scope of bioethics ,biosafety convention on the biological weapons

2. CONTENTS:
 Definition of the bioethics and biosafety.
 Scope of the bioethics and biosafety.
 Convention on the biological weapons.
-Introduction.
-Scope of the BWC.
-Membership and Duration.
-Challenges.
-Implementation.
-Future of BWC.
 References.

3. Definition of Bioethics:
 Bioethics is the study of the typically controversial
ethical issues emerging from new situations and
possibilities brought about by advances in biology and
medicine. It is also moral discernment as it relates to
medical policy, practice, and research. Bioethicists are
concerned with the ethical questions that arise in the
relationships among life sciences,
biotechnology, medicine, politics, law,
and philosophy. It also includes the study of the more
commonplace questions of values (“the ethics of the
ordinary”) which arise in primary care and other branches
of medicine.

4. Scope of bioethics:
 Research using various organisms.
 Environmental degradation.
 Environmental pollution.
 Fetal tissue transfer.
 Organ transplantation.
 Xenotransplantation.
 Stem cell study and storage.
 Cloning and genomic studies.
 Release of transgenic organisms.

5. Definition of Biosafety:
 Biosafety refers to “efforts to ensure safety in using,
transporting, transferring, handling, releasing, and disposing
of biological organisms, including GMOs when they are
considered potentially capable of harming human, animal, or
plant health or the environment”.

6. Scope of Biosafety:
 The protection of animals or plants from pests, diseases, or
disease-causing organisms in different situations.
 The protection of human or animal life from risks arising due to
additives, contaminants, residual toxins or disease-causing
organisms in foods, beverages.
 Making standards for risk assessment.
 To design an appropriate control measure for the hazardous
organisms.
 To plan required emergency action plan for treating the danger.

7. Convention on the biological
weapons(BWC):
 The Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) is a legally
binding treaty that outlaws
biological arms. After being
discussed and negotiated in the
United Nations' disarmament
forum1 starting in 1969, the BWC
opened for signature on April 10,
1972, and entered into force on
March 26, 1975. It currently has
165 states-parties and 12 signatory
states.

8. Introduction to BWC:
 The Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
On Their Destruction (known as the Biological
Weapons Convention, or BWC) forms the foundation
of the international biological arms control regime.
The BWC was designed to ban biological weapons by
prohibiting the development, production, and
stockpiling of biological agents as well as related
equipment and delivery systems that are intended for
hostile use.

9. Scope of the BWC:
 The scope of the BWC's prohibition is defined in Article 1 (the
so-called general purpose criterion). This includes all microbial
and other biological agents or toxins and their means of
delivery (with exceptions for medical and defensive purposes
in small quantities).
 As stated in Article 1 of the BWC:
 "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise
acquire or retain:
 (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever
their origin or method of production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes;
 (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict."

10. The BWC bans:
 The development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and
production of:
 Biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;"
 Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles "designed to use such
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."
 The transfer of or assistance with acquiring the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles described above.
 The convention further requires states-parties to destroy or divert
to peaceful purposes the "agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and
means of delivery" described above within nine months of the
convention's entry into force. The BWC does not ban the use of
biological and toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, which prohibits such use. It also does not ban
biodefense programs.

13. Membership and Duration:
 The BWC is a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration
that is open to any country. Notably absent from the
list of member states is Syria, a treaty signatory that
the United States believes is probably developing
biological weapons.

14. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality

15. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality--many countries still remain
outside the Convention.

16. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality--many countries still remain
outside the Convention,
 lack of verification

17. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality--many countries still remain
outside the Convention,
 lack of verification--the BWC contains no measures to
check for compliance,

18. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality--many countries still remain
outside the Convention,
 lack of verification--the BWC contains no measures to
check for compliance,
 a history of non-compliance

19. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality--many countries still remain
outside the Convention,
 lack of verification--the BWC contains no measures to
check for compliance,
 a history of non-compliance--some States Parties have
violated the BWC and others are suspected of
operating illegal biological weapons programs

20. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality--many countries still remain
outside the Convention,
 lack of verification--the BWC contains no measures to
check for compliance,
 a history of non-compliance--some States Parties have
violated the BWC and others are suspected of
operating illegal biological weapons programs, and
 advances in biosciences and biotechnology

21. Challenges:
Throughout its 30-year existence, the BWC has faced a
number of challenges. The challenges include:
 lack of universality--many countries still remain outside
the Convention,
 lack of verification--the BWC contains no measures to
check for compliance,
 a history of non-compliance--some States Parties have
violated the BWC and others are suspected of operating
illegal biological weapons programs, and
 advances in biosciences and biotechnology--developments
in these areas are rapid and increase the risk that biological
weapons will spread.

22. Implementation:
 The convention has been flagrantly violated in the past.
The Soviet Union, a state-party and one of the
convention's depositary states, maintained an enormous
offensive biological weapons program after ratifying the
BWC. Russia says that this program has been terminated,
but questions remain about what happened to elements
of the Soviet program. Iraq violated its commitments as a
signatory state with its biological weapons program,
which was uncovered by the UN Special Commission on
Iraq after the Persian Gulf War. Iraq became a state-party
after the war but is thought by the United States to be still
violating the convention.

23. Continued…
 In November 2001, the United States publicly accused Iraq, as
well as member state North Korea, of breaching the
convention's terms. Washington also expressed concern
about compliance by Iran and Libya, which are also states-
parties, and by Syria. The United States itself raised concerns
in 2001 about whether some of its activities, ostensibly being
conducted as part of its biodefense program, are permitted
under the BWC. In 2002, Washington added Cuba, also a
state-party, to its list of countries conducting activities that
violate the convention.

24. Future of the BWC:
 The recent years have been turbulent for the BWC.
Revelations in the early 1990s of non-compliance by Iraq
and the former Soviet Union emphasized the
Convention's major deficiency--lack of verification
mechanisms. In addition, the perception of the threat
posed by biological weapons, particularly in the hands of
terrorists, has increased significantly following the fatal
anthrax attacks that took place in the U.S. in fall 2001.
These attacks served as dramatic illustrations of how
destructive biological weapons can be, even on a small
scale.

25. Continued…
 Throughout the 1990s, States Parties worked to strengthen
the Convention, first through VEREX and then negotiation of
a legally-binding Protocol. The momentum of these efforts
remained until 2001, when negotiations broke down and the
Fifth Review Conference had to be suspended for a year.
States Parties stood at a crossroads. They all agreed that the
BWC sets an important international prohibition and that it
needed to be reinforced. However, they differed in the ways
they wanted to achieve a strengthened BWC.

26. Continued…
 The agreement that was reached at the second session of the
Fifth Review Conference in November 2002 is a modest one.
It also signals a shift away from the comprehensive legally-
binding approach of the Ad Hoc Group towards a more
gradual, subject-specific approach that will be comprised of a
combination of national and international measures. Despite
the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Ad Hoc Group
and its mandate, some momentum has been maintained
through the establishment of the annual meetings leading up
to the Sixth Review Conference. The urgent question is
whether this shift in approaches will enable States Parties to
better address the remaining threat posed by biological
weapons.

27. References:
Bibliography:
 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), BWC
Resources.
 Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies, “The Arms Control
Reporter,” January-February 2002.
 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons:
Possession and Programs, Past and Present.
 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, Chronology of State Use and Biological and
Chemical Weapons Control.
 Marie Isabelle Chevrier, “Waiting for Godot or Saving the Show?
The BWC Review Conference reaches modest agreement,”
Disarmament Diplomacy no. 68, December 2002-January 2003.
 Bioethics and Bosafety by M.K.Sateesh.
 Net sources.

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