Animal Rights: A Case for Legal and Political Recognition

The International Library of Essays on Rights
Series Editor: Tom Campbell
Titles in the Series:
Disability Rights
Peter Blanck
The Right to a Fair Trial
Thom Brooks
Indigenous Rights
Anthony J. Connolly
Civil Rights and Security
David Dyzenhaus
Children’s Rights, Volumes I and II
Michael D.A. Freeman
Language and Cultural Rights
Leslie Green
Consumer Rights
Geraint Howells and Iain Ramsay
Group Rights
Peter Jones
Human Rights and Corporations
David Kinley
Genocide and Human Rights
Mark Lattimer
Animal Rights
Clare Palmer
Social Rights
Lord Raymond Plant and Selina Chen
Gender and Rights
Deborah L. Rhode and Carol Sanger
Health Rights
Michael Selgelid and Thomas Pogge
Theories of Rights
C.L. Ten
Bills of Rights
Mark Tushnet

Animal Rights
Edited by
Clare Palmer
Washington University in St Louis, USA

© Clare Palmer 2008. For copyright of individual articles please refer to the Acknowledgements.
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Wherever possible, these reprints are made from a copy of the original printing, but these can themselves
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some variability may inevitably remain.
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Animal rights. – (The international library of essays on
rights)
1. Animal rights 2. Human-animal relationships 3. Animal
welfare – Law and legislation
I. Palmer, Clare, 1967–
179.3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2007930998
ISBN: 978–0–7546–2741–8

Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Series Preface xi
Introduction xiii
PART I ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
1 Peter Singer (1976), ‘All Animals Are Equal’, in Tom Regan and Peter Singer
(eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, pp. 73–86. 3
2 Tom Regan (1985), ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, in Peter Singer (ed.), In
Defense of Animals, New York: Harper & Row, pp. 13–26. 17
3 Mary Anne Warren (1983), ‘The Rights of the Nonhuman World’, in Robert
Elliot and Arran Gare (eds), Environmental Philosophy, St Lucia, Queensland:
University of Queensland Press, pp. 109–34. 31
4 James Rachels (1989), ‘Why Animals Have a Right to Liberty’, in Peter Singer
and Tom Regan (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations (2nd edn),
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 122–31. 57
PART II CRITICAL VIEWS ON ANIMAL RIGHTS – AND SOME RESPONSES
5 R.G. Frey (1977), ‘Animal Rights’, Analysis, 37, pp.186–89. 69
6 Dale Jamieson and Tom Regan (1978), ‘Animal Rights: A Reply to Frey’,
Analysis, 38, pp. 32–36. 73
7 H.J. McCloskey (1979), ‘Moral Rights and Animals’, Inquiry, 22, pp. 23–54. 79
8 Evelyn B. Pluhar (1981), ‘Must an Opponent of Animal Rights also be an
Opponent of Human Rights?’, Inquiry, 24, pp. 229–41. 111
9 Jan Narveson (1983), ‘Animal Rights Revisited’, in Harlan B. Miller and William
H. Williams (eds), Ethics and Animals, Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, pp. 45–59. 125
10 Paul W. Taylor (1987), ‘Inherent Value and Moral Rights’, Monist, 70, pp. 15–30. 149
11 Peter Singer (1987), ‘Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?’, Monist, 70, pp. 3–14. 165
12 Dale Jamieson (1990), ‘Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance: A
Critique of Regan’s Theory of Rights’, Ethics, 100, pp. 349–62. 177
13 Josephine Donovan (1990), ‘Animal Rights and Feminist Theory’, Signs, 15,
pp. 350–75. 191
14 Mark Sagoff (1984), ‘Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad
Marriage, Quick Divorce’, Osgood Hall Law Review, 22, pp. 297–307. 217

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15 Ted Benton (1993), ‘Animal Rights and Social Relations’, in Andrew Dobson
and Paul Lucardie (eds), The Politics of Nature, London: Routledge, pp. 161–76. 229
16 Keith Burgess-Jackson (1998), ‘Doing Right by our Animal Companions’,
Journal of Ethics, 2, pp. 159–85. 245
PART III ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN USES
17 Cora Diamond (1978), ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’, Philosophy, 53,
pp. 465–79. 275
18 Tom Regan (1980), ‘Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights’,
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9, pp. 305–24. 291
19 Bernard E. Rollin (1991), ‘Social Ethics, Animal Rights, and Agriculture’, in
Charles Blatz (ed.), Ethics and Agriculture, Moscow: University of Idaho Press,
pp. 458–66. 311
20 Carl Cohen (1986), ‘The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research’,
New England Journal of Medicine, 315, pp. 865–66. 321
21 Nathan Nobis (2004), ‘On Carl Cohen’s “Kind” Arguments For Animal Rights
and Against Animal Rights’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 43–59. 327
22 Neil Levy (2004), ‘Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis’, Journal of
Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 213–17. 345
23 Deborah Slicer (1991), ‘Your Daughter or Your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of
the Animal Research Issue’, Hypatia, 6, pp. 108–24. 351
24 David Degrazia (1999), ‘The Ethics of Animal Research: What are the Prospects
for Agreement?’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 8, pp. 23–34. 369
25 Donald G. Lindburg (1999), ‘Zoos and the Rights of Animals’, Zoo Biology, 18,
pp. 433–48. 381
PART IV POLITICALAND LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS
26 Joel Feinberg (1978), ‘Human Duties and Animal Rights’, in Richard Morris
and Michael Fox (eds), On The Fifth Day: Animal Rights and Human Ethics,
Acropolis Books: Washington DC, pp. 45–69. 399
27 Gary L. Francione (2006), ‘Taking Sentience Seriously’, Journal of Animal Law
and Ethics, 1, pp. 1–20. 425
28 Richard A. Epstein (2002), ‘Animals as Subjects, or Objects, of Rights’, in
Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and
New Directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 143–61. 447
29 John Hadley (2005), ‘Nonhuman Animal Property: Reconciling
Environmentalism and Animal Rights’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 36,
pp. 305–15. 467

Animal Rights vii
30 Steven M. Wise (2001), ‘A Great Shout: Legal Rights for Great Apes’, in
Benjamin B. Beck et al. (eds), Great Apes and Humans, Washington, DC and
London: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 274–94. 479
31 Robert Goodin, Carole Pateman and Roy Pateman (1997), ‘Simian Sovereignty’,
Political Theory, 25, pp. 821–49. 501
Index 531

Acknowledgements
The editor and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright
material.
Blackwell Publishing for the essays: Tom Regan (1985), ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, in
Peter Singer (ed.), In Defense of Animals, New York: Harper & Row, pp. 13–26; Tom Regan
(1980), ‘Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
9, pp. 305–24; Neil Levy (2004), ‘Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis’, Journal
of Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 213–17. Copyright © 2004 Society for Applied Philosophy;
John Hadley (2005), ‘Nonhuman Animal Property: Reconciling Environmentalism and
Animal Rights’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 36, pp. 305–15. Copyright © 2005 Blackwell
Publishing; Nathan Nobis (2004), ‘On Carl Cohen’s “Kind”Argument ForAnimal Rights and
Against Animal Rights’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 43–59. Copyright © 2004
Society for Applied Philosophy.
Cambridge University Press for the essays: Cora Diamond (1978), ‘Eating Meat and Eating
People’, Philosophy, 53, pp. 465–79. Copyright © Royal Institute of Philosophy; David
Degrazia (1999), ‘The Ethics of Animal Research: What are the Prospects for Agreement?’,
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 8, pp. 23–34. Copyright © 1999 Cambridge
University Press.
Copyright Clearance Center for the essays: Robert Goodin, Carole Pateman and Roy
Pateman (1997), ‘Simian Sovereignty’, Political Theory, 25, pp. 821–49. Copyright © 1997
Sage Publications; Steven M. Wise (2001), ‘A Great Shout: Legal Rights for Great Apes’,
in Benjamin B. Beck et al. (eds), Great Apes and Humans, Washington, DC and London:
Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 274–94.
Gary L. Francione (2006), ‘Taking Sentience Seriously’, Journal of Animal Law and Ethics,
1, pp.1–20. Copyright © 2006 Gary L. Francione.
Indiana University Press for the essay: Deborah Slicer (1991), ‘Your Daughter or Your Dog?
A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue’, Hypatia, 6, pp. 108–24. Copyright ©
1991 Deborah Slicer.
Oxford University Press for the essay: Richard A. Epstein (2002), ‘Animals as Subjects, or
Objects, of Rights’, in Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein (eds), Animal Rights: Current
Debates and New Directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 143–61.
Publishing Division of the Massachusetts Medical Society for the essay: Carl Cohen (1986),
‘The Case for the Use ofAnimals in Biomedical Research’, New England Journal of Medicine,
315, pp. 865–66. Copyright © 1986 Massachusetts Medical Society.

Animal Rights
x
Peter Singer (1976), ‘All Animals Are Equal’, in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds), Animal
Rights and Human Obligations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 73–86. Copyright
© 1976 Peter Singer.
Springer for the essay: Jan Narveson (1983), ‘Animal Rights Revisited’, in Harlan B. Miller
and William H. Williams (eds), Ethics and Animals, Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, pp. 45–59.
Taylor and Francis for the essays: H.J. McCloskey (1979), ‘Moral Rights and Animals’,
Inquiry, 22, pp. 23–54; Evelyn B. Pluhar (1981), ‘Must an Opponent of Animal Rights also
be an Opponent of Human Rights?’, Inquiry, 24, pp. 229–41.
University of Chicago Press for the essay: Josephine Donovan (1990), ‘Animal Rights and
Feminist Theory’, Signs, 15, pp. 350–75. Copyright © 1990 University of Chicago Press.
Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently
overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the irst
opportunity.

Series Preface
Much of contemporary moral, political and legal discourse is conducted in terms of rights and
increasingly in terms of human rights. Yet there is considerable disagreement about the nature
of rights, their foundations and their practical implications and more concrete controversies
as to the content, scope and force and particular rights. Consequently the discourse of rights
calls for extensive analysis in its general meaning and signiicance, particularly in relation to
the nature, location and content of the duties and responsibilities that correlate with rights.
Equally important is the determination of the forms of argument that are appropriate to
establish whether or not someone or some group has or has not a particular right, and what
that might entail in practice.
This series brings together essays that exhibit careful analysis of the concept of rights
and detailed knowledge of speciic rights and the variety of systems of rights articulation,
interpretation, protection and enforcement. Volumes deal with general philosophical and
practical issues about different sorts of rights, taking account of international human rights,
regional rights conventions and regimes, and domestic bills of rights, as well as the moral and
political literature concerning the articulation and implementation of rights.
The volumes are intended to assist those engaged in scholarly research by making available
the most important and enduring essays on particular topics. Essays are reproduced in full
with the original pagination for ease of reference and citation.
The editors are selected for their eminence in the study of law, politics and philosophy.
Each volume represents the editor’s selection of the most seminal recent essays in English
on an aspect of rights or on rights in a particular ield. An introduction presents an overview
of the issues in that particular area of rights together with comments on the background and
signiicance of the selected essays.
TOM CAMPBELL
Series Editor
Professorial Fellow, The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE),
Charles Sturt University, Canberra

Introduction
Background: Animals and Moral Rights
Can animals be regarded as rights-holders? Should they be so regarded? Questions such
as these have a long pedigree. In 1792 an anonymous satirical volume, The Vindication of
the Rights of Brutes was published. This text intended to expose the ridiculous nature of
arguments for the rights of women by maintaining that such arguments, followed to their
logical conclusion, would support the idea that animals, too, have rights. Since that claim was
so obviously absurd, plainly women did not have rights either.1
But this scathing discussion of animal rights was moving against a tide of interest in, and
concern about, animal welfare and animals’ legal and moral status. Only a couple of years
earlier Jeremy Bentham in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)
maintained that:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could
have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. It may one day come to be recognized
that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons
equally insuficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should
trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-
grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more conversable animal, than
an infant of a day or a week or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it
avail? The question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Bentham,
1789, p. 311)
By the late nineteenth century, arguments that animals can be thought of as having rights,
and do in fact have them, were being proposed in more systematic form. Most well-known
among these early advocates of animal rights is Henry Salt, whose book Animals’ Rights
Considered in Relation to Social Progress was published in 1894. Salt maintains that his
object is to ‘set the principle of animals’ rights on a consistent and intelligible footing’ (Salt,
1894, Prefatory Note). To establish this footing, Salt begins his book by asking: ‘Have the
lower animals “rights”? Undoubtedly – if men have’ (ibid., ch. 1). Forms of this claim – if
humans have rights, then there are no consistent grounds for denying them to animals – have
been central to arguments about animals’ rights ever since, the essays collected in this book
being no exception.
Although debates continued through the early twentieth century, the 1970s heralded a
massive growth of interest in the moral status of animals. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation
(1975) is often seen as the landmark text that generated an explosion of both popular and
philosophical discussion about animals’ rights. Most importantly, for the purposes of this
1
I owe this reference to Peter Singer, who discusses it at the beginning of Animal Liberation
(1975) and in his essay ‘All Animals are Equal’ , Chapter 1 in this collection.

Animal Rights
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collection, philosophical essays, both supporting and opposing the idea that animals might
have rights, were published in journals and essay collections in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
A number of essays from these discussions are reprinted here. A key contributor to this debate
was Tom Regan, whose book The Case for Animal Rights (1983) laid out what is still the most
systematic and widely discussed set of arguments for animal rights. (Although, obviously,
this book could not be reproduced here, several essays by Tom Regan are included). By the
mid-1980s the discussion of animal rights had expanded to include concerns about the kinds
of right to which animals might be entitled, what the implications for human society might
be of taking animals seriously as rights-holders and whether there should be legal changes
to afford animals legal rights. (I will comment on this further later.) What became known as
the ‘animal rights movement’ came into being, representatives of which engaged in activities
ranging from philosophical argument and lobbying for changes in law and policy to more
radical direct action on behalf of animals.
The Expression ‘Animal Rights’
The use of the terms ‘animal’ and that of ‘rights’ needs further explanation. First – as already
will have become clear – the term ‘animal’ here is being used to mean ‘non-human animal’.
But some ind this problematic: it has been argued that the term ‘animal’ used in this way
rests on an implicit denial that humans are themselves animals; and also that it functions to
elide differences between non-human animals by grouping them all into one class. Alasdair
MacIntyre (2001, p. 45), for instance, maintains that this use of ‘animal’ implies ‘that the
differences between nonhuman species are of no importance, or almost no importance in any
relevant respect’.2
However, while it is worth lagging up these worries, Henry Salt’s 1894
response still seems apposite: ‘my only excuse for using it [the term animal]…is that there is
absolutely no other brief term available’(Salt, 1894, ch.1).
Arelated concern does require further attention, though: what kinds of creature are included
within the scope of ‘animal rights’? Insects, reptiles, mammals, or only some of these? The
response to this question varies from author to author. Whether moral rights are attributed to
some species of animal generally depends on (a) what kind of capacities a particular author
thinks a being has to have in order to qualify as a rights-holder, and (b) which animals the
author thinks actually possess those capacities. So, someone who thinks that, for example,
(a) possessing sentience is suficient for the attribution of moral rights, and (b) that reptiles
are sentient, will attribute rights to a wider range of beings than someone who maintains
that (a) possessing some idea of oneself as a being that persists over time is necessary for
the attribution of moral rights and (b) that only great apes possess such an idea. In practice,
though, a number of the essays in this collection do not explicitly discuss what kinds of animal
they are picking out when they use the term ‘animal rights’. In these cases it’s usually safe
to suppose that they at least mean ‘mammal rights’, and they may extend this to include ish,
reptiles and amphibians (but rarely go beyond these groups).
2
See also Jacques Derrida (2002, p. 416) who (in more strident language) commented: ‘The
confusion of all nonhuman living creatures within the general and common category of the animal is not
simply a sin against rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority; it is also a crime. Not
a crime against animality precisely, but a crime of the irst order against the animals, against animals.’.

Animal Rights xv
What, then, of the use of the term ‘rights’? The expression ‘animal rights’ has been used
to pick out somewhat different ideas. Two senses in particular have been important. The irst
takes ‘animal rights’to be shorthand for the idea that animals have any kind of moral standing
at all – David DeGrazia (2002, p. 15) calls this the ‘moral-status’ sense of animal rights. On
this view, to say that an animal has rights is just to say that (for instance) it’s wrong for you
to gratuitously hurt it, or to kill it without good reason, for animals are the kinds of being
that should be taken directly into account when making moral decisions. There are different
explanations as to why this might be the case (that animals feel pain is the most common)
but, whatever the reason, to say that animals have rights in this sense is to say that they have
moral status.
The second sense of rights is narrower – a subset of the irst. It refers to a particular kind
of moral status, the kind oriented around rights theory, where rights theory is understood as
one ethical tradition among others. This narrower sense of rights is the one generally used in
philosophy and is the sense almost (but not quite) universally adopted by the authors in this
collection. It’s important to recognize this distinction, not least because the denial of animal
rights means something quite different in the two contexts. To deny that animals have rights in
the ‘moral status’sense means to deny that they are of direct moral concern at all. To deny that
animals have rights in the second, philosophical sense need have no implications for whether
animals should be thought of as having moral status. Many objections to animal rights in this
sense are not objections to the idea that animals have moral status; rather, they are objections
to the idea that rights theory is a good way to conceive of it.
In order to untangle some of these issues a little further, I’ll outline some very basic (if
simpliied and contested) ideas, irst about what rights in this narrower sense might be thought
to be, and then about how rights theory relates to other moral theories. I’ll then say something
about legal rights before moving on to outline the contents of this collection in more detail.
Moral Rights and Rights Theory
This collection brings together arguments about the moral and legal rights of animals. But
what is a moral right? Wenar (2005) describes rights as ‘entitlements (not) to perform certain
actions or be in certain states, or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or be
in certain states’. What’s particularly important here is the idea that rights are entitlements. In
many cases, rights can be best understood as claims against others. Although rights are widely
agreed to be entitlements, there is considerable debate about the form of such entitlements.
One distinction commonly – though controversially – made is that between ‘negative’ and
‘positive’ rights.3
Negative rights are usually interpreted as entitlements a rights-holder has
not to be interfered with. In this sense, for example, if one has a right to life, one is entitled
not to have the continuance of one’s life interfered with – so, one has a right not to be killed.
Positive rights, on the other hand, are usually interpreted as rights to provision, or to some kind
of assistance from others. A right to life in this sense may mean a right to be assisted in staying
alive, by, for instance, the provision of minimum subsistence. Negative rights are, generally,
less controversial than positive ones; libertarians, for example, for whom the distinction is
3
This distinction is not intended to suggest that all rights must be either positive or negative.

Animal Rights
xvi
particularly important, argue that only negative rights exist.4
It’s important to raise this issue
here, because worries about whether rights-holding entails (or fails to entail) positive rights to
assistance has particular relevance in the case of animals’rights. We’ll see this concern emerge
in Dale Jamieson’s essay ‘Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance’ reproduced as
Chapter 12 in this collection.5
An important question – and one that arises in various different contexts in this book –
concerns the justiication for rights. On what basis can it be claimed that humans – or animals
– have rights? One long-standing tradition is natural rights theory: the idea that humans have
rights on account of their nature as human beings, an idea prominent in the work of John
Locke. One strand of this tradition maintains that human rights are divinely bestowed; such
a claim, obviously, makes explaining where rights come from relatively easy (if one accepts
the divine as a premise!). Other more contemporary philosophical traditions take a broadly
Kantian approach, maintaining that the possession of rights lows from ‘human dignity’ or
from some other human capacity or capacities (although there is no consensus about what
these capacities might be). However, the thought that rights are natural has long been
controversial; Jeremy Bentham famously referred to the idea as ‘nonsense on stilts’. Others
argue that rights are a set of entitlements negotiated between people – a kind of reciprocal,
contractual arrangement. On some natural rights approaches, and on most contractualist
views, being able to understand what rights are, being able to claim them and to respect
others’ claims to them are central to possessing them: one must be ‘morally autonomous’ or
a ‘moral agent’ to have rights (McCloskey and Cohen, Chapters 7 and 20 in this collection,
take this view). Yet others – consequentialists, for whom bringing about the best overall
consequences lies at the heart of morality – may adopt rights language on the basis that rights
can have a consequentialist justiication: for instance, that the afirmation of human rights
maximizes human welfare or utility. However, none of the authors in this collection offers
such a consequentialist justiication; the philosophical rights advocates here are either natural
rights theorists or contractualists.
These differing ideas about the justiication of rights have been particularly important for
discussions about animals. Many ethicists – utilitarians, in particular – have argued that rights
theory should not be adopted at all, for anyone, whether human or not. But advocates of
animals’ rights have taken issue both with the idea that humans have natural human rights not
available to animals and with the claim that rights are contractual agreement made between
human beings, from which animals are excluded. More about how these arguments work will
become clear later in this Introduction.
Despite disagreements about the form and justiication of rights, almost all of those who
accept rights theory agree that to say something is someone’s right is to say that they have a
very strong, perhaps an overriding, entitlement to it (or entitlement not to be deprived of it).
Ronald Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously (1977) famously described rights as ‘trumps’.
The strength of rights claims (in the narrower, philosophical sense) is one of the reasons
4
This positive/negative distinction is not unproblematic, as a number of authors make clear. See
Shue (1996) and McCloskey, Chapter 7 in this volume.
5
The Hohfeldian system for analyzing the form of rights is more careful and detailed than the
division into positive and negative rights. It describes four forms of rights: privileges, claims, powers
and immunities. Important though this Hohfeldian system is in discussions about moral and legal rights,
it has not featured prominently in the debate over animals’ rights.

Animal Rights xvii
why the debate over animal rights has been so intense. While almost everyone is willing to
accept that animals have some kind of moral status – that, for instance, as Nozick (1974, p.
37) maintains, there would be something morally problematic about smashing a baseball bat
into a cow’s head just because one enjoyed this more than one would enjoy another form
of exercise – to say that animals are rights-holders is to attribute to them extremely strong
entitlements. For example, if animals have any rights at all, it’s at least arguable that they have
a right to life. But, given the strength of rights claims, wide recognition of this right, even in
negative form, would fundamentally change the fabric of virtually all human societies. For
even if an animal’s right to life could be overridden in special circumstances (such as in a case
where there is a conlict between the right to life of a human and an animal), overriding such a
strong entitlement could surely not be justiied for the workaday killing of millions of animals
in slaughterhouses across the world. As a result, the argument that animals have rights has
been particularly controversial because of the extremely strong nature of the duties to animals
that seem to result.
Rights theory, as noted above, is just one approach to moral theory. Some ethicists argue
that rights theory encompasses the entire moral sphere: morality just is about rights. Others
argue that rights are important, but that they constitute only one part of the moral sphere. So,
for instance, it’s possible to argue that though the possession of rights is a special ‘high-level’
moral entitlement, one might still have some (albeit lesser) moral status without possessing
moral rights – the kind of position argued for by Carl Cohen in Chapter 20. Alternatively, one
might argue that rights theory – understood, at least, in terms of ‘natural’ rights or as part of a
putative contract – is wrong-headed in itself. Representatives of several traditions critical of
rights theory in this way are found in this collection. Consequentialists may accept, as we saw
above, that rights language can be useful as a way of bringing about the best consequences.
But what’s of primary interest for consequentialists are those consequences, not the respecting
of rights in themselves. And for the consequentialists represented in this collection at least, if
bringing about the best consequences would entail the violation of a right, so much the worse
for the right.6
This debate between those who argue for rights, understood as very strong or
inviolable claims, and those who argue that the aim of moral behaviour is to bring about the
best consequences, is represented in the contributions by Tom Regan and Peter Singer to this
volume. (I’ll say more about this debate below.) Those who advocate some form of feminist
ethic, or ethic of care, also argue that a focus on rights is problematic. The idea of ‘having
a right’ from these perspectives, care ethicists suggest, is oppositional and individualistic,
relecting a view of the world in which living beings are independent and self-suficient,
rather than embedded in relationship; and it neglects the importance of the emotions in the
moral sphere. Here the idea of animal rights is problematic not because animals should be
excluded from the moral sphere, but because care and the moral emotions such as sympathy
give better guides as to how humans should treat animals than the more rigid dictates of rights
theory.
6
Evelyn Pluhar (Chapter 8), drawing on a distinction made by Regan, describes rights in
this tradition as being ‘non-basic rights’ as opposed to ‘basic rights’ – rights that are not related to
consequences. There are, probably, rule consequentialists who argue that respecting animals’ rights can
be seen as rule-following, which might make them close to basic. However, so far as I know, no one has
advocated such a position.

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The idea that animals have rights, then, has been questioned for a number of different
reasons. Some argue that animals have no moral status at all. Others argue that they do have
moral status, but that they do not have rights (even though all or some humans do have rights).
Yet others argue that they do have moral status, but that rights theory is the wrong way to
conceptualize this status (both for humans and for animals). Essays representing all these
views are included in this collection.
Legal Rights and Animals
So far, I’ve considered some basic ideas about animals and moral rights. There are also debates
about whether legal rights – that is, rights protected by law and enforceable by the courts
– should be extended to animals. While legal rights often track widely accepted moral rights,
the two do not always coincide. The law in any particular country may not recognize what are
widely thought to be human moral rights (indeed, the failure to do so may be the source of
protest). And there might be a legal right to something to which it can at least be argued that
there is no moral right (some maintain this to be the case in the USA with respect to accessing
violent pornography). But those who argue that animals should have legal rights usually base
their argument on the view that animals have moral rights, and maintain that those rights, like
human rights, should be protected by law.
Of course, many countries have had legislation to protect animals in place for decades, even
for centuries. This legislation may regulate practices such as slaughter or experimentation,
or may be more generally aimed at preventing cruelty. But whether this kind of legislation is
adequate lies at the heart of a key debate between those who argue, in a legal context, for the
promotion of animal welfare and those who argue for the promotion of animal rights. Those
who argue for animal welfare seek increased legal protection for animals from human-inlicted
pain and other kinds of suffering (for example, insuficient food and space). Animal rights
advocates maintain that this welfare legislation does not go far enough. Welfare legislation
accepts, they argue, that animals may be used by humans for food and as experimental
subjects; it merely tries to curb the worst excesses of these practices (and is rather ineffective
at that). The problem, on the rights view, is more fundamental than this: animals (or at least,
members of some species of animal) are not the kinds of thing that humans should use in this
way at all. The problem, therefore, is not one about treating animals inhumanely, but instead
one about understanding them as human resources.
The current legal status of animals as property is a particular concern for those arguing
a case for the legal rights of animals. If animals are, or can legally be, someone’s property,
then they lack legal status in their own right; property status provides a foundation for their
use as resources. Several essays in this collection explore these questions with respect to
the extension of legal rights to animals. The most well-known of the initiatives arguing for
legal rights for animals – or some animals, at least – is the Great Ape Project. Its Great Ape
Declaration maintains that great apes should be recognized – as are humans – as having the
right to life, to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty and to protection from torture.
These moral rights, further, should be enshrined in law, removing great apes from the category
of human property and giving them independent legal standing. The Great Ape Project and
special issues (arguably) raised by great apes are discussed in several of the essays towards
the end of this collection.

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The Structure and Contents of this Collection
Following this Introduction, this book is divided into four main sections. Part I contains four
inluential essays that argue a case for animal moral rights, each putting forward a somewhat
different view. Part II, which is longer, brings together essays that are, for different reasons,
critical of arguments that animals have moral rights. Some direct responses to those critical
essays are included. Some authors in this section argue that only humans, but not animals,
can have moral rights; others are critical of rights theory in general and propose different
ways of conceptualizing human moral relationships towards animals; others defend rights
theory against these claims. Part III moves from general discussions about animals’ rights to
more speciic contexts in which questions about these rights arise and what those rights might
mean in practice: for example, the eating of animals, animal experimentation, the keeping
of animals in zoos. Even in these more speciic contexts, though, general questions about
what capacities underpin animal rights and whether rights is the best way to conceptualize
what’s morally owed to animals continue to arise. (Indeed, some of these essays would be as
comfortably located in Part II as in Part III). Finally, Part IV considers issues about animal
rights in a legal and political context. It includes essays arguing in favour of, and against, the
extension of legal rights to animals and concludes with two essays exploring the political and
moral status of the great apes.
Arguments in Favour of Animal Rights
The irst essay in this collection is Peter Singer’s ‘All Animals Are Equal’. First published
in the journal Philosophic Exchange (1974), and closely followed by Singer’s book Animal
Liberation (1975), this is one of the earliest – and subsequently most reproduced – essays in
the modern debate about the moral status of animals. It should be noted that Singer’s essay
does not advocate animal rights in the stricter, philosophical sense (as is made clear in his essay
‘Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?’ (Chapter 11)). Although he does use rights language
occasionally here, Singer is a utilitarian, not a rights theorist. But the primary concern of this
essay is not to advocate any particular moral theory, but rather to argue that animals should be
taken equally into consideration with humans in moral decision-making.
Singer argues that capacities such as IQ and the ability to communicate are irrelevant to
moral status – after all, humans differ quite widely in these ways. Rather, ‘[t]he capacity for
suffering and enjoying things’(p. 8) is the only non-arbitrary basis for moral status: if you can
suffer, you can have interests; things can go better or worse for you. On Singer’s argument, all
beings that can suffer should be taken into account morally. Indeed, the suffering of any being
should be taken into account equally with like suffering of any other being, no matter what
the species. Since animals can suffer, as humans can suffer, failing to take animals’ interests
equally into account reveals that one is a speciesist, a person who among other things ‘allows
the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species’
(p. 9). This speciesist attitude, according to Singer, underpins the institutions of animal use in
human societies, such as eating meat and animal experimentation.
Singer’s essay lags up several key issues, debated by most of the subsequent essays. First,
he focuses on sentience (using this term as shorthand for the capacity to feel pleasure and
pain); this raises the question whether sentience is suficient (a) to establish rights and (b)

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to ground equal moral consideration for humans and other animals. Second, he raises a very
preliminary form of what has subsequently become called the Argument from Marginal Cases
(AMC). He compares an animal with a human being that is in some sense ‘marginal’ – irst,
an orphaned infant, later ‘an imbecile’. An infant, or someone with a severe mental disability,
lacks the mental complexity that is often argued to give humans special moral status. Singer’s
orphaned infant also lacks the emotional connections that make the loss of a human life so
painful for those left behind. So two of the characteristics often argued to separate humans
from animals (mental complexity and emotional attachments) are missing. What, then, other
than discriminatory speciesist prejudice, could justify experimenting on an animal, and not
on a human, when the animal is at least as sentient as the human? As we will see, subsequent
essays in this collection pick up, develop, explain and refute different versions of the AMC.
Tom Regan, the author of the second essay in the collection, argues that animals have
moral rights. The essay reproduced here, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’ (Chapter 2), shares
a title with his 1983 book, and provides an introduction to the more detailed arguments
contained in that book. Regan considers a variety of approaches to moral theory that he inds
inadequate: moral contractarianism, a ‘cruelty-kindness view’ (p. 22), and utilitarianism.
Moral contractarianism, Regan maintains (somewhat controversially), is inadequate for
people, let alone animals, as it excludes all those who are not able to understand or agree to
a moral contract. Equally, a morality based around cruelty and kindness is inadequate in the
case of people: one could be a kindly racist, for instance. Utilitarianism, while having the
advantage of focusing on egalitarianism, also fails. Its emphasis on aggregating consequences
to arrive at the best outcome allows for individuals to be sacriiced or traded off in order to
promote the greatest good. The most adequate kind of moral theory, Regan argues, is one that
focuses on the inherent value of individuals – and rights theory, on his account, does just this.
An individual has inherent value if it is an ‘experiencing subject of a life’ (p. 26), the kind
of creature with a welfare, beliefs, preferences, memory, feelings and an experienced quality
of life. And at least some kinds of animal, as well as humans, have these qualities. As such,
they have inherent value, and those that have inherent value have at least some rights. Further,
Regan insists, all who have inherent value have it equally.
Regan’s account of animal rights in this essay is necessarily truncated (his book gives a
much fuller account – though some argue, still not full enough). However, two central points
emerge. First, to have inherent value – and hence rights – on Regan’s account, a creature must
have quite sophisticated mental capacities – beyond sentience alone, which Singer argued to
be both necessary and suficient for moral status. Of course, Regan maintains that mammals
such as cows and dogs do have such sophisticated capacities. But one way to attack Regan’s
view is to attack his description of what animals are like (although, in doing so, one faces
arguments about people who lack the same sophisticated capacities). Second, Regan argues
that the real problem is not that humans make animals suffer, wrong though that is. It is
something more fundamental: that humans treat animals as instruments, as resources, things
they can use for their own ends. Inlicting suffering on them is a symptom of this deeper
failure to recognize animals’ inherent value. Regan’s clear expression of this position has
made a deep impact on the debate about animal rights – not only with respect to their moral
rights, but also with respect to their status in law.
The contributions of Singer and Regan, often thought of as the architects of the animal
liberation/rights movement as it has emerged today, have been extremely signiicant. However,

Animal Rights xxi
they are not the only advocates of animal rights. The remaining two essays in Part I make
somewhat different cases for animal rights. In Chapter 3 Mary Anne Warren argues that, on
the basis of their capacity to feel pain and pleasure, animals should be thought of as having
basic rights. However, she argues that (most) animals are suficiently dissimilar to (most)
humans that the kinds of right to which they are entitled are likewise different – and less
extensive. For example, humans have sophisticated mental and imaginative lives, and long-
term future-oriented desires, that make their interest in continuing to live greater than that of
most animals. This, she suggests, gives humans more intrinsic value than most animals and
means that a human right to life is usually stronger than that of an animal. In addition, Warren
accepts some part of the contractualist rights theory rejected by Regan. While animals may
have some weaker rights, ‘full and equal rights’only exist between reciprocating members of a
moral community – and such a community cannot include animals. This argument, of course,
again raises the question whether ‘non-paradigm’ humans: (infants, people with disabilities)
have lesser rights than ‘paradigm’ humans. Warren provides a series of (contentious) reasons
as to why strong moral rights should be extended to these individuals but not to animals.
She concludes by considering some objections to animals’ rights from various environmental
perspectives, such as the view that if animal rights are to be respected, then (for instance)
overpopulation by a sentient species could not be corrected by culling, because culling
would fail to respect rights. Warren here appeals to the weak nature of the animal rights
she endorses: they can be overridden for suficiently serious causes – such as protecting
threatened ecosystems. Her brief consideration of potential conlicts between some forms of
environmental ethics and animal rights will be revisited elsewhere in this collection.
The inal essay in Part I is James Rachels’‘Why Animals Have a Right to Liberty’(Chapter
4). Rachels’ method here is as follows: irst, ind a right we are conident that humans have,
then ask whether there’s a relevant difference that justiies denying the right to members of
a particular species of animal; if not, the animals have the right. On this basis, Rachels has
no dificulty arguing that animals such as rabbits, pigs and monkeys have the right not to be
tortured, but that no animal has the right to freedom of worship. He focuses on one particular
human right – the right to liberty – and argues that the idea of ‘freedom’ makes sense not
only in the context of ‘rational agents’, but also of any being that ‘is able to act as seems
best to him without being subject to external constraints on his actions’ (Lucas, 1966, cited
on p. 60). And animals are able to do this. In addition, being restricted in their activities can
negatively impact animals’ interests: Rachels cites numerous cases in which, he maintains,
restrictions on animals’freedom of movement caused them distress. This, he argues, indicates
that animals that suffer in captivity ‘have an interest in being free, and so at least a prima facie
right to liberty’ (p. 63), although rights to liberty will vary between species.
The four essays in Part I, then, all make a strong case for the moral signiicance of animals.
Singer’s essay – while not, narrowly speaking, advocating animal rights – argues on the basis
of animal sentience that animals and humans should be taken equally into consideration in
moral decision-making. Regan argues that all creatures that are ‘experiencing subjects of
a life’ – which includes many animals – have equal inherent value, and therefore rights;
creatures with inherent value should not be treated solely as the instruments or resources of
others. Warren argues that, on the basis of their capacities for pain and pleasure, animals do
have moral rights, but that these rights are weaker than human rights and may be over-ridden
for suficiently serious reasons. Rachels maintains that, if we can be sure that humans have a

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particular right, unless we can ind a good reason why an animal should be denied that right,
we should attribute it to the animal too; and argues, correspondingly that, the right to liberty
is just such a cross-species right.
Critical Views on Animal Rights – and Some Responses
Part II contains a number of critical responses to the arguments for animal rights proposed
in Part I. R.G. Frey is a long-standing opponent of animal rights (though he does, in other
publications, accord moral status to animals). The essay reproduced here as Chapter 5 picks up
on aspects of theArgument from Marginal Cases (AMC), which, as we saw in Part I, is central
to arguments for animal rights. Frey portrays the AMC as working like this: each and every
criterion that excludes animals from holding rights also excludes some ‘marginal’ humans
(for example, babies or those with mental handicaps), but since these ‘marginal’ humans do
have rights, none of the animal-excluding rights criteria succeeds. Frey offers two possible
responses to this version of the AMC. First, perhaps ‘marginal’ humans don’t have rights.
Second, the best arguments for attributing rights to ‘marginal’ humans would, if successful,
separate them from animals – arguments from potential rationality (which would separate
babies and animals), arguments from similarity (which would separate those with mental
disabilities from animals) and arguments from immortal souls (possessed by all humans, but
no animals). Frey doesn’t attempt to defend these arguments, merely to maintain that, due to
them, the AMC fails, since either (a) marginal humans may not themselves be rights-holders
or (b) there are criteria that would separate marginal humans from animals. In Chapter 6, Dale
Jamieson and Tom Regan engage directly with Frey’s argument. They suggest that Frey’s is
a ‘straw man’ argument: those who argue for animal rights don’t formulate the AMC in this
way. Defenders of the AMC only maintain that some prominent criteria that exclude animals
from rights-holding exclude some humans too, and, in any case, this is just one of a range of
reasons for rejecting particular criteria as the basis for rights-possession. Further, Jamieson
and Regan suggest, it isn’t clear that all animals would fail either Frey’s ‘potential rationality’
test or his ‘similarity’ test, depending on how those criteria were drawn up; and in any case,
Frey fails to provide suficient evidence for thinking that these arguments are, in fact, ‘the
best’. Sentience, Jamieson and Regan suggest, is surely a good premise for rights-holding; but
this is inexplicably missing from Frey’s account.
For H.J. McCloskey (Chapter 7), rights form only one part of the sphere of morality:
animals may have moral status, even if they are not rights-holders. However, given the
particularly strong nature of rights claims, establishing whether or not animals have rights is
nonetheless important. McCloskey argues that, to have rights, one must have the capacity for
‘rational, moral self-determination, moral autonomy’ (p. 88). Available evidence, McCloskey
maintains, makes it unlikely that any animal has this capacity – and hence no animal has
rights. Again, this runs up against the AMC. But McCloskey bites on some of the bullet.
Humans that have no potential for moral autonomy don’t have rights. However (using one of
the arguments proposed by Frey in Chapter 5) rights can be extended to infants on the basis
of their potential for moral autonomy. Although McCloskey does not accept that animals do
have rights, he nonetheless considers what rights they might have if they did. He responds
to Rachels’ argument concerning animals’ right to liberty, as well as discussing, in passing,
animals’ right to property (the subject of John Hadley’s essay in Part IV). He also maintains

Animal Rights xxiii
– raising issues that recur in Jamieson’s ‘Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance’
(Chapter 12) – that the attribution of rights to animals would result in insuperable dificulties
concerning incompatible demands: for example, the protection of one animal’s life from
deadly aggression by another animal.
In Chapter 8 Evelyn Pluhar defends animals’ rights against views of this kind, attacking
those who maintain that, even though ‘nonparadigmatic humans’(p. 111) – the ‘marginal cases’
– differ from paradigmatic humans in a variety of ways, there are still plausible arguments that
separate permissible treatment for them from what is permissible for animals.An animal rights
opponent who ‘fully accepts the consequences of his theory’ (p. 121, emphasis in original)
would have to accept that, if animals lack rights, so too do non-paradigmatic humans. Thus,
Pluhar maintains, someone who holds this view should accept that it’s morally permissible
to treat non-paradigmatic humans like animals (by breeding them for food, experimenting on
them and so on). If this conclusion is unacceptable, then it is time to reconsider arguments for
animals’ rights.
In Chapter 9 Jan Narveson (whose earlier views are also discussed by Pluhar) considers
three possible groundings for rights: those emerging from libertarianism, utilitarianism and
contractarianism. From none of these theoretical positions, he suggests, is it clear that animals
have rights; or, if they do, it is not obvious that such rights should protect animals from, for
instance, being eaten by people. Most interesting in Narveson’s account is his discussion of
libertarianism and animal rights. First, he suggests, it’s unclear whether a libertarian view
(such as that of Nozick) could attribute rights to animals at all. If it did, these rights would
be purely negative rights – rights as side-constraints on our actions; rights, Narveson says,
‘not to be treated badly without one’s consent’ (p. 129). But perhaps, Narveson suggests,
the importance of consent raises other questions. Animals are not able to give consent to be
treated badly (or in any particular way at all). But is it unimaginable that a farm animal would
hypothetically consent to a deal where it was treated well and slaughtered painlessly? Suppose
the alternatives are non-existence (which of course, raises a whole series of further issues)
or being turned out to fend for itself in the wild? Although Narveson’s answers raise more
problems than they solve, these kinds of questions seem important and neglected. Humans
bring livestock animals into being literally (they would not exist without human breeding
practices) and in terms of their dependent, domesticated natures. What implications does this
human role have for thinking about animals’ rights?
Both Paul Taylor and Peter Singer, in Chapters 10 and 11 respectively, take on aspects
of Regan’s rights argument. Taylor raises several concerns about arguments central to the
internal structure of Regan’s position. First, he maintains that it’s perfectly coherent to accept
that humans and animals both have inherent value, but that humans have more of it than
animals (a view that Regan rejects). Second, he questions the link that Regan makes between
inherent value, duties and rights. Regan, Taylor maintains, claims that rights are derived from
duties – duties that one has towards beings because they have inherent value. But this is the
wrong way round. Moral rights are ‘logically prior to the duties correlative to them’ (p. 159).
We have duties because someone else has rights; they don’t acquire rights because we have
duties. This is not, as Taylor makes clear, to deny the possibility that animals have rights;
but rather to maintain that Regan’s route of getting to them is misguided. Singer, on the
other hand – as has been already noted – opposes the rights approach in itself, for humans as
well as animals. He unpicks the arguments Regan makes in Chapter 2 against utilitarianism,

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rejecting the claim that all forms of utilitarianism are committed to treating individuals as
lacking in inherent value, and advocating maximizing consequentialism as the best way of
making moral decisions. For a utilitarian to aim for the best outcome, Singer maintains, is not,
contra Regan, the same as treating individuals merely as a means to an end, for everyone has
been given equal consideration. Regan, Singer argues, provides no case ‘for attributing rights,
rather than equal consideration, to animals’ (p. 175).
Dale Jamieson’s complex and important essay (Chapter 12) raises several key dificulties
with animal rights arguments (the target is Regan, but the problem is a broader one), though
I’ll consider just one of his objections here. On Regan’s account, only moral agents can
violate rights, since rights claims only exist against those who can recognize them; and where
rights have been violated there are duties to assist. But this limits duties to assist to cases of
rights violations, and allows Regan to maintain that, for example, humans have no duties to
intervene between predators and prey animals, because predators, not being moral agents,
cannot violate rights. However, as Jamieson points out, this restriction on duties to assistance
has other worrying implications, in the human as well as in the animal sphere. So, for instance,
there seems to be no duty to warn someone of a falling boulder (unless, perhaps, the boulder
was deliberately dislodged by a murderous moral agent) since a boulder itself can violate no
one’s rights. It’s dificult, Jamieson suggests, for Regan to deal with this problem; maintaining
that there are, after all, non-discretionary duties to assist in the boulder case would reopen the
problem of predation and is likely to be just an ad hoc addition to his overall theory. Jamieson
argues that to resolve this problem (as well as others thrown up by clashes in rights) Regan
will need to move closer to a more consequentialist moral theory.
Josephine Donovan’s critical essay (Chapter 13) takes quite a different approach from
those so far considered. She argues that animal rights (and, indeed, utilitarian) approaches
emerge from, and are still immersed in, a world-view invested in rationalism, scientiic
knowledge and domination over, or control of, nature. According to Donovan, Regan, for
example, emphasizes the necessity of having ‘complex consciousness’ to be ‘subject of a life’
(p. 196); he maintains that the recognition of animal rights is required on rational grounds and
has no place for relationship or emotional attachment in his account of morality. His work
privileges rationalism and individualism over emotion and relationship. Donovan argues that
what is needed is a shift in world-view, a reorientation towards the sorts of perspective often
revealed by women’s thinking and writing and currently manifest in cultural feminism. These
perspectives emphasize empathy with and respect for nature, emotional engagement and the
maintenance of caring relationships, in contrast to the ‘rigidity’ of rights theory. A ‘women’s
relational culture of caring and attentive love’, rather than the rigidity of rights theory, provides
the best basis for the ethical treatment of animals (p. 216).
The individualist focus of animal rights arguments is not only a concern for those coming
from a feminist perspective. The remaining three essays in Part II – albeit in somewhat
different ways – all emphasize the need to think about animals in context and in relationship
– and thus raise questions about the rights view. In Chapter 14 Mark Sagoff approaches
animal rights from the perspective of ‘holistic’ environmentalism, raising questions similar
to those considered by Mary Anne Warren in Chapter 3. Environmentalism, Sagoff argues,
drawing on Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, concerns the protection of ecosystems and endangered
species – the land community. Animal rights, however, focus on the protection of individual
sentient animals. These two concerns are quite different: an animal rights view has no built-

Animal Rights xxv
in commitment to environmental protection; indeed, the two might be in opposition to one
another. For, Sagoff (contentiously) argues, basic human rights include positive rights to
security and subsistence. But if wild animals have these basic rights, then human intervention
in ecosystems is mandated, for wild animals are constantly threatened and are often hungry.
Should feedlots for wild animals be organized? Should wildernesses become managed for
animal welfare? If so, this puts animal rights advocates and environmentalists at odds with
one another. Animal rights advocates (problematically, on Sagoff’s account) emphasize the
welfare of individuals; environmentalists are interested in the whole land community. Sagoff’s
notorious essay pulls animal rights and environmentalism apart: although it should, perhaps,
be read in the context of Jamieson’s essay (Chapter 12) since the two have quite different
readings of what rights for wild animals might mean.
Ted Benton’s essay (Chapter 15), written from a sociological perspective, focuses on
the potential effectiveness of liberal-individualistic rights discourse in the case of animals.
While those who advocate animal rights have been effective in getting the discourse widely
recognized, in doing so, he maintains, they have lost potential allies amongst those sceptical of
the rights tradition (in the human as well as the animal case). Relatedly, in failing to consider
the broader context of power and social relationship in which humans and animals are located,
they have failed to be practically effective in changing the situation for animals. Central to
Benton’s argument is the claim that where societies are radically unequal in terms of power,
wealth and accomplishment, claims to equal rights are likely to have ‘little de facto purchase
on the realities of social life’ (p. 234). And animals are, as Benton rightly notes, ‘signiicantly
less well placed than even the most disadvantaged humans’ (p. 235). When human property
rights, the rights of hunters and the human right to health seem to conlict with animals’
rights, human rights will usually win out. Furthermore, in situations such as industrial
farms, the mechanized and impersonal nature of human interactions with animals makes
their recognition as ‘subjects of a life’ particularly unlikely. What’s especially interesting
in Benton’s argument is his emphasis on the role that relations of power and dependency,
affection and detachment can play both in understanding human relations with animals and
in generating moral relationships with them. The inal essay in Part III, by Keith Burgess-
Jackson, develops this issue still further, in the context of exploring humans’ obligations
towards their ‘animal companions’. A dificulty, Burgess-Jackson suggests, with the animal
rights literature is that it assumes that ‘whatever obligations humans have to any animals are
had to all animals’ (p. 247). This view, Burgess-Jackson argues, is inadequate as it fails to
consider the special obligations individual humans have towards individual animals that they
voluntarily bring into their lives. Bringing a companion animal home, he maintains, generates
a responsibility to provide for it because, in doing so, one closes off other opportunities for it to
fulil its needs; rather like producing a child, both vulnerability and dependence are generated.
Burgess-Jackson recognizes that animal rights theorists are made uneasy by such claims: they
fear an emphasis on special responsibilities towards only some individuals. Further, on the
rights view, all that seems to be relevant to moral status is the intrinsic properties of the being
concerned, not the relationships in which it stands. But, as Burgess-Jackson maintains, one
can acknowledge special responsibilities without denying general ones: relational properties
may carry moral responsibilities, as well as intrinsic ones.
Burgess-Jackson’s essay provides a bridge into Part III, inasmuch as he is concerned with
animals in a particular context in relation to humans: in their homes. Part III considers ethical

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issues raised by human uses of animals in other contexts: as food, in laboratories, and in
zoos.
Animal Rights and Human Uses
The irst two essays in Part III concern the relationship of animal rights arguments to
vegetarianism. In Chapter 17 Cora Diamond – while not opposed to vegetarianism – argues
that a rights view is wrongheaded and simplistic, failing to ask enough questions about (for
instance) why we don’t eat people – or pets – but do eat other animals. The reason why we
don’t eat people – even dead ones – is not because they are perceived as having rights, but
rather because of certain ideas we have about what it is to be human and certain relations in
which we stand to our fellow humans. (Thus, this essay connects interestingly with several
of those towards the end of Part II.) She suggests that, in order for animals to receive better
treatment, we need to change the ways in which they are conceptualized and understood to
relate to humans, rather than insisting on their rights. Seeing animals as ‘fellow creatures’that
appeal to our pity and ask us not to treat them callously and unrelentingly, she suggests, might
provide more compelling grounds for not eating them than insistence on their rights ever could.
However, the next essay by Regan, in contrast, reasserts a rights view. He claims that a rights
view requires vegetarianism and that vegetarianism requires a rights view. This puts his essay
implicitly at odds with Diamond’s and explicitly at odds with arguments for vegetarianism
based on utilitarianism. Indeed, Regan carefully picks out differences between utilitarian and
rights views, using vegetarianism as a test case. There’s no guarantee, Regan maintains, that
the ‘best consequences’on a utilitarian calculation will come up with vegetarianism, and none
of Singer’s many arguments about equality can guarantee it either. Only a view that animals
– and humans with disabilities – are, because of their capacities, the kinds of beings that have
rights and that therefore there are some things that should not be done to them, including
eating them, is strong and consistent enough to support the claim that humans should be
vegetarians.
Bernard Rollin (Chapter 19) does not engage directly with arguments for vegetarianism,
but instead tackles more general questions about animals in agriculture, injecting a new
note: the importance of animal natures. He does not just mean by this the capacities that
make animals morally signiicant, but the ‘distinctive set’ of needs and interests – borrowing
from Aristotle, the telos – that each species of animal manifests. It is the expression of a
species member’s distinctive nature that animal rights should protect, just as human rights
protect what is fundamental to being human. And this has particular implications for animal
agriculture, even if we accept the idea that it’s permissible to raise animals for slaughter.
Technological agriculture, with its features of coninement and its inappropriate social
arrangements, frustrates animals’ telos. The moral ideal for animal husbandry should be to
respect animals’ rights by allowing them to fulil their natures in appropriate physical and
social environments.
Thenextgroupofessaysmovesfromanimalagriculturetoanimalexperimentation–perhaps
the most contested way in which humans use animals. Carl Cohen’s essay (Chapter 20) is
well known and much cited. He maintains that animal experimentation is morally justiied,
inasmuch as two of the key arguments against it fail: that animals have rights and that animal
experimentation inlicts avoidable suffering on animals. Like McCloskey (Chapter 7) Cohen

Animal Rights xxvii
maintains that rights-possession is contingent on moral autonomy and on being part of a
community of reciprocal claims-makers. Animals are not morally autonomous, so they do
not have rights. Research therefore cannot violate their rights. This does not mean that they
have no moral status at all; but any obligations we do have do not arise from their rights.
One obvious response to Cohen’s claims is the AMC. What about humans who lack moral
autonomy? Cohen’s response here provokes the debate in the two essays that follow. He
maintains that such humans are ‘of a kind’ with those humans that do have moral autonomy;
the capacity for moral autonomy is not ‘a test to be administered to human beings one by
one’ (p. 322). Thus, all humans, whatever their capacities, have rights and no animals do, for
none of their ‘kind’ can be morally autonomous. Cohen’s essay emphasizes the gulf between
humans and animals, afirming that speciesism is ‘essential for right conduct’ (p. 323). Since,
he argues, the beneits of biomedical research to animals and humans vastly outweigh the cost
in animal suffering, there are no good alternatives to animal research, and as animals lack
rights, then animal experimentation is not only permissible, it is a duty.
In Chapter 21 Nathan Nobis maintains that Cohen’s arguments are multiply lawed.
Central is the problem of his idea of ‘a kind’. Does Cohen mean ‘normal’ humans are morally
autonomous, so ‘marginal’ humans are too? Or perhaps that it’s ‘natural’ for humans to have
these capacities, and ‘marginal’ humans are of a kind with natural humans? Nobis suggests
a number of interpretative alternatives, arguing that none of these explanations of ‘kind’
works for Cohen. Even the argument that ‘kind’ means ‘human’ is problematic, since there’s
no explanation why humanness should be picked out as the particularly relevant kind (as
opposed to, say, ‘sentient being’). Neil Levy’s brief essay (Chapter 22), which follows, is a
direct response to this part of Nobis’s argument. Levy maintains that there are natural kinds
and that species is just such a natural kind, so organisms can be non-arbitrarily classiied into
kinds. Furthermore, he maintains, there are reasons for thinking that species membership is
morally relevant. Thus, this part of Nobis’s argument against Cohen, Levy maintains, fails to
stick. Nonetheless, he accepts that there might be other objections to animal experimentation,
even if Nobis’s argument is lawed.
Quite a different view on animal research is proposed by Deborah Slicer (Chapter 23),
who develops the kind of arguments put forward by Donovan in Chapter 13. Rights and
utilitarian views, she suggests, share similar qualities. They are both essentialist, selecting a
key capacity – which she characterizes as the possession of interests – as the foundation for
moral consideration. This, however, ignores relationships and contexts, fails to acknowledge
difference and excludes those without this capacity from moral status at all. Further, there’s
no acknowledgement of the context or affective relationships in which a being is located.
In thinking about animal research, Slicer argues, we need to pay much more attention to
context. The issue is not one of clear-cut abolition (and disregard for our human relations and
contexts) or one of business as usual (as the animal research community seems to suggest).
Echoing some of Benton’s arguments set out in Chapter 15, Slicer maintains that we need to
think about animal experimentation in the context of human power and animal vulnerability
and to extend the empathetic attention we pay to our loved ones to those beings that are more
distant.
The inal essay on animal research, by David DeGrazia (Chapter 24), considers whether
conlicts around animal rights and the use of animals in medical research might be resolved,
or at least diminished. Within biomedicine, he points out, animal research is regarded as

Animal Rights
xxviii
essential for progress, but almost all animal protection groups – including, but not conined
to, those advocating animals’ rights – argue at least that current levels of animal research
should be substantially reduced. How might these differing views be reconciled? DeGrazia’s
strategy is to outline areas on which both sides, or most representatives of both sides, actually
agree. He also notes support from both sides on questions where it’s often thought that there
is disagreement – for instance, all agree that ‘the moral presumption against taking human life
is stronger than the presumption against killing at least some animals’ (p. 375). And everyone
considers that some animal research is, or should be, justiied – for instance, where animals
are not harmed or research is in an animal’s interest. There are, of course, points of substantial
disagreement, particularly on how human and animal moral status is to be comparatively
weighed. But, DeGrazia maintains, both sides should have enough in common for a more
constructive dialogue to take place.
Donald Lindburg, author of the inal essay in Part III, tackles questions concerning
zoos/aquariums and animal rights. Defenders of animal rights, such as Tom Regan, argue
that zoos are morally impermissible. Lindburg argues that modern zoos do have an ethical
justiication, but one built on a different foundation from animal rights. Zoos advocate
conservation, centred on the value of populations, processes, systems and species (rather like
the position outlined by Mark Sagoff in Chapter 14). Whereas an animal rights perspective
has no special interest in preserving species, this is one of the principal concerns of a ‘holistic’
or conservationist environmental ethic. Lindburg himself, inluenced by the work of the
philosopher Bryan Norton, urges the development of a more contextual, less rigid approach
to animal/environmental ethics, arguing that such a view can justify taking individual sentient
animals into captivity in order to protect their species.
Lindburg’s essay provides an interesting link to Part IV. His discussion of animal rights
extends beyond more abstract ethical commitments to its manifestation as a political
movement – one that puts pressure on practice, policy and institutions. The essays in Part IV
further explore the legal and political aspects of animal rights.
Political and Legal Rights for Animals
Joel Feinberg’s work on animal rights has been extremely important. The essay reproduced
here (which could also have been located in Part I) outlines some key early (1978) arguments
that animals have moral rights and should be assigned legal ones. Animals, Feinberg argues,
cannot be moral agents; they are not responsible for their actions and they cannot therefore be
legally punished. If these were the grounds for having moral or legal rights, animals would be
disqualiied. But this is not the view either morality or the law takes of human beings who are
not moral agents – for example, infants and people suffering from senility. It’s also true that
animals can’t represent themselves nor make claims on their own behalf, but, again, this is not
the qualiication for moral or legal rights in the case of, say, human infants. Humans unable
to represent themselves can have a proxy representative, and this path is surely available to
animals as well. Animals, Feinberg argues, are the kinds of beings that have interests, and
as long as a being has interests, ‘moral or legal rights can be ascribed without conceptual
absurdity’ (p. 409). If animals can be ascribed rights, do they actually have any and, if so,
to what? Feinberg proposes ‘general legal rights to noncruel treatment derived from statutes
designed to protect them’(p. 411) and moral rights to not be treated cruelly. Their rights might

Animal Rights xxix
include, Feinberg speculates, something like property rights for wild animals; incursion on
their space, which diminishes their wild lourishing, may be regarded as a form of cruelty.
Feinberg is, however, uncertain whether animals have a right to life – if they do, the claim is a
very weak one – and maintains that animals have no right not to be degraded, as humans do.
Feinberg tentatively raises questions about animals and property rights. These questions
loom large in the next three essays in Part IV. Gary Francione’s and Richard Epstein’s essays
(Chapters 27 and 28) take opposing views on the question whether sentient animals should
be viewed as legal property; John Hadley (Chapter 29) argues that animals should be able
to legally own property themselves. Francione’s essay makes two central points: irst, he
argues that being sentient alone is suficient for an animal to be a full member of the moral
community. Second, he maintains that sentient animals are treated badly because of their
status as property – this makes animals commodities and denies their inherent value, their
full membership of the moral community. The status of animals as property makes them,
essentially, slaves. Epstein, in contrast, argues for the retention of property status for animals
and denies that they should be ascribed legal rights in themselves. He provides an overview of
the historic evolution of human property rights in animals, maintaining that it was not denial
of animal sentience that led to the evolution of these laws, but rather the belief that owning
and using animals, however sentient, was necessary for human survival. And after all, Epstein
notes controversially, human ownership of animals has, in at least some cases, improved their
well-being in comparison what it would be in the wild. Rejecting Francione’s claim that there
are parallels between animals as property and slave-holding, Epstein considers two possible
reasons why partial human–animal parity should be enshrined in law: sensation and cognition.
But neither basis, he argues, justiies legal rights for animals. While human relations with
animals should be legally regulated, these regulations should not extend to ascribing them
rights.
Hadley’s essay picks up on a somewhat different question about property rights: not whether
animals should be seen as property, but whether they should be able to own property themselves
(unfortunately, there is no discussion in these essays about how these questions might relate
to one another). Hadley argues that, even though animals are not able to understand issues
relating to property rights, they could be adequately represented by human guardians who do.
If wild animals were ascribed property rights to their habitat, this would provide a higher level
of protection to that land than is currently possible, since property rights have high status and
are likely to be respected. The ascription of property rights to wild animals would not only
demonstrate recognition of animal interests and autonomy, but would also make it less likely
that animals’ habitat could be redeveloped merely by relocating them, for relocation would
constitute harm. Ascribing property rights to wild animals would thus have the effect, Hadley
argues, of protecting ecosystems and hence should be supported by holistic environmental
ethicists, as well as those concerned for animal rights. Further, Hadley maintains, animals’
property rights need not be construed as exclusive; they are likely to be compatible with at
least some human uses of the land (animals might have usufructuary rights over land owned
by humans).
The inal two essays in the collection concern a speciic group of animals over which there
has been much recent debate: the great apes. The Great Ape Project, mentioned by several
essays in this collection, aims to widen recognition of the moral rights of great apes and
to enshrine these rights in national law. Steven Wise’s essay defends the claim that great

Animal Rights
xxx
apes should be thought of as legal rights-holders. He points out that all humans – however
incompetent – are ascribed full legal liberty rights (he calls these dignity rights); cognitive
ability has not been deemed to be necessary for human individuals to be legal rights-holders.
But in the case of great apes, even though ‘their natures and interests would justify those
rights if only they were us’ (p. 490), legal rights are denied. Wise proposes a number of
arguments from consistency that if humans who lack full autonomy are ascribed legal rights,
the same should apply to great apes; he rejects arguments (such as Cohen’s in Chapter 20)
that group membership is suficient for the ascription of rights, independent of the capacities
of any particular individual. Great apes, Wise insists, should be recognized as legal persons;
not to do so is ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, and unprincipled’ (p. 493). Finally, Robert Goodin,
Carole Pateman and Roy Pateman (Chapter 31) focus on political, rather than moral, rights for
great apes: in particular whether and how great apes could have political ‘sovereignty’ over
their territory. Something like this, they suggest, seems to be implied by The Declaration on
Great Apes. But how might such a claim for ‘simian sovereignty’ work? The authors explore
a variety of different strategies, including something rather like the property ownership
arrangement envisaged by Hadley: a kind of ‘trust territory’ to be owned by the apes and
administered by trustees, giving great apes a kind of sovereignty over their territory. This
essay, then, completes the move from the more abstract, philosophical claims for animal
rights discussed in Part I of this book to considering a political, territorial implementation of
animals’ rights in practice.
Conclusion
Debates about both the moral and legal rights of animals are hotly contested and are likely
to remain so. Some recent – if relatively small-scale – legal changes suggest that, gradually,
theoretical debates both in ethics and in law are having an impact on practice. So, for instance,
in 2001, the US state of Rhode Island in House Bill 6119 introduced the title ‘guardian’
as interchangeable with ‘owner’ for someone ‘who possesses, has title to or an interest in,
harbors or has control, custody or possession of an animal and who is responsible for an
animal’s safety and well-being’, the irst time the term ‘guardian’ had been used in this sense
in law.7
In 2007 the Balearic Parliament announced its approval of a resolution to seek legal
rights for great apes. Animal welfare legislation – if not animal rights – has been important in
the development of agricultural policy in the European Union; for instance, battery cages for
egg production will become illegal in the EU from 2012. These changes relect ways in which
concerns about the moral and legal standing of animals – their welfare, their interests, their
status as property and what responsibilities humans may have towards them – have become
more widespread and more signiicant since the upsurge in debate in the 1970s. As I write
this Introduction, one of the news headlines of the day is that Masterfoods – the makers of
Mars Bars, Snickers and other confectionary products – have retreated from the inclusion of
non-vegetarian rennet in their foodstuffs, under pressure from a large consumer lobby, the
Vegetarian Society UK, and with the support of 40 UK members of parliament. Whatever one
7
See http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/stusri2000housebill6119.htm for more details of this
statute.

Animal Rights xxxi
may think about the moral and legal rights of animals, both the rational arguments and the
ierce passions generated by this issue seem to be here to stay.
References
Bentham, Jeremy (1948) [1789], An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, New
York, NY: Hafner.
DeGrazia, David (2002), Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Derrida, Jacques (2002), ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, trans. David Wills,
Critical Inquiry, 28(2), pp. 390–418.
Dworkin, Ronald (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Frey, R.G. (1988), ‘Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism’, Between the Species, 4, pp.
191–201.
Lucas, J.R. (1966), The Principles of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, Alistair (2001), Dependent, Rational Animals, Chicago: Open Court.
Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
Regan, Tom (1983), The Case for Animal Rights, London: Routledge.
Salt, Henry (1894), Animals’ Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress, New York: Macmillan
& Co. Text available online at http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-c/salt01.htm.
Shue, Henry (1996), Basic Rights, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Singer, Peter (1975), Animal Liberation, New York: Avon Books.
Wenar, Leif (2005), ‘Rights’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
rights/.

Name Index
Adams, Carol J. 201, 359
Adams, John Quincy 488, 489
Adorno, Theodor 202, 203, 204
Ahlquist, Jon 511
Allen, Paula G. 201, 211, 215
Anderson, Benedict 510
Anthony, Susan B. 200
Aquinas, St Thomas 321, 427, 506
Aristotle 41, 42, 50, 195, 314, 427, 451, 453,
480, 485
Augustine, Saint 321, 506
Auxter, Thomas 50
Bacon, Francis 204
Baier, Annette 267
Basler, R.P. 483
Baxter, William F. 49
Beauvoir, Simone de 209
Beethoven, Ludwig von 133
Bekoff, M. 382
Benn, Stanley 14–16 passim
Bennett, J. 288
Bentham, Jeremy xiii, xvi, 7, 8, 32, 33, 150,
196–7, 224, 276, 292, 323, 385, 417–18,
428–9 passim, 433, 439, 440, 441, 442,
444, 457
Benton, Ted xxv, xxvii, 229–44
Berlin, Isaiah 483
Beston, Henry 501
Birke, Lynda 241
Blackstone, Sir William 481
Blackwell, Elizabeth 200, 208
Bordo, Susan 205
Bostok, S. St C. 393
Boysen, Sally 480
Baracton, Henry de 481
Bradley, F.H. 321
Britton, John 481
Broida, J.P. 385
Brophy, Brigid 39
Burgess-Jackson, Keith xxv, 245–71
Burns, Robert 284, 285
Callicott, J. Baird 45, 220, 389, 391, 393
Carrighar, Sally 214
Carruthers, Peter 371, 372
Carter, Janis 214
Cavalieri, P. 387
Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle
206, 207, 504
Cheney, Jim 354, 357
Cherniak, C. 486
Child, Lydia M. 200
Chopra, S.K. 483
Cigman, Ruth 38
Cobbe, Frances P. 193, 200
Cohen, Carl xvi, xvii, xxvii, xxx, 321–6, 327–41
passim, 345, 347, 349, 492, 493
Coke, Sir Edward 481
Collard, Andrée 359, 360, 362, 363
Corea, Gena 360
Correia, E.O. 484
D’Amato, A. 483
Darwin, Charles 222, 315, 434, 451
Dawkins, M.S. 316
DeGrazia, David xv, xxviii, 369–80
de la Mare, Walter 283, 284, 285
Descartes, René 205, 206, 315, 427, 505
Diamond, Cora xxvi, 275–89
Diamond, Jared 448
Donovan, Josephine xxiv, xxvii, 191–216
Dworkin, Ronald xvii, 484
Ehrenfeld, D. 383
Ehrlichman, J. 243
Einstein, Albert 485
Eldredge, N. 489
Epstein, Richard A. xxix, 447–65
Eudey, A. 382
Fascione, N. 381
Feinberg, Joel xxviii, xxix, 93, 399–423
Finch, Anne, Lady Conway 206, 207
Finson, L. 384

Animal Rights
532
Finson, S. 384
Fleta 481
Fossey, Dian 214
Foucault, Michel 207, 208
Fouts, Roger 480
Fox, Michael 114, 115, 249–50, 336, 382
Francione, Gary L. xxix, 425–44, 447, 456, 460
Francis, Leslie P. 232, 233, 336, 354
Frankena, William 12
French, Marilyn 201, 210, 215
Freud, Sigmund 485
Frey, Ray G. xxii, xxiii, 69–72, 73–7 passim,
91, 371
Frye, Marilyn 355
Fuller, Margaret 199, 200
Galdikas, Birute 480
Geist, V. 385
Gewirth, Alan 491
Gibbons, E.F. Jr 382
Gilligan, Carol 215, 353, 356, 358
Gilman, Charlotte P. 193, 199, 200
Goldman, Emma 199
Goodall, Jane 214, 355, 435, 480
Goodin, Robert E. xxx, 501–29
Goodman, M. 489
Goodpaster, K.E. 389
Gottlieb, Gideon 510
Grandy, J.W. 382
Grant, Douglas 207
Gray, John C. 405, 407
Grifin, Donald 438–9
Grifin, Susan 201, 212
Grimké 200
Gunn, Alastair 48
Hadley, John xxii, xxix, xxx, 467–77
Hale, Sir Matthew 504
Hamilton, Edith 482
Haraway, Donna 510
Hardin, Garrett 226, 297
Harding, Sandra 360
Hare, R.M. 96
Hargrove, E.C. 389, 391
Harlow, Harry 62
Harrison, Ruth 294, 415
Hartley, David 504
Hegel, Georg W.F. 321
Herman, B. 485
Herzog, H.A. 383, 384, 385, 387
Hitler, Adolf 13
Hobbes, Thomas 503, 504
Holmes, Oliver Wendell 480, 481
Horkheimer, Max 202, 203, 204
Hume, David 202, 504
Husserl, Edmund 202
Hutchins, M. 381, 382, 389, 390
Isaacs, Susan 285, 286
Jackson, Justice 484
James, William 419
Jamieson, Dale xvi, xxii–xxv passim, 73–7,
177–90, 382, 383, 385, 391, 392
Justinian, Emperor 454, 481
Kader, D. 486
Kalin, Jesse 115, 117
Kant, Immanuel 174, 194, 195, 196, 197, 224,
307, 322, 427, 462, 485
Katz, M.A. 480
Kean, H. 387
Keller, Evelyn F. 209, 214, 355
Kent, James 481
Kheel, Marti 354, 355, 358, 359
King, Chrystos 201
King, Ynestra 201, 362
Kingford, Anna 200
Koontz, F. 389
Krueger, P. 480
Kull, A. 490
La Mettrie, Julien O. de 205
Langer, E. 485
Lansbury, Coral 208
LaPorte, J. 347
Larson, E.J. 481
Lauter, Estella 212, 213, 215
Leakey, Richard 489
Legge, Jane 282–3, 284, 287
Leopold, Aldo xxiv, 31, 32, 47, 217, 219–20
passim, 225, 226, 389
Levy, Neil xxvii, 345–9
Lewin, R. 489
Lewis, C.S. 413
Lincoln, Abraham 479
Lindburg, Donald G. xxviii, 381–96
Lindburg, L.L. 394
Linzey, Andrew 73–4 passim
Livingston, J.A. 393

Animal Rights 533
Locke, John xvi, 59–60, 106, 194, 414, 427
Lovejoy, Arthur 453, 459
Lucas, J.R. xxi, 60
McClintock, Barbara 214
McCloskey, H.J. xvi–xxiii passim, xxvii, 40,
79–110, 114, 115
Machiavelli, Nicoló 208, 209
MacIntyre, Alasdair xiv
MacKinnon, Catharine A. 205, 206
McManamon, R. 393
McPherson, J.M. 483
Mahler, Gustav 181
Mansield, Lord 481
Maple, T. 394
Marx, Karl 234
Mason, Jim 241–2
Melden, A.I. 98
Merchant, Carolyn 201, 202, 204–5, 360
Midgley, Mary 192, 358
Mill, John Stuart 32, 100, 101, 131–2 passim,
276, 351, 415, 461
Miller, W.L. 488, 489
Minow, Martha 488
Mithen, S. 489
Mommsen, T. 480
Monboddo, Lord 504, 505
Monroe, M.C. 390
Montaigne, Michel de 206
Moore, G.E. 80
Morey, D.F. 387
Morgan, Robin 358
Morrison, A.R. 385
Murdoch, Iris 214, 355
Narveson, Jan xxiii, 115–17 passim, 125–48, 306
Nelson, L. 93–4
Newkirk, Ingrid 324, 384
Newton, Isaac 202
Nino, C.S. 488
Nobis, Nathan xxvii, 327–43, 345, 346–7
passim, 348, 349
Norman, Richard 232, 233, 336, 354
Norton, Bryan G. xxviii, 381, 385, 387, 389,
391, 392, 393
Noske, B. 387, 393
Nozick, Robert xvii, xxiii, 118, 126, 127–30
passim, 261, 456, 457, 460
Nussbaum, Martha C. 494
Orwell, George 287
Pacheco, Alex 384
Paine, Thomas 505
Palmer, Clare
Passmore, John 49, 516
Pateman, Carole xxx, 501–29
Pateman, Roy 501–29
Patterson, Francine 214
Patterson, O. 483
Peacock, Thomas Love 505
Perdue, Frank 223
Perry, Ralph B. 419
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 13
Pinckney, Henry L. 488
Pitkin, Hanna F. 208, 209
Plato 50, 427, 480, 485
Plous, S. 385
Pluhar, Evelyn B. xvii, xxiii, 111–23, 371
Price, Richard 80
Prichard, H.A. 322
Rachels, James xxi, xxii, xxiii, 57–66, 101, 106,
345, 486, 488, 492
Rashi 480
Ratcliffe, Herbert 61, 62
Rawls, John 21, 136, 167
Regan, Tom xiv, xvii, xx–xxiv passim, xxvi,
xxviii, 27–30, 34, 35, 42, 44, 112, 114,
116, 118, 120, 149–51 passim, 152,
153–5 passim, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162,
163, 165, 168–9 passim, 170, 171, 172–5
passim, 177–90 passim, 192, 194, 195,
196, 198–9 passim, 205, 206, 215, 230,
231, 258, 259, 260, 275, 276, 277, 278,
281, 291–310, 328, 349, 351, 352, 354,
355, 356, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 371,
381, 382, 385–6 passim, 388, 389, 390,
391, 392, 486
Remmert, Hermann 469–70
Ritchie, D.G. 45, 46, 221, 224, 294
Rodd, Rosemary 371
Rollin, Bernard xxvi, 240, 311–19, 371
Rolston, H. III 389, 390
Rose, Steven 232, 239
Ross, W.D. 80, 99
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 197, 205, 504
Rowan, Andrew N. 383, 384, 385
Ruddick, Sara 214, 215, 358

Animal Rights
534
Ruether, Rosemary R. 201, 209, 210–11, 215
Rumbaugh, Duane 480
Russell, J. 486
Ryan, Agnes 200
Ryder, Richard D. 240, 275, 276, 292
Sagoff, Mark xxiv, xxv, xxviii, 217–27
Salamone, Constantia 192, 201
Salleh, Ariel K. 354
Salt, Henry xiii, xiv, 165
Santayana, George 419
Sapontzis, Steve 371, 375
Savage-Rumbaugh, Sue 480
Sayer, K.M. 389
Scheler, Max 202–3
Schmidtz, David 336
Scruton, Roger 332
Shakespeare, William 345
Shaw, George Bernard 362
Sibley, Charles 511
Sidgwick, Henry 7, 507, 508
Simons, K.W. 490, 491
Singer, Peter xiii, xvii, xix, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv,
xxvi, 3–16, 33, 34, 42, 47, 63, 64, 96,
103, 107, 114, 118–20, 150, 165–76,
182, 187, 191–2 passim, 193, 196,
197–9 passim, 206, 218, 219, 220, 224,
258, 259, 260, 263, 275, 276, 277, 278,
291–305 passim, 310, 323, 351, 353,
355, 356, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 371,
382, 387, 390, 391, 440, 441, 442
Slicer, Deborah xxvii, 351–67
Socrates 131, 480
Soulé, M.E. 381
Sperlinger, D. 240
Spira, Henry 369, 378
Stalin, Josef 13
Stanton, Elizabeth C. 200
Stepney, R. 240
Stone, Christopher 217, 218, 226
Stone, Lucy 200
Stowe, Harriet B. 200
Swift, Jonathan 279
Swisher, C.C. 489
Tattersall, I. 489
Taylor, Paul W. xxiii, 149–64
Taylor, Thomas 4, 5, 505
Teleki, Geza 480
Thomas, Keith 195, 207
Toone, W.D. 392
Tribe, Laurence W. 217–18, 224, 225, 490, 493
van Vyer, J.D. 484
Varner, G.E. 383, 390
Walker,Margaret 354, 357
Wallace, N.P. 392
Walzer, Michael 501, 502, 509
Ward, Elizabeth S.P. 200
Warren, Karen 354, 355, 357, 359
Warren, Mary Anne xxi, xxiv, 31–56
Wasserstrom, Richard 57, 158
Watson, Alan 480
Weil, Simone 214
Wellman, C. 491, 492
Wemmer, C. 382, 389, 390
Wenar, Leif xv
Wennberg, Robert 336
Westermarck, Edward 402
White, Alan 333
White, Caroline E. 200
Willard, Frances 200
Wise, Steven M. xxix, xxx, 447, 450, 451, 453,
458–9 passim, 461, 479–99
Witham, L. 481
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 202
Wollstonecraft, Mary 4, 200, 505
Woodhull, Victoria 200
Woolf, Virginia 193
Woozley, A.D. 156
Wrangham, Richard 480
Wright, W.A. 486
Zak, S. 387
Zaretsky, Eli 203

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