2. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly â Autumn 2022
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mustberesponsibledecisions.Foradecisiontoberesponsibleitmust(amongother
things) proceed from a position of reasoned confidence. We must be convinced that
what we are doing is right. It would be reckless to make decisionsâespecially about
important mattersâif you do not bother to check that what you are doing is right
or have sincere doubts about it. Reckless action shows a lack of regard for careful
judgment and therefore impairs our ability to pursue good and avoid evil. It is also
contrary to our nature as truth-seeking beings, as careful judgment is necessary to
discern truth from error.
Even if a reckless decision turned out in your favor, it would still be irrespon-
sible because you made the decision carelessly without proper consideration of its
merits. That is to say, you did not make the decision for the right reasons. What
makes a choice reckless is not a matter of its results but of how it is chosen.
It would be wrong to coerce responsible persons into making a decision that
they are not confident about, even if that decision turns out to be the right course
of action. What makes it wrong is not merely the fact that you are overriding their
autonomyâalthough that is certainly relevantâbut the fact that they are being
compelled to act recklessly. They are not acting from a position of confidence but
from a position of fear. Even if their decision turned out to be right, this result
would be a pure accident.
Thus, conscience is morally significant because of its essential role in making
decisions. There are many good ideas that are worth acting on. To avoid making
reckless decisions about these ideas, oneâs decisions to act on these ideas must
proceed from a position of confidence. This is what conscience provides us with.
Conscience is the ability to make rational judgments about matters of morality. It
yields confidence, trust, or assurance that what one is doing is the right course of
action. This confidence, trust, or assurance is what allows us to act in a responsible
manner. The importance of conscience pertains to how we make decisions, not
only what we end up deciding.
Note that on this framework, conscience is not a still small voice in our heads
that mysteriously guides the individual, but an attitude of reasoned conviction about
oneâs actions. Protecting conscience is a matter of protecting the ability to make
responsible decisions. Forcing people to act against their conscience (even if their
conscience is mistaken) is wrong because it means that they are being compelled
to make an irresponsible decision.1
None of this is to say that conscience is infallible. Conscience is a judgment
of reason about moral matters and can be mistaken like other judgments of reason
in other areas. One can be confident about something that turns out to be wrong.
However, even a conscience that is mistaken must still be respected, for as was
just said, compelling someone to act against his or her reasoned judgment (and to
therefore adopt a judgment that he or she are not confident about) is to force him
1. Note that there is a difference between coercing someone into reckless action and
preventing one from acting recklessly. What makes the former objectionable is that it
compels action that is not motivated by careful judgment. By contrast, the latter need
not involve any kind of action at all. Hence, the wrongness of the former does not
entail the wrongness of the latter.
3. Hsiao â Respecting Conscience
3
or her to act recklessly. Conscience is our only means of discerning moral obliga-
tions, and so abandoning conscience is abandoning morality itself.
All this shows the importance of informing, educating, and developing our
conscience. If an individual does not have a clear conscience on an issue, or if their
conscience is believed to be mistaken, then the proper thing to do is not to violate
their conscience but to engage them in reasoned argument so that they may adopt
the correct beliefs needed to act rightly with a clear conscience. In doing so, their
ability to make responsible decisions is left intact. However, one might worry that
this view of conscience is far too permissive and might imply that the right of
conscience can be used as a universal permission slip for anything we do not like.
However, this objection is based on a misunderstanding of what conscience
is. As John Henry Newman put it, âconscience has rights because it has duties.â2
Conscience matters because we have an obligation to make responsible decisions.
It serves to illuminate our obligations by giving confidence to our decisions. Put
anotherway,consciencegivesustheassurancetodowhatweshoulddo(ortorefrain
from doing what we should not do). Conscience is thus a judgment of reason, not
a reflection of sheer emotion or preference. It considers arguments and evidence
and identifies obligations, not permissions. In other words, conscience is narrow,
not broad. It tells us what we should do. It does not give blanket authorization to
do as we please.3
Indeed, we are under an obligation to inform our consciences by
diligently considering arguments and evidence. Thus, conscience is not another
name for autonomy, desire, or will; it cannot be used as an excuse to allow us to
indulge in our personal preferences.
From this we see that what ultimately gives conscience its moral significance
is its role in discovering what is true and good. The most basic obligation we have
is to pursue truth and reject error. To that end, the function of conscience is to
identify what is true and good in order that it may be pursued. Thus, conscience is
sometimes aptly referred to as oneâs moral compass. The value of a compass consists
not in the fact that it points somewhere but in the fact that its readings are aligned
with true north. Likewise, conscience, being a judgment of reason, is aligned with
what is true and good. Without it, we are blind to what we ought to do. Again, this
is not to say that conscience cannot err but only that it is an indispensable element
of pursuing what is true and good. Respect for conscience is a moral right in that it
is a precondition for the exercise of our responsibilities. Rights exist to protect that
which we need in order to flourish. Since human beings flourish by performing
actions in pursuit of what is good, conscience is an essential ingredient of liberty
and autonomy. Indeed, as we have seen, conscience is essential for any meaningful
pursuit of the good life, for it identifies what the good life is. Thus, if we have the
rights to liberty and autonomy, then we must also have the right of conscience.
Insofar as these moral rights are also enshrined into law as legal rights, so must
2. John Henry Newman, âLetterAddressed to the Duke of Norfolk,â in Certain Difficul-
ties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching, vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green, and
Co, 1900), 250.
3. Robert P. George, âJohn Stuart Mill and John Henry Newman on Liberty and Con-
science,â The Saint Anselm Journal 10.2 (Spring 2015): 40â46.
4. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly â Autumn 2022
4
the law also recognize conscience as a legal right. Moreover, given how central
conscience is to decision-making, the right of conscience must be a fundamental
right that carries serious moral weight. It is not contingent like the right to vote or
the right to drive, but a right that comes with being a human person.
For these reasons, conscience deserves serious legal protection. The right
of conscience is connected with the duty to make responsible decisions, which is
integral to our flourishing. The failure to respect conscience is a direct attack on
morality itself.
Conscience and COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates
Based on what has been said, how would conscience apply to recent debates over
vaccination mandates, specifically over COVID-19? Let us suppose that COVID-
19 vaccination is generally effective. However, some individuals have doubts about
its safety, believe that it is an unnecessary risk given their natural immunity, or are
uncertain about the morality of using abortion-derived cell lines in vaccine testing
and production.4
If vaccinations are going to be mandated as a matter of policy
or law, then the doubtful conscience of these individuals must be respected. They
must have the right to refuse the vaccine on grounds that they are not confident
that what they are about to do is right. Removing conscience-based exemptions
compels these individuals to act in reckless ways.
The reasoning is straightforward. To make responsible decisions, we must
make them from a position of confidence. But one cannot act from a position of
confidence about a medical decision if he is coerced into that decision. Vaccine
mandates are an example of medical coercion, since they involve substantial penal-
ties of various kinds, such as job loss, cancellation of school enrollment, fines, and
restrictions on travel. So, vaccine mandates without conscience-based exemptions
conflict with the obligation of each person to make responsible decisions. In the
absence of these exemptions, these mandates are unjust and immoral.
If one is convinced that COVID-19 vaccination is a wise choice and that indi-
viduals should choose to be vaccinated, the right thing to do would be to work to
change the minds of those who are unconvinced. This is done through reasoning
and education, not threats. One can be pro-vaccination without having to resort
to coercive mandates that violate conscience.
One might object on the grounds that refusing vaccination can pose health
riskstothemselvesandthepublic.Unvaccinatedindividualsmayfacilitatethespread
of COVID-19 to those who are vulnerable. Even if correct, the utilitarian nature
of this objection obscures a key point. The value of conscience is not a function of
the benefits or risks that accompany a conscience-based decision, but rather has
to do with its being an essential part of oneâs personhood. If we deny someone the
right to make responsible decisions, we deny him the very thing that makes him a
unique human person: his rationality. The right of conscience is a basic right that
4. On the last doubt, see David Prentice, âCOVID-19 Vaccine Candidates and Abortion-
DerivedCellLines,âCharlotteLozierInstitute,June2,2021,https://lozierinstitute.org/wp
-content/uploads/2020/12/CHART-Analysis-of-COVID-19-Vaccines-02June21.pdf.
5. Hsiao â Respecting Conscience
5
comes with being human. As such it cannot be overridden simply because it would
reduce risk.
Note also that there is also a difference between risk and harm. The right of
conscience cannot be used to justify activities that are intentionally harmful, that is,
damaging or injurious. This is because conscience functions to facilitate responsible
decision-making,anddecisionsthatintentionallycauseharmcannotberesponsible.
Thus, conscience does not protect activities such as human sacrifice. By contrast,
risk is simply the likelihood that an action might lead to harm. Everything we do
generates some non-zero probability of risk, whether it be commuting to work,
shaking someoneâs hand, or just opening a window. Although refusing vaccination
may increase risk, there is not a moral obligation to reduce risk as much as pos-
sible. Otherwise, we could not drive to coffee shops, build campfires, or give hugs.
This is not to say that there is no threshold at which risk becomes unaccept-
able: risk comes in degrees and is not an all-or-nothing concept. The point is that
conscience (along with the entire concept of moral rights) is generally resistant to
utilitarian or consequentialist arguments, such that a mere balancing-test approach
is not enough. Of course, just because rights generally trump utility does not mean
that they always do. We might think of rights as breakwaters that can yield if the
consequencesaresufficientlydire. Accordingly,themorepertinentquestionis,How
much risk is acceptable? One needs to show that the risks of refusing vaccination
are so great that we can override a key moral right. But given just how significant
conscienceistooneâspersonhoodandautonomy,thethresholdofriskforoverriding
conscience must be incredibly high. Moreover, there are other options (e.g., natural
immunity, regular testing, mask wearing, social distancing, remote working, and
other kinds of reasonable accommodations) that must all be exhausted first before
resorting to overriding conscience, given how deeply intrusive such an act would
be. Thus, it is unlikely that the risk of being unvaccinated by itself warrants this
kind of intervention.5
Intruding on conscience, if it is ever justified, can only be
justified as a last resort. We need not settle the difficult question of where exactly
to draw the line (if there even exists such a point) to know that certain violations
of conscience go too far.
Another objection is that vaccine mandates are not actually coercive. After
all, one can always choose another job or move to a place where there are no man-
dates. But this objection misses the point. While it is true (at least for now) that
one can find a new job or move elsewhere, these things are incredibly burdensome.
Given the importance of conscience, one should not have to endure these burdens
simply because he refuses to be coerced into making a decision that conflicts with
his convictions.
The points that are articulated here can be formulated as follows:
1. We have an obligation to make responsible decisions.
5. Note also that this risk is not monolithic. It varies depending on oneâs location, age,
fitness, other health conditions, and importantly on whether one has already recovered
from COVID-19, as it confers at least some temporary natural immunity.
6. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly â Autumn 2022
6
2. For decisions to be responsible, we must make them from a position
of confidence.
3. One cannot decide from a position of confidence about a medical
decision if one is coerced into it.
4. Therefore,coercivemedicalrequirements conflictwiththeobligation
to make responsible decisions.
5. Vaccinemandateswithoutconscience-basedexemptionsarecoercive
medical requirements.
6. Therefore, vaccine mandates without conscience-based exemptions
conflict with the obligation to make responsible decisions.
It is important to point out that I am not saying that all vaccinations are
unhealthy, bad, or otherwise morally dubious. On the contrary, I believe that vac-
cination in general is typically a wise course of action. The point is simply that
individuals should not be coerced into decisions they are unsure about. Good
decision-making is responsible decision-making, and responsible decision-making
proceeds from a position of confidence. Forcing someone who is not confident
about a choice to make that choice is forcing him to act irresponsibly, even if that
choice is good for him.
Religious Exemptions and Conscience
It is sometimes argued that no major religious group opposes vaccination and
that therefore religious exemptions for the COVID-19 vaccine are without merit.
This is an entirely wrong way of looking at things. It is a naive mistake to think
that if something is not specifically named in a religious tradition, then there is no
ethical principle that applies to it. While it is true that no major religion opposes
vaccination specifically, all major religions affirm the importance of acting from
a clear conscience. This provides a general model for which followers of those
religious traditions can approach a host of various decisions, even if they are not
specifically named.
In fact, the justification for religious exemptions very closely parallels the jus-
tification for conscientious exemptions sketched previously. Consider Christianity
as an example. In 1 Corinthians 8, Christians are obligated to honor God with their
bodies. Romans 14:23 provides additional insight: in order to honor God with their
bodies(andindeed,tohonorGodingeneral),Christiansmustactfromfaithwithout
any doubts.6
The verses immediately prior warn against placing a âstumbling block
or obstacleâ (ESV) in the way of oneâs conscience. Whatever does not proceed from
faith is described as being sinful. When it comes to faith, biblical faith is equated
in Hebrews 11 with confidence (NIV), assurance (ESV), and certainty (NASB) in
oneâs beliefs and actions. Coercive measures that pressure one to act against his
conscience amount to stumbling blocks in his faith.
6. The immediate context pertains to eating meat sacrificed to idols, but Paul generalizes
from this.
7. Hsiao â Respecting Conscience
7
Putting this all together, the obligation to honor God requires that a Christian
act from a position of confidence that what he is doing is right.7
Indeed, as both
Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8 straightforwardly indicate, even some choices that
are otherwise morally acceptable can be sinful if they do not proceed from faith.
Hence, Christians should not be compelled to make decisions that do not proceed
fromapositionoffaith.TodosowouldnotjustbeanattackonaChristianâsintegrity
but would also be a stumbling block in his relationship with God.8
The Christian model for conscientious decision-making directly parallels the
model sketched earlier (which was framed in non-religious terms). On the Chris-
tian model, Christians are called to honor God by being stewards of their bodies.
A steward is a caretaker, and caretakers must act carefully as opposed to carelessly.
Careful decision-making means acting from a position of confidence (faith), and
not doubt. Any decision that does not proceed from this position of confidence is
sin, according to Paul in Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8.
Thus,whileChristianitydoesnotspecificallyaddresstheethicsofvaccination,
Christian scriptures articulate general ethical principles that are very relevant to the
debate over vaccination mandates. Christians who have a doubtful conscience over
the ethics of COVID-19 vaccinationâsay, because of the use of abortion-derived
cell lines in vaccine testing or productionâshould not be compelled under threat
of sanction or loss of livelihood to act in violation of their conscience.
My goal here is not to wade too deep into complex theological matters, nor
am I attempting to assess the truth of Christian teaching. Rather, it is that the case
for religious exemptions (at least in the Christian tradition) is just as strong as the
case for non-religious conscientious exemptions. Both proceed from the same kind
of moral reasoning.
Conscience Comes with Responsibility
Conscientious objection, both religious and non-religious, is treated by many as
nothing more than a convenient excuse to get around the rules. What I have said
here shows that to be clearly wrong. Individuals who cannot in good conscience
submit to certain vaccination requirements should be granted relief from them. At
the same time, conscience has rights because it has duties; we ought to continue
examining the evidence and forming our conscience. Whatever we end up decid-
ing, appealing to conscience does not provide an excuse to remain in ignorance,
nor does it function as a permission slip that lets us get out of anything. We ought
to align our consciences to what is true.
7. Rom. 14:5 (ESV): âOne person esteems one day as better than another, while another
esteems all days alike. Each one should be fully convinced in his own mind.â
8. Rom. 14:21 (ESV): âIt is good not to eat meat or drink wine or do anything that causes
your brother to stumble.â