Moral Responsibility - Sarah Buss

1.  I am GradyWatts I teach Criminology, Philosophy, and
Humanities for LSC-Cyfair and University Park. I also
teach forArgosy University, Brescia University, Our
Lady of the Lake University, Ashford University and
Lamar University.
 I have a Master of Science in Criminology and a
Master of Arts in Philosophy, two years of law school
and 18 hours toward my Ph.D
 My Professional background is in Philosophy of law,
Legal Ethics, and Criminal Justice ethics
 I love the ALL community! (And, Sarah obviously).
 Sorry I had the days mixed up last time!

3.  Fields of Study
 Ethics,ActionTheory, Moral Psychology
 Professor Buss is interested in issues at the
intersection of metaphysics and ethics. She is
the author of articles on autonomy, moral
responsibility, practical rationality, and respect
for persons.
 Education
 1989, PhD, Philosophy,Yale University
 1981, BA, Philosophy,Yale University

4.  Can you act counter to your strong moral
desires and be acting without some external
overriding influence which denies agency?

5.  The one driving question:
 when is a person a moral agent, and when is there
only an illusion of agency?

6.  Whenever we do things for reasons, we do
what we do because we regard certain
features of our circumstances as reasons to
behave in certain ways and not others, and
because we are motivated to behave in
certain ways and not others.
 This is when we acting as ourselves

7.  “what is required in order for rational beings
to act must differ significantly from an
account of what is required in order for non-
rational beings to act.”

9.  Sec. 22.01. ASSAULT. (a) A person commits an offense if
the person:
 (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another, including the person's spouse;
 (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with
imminent bodily injury, including the person's spouse; or
 (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with
another when the person knows or should reasonably
believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive
or provocative.
 (b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor
 (c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) or (3) is a Class C
misdemeanor, except that the offense is:

10.  Why do we not do otherwise, or why do we
do otherwise?

11.  Did you ever have the feeling you wanted to
hit/bump/yell/startle a person that was your
friend, for no reason at all?Was it just some
odd impulse, but did you refrained?
 Why did you refrain?
 Can you own that action, if you did other than
your desire?

12.  When a person decides to do something
other than they desire, then there are
external influences changing the way the
person first wanted to act.
 Dissociation from action

13.  Thesis
 A person cannot constitute their-self unless:
▪ the relationship between a rational beings reason and
their non-rational desires to bring about various changes
is a partly internal relationship.
 What do you think that means?

14.  The capacity to reason gives a person the
ability to accept or reject certain impulses
whereas a non-rational being (a squirrel)
follows impulses without introspection.

15.  In order for a rational being to act, it is not
enough that she engages in instrumentally
rational goal-directed behavior.
 A person cannot be a passive bystander to
their own actions.
 Any force that alienates a person from their
desired/rational action, is a self-alienating
force.

16.  We cannot regard something as our goal
while wittingly committing ourselves to
behaving in a way that will ensure that we do
not achieve it.This is as impossible as walking
off in two different directions at once.

18.  If a person wants to avoid doing an action
based on a normative judgment
(ought/should), then, to be consistent, they
must act in a way to avoid that action.
 If a person does not desire the action but then
attempts to do that action, then they cannot
credit their self with the normative
statement.

19.  It is wrong for you to steal from someone you
love. (normative)
 Your loved one is missing $400, and they
think they lost the money at the Mall; but
you find it under their car seat and keep it.
 You do not own the normative judgment

20.  Some actions will have various possibilities
without a definitive normative statement to
rely on.
 E.G. Is it corrupt to kill 1 to save 400?

21.  Considering a person hanging on a ledge.
 They do not want to die
 No one is around
 Their fingers are worn-out
 They let go.
 The letting go is an involuntary external force
which is contrary to the desire to live.

22.  In order for desires to play the role of gravity,
they would have to be, at one and the same
time, the sort of causes that prevent our
behavior from being voluntary and the sort of
causes that overpower our agency.
 What does that mean?

23.  If a person can at the same time choose
between two different actions and they
desire to do actionA instead of action B but
can only carry out action B, then there is no
agency.

25.  If a person does not have the power of reason
but desires to take an action, just knowing
that the chain of events will cause/lead to the
successful achievement of the goal, does not
make the person an agent.
 What does this mean?

26.  Many times we do not pay attention to what
we are doing and act other than what we
would normatively desire.

27.  An adequate account of rational agency will
thus be an account of this self-relation, and of
the normative judgment that is inseparable
from it.

28.  (1) a genuine intrapersonal authority relation
presupposes that there are facts about what
we have reason to do that are not grounded
in our commitment to acting;
 What does this mean?

29.  (2) a genuine intrapersonal authority relation
requires that in our capacity as the one who is
governed, we are not so alienated from our
governing self that we cannot appreciate any
reason for regarding the demands of the
governing self as authoritatively binding.
(epistemic)
 What does this mean?

31.  When a person is in conflict about eating a lot
of pie instead of 1 slice of pie….
 They are in conflict with their-self
 Desire – eat the pie
 Reason – you will get fat/unhealthy

32.  Desire – eat the pie
 Can be identified with the self
 Reason – you will get fat/unhealthy
 Epistemic authority
 Contrary to the self
 External/internal

33.  Practial Reason alongside practical authority
is not identified as completely aligned with
the self, even if the normative judgment is
followed.

34.  The balance of desires and the thinking self
must be such that the thinking self has some
authority for there to be agency.

35.  DavidVelleman
 When a person acts without understanding between
desires and physical action, then they are doing
nothing.
▪ No agency
▪ Non-human animals considered
 To act means to reflect, consider, reason, and predict.
▪ When we can predict we understand ourselves and our
actions

36.  For an agent to own the action the action must
be based on more than mere facts, but facts that
have a normative significance to the actor.
 To help a person with their groceries is more
than a fact about the type of person you
believe/predict yourself to be (Velleman), but
there must be a normative framework that gives
essence to the rightness of helping someone
with their groceries (Buss).

37.  1.We have inner conflict, and we need to explain it.
 2. It must be more than goal driven. (means/ends)
 3.The inner conflict cannot disassociate the person
from the person. (it is not who I am)
 4. Desires must recognize the interest of reason on
behalf of the person. (too much pie is bad)
 5. Normative frameworks must be taken into account.
 6. Impulses and normative judgments cannot be
alienated.
 7. Actions not in line with normative judgments are
not ours.