gen. William R. Shafter to R. A. Alger, July 29, 1898, U.S.
Dept. of War, Corre-
spondence Relating to the War with Spain (Washington, D.C.,
1902), 185 (hereafter cited as
Correspondence).
29Gen. William R. Shafter to Adj. Gen., Aug. 16, 1898, U.S.
Cong., Report of the
Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the
Conduct of the War Department in the
War with Spain, 56th Cong., 1st session, ser. 3859-3866 (8
vols., Washington, D.C.,
1900), II, 1052 (hereafter cited as RCAP).
30Gen. H. W. Lawton to Adj. Gen. Corbin, Aug. 16, 1898, file
116542, Records of the
Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, National Archives.
exercise of American authority, Lawton was instructed, could
not be tolerated. Washington demanded Cuban recognition of
the military occupation and the authority of the United States
over the island.31
IV
By late summer and early fall, the rupture between the
United States and the insurgent leaders was all but complete.
Earlier disparagement of their Cuban allies during the war
gave way to increasing public doubts about whether the Cubans
possessed the virtues necessary for self-government. In the
weeks and months that followed the peace protocol, the Ameri-

can supposition of Cuban incapacity for self-government
hardened. "Self-government!" Shafter responded intemper-
ately to a reporter's query. "Why those people are no more fit
for self-government than gunpowder is for hell."32 It would be
another generation, General William Ludlow, …
Critical Essay - Required Structure
Title: TYPE OF ESSAY: YOUR ORIGINAL FOCUS
Your Name
Date
Statement of Thesis
(Your main stance and the 2-3 supporting points* that will
substantiate your position. Note: this will be your intro, no
elaborate intro to the paper needed)
Topic sentence #1: A statement that introduces your 1st
supporting point
followed by sentences that present and discuss supporting
evidence
Evidence 1[endnoteRef:1] and discussion that supports your
point
Evidence 2 and discussion that supports your point [1: Citation
References after introducing any evidence (quoted or
paraphrased)
Include at the end of your essay
Paper Title
Page Number
Your Name ]
Optional - Evidence 3 and discussion that supports your point
Topic sentence #2: A statement that introduces your 2nd

supporting point
followed by sentences that present and discuss supporting
evidence
Evidence 1 and discussion that supports your point
Topic sentence #3: A statement that introduces your 3rd
supporting point
* Aim for a balance in your discussion of supporting points,
e.g., 1-2 paragraphs each , introduced by topic sentences
Conclusion
Begins with Thesis statement – re-articulated and a culminating
discussion of points made above. Incorporates statements that
gesture outwards, i.e. – they point to the possibilities that
emerge now that your thesis has been established.

SAMPLE 1Working title Personal essay The rise of inequality in.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to SAMPLE 1Working title Personal essay The rise of inequality in.docx

Similar to SAMPLE 1Working title Personal essay The rise of inequality in.docx (7)

More from rtodd599

More from rtodd599 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

SAMPLE 1Working title Personal essay The rise of inequality in.docx