Emotional Intelligence in Young and Middle AdulthoodCross-S.docx

Emotional Intelligence in Young and Middle Adulthood:
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Latent Structure and Means
Benjamin P. Chapman
University of Rochester Medical Center
Bert Hayslip Jr.
University of North Texas
Differentiation of the construct of emotional intelligence was
investigated in young and middle-aged
adults, on the basis of hypotheses generated from differential
emotions theory, discrete emotions
functionalist theory, and empirical literature on age-related
changes in affective complexity and differ-
entiation of abilities. Both age groups were characterized by the
same set of comparably related
dimensions. However, midlife adults reported significantly
greater use of optimism as a mood-regulation
strategy than was reported by young adults. This study
considers implications of possible structural
continuity in emotional intelligence in conjunction with mean
increases in the use of optimism as a
strategy for managing affect.
Keywords: emotional intelligence, midlife, differentiation
Since its introduction by Salovey and Mayer (1990) and popu-
larization by Goleman (1995), emotional intelligence (EI) has
been
a heavily researched individual difference construct. The EI
field

has more recently focused on two putatively distinct forms of
EI.
Trait EI is hypothesized to be a component of personality space
that is distinct from other traits such as the Big Five (Petrides &
Furnham, 2001), and it is measured by self-report inventories.
Ability EI is hypothesized to be a mental ability that is distinct
from other abilities (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999), and it is
measured by performance tests.1
The issue of whether EI “behaves” more like a personality
trait or a cognitive ability has implications for its lifespan
trajectory, which with only a few exceptions, has been ne-
glected by researchers. Focusing mainly on the period from
infancy to young adulthood, Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Si-
tarenios (2001) proposed a “developmental criterion” for EI,
predicting that EI will increase with age, because it is an
adaptive function that develops in concert with cognitive and
social skills. Schaie (2001) pinpointed midlife as a time of peak
emotional functioning and called for cross-sectional compari-
sons involving samples of older adults. Kafetsios (2004) re-
ported that middle-aged persons scored higher than young per-
sons on performance EI tasks involving the facilitation,
understanding, and management of emotion. However, Ka-
fetsios’s primary concern was EI’s relationship to attachment
patterns, rather than its relationship to existing adult theories of
emotion related to development and aging.
The developmental criterion for EI implies mean-level
change in one or more dimensions of EI, but another question
prefigures this issue: Do the same specific dimensions charac-
terize the construct and/or exhibit similar interrelationships at
midlife as in young adulthood? Schaie (2001) raised this con-
cern on the basis of the literature on differentiation of abilities.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make a strong prediction about
EI’s differentiation on the basis of this literature alone, for two

reasons: (1) Zelinski and Lewis (2003) have called into question
whether such a pattern is universally true for abilities, and (2)
EI appears to be a construct “somewhere at the intersection
between the domains of intelligence and personality” (Schaie,
2001, p. 202). Schaie’s observation suggests that the structural
configuration of EI might remain constant, because the struc-
ture of personality generally remains stable across time (cf.,
McCrae & Costa, 2003).
At least two theories may provide some basis for speculation
about the development of EI across the life span. Differential
emotions theory (DET) (Izard, 1991) posits that 11 basic emo-
tions function as the primary motivational units of human
personality (Izard & Malatesta, 1987) and suggests that the
1 Measurement poses a serious and unresolved problem for EI
research-
ers, because self-report items reflecting EI may or may not
elicit accurate
depictions, and “objectively correct” answers to items dealing
with emo-
tional experience are difficult to justify due to cultural and
contextual
differences in what may be “emotionally intelligent.” (For a
review of these
details, see MacCann, Roberts, Mathews, & Zeidner, 2004;
Mathews,
Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004; Mathews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002;
Roberts,
Zeidner, & Mathews, 2001; Zeidner, Mathews, & Roberts, 2001;
vs.
Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004a, 2004b; Mayer, Caruso, &
Salovey,
1999; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001).
Benjamin P. Chapman, Department of Psychiatry, Laboratory of

Per-
sonality and Development, University of Rochester Medical
Center, and
Bert Hayslip Jr., Department of Psychology, University of
North Texas.
This project was part of Benjamin P. Chapman’s dissertation
research,
conducted under the supervision of Bert Hayslip Jr. Portions of
this
research were presented at the 113th Annual Convention of the
American
Psychological Association, in Washington, DC, August 20,
2005.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Ben Chapman, University of Rochester Medical Center,
Department
of Psychiatry, Laboratory of Personality and Development. E-
mail:
[email protected]
Psychology and Aging Copyright 2006 by the American
Psychological Association
2006, Vol. 21, No. 2, 411– 418 0882-7974/06/$12.00 DOI:
10.1037/0882-7974.21.2.411
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basic quality of emotional experience remains constant over the
life span, which preserves the coherence of personality (Dough-
erty, Abe, & Izard, 1996). Malatesta and Wilson (1988) ex-
panded this notion with discrete emotions functionalist theory
(DEFT), arguing from the perspective of dynamic systems
(Magai & Nussbaum, 1996) that the habitual experience of
basic emotions drives crystallization of personality, but that a
period of acute high emotion may also lead to sudden per-
sonality change. Empirical literature supports both strong
temporal stability of individual differences in basic emotions
and close longitudinal links between discrete emotional expe-
riences and personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1996; Costa,
McCrae, & Zonderman, 1987; Izard, Libero, Putnam, &
Haynes, 1993).
However, DET also proposes that the complexity of
affective– cognitive structures increases with age, through
growth in the associational network of images and thoughts
associated with each basic emotion (Dougherty et al., 1996).
This hypothesis is consistent with the cognitive–affective de-
velopmental theory (CADT) of Labouvie-Vief (1996;
Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1989; Labouvie-Vief, Hakin-
Larson, DeVoe, & Schoeberlein, 1989), which proposes that
midlife is a time of increasing complexity in immediate emo-
tional experience. A growing body of empirical work on age-
related differences in the complexity of affect has produced
mixed results. In an experience-sampling study, Carstensen,
Pasupathi, Mayr, and Nesselroade (2000) found a correlation
between age and the number of eigenvalues extracted from
intraindividual correlation matrices of ratings of affect over

time. Lawton, Kleban, Rajagopal, and Dean (1992), in explor-
atory factor analyses of several dimensions of affect across age
groups, found an additional factor in midlife adults not evident
in their sample of young adults that was related to the damp-
ening of positive affect. Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka
(1989) also found evidence of greater cognitive–affective com-
plexity in narratives of midlife adults than in those of young
adults.
Other evidence suggests similarity, rather than differences, in
the experience of affect across age. Lawton, Kleban, Dean, Ra-
jagopal, and Parmelee (1992) found no differences between
young
and middle-aged adults in the correlation of factors related to
positive and negative affect; the loadings of emotion adjectives
were similar in the two groups. In another analysis of differenti-
ation of affect, Terracciano, McCrae, Hagemann, and Costa
(2003)
found that young adults produced a near-circular structure of
affect
while terms, midlife adults produced more clustered (i.e., less
differentiated) affect ratings in circumplex space. More recent
work suggests greater emotional heterogeneity in older versus
young adults (Charles, 2005), greater emotional specificity in
reaction to emotionally arousing stimuli among older adults
(Kun-
zmann & Gruhn, 2005), but less amplification and more
suppres-
sion of emotions in older persons (Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, &
Levenson, 2005).
Although these findings are mixed,2 one implication for the
EI construct—and one consistent with the stability of basic
emotional patterns implied by DET and DEFT—is that any
differentiation that does occur in the emotion system happens at
the molecular level of immediate affective experience, not at

the molar level of the higher emotional skills or traits. Terrac-
ciano et al. (2003) speculated that the differentiation of specific
emotions was a function of EI or its components, suggesting
that dimensions of EI may be organizational elements of per-
sonality structure. This hypothesis is consistent with DET,
which proposes that increasing, complexity in cognitive–
affective units occur against a backdrop of basic stability
(Dougherty et al., 1996); presumably, such stability would
require invariant organizational components of the emotion
system itself. From the standpoint of DEFT, the stability of
such underlying structures would contribute to the continuity in
emotional functioning requisite for personality coherence
(Malatesta & Wilson, 1988).
In this study, we sought to address Schaie’s (2001) question of
midlife differentiation of EI dimensions. On the basis of the
basic
continuity in emotional systems suggested by DET and DEFT,
we
hypothesized that the exploratorily derived factor structure of a
self-report measure of EI in young adults would be replicable in
midlife adults. This hypothesis was also informed by a
molecular–
molar distinction between basic affective experience, which
may
grow more complex and differentiated by midlife, and the EI
dimensions overseeing such experience, which would be
expected
to remain stable.
Another aim was to explore mean differences likely to
emerge along dimensions of EI. One reliably occurring dimen-
sion in EI factor analyses is emotion regulation; Kafetsios
(2004) found age-related increases in this component of EI.
This finding is consistent with several theories also suggesting

greater emotion-regulation at midlife. CADT proposes that
emotion regulation may improve at midlife as a function of
increasing cognitive–affective complexity and sensitivity to
context and that regulation efforts seek to maximize positive
affect and minimize negative affect (e.g., Labouvie-Vief,
Hakin-Larson et al., 1989). Maximization of positive affect is
also seen as an age-related shift tied to interpersonal patterns in
socioemotional selectivity theory (SST) (Carstensen, 1992,
1995). SST predicts that with age, individuals shift the breadth
and depth of their social networks in an effort to regulate
emotion, which becomes increasingly important relative to
other goals such as knowledge acquisition. Because emotion
regulation in our measure of EI taps the use of expectations of
positive outcome, findings on optimism in middle age are also
relevant. Chang & Sanna (2001) developed a model in which
optimism’s effects on life satisfaction were partially mediated
by positive affect, suggesting that optimism may be a mood-
regulation tool. Isaacowitz’s (2005) results reveal that midlife
adults are also more likely to use an optimistic explanatory
style
than are young adults. John and Gross (2004) also suggest that
reappraisal strategies, which involve positive construal of
emotion-eliciting events, are used more in midlife than in young
adulthood. We thus expected that midlife adults would report
better mood regulation, particularly to the extent that this di-
mension taps optimism.
2 These mixed findings may also be artifacts of the methods
used to
assess differentiation.
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We offered no a priori hypotheses about mean differences
likely to emerge across other dimensions of EI, but we explored
these to the extent possible. Finally, on the basis of Schaie’s
(2001) speculation that EI may be differently related to person-
ality and intelligence at different points in the life span, we also
explored EI’s convergent and discriminant validity with per-
sonality traits and intellectual abilities in each study sample.
Method
Participants and Procedure
The sample of young adults consisted of 308 undergraduates
from a
large public university in the southern United States (74%
women; M �
20 years of age, SD � 2.2; 66% Anglo American) who were
recruited
through large courses in introductory psychology. The midlife
sample
consisted of 256 adults from the community (62% women; M �
49
years of age, SD � 5.4; 76% Anglo American), who were
reached
through community organizations and contacts in undergraduate

courses. The sample of midlife adults contained proportionally
more
women and Anglo Americans than the sample of college
students and
the midlife adults had more education than the college sample
did
(15.23 years vs. 13.58 years). Study participants completed a
battery of
measures for the North Texas Personality–Ability–Emotional
Intelli-
gence Project (Chapman, 2005), and these results were
confidential.
Emotional Intelligence Measure
EI was assessed by the Schutte Self-Report Inventory of
Emotional
Intelligence (SSRI) (Schutte et al., 1998), which is the most
commonly
used short measure of EI. It contains 33 five-point Likert-type
items
sampling equally from the domains of the original Salovey and
Mayer
(1990) model of EI: emotional appraisal, emotion regulation,
and utiliza-
tion. The SSRI correlates strongly in the expected direction
with measures
of alexithymia, depression, mood awareness and repair,
interpersonal func-
tioning, and cognitive task persistence (Schutte et al., 2001;
1998; Schutte,
Schuettpelz, & Malouff, 2002); discriminates between prisoners
and ther-
apists (Schutte et al., 1998); predicts partner satisfaction in
intimate dyads
(Schutte et al., 2001); and predicts emotional well-being

(Schutte, Malouff,
Simunek, McKenley, & Hollander, 2002). Internal consistency
ranges from
.84 to .90 (Austin, Saklofske, Huang, & McKinney, 2004;
Saklofske,
Austin, & Minski, 2003), and 2-week test–retest reliability is
.78 (Schutte
et al., 1998).
One criticism of the scale has been its potential overlap with
five-
factor instruments (Brackett & Mayer, 2003), although it
diverges more
from these constructs than other self-report measures such as
Bar-On’s
(1997) EQi (Mathews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). Another
criticism has
been the scale’s unclear dimensionality. Petrides and Furnham
(2000a)
encouraged researchers to factor analyze the scale each time it
is used.
Results have consistently yielded factors for Emotion Appraisal,
Opti-
mism/Emotion Regulation, and Emotion Utilization (Austin et
al.,
2004; Petrides & Furnham 2000a; Saklofske et al., 2003); an
occasional
fourth dimension is Social Skills. These four factors have
differential
incremental validity in predicting adjustment to college
(Chapman &
Hayslip, 2005), and they differentially moderate the relationship
be-
tween stress and mental health (Ciarrochi, Dean, & Anderson,
2002).

Personality and Intelligence
Personality was assessed with the NEO-Five-Factor Inventory
(Costa &
McCrae, 1992), and intelligence was assessed with the matrices
and
synonyms subtests of Horn’s (1975) Fluid-Crystallized Sampler.
The
NEO-Five-Factor Inventory is a well-established and frequently
used in-
strument assessing the Big Five personality traits. The Fluid-
Crystallized
Sampler comprises objective tests of fluid ability and
crystallized ability
(Hayslip, 1989; Hayslip & Brookshire, 1985; Hayslip & Sterns,
1979;
Horn, 1977, 1975).
Results
Exploratory Analysis
Consistent with Petrides and Furnham’s (2000a) recommen-
dations, a principal axis exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was
conducted in the young adults, to determine the number of
dimensions underlying EI. A Minimum Average Partial Corre-
lation Test and Parallel Analysis (Zwick & Velicier, 1986)
revealed the lowest average partial correlations in the residual
correlation matrix after the extraction of the third factor, and
that only the first three Eigenvalues (8.09, 2.21, and 2.08) were
higher than the average corresponding Eigenvalues (1.67, 1.58,
1.52) of random matrices, respectively. These factors explained
38% of the common variance, and this result was comparable to
the findings of Austin et al. (2004); Petrides and Furnham
(2000a); and Saklofske et al. (2003).

Rotation proceeded obliquely and a stepwise variable selection
program (Kano & Harada, 2000, http://koko16.hus.osaka-
u.ac.jp/
�harada/sefa2002/stepwise/) was employed in order to provide
an
empirical evaluation of the items salient to each factor. The
first
factor—Appraising Others’ Emotions—was defined by four
items
(18, 25, 29, and 32) that dealt with perceiving and Appraising
Others’ Emotions, for example, “I am aware of the nonverbal
messages other people send.” The second factor—Optimistic
Mood Regulation—was defined by five items (3, 10, 12, 22, and
23), which dealt with maintaining an optimistic mood, for
exam-
ple, “I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to tasks I
take on” and “When I experience a positive emotion, I know
how
to make it last.” The final factor—Emotion Utilization—was de-
fined by four items (7, 8, 26, and 27), which dealt with using
emotions for problem solving, motivation, or empathy, for
exam-
ple, “When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with
new ideas.” These factors were consistent with those reported in
other analyses (cf., Austin et al., 2004; Petrides & Furnham,
2000b; Saklofske et al., 2003). When computed as unweighted
composites of constituent items, the factors correlated .30 –.40
(see
Table 1).
Confirmatory Analyses
The factor model was then tested in the midlife sample by using
CFA, fixing loadings of marker items on each factor, and
estimat-

ing all other parameters of the model with robust maximum-
likelihood estimation, which produces the Satorra-Bentler chi-
square (Satorra & Bentler, 2001) and scaled fit indices to
correct
for non-normality. The model was a good fit for the data on
the midlife adults, SBX2 (62) � 87.35, p � .02, CFI � .946,
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RMSEA � .040.3 A series of nested models then followed in
which elements of the factor structure were constrained to
equality
across groups and degradations in fit evaluated by difference
SBX2
(Satorra & Bentler, 2001) and difference CFI (Cheung & Rens-
vold, 2002), releasing offending constraints before proceeding
to
more restrictive models. Equality tests proceeding in the
following
order (Horn & McCardle, 1992; Hertzog & Schaie, 1988): factor
loadings (metric invariance), item residuals (equal

uniquenesses),
factor variances (equal individual differences), and factor
covari-
ances (differentiation). The model achieved metric invariance,
partial uniqueness invariance, and invariant factor variances and
covariances, yielding no evidence of greater differentiation
among
the midlife adults than among the young adults. The multigroup
factor model and its standardized estimates are shown in Figure
1.
After these tests, mean and covariance structure modeling (cf.,
Hertzog & Schaie, 1988) revealed no differences in latent means
for the Appraising Others’ emotions or Emotion Utilization
factors
in the two age groups. However, the latent mean for Optimistic
Mood Regulation in midlife adults was significantly higher than
that for young adults (d � .34). To control for potential
confound-
ing by gender (Petrides & Furnham, 2000b), the series of nested
models and the Mean and Covariance Structure Analysis
(MACS)
model were repeated using a subset of the young adult sample in
which females were randomly eliminated until gender
proportions
were equal (Ns � 203 young, 246 midlife adults). Results were
nearly identical, but the differences in latent means for
Optimistic
Mood Regulation increased (d � .48).
Finally, the convergent and discriminant correlation matrices of
EI dimensions, the Big Five, and fluid ability and crystallized
ability in each group were submitted to an omnibus test of
corre-
lation matrix equality. This process revealed that five
correlations

differed significantly across groups, including three involving
di-
mensions of EI and the Big Five (see Table 1).
Discussion
Overall, this cross-sectional analysis yields preliminary evi-
dence that self-reported EI is configured similarly in midlife
and
young adulthood. This finding has several implications. First,
dimensions of EI, at least those measured by the SSRI, may be
more associated with the structurally invariant personality
system
than with differentiating cognitive abilities. Low or
nonsignificant
EI correlations with measures of fluid ability and crystallized
ability in Table 1 support such an interpretation. Second, the
dimensions characterizing EI may correspond more closely to
higher order emotional tendencies that constitute part of the
stable
backdrop of emotional continuity posited by DET (Dougherty et
3 Because our goal was to test the equivalence of various
elements of the
factor structure, (particularly factor covariances), the model was
tested
individually via CFA in the young adult sample in which it was
derived
preliminary to multiple group analyses. As expected, it fit well,
SBX2
(62) � 75.26, p � .12, CFI � .975, RMSEA � .027. Analyses
used only
complete cases in each sample (young, N � 305; midlife, N �
246).

Table 1
Convergent and Discriminant Correlations Between Dimensions
of Emotional Intelligence, the Big Five, and Crystallized Skills
and
Fluid Skills
Variable
Young adults
Mean (SD)
Midlife adults
Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Neuroticism 24.14 (8.09) 20.00 (8.41) .86 �.43** .11*
�.30** �.34** �.14** �.07 �.07 �.46** �.03
.84
2. Extraversion 27.74 (7.37) 27.35 (7.15) �.43** .82 .08 .29**
.44** .00 .03 .27** .58** .14**
.83
3. Openness 27.78 (5.64) 24.75 (5.97) .11* .08 .69 .16** �.05
.27** .22** .20** .12** .14**
.63
4. Agreeableness 29.01 (5.65) 31.52 (5.94) �.30** .29** .16**
.76 .52* .17** .21** .21** .30** .24**
.68
5. Conscientiousness 28.29 (6.22) 33.71 (6.43) �.34** .44**
.12* .32** .83 .10* .06 .16** .49** .12**
.75
6. Crystallized skills 8.63 (3.18) 8.33 (3.26) �.14** .00 .27**
.17** .10* .95 .34** .05 .09 �.04
.78

7. Fluid skills 10.88 (2.51) 10.41 (5.03) �.07 .03 .22** .21**
.06 .34** .74 .03 .09 �.02
.73
8. Appraising others’
emotions 14.47 (2.72) 14.31 (2.57) �.07 .27** .20** .21**
.16** .05 .03 .76 .30** .40**
.77
9. Optimistic mood
regulation 14.54 (2.58) 15.21 (2.30) �.46** .58** .12** .46**
.49** .02 .09 .30** .69 .32**
.67
10. Emotion utilization 13.78 (2.62) 13.66 (2.56) �.03 .28**
.14** .17** .12** �.04 �.02 .40** .32** .62
.62
Note. Means and standard deviations of raw scores for each
variable. Correlations above diagonal for subset of midlife
sample (N � 204), correlations
below diagonal are for subset of young adult sample (N � 242).
Initial omnibus test of equality of correlation matrices, SBX2
(45) � 74.38, p � .0038,
CFI � .959, RMSEA � .038, revealed that corresponding
bolded off diagonal elements differed significantly between
samples. Freeing these correlations
to vary in each sample resulted in near perfect model fit, SBX2
(40) � 39.18, p � .507, CFI � 1.00, RMSEA � .000, �SBX2 �
33.45, �df � 5, p �
.001, �CFI � �.041.
* p � .05. ** p � .01 Diagonal shows Cronbach’s alpha internal
consistency estimates.

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al., 1996). Both the theoretical differentiation of cognitive–
affective structures supposed by DET and the increasing
complex-
ity of immediate emotional experience (e.g., Carstensen et al.,
2000) may represent a more molecular level of emotional
experi-
ence, whereas broad EI dimensions function as molar,
individual
difference constructs.
The EI factors that emerged were consistent with those reported
in previous research, and midlife adults’ higher latent means for
Optimistic Mood Regulation echo Kafetsios’ (2004) findings of
better emotion management in midlife adults. This factor dealt
primarily with maintaining hope and optimism. Isaacowtiz’s
(2005) results also indicate that optimism tends to increase with
age. Thus, optimism may be used as a strategy to maximize
positive affect, consistent with Diehl, Coyle, and Labouvie-
Vief’s

(1996) findings that older adults may regulate mood with more
cheerful interpretations of conflict situations.4 Finally, “looking
on
the bright side” may be a form of what Shulz and Heckhausen
(1998) have deemed secondary control. Primary control
involves
instrumental action on the environment to regulate emotion;
sec-
ondary control involves altering one’s internal perspective to
reg-
4 As one reviewer pointed out, Optimistic Mood Regulation
shares
empirical and conceptual overlap with Extraversion and
Neuroticism, two
affectively loaded Big Five traits. However, midlife adults’
observed
scores were still significantly higher than young adults’ scores
in an
analysis of covariance controlling for Extraversion and
Neuroticism, F(1,
504) � 5.01, p � .026.
Figure 1. Fit of final multiple groups covariance structure
model � SBX2 (150) � 182.22, p � .038, CFI �
.969, RMSEA � .020. Parameters with two estimates indicate
elements of model that differ across groups;
boldfaced estimates are for midlife adults (N � 246). Young
adults N � 305.
415BRIEF REPORTS
T
hi
s

do
cu
m
en
t i
s
co
py
ri
gh
te
d
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
P
sy
ch
ol

og
ic
al
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
o
ne
o
f i
ts
a
lli
ed
p
ub
lis
he
rs
.

T
hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
s
ol
el
y
fo
r t
he
p
er
so
na
l u
se

o
f t
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r a
nd
is
n
ot
to
b
e
di
ss
em
in
at
ed

b
ro
ad
ly
.
ulate emotion; and midlife marks the beginning of a shift
between
relative preference for primary over secondary control
strategies.
John and Gross’ (2004) notion of age-related increases in reap-
praisal and decreases in suppression as emotional regulatory
mech-
anisms is similarly commensurate with greater use of optimism
among midlife adults.
With respect to the other two dimensions of EI, midlife adults
did not report better appraisal of others’ emotions. This finding
is
inconsistent with DET predictions of improved emotion percep-
tion; the increased attention to context in emotion regulation,
suggested by CADT (Labouvie-Vief, 1996); and the notion that
better perception of others’ emotions may facilitate increased
interpersonal intimacy in significant relationships, derived from
SST. This null finding may not be an artifact of self-report,
because Kafetsios (2004) also failed to find age differences on
an
emotion perception task. One explanation may rest in the link
between emotion perception and the facial displays of others.
Midlife adults may interact more with older individuals, whose
facial expressions may be harder to judge, whereas younger
indi-

viduals may interact primarily with each other and with midlife
parents. Midlife adults also did not report greater use of
emotions
to solve problems or empathize with others.
However, both Emotion Utilization and Emotion Regulation
were differentially correlated with Agreeableness and
Extraversion
in the two groups. Because Agreeableness and Extraversion
have
sometimes been conceptualized as the dominance (vs.
submissive-
ness) and friendliness (vs. hostility) axes of the interpersonal
circumplex (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990), these results may in
part
reflect age-related changes in the interplay between emotional
functioning and interpersonal relationships supposed by SST.
Op-
timistic Mood Regulation may be more tied to Agreeableness or
friendliness in young adulthood than in middle adulthood,
because
as SST posits, young adults use broader social networks in the
service of emotion regulation and for knowledge acquisition
(Carstensen, 1992, 1995). The finding that Emotion Utilization
is
more tied to Agreeableness or friendliness in midlife than in
young
adulthood is consistent with the findings of previous work sug-
gesting that midlife adults attend more to interpersonal
information
in problem solving than young adults do (Strough, Berg, & San-
sone, 1996; see also Blanchard-Fields & Abeles, 1996). On the
other hand, Emotion Utilization is slightly more tied to
Extraver-
sion or dominance in young adults than in midlife adults. Con-
ceivably, declines in the activity and excitement-seeking

compo-
nents of Extraversion (cf., Terracciano, McCrae, Brant, &
Costa,
2005) could alter this correlation in middle age. These
interpreta-
tions are preliminary, and links between EI and personality
across
the life span deserve further investigation in their own right, as
Schaie (2001) pointed out.
On balance, this study provided important initial information on
self-reported EI in young adulthood and middle age. However,
results must be qualified by the limitations of self-report.
Individ-
uals do not always reliably report their characteristic behavior
and
experience, and they may be even less able to accurately judge
skills of the sort implied by the term emotional “intelligence.”
Similarly, the stability of such self-reports is uncertain, because
test–retest intervals for the SSRI are limited. The use of a cross-
sectional design precludes statements about developmental
change, and limitations are compounded by variations in sample
demographics. Future work might use multiple methods
sampling
broader emotional functions and cohort sequential strategies to
disentangle age-related change, cohort effects, and antecedents
and
consequents of the change or stability of individual differences
in EI.
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in
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r t
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Received January 27, 2005
Revision received December 2, 2005
Accepted December 28, 2005 �
418 BRIEF REPORTS
T
hi
s
do

cu
m
en
t i
s
co
py
ri
gh
te
d
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
P
sy
ch
ol
og

ic
al
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
o
ne
o
f i
ts
a
lli
ed
p
ub
lis
he
rs
.
T

hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
s
ol
el
y
fo
r t
he
p
er
so
na
l u
se
o

f t
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r a
nd
is
n
ot
to
b
e
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
b

ro
ad
ly
.
fairly well satisfied before safety needs become im-
portant, and so on. As applied to social work prac-
tice, Maslow’s theory indicates that social workers
must first help clients meet basic needs (e.g., physio-
logical needs). Once clients’ basic needs are met,
higher-level needs can be dealt with.
Maslow did not offer an age-stage approach to
development. Striving for self-actualization is seen
as a universal process that can be observed at
nearly all ages. However, it is likely that there is
some progression among age groups. Infants prob-
ably have a strong emphasis on physiological
needs. As a person gradually grows older, safety
needs are emphasized, and then belongingness
and love needs, and so on. Because middle-aged
adults have had a variety of learning experiences
and tend to be at the peak of their earning poten-
tial, they tend to have a greater opportunity to fo-
cus on meeting self-actualization needs. However,
such crises as unemployment, prolonged illness,
and broken relationships can switch the emphasis
to a lower level of need.
Emotional Intelligence
Psychologists Peter Salovey and John Mayer coined
the term emotional intelligence (EI) in 1990 (Papalia

et al., 2009). It refers to the ability to recognize and
deal with one’s own feelings as well as the feelings of
others. Daniel Goleman (1995) popularized the EI
concept and expanded it to include such qualities
as empathy, motivation, social competence, optimism,
and conscientiousness.
McClelland had done some earlier work on
factors related to emotional intelligence (Papalia
et al., 2009). In the 1960s, the U.S. State Depart-
ment concluded that a test of general knowledge
was a poor predictor of how well those applying
to be foreign service officers would perform. In
addition, the test tended to screen out women
and people of color. McClelland devised a selec-
tion process that had nothing to do with general
knowledge. He found that the best foreign service
officers had positive expectations of others, were
perceptive of the needs of others, and were skillful
in forming social networks. His selection process
emphasized these characteristics, and led to the ap-
pointment of effective foreign service officers. It
also ended the discrimination against women and
people of color.
Goleman (1995) developed an EI test. Studying
nearly 500 corporations, Goleman found that those
who rose to the top of the corporate ladder tended to
score highest on EI. Goleman (1998, 2001) found the
following competencies to be most closely associated
with effective work performance:
• Self-awareness (accurate self-assessment, emotional
self-awareness, and self-confidence)

• Self-management (trustworthiness, achievement drive,
initiative, adaptability, and self-control)
• Social awareness (empathy, organizational aware-
ness, and service orientation)
• Relationship management (exerting influence,
conflict management, leadership, communication,
building bonds, teamwork and collaboration, be-
ing a catalyst for change, and developing others
Goleman (1998) found that excelling in at least one
competency in each of these four areas appears to be
a key to success in almost any job.
Emotional intelligence is not the opposite of cog-
nitive intelligence. Some very bright people score
high in EI, whereas others score lower. Some less-
than-average scorers on IQ tests score high on EI,
whereas others score lower.
Emotional intelligence is not easy to measure.
Papalia, Olds, and Feldman (2004, p. 478) note:
Hard as it is to assess cognitive intelligence, EI
may be even harder to measure. For one thing,
lumping the emotions together can be misleading.
How do we assess someone who can handle fear
but not guilt, or who can face stress better than
boredom? Then too, the usefulness of a certain
emotion may depend on the circumstances. Anger,
for example, can lead to either destructive or con-
structive behavior.
Self-
actualization

needs
Self-esteem needs
Belongingness and love needs
Safety needs
Physiological needs
FIGURE 11.1 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
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Psychological Aspects of Young and Middle Adulthood 475
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Social Intelligence
Closely related to emotional intelligence is social in-
telligence. Social Intelligence (SI) has been defined
in a variety of ways.
According to the original definition of Edward
Thorndike (1920, p. 228), social intelligence is “the
ability to understand and manage men and women,
boys and girls, to act wisely in human relations.”
According to this definition, it is equivalent to inter-
personal intelligence.
Some authors have restricted the definition of SI
to deal only with knowledge of social situations.
With this perspective, SI is synonymous with social
cognition or social marketing intelligence.
Daniel Goleman (2006) has drawn on social neu-
roscience research to propose that social intelligence
is made up of social awareness (including social cog-
nition, empathy, attunement, and empathic accu-
racy) and social facility (including self-presentation,
influence, concern, and synchrony).
There are various types of intelligence, including
intellectual competencies, emotional intelligence, and
social intelligence. Counseling/psychotherapy often
involves helping people to modify their patterns of
social intelligence, particularly those that cause clients
to have problems in their interpersonal relationships.
Some tests have been developed to measure SI

(Goleman, 2006). Like IQ tests, SI tests are usually
based on a 100-point scale in which 100 is the aver-
age score. Most people score between 85–115. Scores
of 140 are considered to be very high. People with SI
scores below 80 may have an autism spectrum disor-
der. These people are apt to have trouble making
friends, and with communication. They might need
social skill training. People with SI scores over 120
are considered to be very socially skilled and well
adjusted, and probably will excel in jobs that involve
direct contact and communication with people.
Mezzo-System Interactions:
Nonverbal Communication
In seeking to assess human behavior, it is also im-
portant to attend to nonverbal communication. Sig-
mund Freud (quoted in Knapp & Hall, 1992) noted,
“He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may con-
vince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his
lips are silent, he chatters with his finger tips;
betrayal oozes out of him at every pore” (p. 391).
It is impossible not to communicate. No matter
what we do, we transmit information about our-
selves. Even an expressionless face communicates
messages. As you are reading this, stop for a minute
and analyze what nonverbal messages you would be
sending if someone were observing you. Are your
eyes wide open or half closed? Is your posture
According to Maslow, we have a basic need to “belong” and a
basic need to be “loved.”
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476 Understanding Human Behavior and the Social Environment
When psychological dependence occurs, the user
feels psychological discomfort if use is terminated.
Dependent users tend to believe that they will use
the chemical for the rest of their lives as a regular
part of social or recreational activities. They question
whether the desired emotional state can be achieved
without the use of the chemical, and they have a pre-
occupation with thinking and talking about the chem-

ical and activities associated with using it.
Users also generally develop a tolerance for some
drugs, which means they have to take increasing
amounts over time to achieve a given level of effect.
Tolerance depends partly on the type of drug, be-
cause some drugs (such as aspirin) do not create
tolerance.
Drug addiction is difficult to define. In a broad
sense, addiction refers to an intense craving for a
particular substance. The problem is that this defini-
tion could be applied to an intense craving for a
variety of substances—pickles, ice cream, potato
chips, strawberry shortcake. To avoid this problem,
we will define addiction as an intense craving for a
drug that develops after a period of heavy use.
Why Do People Use and Abuse Alcohol and
Other Drugs?
The effects of using drugs are numerous, ranging
from feeling light-headed to death through overdos-
ing. Drug abuse may lead to deterioration in health,
relationship problems, automobile accidents, child
abuse, spouse abuse, loss of job, low self-esteem, loss
of social status, financial disaster, divorce, and arrests
and convictions.
A distinction needs to be made between responsi-
ble drug use and drug abuse. Many drugs do have
beneficial effects when used responsibly; aspirin re-
lieves pain, alcohol helps people relax, tranquilizers
reduce anxiety, antidepressant drugs reduce depres-
sion, amphetamines increase alertness, morphine is a
painkiller, and marijuana is useful in treating glau-
coma. Irresponsible drug use is abuse, which was

defined earlier in this chapter.
Why do people abuse drugs? The reasons are nu-
merous. Drug companies widely advertise the bene-
ficial effects of their products. The media (such as
television and movies) glamorize the mind-altering
effects. Many popular songs highlight drinking.
Bars and cocktail lounges have become centers for
socializing, and promote drinking. Through such
channels, Americans have become socialized to ac-
cept drug usage as a part of daily living. Socializa-
tion patterns lead many people to use drugs, and for
some the use is a stepping-stone to abuse.
Attitudes toward drug use also encourage abuse.
For example, some college students believe they
should get blitzed or stoned after a tough exam.
Ryne Duren (1985), former pitcher for the New
York Yankees, asked this question: “I started becom-
ing an alcoholic at age four, even though I had my
first drink at age nine—how can this be?” Duren went
on to explain that at a very young age he became
socialized to believe that a real man was “someone
who could drink others under the table,” and that
the way to have fun was to get high on alcohol.
People abuse drugs for a variety of reasons. Some
people build up a tolerance to a drug and then
HIGHLIGHT 11.6
Steroid Use in Baseball
On March 30, 2006, baseball commissioner Bud Selig asked
former Senator George Mitchell to investigate steroid use in
baseball. On December 13, 2007, Mitchell released his report.

The report found steroid use to be rampant among former
and current players.
Eighty-six former and current players were named in the
report. (It is thought that there are many other users among
baseball players who have not yet been identified.) Steroids
have been on baseball’s banned substance list since 1991; how-
ever, testing of Major League players did not begin until 2003.
Seven Most Valuable Player Award winners were named
in the report, along with 31 All-Stars—at least one for every
position. Some of the biggest names in baseball are alleged to
have been users, including Barry Bonds, Roger Clemens, Mark
McGwire, David Justice, Jason Giambi, Gary Sheffield,
Miguel Tejada, Lenny Dykstra, Rafael Palmeiro, Andy
Pettitte, Chuck Knoblauch, and Alex Rodriguez. (Some
of these players have denied, under oath, that they used
steroids.)
To avoid testing positive for steroids, many athletes
looking for an edge have now turned to human growth hor-
mone (HGH) to build muscle. It is difficult to detect, and
the best test available has a window of detection of only
48–72 hours.

increase the dosage to obtain a high. Physical and
psychological dependence usually leads to abuse.
People with intense unwanted emotions (such as
loneliness, anxiety, feelings of inadequacy, guilt, de-
pression, insecurity, and resentment) may turn to
drugs. For many abusers, their drug of choice be-
comes their best friend because they tend to person-
alize it and value it more highly than they value their
friends. The drug is something that they can always
count on to relieve pain or give them the kind of
high they desire. Many abusers become so highly
attached to their drug that they choose to continue
using it even though it leads to deterioration of
health, divorce, discharges from jobs, automobile
accidents, alienation from children, loss of friends,
depletion of financial resources, and court appear-
ances. Drug abusers usually feel they need their
drug as a crutch to make it through the day.
Abusers develop an intimate relationship with
their drug of choice. Even though this relationship
is unhealthy, the drug plays a primary role in the
abuser’s life, dictates a certain lifestyle, fills a psycho-
logical need, and more often than not takes prece-
dence over family, friends, and work. Most abusers
deny their drug usage is creating problems for them,
because they know that admitting they have a drug
problem means they will have to end their relation-
ship with their best friend, and they deeply believe
they need their drug to handle their daily concerns
and pressures. Drug abusers are apt to use a number
of defense mechanisms in order to continue using

drugs. They rationalize adverse consequences of drug
abuse (such as the loss of a job) by twisting or dis-
torting reality to explain the consequences of their
behavior while under the influence. They minimize
the adverse consequences of their drug use. They
use projection to place the blame for their problems
on others; for example, “If you had a wife like mine,
you’d drink too.”
Theories About Drug Use
A variety of theories have been offered as to why
people use drugs. Biological theories assert that
physiological changes produced by the drugs eventu-
ally generate an irresistible craving for the drug.
Some biological theories also postulate that some
people are predisposed by their genetic structure to
abuse certain types of drugs. For example, some au-
thorities believe that genes play a role in predispos-
ing some people to alcoholism. Behavioral theories
hold that people use drugs because they find them
pleasurable and continue to use them because doing
so prevents withdrawal distress. Interactionist theo-
ries maintain that drug use is learned from interac-
tion with others in our culture. For example, people
drink alcohol because drinking is widely accepted.
Interactionist theories assert that those who use ille-
gal drugs such as marijuana or cocaine have contact
with a drug subculture that encourages them to ex-
periment with illegal drugs.
Interaction in Family Systems: A Theoretical
Approach to Drug Abuse
Wegscheider (1981) maintains that chemical depen-
dency is a family disease that involves and affects
each family member. Although she focuses on the

families of alcoholics, much of what she says may
also apply to the families of other types of chemical
substance abusers.
She cites several rules that tend to characterize
the families of drug abusers. First, the dependent
person’s alcohol use becomes “the most important
thing in the family’s life” (Wegscheider, 1981, p. 81).
The abuser’s top priority is getting enough alcohol,
and the family’s top priorities are the abuser, the abu-
ser’s behavior, and keeping the abuser away from al-
cohol. The goals of the abuser and of the rest of the
family are at completely opposite poles.
A second rule in an alcoholic family is that alco-
hol is not the cause of the problem. Denial is para-
mount. A third family rule maintains that the
dependent person is not responsible for his or her
behavior and that the alcohol causes the behavior.
There is always someone or something else to
blame. Another rule dictates that no one should
rock the boat, no matter what. Family members
strive to protect the family’s status quo, even when
the family is miserable. Yet other rules concern for-
bidding discussion of the family problem either
within or outside of the family, and consistently
avoiding stating one’s true feelings. Wegscheider
(1981) maintains that these rules protect the depen-
dent person from taking responsibility for his or her
behavior, and that the rules serve to maintain the
drinking problem.
Wegscheider (1981) goes on to identify several
roles that family members typically play. In addition
to the chemically dependent person, there is the chief
enabler, the family hero, the scapegoat, the lost

child, and the mascot.
The chief enabler’s main purpose is to assume the
primary responsibility for family functioning. The
506 Understanding Human Behavior and the Social Environment
abuser typically continues to lose control and relin-
quishes responsibility. The chief enabler takes on
more and more responsibility and begins making
more and more of the family’s decisions. A chief
enabler is often the parent or spouse of the chemi-
cally dependent person.
Conditions often continue to deteriorate as the
chemically dependent person loses control. A posi-
tive influence is needed to offset the negative. The
family hero fulfills this role. The family hero is often
the person who does well at everything he or she
tries. The hero works hard at making the family
look as though it is functioning better than it is. In
this way, the family hero provides the family with
self-worth.

Another role typically to played by someone in
the family is that of scapegoat. Although the alco-
hol abuse is the real problem, a family rule man-
dates that this fact must be denied. Therefore, the
blame must be placed elsewhere. Frequently, an-
other family member is blamed for the problem.
The scapegoat often behaves in negative ways that
draw attention to him or her (for example, the per-
son gets caught stealing, runs away, or becomes ex-
tremely withdrawn). The scapegoat’s role is to
distract attention away from the chemically depen-
dent person and onto something else. This role helps
the family avoid addressing the problem of chemical
dependency.
Often, someone plays the role of lost child. This
is a person who seems relatively uninvolved with the
rest of the family and never causes any trouble. The
lost child’s purpose is to provide relief from some of
the pain the family is suffering. At least there is
someone in the family who neither requires much
attention nor causes any stress. The lost child is sim-
ply there.
Finally, chemically dependent families often have
someone playing the role of mascot. The mascot is
someone who has a good sense of humor and appears
not to take anything seriously. Despite how much the
mascot might be suffering inside, he or she provides a
little fun for the family.
In summary, chemical dependency is a problem
affecting the entire family. Each family member suf-
fers from the chemical dependency, yet each assumes
a role in order to maintain the family’s status quo
and help the family survive. Family members are

driven to maintain these roles no matter what hap-
pens. The roles eventually become associated with
survival.
The Application of Theory to
Client Situations: Treatment for
the Chemically Dependent
Person and His or Her Family
One of the first tasks in treatment is for
the chemically dependent person to
take responsibility for his or her own
behavior. The abuser must acknowl-
edge that he or she has a problem before beginning
to solve it. Several concepts are critical in working
with the family (Wegscheider, 1981). Family members
must first come to realize the extent of the problem.
They need to identify the chemical abuse as their ma-
jor problem. Additionally, they need to learn about
and evaluate their family dynamics. They need to eval-
uate their own behavior and break out of the roles that
have been maintaining the chemical abuse. The chief
enabler, in particular, must stop making excuses and
assuming the chemically dependent person’s responsi-
bilities. If the chemically dependent person is sick from
a hangover and cannot make it to school or work the
next day, it must be that person’s responsibility, not a
parent’s or spouse’s, to call in sick.
Family members eventually learn to confront the
chemically dependent person and give him or her
honest information about his or her behavior. For
instance, they are encouraged to tell the dependent
exactly how he or she behaved while having a black-
out. If the dependent person hit another family
member while drunk, this fact needs to be con-
fronted. The confrontation should occur not in an

emotional manner but rather in a factual one.
The family also needs to learn about the pro-
gression of the disease. We’ve already discussed
some characteristics of drug dependence. There is
a typical progression of an alcoholic’s feelings and
behavior. At first, only occasional relief drinking
occurs. Drinking becomes more constant. The de-
pendent person then begins to drink in secret and
to feel guilty about drinking. Memory blackouts
begin to occur and gradually increase in frequency.
The dependent person feels worse and worse about
his or her drinking behavior, but seems to have less
and less control over it. Finally, the drinking be-
gins to seriously affect the person’s work, family,
and social relationships. A job may be lost or all
school classes flunked. Perhaps family members
leave or throw the dependent person out. The de-
pendent person’s thinking becomes more and more
impaired.
EP 2.1.3b,
2.1.6b,
2.1.10a,
d, e, g, & j

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