FORTRESS Cascading Effects presentation -Emergency Services Conference 2014
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FORTRESS Cascading Effects presentation -Emergency Services Conference 2014
- 1. @FORTRESS_EUhttp://fortress-project.eu Case studies of cascading disasters Kim Hagen Trilateral Research & Consulting kim.hagen@trilateralresearch.com
- 2. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Fukushima nuclear disaster Disrupted electricity supply to the nuclear power plant System for cooling the nuclear reactors could not function Back-up transmission line Mismatched sockets Firefighters became responsible for alternative water injections Aftershocks Earthquake Tsunami
- 3. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu FORTRESS 1. Identify and understand cascading effects in crisis situations • Analyse relations and interdependencies between systems and actors 2. Build a modelling platform for cascading and cross- border effects 3. Develop an incident evolution tool/decision support tool
- 4. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu FORTRESS 1. Identify and understand cascading effects in crisis situations • Analyse relations and interdependencies between systems and actors 2. Build a modelling platform for cascading and cross- border effects 3. Develop an incident evolution tool/decision support tool
- 5. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Case studies of cascading disasters
- 6. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Case studies of cascading disasters • Frequency of crises • Cross-border aspect of crises • Presence and severity of cascading effects 9 case studies
- 7. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu List of case studies • 2005 London attacks, UK • 2000 Enschede fireworks factory explosion, the Netherlands • 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan • 1999 Galtür avalanche disaster, Austria • 2003 Heatwave, France • 2014 MH17 plane crash, Ukraine • 2010 Eyafjallajokull volcanic eruption, Iceland/UK • 2012 Hurricane Sandy, USA • 2002 Central European floods, Prague, Czech Republic
- 8. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Approach and methodology • Approach • Pages of text • Visual analysis
- 9. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Approach and methodology • Excel sheet • Triggers of cascading effects • Time- when did what happen • Unfolding of events and actions in crisis management • Unfolding of the crisis itself • Negative effects • Sectors directly affected • Sectors indirectly affected
- 12. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Blue arrow- direct causal relation Yellow arrow- of influence on Green line- subsequent steps but not a causal relation
- 13. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Blue arrow- direct causal relation Yellow arrow- of influence on Green line- subsequent steps but not a causal relation Red line- connects trigger in green column to the cascade it caused
- 14. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Approach and methodology Uniform approach for categorising the triggers of cascading effects • Disruption of • Information relation • Supply relation • Organisation relation • Malfunctioning of legal and regulatory relation • Disturbance relation • Relational conditions
- 17. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis What are common triggers of cascading effects and what are the implications for emergency management?
- 18. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of • Information relation • Supply relation • Organisation relation • Malfunctioning of legal and regulatory relation 2. Disturbance relation 3. Relational conditions
- 19. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of information relations: 12 times • Congestion of telecommunication networks
- 20. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu London attacks -First responders reliant on mobile phones -Increase in call traffic (up to 250%) -Difficulties in organizing response efforts with hospitals, and in allocating additional resources
- 21. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of information relations: 12 times • Congestion of telecommunication networks ►Importance of having separate reliable communication systems
- 22. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of supply relations: 8 times
- 23. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Galtür avalanche -Roads were inaccessible- no transport via roads -Not enough helicopters to bring emergency personnel and evacuate people -Helicopters had to be requested from neighbouring countries and NATO member states
- 24. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of supply relations: 8 times • Supply of water ►Importance of access to resources
- 25. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of organisational relations: 11 times • Decisions based on incorrect information
- 26. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Enschede fireworks factory explosion -Fire brigade asked SE Fireworks if fire safety measures were up to date -SE Fireworks claimed they were -Firefighters subsequent actions were based on this.
- 27. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of organisational relations: 11 times • Decisions based on incorrect information • Decisions proved to be wrong
- 28. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu London attacks -Meeting location for members of the Gold Coordination Group was changed -Congestion on roads and closure of underground -Senior officials experienced difficulties in getting to the new location -Impacted the strategic coordination to the attacks
- 29. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of organisational relations: 11 times • Decisions based on incorrect information • Decisions proved to be wrong • Organisational responsibilities were not agreed upon
- 30. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Heatwave- France -No heatwave response plan was in place -Classification as an ‘emergency situation’ was delayed- it did not fit in the existing format -Poorly coordinated and inadequate response to the event
- 31. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 1. Disruption of relations Disruption of organisational relations: 11 times • Decisions based on incorrect information • Decisions proved to be wrong • Organisational responsibilities were not agreed upon ►Triangulation of knowledge provided by those who have a stake in the situation ►Importance of systematic organisation of both resources and people, between and within organisations, pre- and during disaster
- 32. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 2. Disturbance relations: 12 times (unintended relations between systems or actors that come into being during a crisis)
- 33. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Fukushima -No electricity -Failure of pumps - reactors could not be cooled -Firefighters became responsible for cooling nuclear reactors.
- 34. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 2. Disturbance relations: 12 times (unintended relations between systems or actors that come into being during a crisis) ►Known risks are valuable resources of knowledge that can be used in emergency planning
- 35. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 3. Pre-disaster relational conditions: 12 times • Wider trends influenced specific behavior
- 36. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Fukushima -Nuclear power less profitable in Japan prior to 2011 -Investment in cost reduction at the expense of safety measures -Inadequate diagrams and instruments related to safety protocols -Delay in responding to the accident AP
- 37. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 3. Pre-disaster relational conditions: 12 times • Wider trends influenced specific behavior • Specific behavior influenced wider trends
- 38. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Floods- Prague -Political decisions – use of dams for the production of electricity -Flood models and structural barriers -Urbanisation -Gradual loss of flood mitigation practices AP
- 39. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Analysis 3. Pre-disaster relational conditions: 12 times • Wider trends influenced specific behavior • Specific behavior influenced wider trends ►Triggers of cascading effects that have their origin in a pre-disaster period are more difficult to address during actual crisis management. However, they allow greater opportunities for the mitigation of risk.
- 40. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu Take home lessons ►Triggers of cascading effects can originate prior or during crisis ►Effective regulations can limit cascading effects ►Pre-crisis mitigation and preparation measures can limit the occurrence of triggers of cascading effects during crises ►Systems and human resources cannot be considered in isolation from each other
- 41. @FORTRESS_EU http://fortress-project.eu THANK YOU If you have any further questions or would like to be kept up-to-date with the project’s findings and events please contact: kim.hagen@trilateralresearch.com FORTRESS has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 607579.
Editor's Notes
- In this presentation I’d like to talk about some of the work we have carried out for the FORTRESS project.
- FORTRESS is a 3 year project, which roughly consists of the three phases listed here,
- But what I’ll be talking about today mainly concerns our work in the first phase. What we wanted to do in this phase is create a better understanding of what common triggers of cascading effects are – an understanding which we can subsequently use to think about ways in which we can address such cascading effects in preparing for disaster or managing emergencies. We decided to carry out research on historical cascading crisis situations, with particular emphasis on the triggers of cascading effects.
- The choice of the crises case studies was informed by an analysis of crises most frequently occurring in Europe between 2003 and 2013, based on data available in EMDAT.
- In selecting case studies -the frequency of certain types of crises was considered, -as well as the cross-border aspect of crises -and the presence and severity of cascading effects. Additionally, two large non-European cascading crises were included, and we looked at the MH17 plane crash as this is such a recent example of a cross-border disaster. In total we examined and analysed these 9 case studies. Our research was carried out with the help of two other organisations: IRKS research based in Vienna, and IRDR UCL in London.
- list
- *When thinking about how to approach this analysis *One thing we did not want to do was providing them with endless pages of text, *We evaluated other ways of approaching this, and thought ‘why don’t we try making this more visual’- and work towards a visual analysis of the crisis case studies in which we identify what happened in that situation, what the cascading effects were, and trace back how these effects originated- hence identifying their triggers.
- For each of the case studies we created an Excel sheet, with seven columns
- In each of these columns we identify what happened in that particular crisis.
- We listed that in boxes.
- Next, we used arrows and lines to indicate the relations between the boxes. Blue arrow: Direct causal relation: A naturally leads to B – fire in the factory expands (if the fire is not extinguished)- Yellow arrow: of influence on- something either influences how A leads to B, or something influences actions taken.- first horizontal yellow arrow shows that as the firefighters focussed on the factory alone, and not on the areas around the factory, the fire around the factory expanded. If the firefighters would have focused on the areas around the factory as well, the fire might not have expanded the way it did. Hence, their actions influenced the expansion of fire, which was indicated by the blue arrow. Green line- subsequent steps but not a causal relation- things that followed each other up in time. For example: actions in crisis management: they are subsequent steps, but one step is not the inevitable consequence of another step.
- Next, what we did is we indicated in the green column what caused the event to unfold and cascade the way it did. And we brought in a red line to link the trigger listed in the box in the green column it to the cascade it caused.
- After extensive discussions we agreed on a uniform approach for categorising the triggers of cascading effects. *Disruption of -information relation – something is not functioning in the production or delivery of information–e.g., phone lines are overloaded and emergency responders cannot communicate with one another -supply relation – such as the supply of physical resources or manpower such as firemen -organisation relation- malfunctioning of the organisation of crisis management *-legal and regulatory relation- inspections on fire safety that were not carried out. *Disturbance relation- relations between systems of actors that did not exist prior to the crisis but came into being during the crisis and caused cascading effects. For example in the case of Fukushima the cooling of the reactors depended on sea water. As this automatic injection of sea water stopped due to the earthquake, firetrucks had to provide water injections. In an everyday situation the cooling of reactors did not depend on firetrucks at all, so this relation between firefighters and fukushima was created due to the disturbance caused by the disaster. A particularly interesting point about this example is that the provision of water via firetrucks was also hindered: they had difficulties reaching the site due to aftershocks. *Relational conditions- As nuclear power business became less profitable, TEPCO put more emphasis on reducing costs, at the expense of safety. Proper diagrams and instruments were not in place.
- And like this we identified all triggers of cascading effects we could find.
- We did this for all 9 case studies, producing overviews like this.
- These were the most common triggers
- Disruption of information relations was identified 12 times as a trigger of cascading effects
- First responders, representatives from London Fire brigade and London Ambulance, were reliant on mobile phones. Increase of phone traffic affected the abilities of the ambulance service to organise response efforts with local hospitals, and the allocation of additional resources at the scene of the attacks, including the deployment of “vehicles, personnel, equipment and supplies
- This placed a lot of emphasis on the xxx
- What this hightlighted was The importance of triangulation
- Both these disasaters were not completely unexpected.
- The disasaters were not completely unexpected.
- Floods in Czech Republic: political decisions – changes in settlement patterns
- *Triggers of cascading effects can originate prior or during crisis- illustrates that disasters cannot be viewed in isolation to everyday events. *Effective regulations can limit cascading effects. How effective legislations are depends on their implementation as well as the compliance to such regulations. Compliance is the responsibility of both those being regulated and the regulator. *XXX Think of functioning back-up systems, checks, trainings, separate communication systems * XXX No cascading distaster happens merely because of one or the other. It is almost always a combination of the two.