Social and Personality Psychology Compass 101 (2016) 11–25, .docx

Social and Personality Psychology Compass 10/1 (2016): 11–25,
10.1111/spc3.12229
Exploring the Toolkit of Emotion: What Do Sadness and
Anger Do for Us?
Heather C. Lench*, Thomas P. Tibbett and Shane W. Bench
Texas A&M University
Abstract
What do negative emotions do for people? We present a
framework that defines the function of emotions
as the degree to which discrete emotions result in better
outcomes in particular types of situations. Focus-
ing on sadness and anger, we review evidence related to the
situations that elicit these emotions; the cog-
nitive, physiological, and behavioral changes associated with
the emotions; and the extent to which these
changes result in demonstrably better outcomes in the type of
situation that elicits the emotion. Sadness is
elicited by perceived goal loss without possibility of restoration
given current abilities and is associated
with deliberative reasoning, reduced physiological activity, and
behavioral expression. There is prelimi-
nary evidence suggesting that sadness can permit coping with
loss, and that expression of sadness can re-
cruit others to assist in goal attainment. Anger is elicited by
perceived goal loss that can be prevented if an
obstacle is overcome and is associated with heuristic reasoning,
increased physiological activity, and be-
havioral expression. There is evidence that expression of anger
prompts others to remove themselves as

obstacles, and preliminary evidence that anger can promote
overcoming obstacles and goal attainment.
Like precision tools, specific emotions are best utilized to
resolve particular problems.
People often assume that being in a constant state of happiness
would be ideal for human func-
tioning. In fact, the majority of people consider being happy to
be of paramount importance in
their lives (Diener, 2000). Yet research findings have revealed
that happiness is not the panacea it
might appear, and that instead a mixture of positive and
negative emotions is related to positive
outcomes (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004). In the present review,
we address the question of
what negative emotions do for people. We utilize a class of
emotion theories – functional ac-
counts – to integrate findings related to the consequences of
emotions. Broadly speaking, func-
tional accounts of emotion posit that emotions are functional in
the sense that they do
something useful for people. We present a framework that
defines the function of emotions
as the degree to which the changes associated with discrete
emotions result in better outcomes
in particular types of situations. To use an analogy, emotions do
not function as sledgehammers that
can deal with any problem, but rather as a Swiss army knife
with a multitude of tools that are
best utilized to resolve particular problems.
Functional Accounts of Emotion
The term “emotion” is used in a variety of ways in the research
literature and in colloquial
speech. Although debate continues, there is an emerging

consensus that a primary distinguishing
feature of emotions is that they are reactions to events (Eich,
Kihlstrom, Bower, Forgas, &
Niedenthal, 2000; Kaplan, Levine, Safer, & Lench, 2015;
Lench, Bench, Darbor, & Moore,
2015; Verduyn, Van Mechelen, & Tuerlinckx, 2011). Emotions
are directed toward or “about”
a specific event, such as the sadness experienced after a defeat
or the anger felt over an insult.
This can be contrasted with moods, which have less identifiable
specific causes and are more
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
generalized, such as feeling down or cheerful (Beedie, Terry, &
Lane, 2005; Eich et al., 2000;
Kaplan et al., 2015). The present review focuses on the
emotions sadness and anger, as illustra-
tions of how existing accounts can be integrated to identify the
functions of emotion within
particular situations. Anger and sadness were selected because
they are included on almost all lists
of emotions that are universally experienced and have a
biological basis (e.g., lists of “basic emo-
tions,” and cross-species comparative analyses; Ekman, 1992;
Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2011).
They also are both negative in valence and therefore can
illustrate the differences between
emotions of the same valence that can be predicted from
functional accounts. Further, both
emotions are frequently regarded as states that should be
managed or regulated (Erber & Erber,
2000; Taylor, 1991). This perception likely arises in part
because extreme or chronic sadness and

anger are symptoms of psychiatric disorders, and in part
because they are aversive experiences, so
much so that people will pay money to avoid experiencing them
(Lau, White, & Schnall, 2013;
Tibbett & Lench, 2015).
Functional accounts posit emotions are powerful organizing
forces of cognition, physiology,
and behavior that do something for people, in that they function
to resolve particular types of
problems. There are multiple functional accounts that vary in
their particulars (Arnold, 1960;
Averill, 1983; Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1987; Lerner & Keltner,
2001; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter,
Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005; Pinker, 1997). Rather than reviewing
support for a particular
functional account, the present review focuses on evidence
related to the core assumption
among all of these accounts – that emotions serve a function.
There are three key questions
that must be addressed in order to identify the potential
functions of any emotion: (1) What
are the situations that elicit that emotion? (2) What cognitive,
physiological, and behavioral
changes are associated with that emotion? And (3) to what
extent do these changes result in
demonstrably better outcomes in the type of situation that
elicits the emotion? The challenge
of a functional account, then, is to determine the extent to
which a given emotion resolves the
type of situation that elicited the emotion. In other words, to
identify what a particular emo-
tional “tool” can do. Figure 1 presents an overview of this
approach applied to evidence related
to sadness and anger.

Figure 1 Framework for identifying the functions of specific
emotions.
12 Functions of Emotion
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Social and Personality
Psychology Compass 10/1 (2016): 11–25, 10.1111/spc3.12229
What Situations Elicit Emotions?
Some functional accounts focus on the objective situations that
result in different emotions, such
as images of snakes that trigger a fear response (Öhman &
Mineka, 2001). Although there do
appear to be stimuli that elicit particular emotional responses,
the vast majority of studies have
revealed individual variability in how people respond to
objective situations. In one study, in-
vestigators videotaped travelers reporting lost luggage at the
airport (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997).
The emotions that the travelers expressed to this identical
objective situation varied quite a
bit, with some people expressing anger and others expressing
anxiety. Yet this variability in re-
sponse was accounted for by differences in how people
perceived the situation. Across individuals
and cultures, people’s perceptions of situations are stronger and
more accurate predictors of their
emotional response than the objective situation (Moors,
Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013;
Scherer & Meuleman, 2013; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007;
Stein & Hernandez, 2007).
So what perceptions of situations matter? This is a matter of
some debate among researchers,

and the inferences that can be drawn from the existing empirical
literature are often mixed.
Conceptualized broadly, emotions result from the perceived
discrepancy between the desired
and current status of goals and values (Arnold, 1960; Carver,
2004; Frijda, 1986; Lench, Flores,
& Bench, 2011; Levenson, 2014; Levine, 1996). Negative
emotions result when there is a mis-
match between what people want and what they have at the
moment. Indeed, many theorists
regard negative emotions as signals that direct attention to
relevant stimuli when there are goals
that are in danger of failing (Carver, 2004; Cole et al., 2004).
The specific negative emotion ex-
perienced results from the specific type of mismatch that is
perceived (Arnold, 1960; Campos,
Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994). In a study of people’s
daily emotional lives, almost 70%
of specific emotional experiences could be predicted from the
perceived goal-relevant events
that preceded them (Oatley & Duncan, 1994).
Sadness
Sadness is conceptualized as resulting from the perception that
a goal has been lost, without the
possibility of restoration given one’s current abilities (Carver,
2004; Frijda, 1986, 1987; Gross &
Levenson, 1995; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lench et
al., 2011; Levine, 1996; Levine
& Pizarro, 2004; Oatley & Jenkens, 1996). Some theories focus
specifically on the social situa-
tions of relationship loss that predict the emotion of sadness
(see Keltner & Kring, 1998, for
a review), but sadness has been consistently documented in

nonsocial situations involving fail-
ure. Images and films depicting relationship losses (e.g., death,
illness) effectively elicit sadness,
as do imaginative tasks, texts, recall, and real life experiences
that involve the experience of goal
failure (Lench et al., 2011). In one example, the experience of
sadness was effectively manipu-
lated by failure to attain an incentive during a game (Carver,
2004 & Scheier, 2001). Similarly,
young children predict that a protagonist will experience
sadness in situations involving irrevoca-
ble goal loss (Levine, 1995) and adults report sadness after loss
(Oatley & Duncan, 1994). Concep-
tualizing sadness as the result of perceived goal failure beyond
one’s ability to repair is also
consistent with findings from studies of the specific evaluations
(appraisals) of situations that pre-
dict emotions. Appraisals that a situation is beyond one’s
control (i.e., high situational control, low
personal control) reliably predict the experience of sadness
across a number of objective situations
involving goal failure (Keltner et al., 1993; Siemer et al., 2007;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
Anger
Anger is also conceptualized as resulting from the perception
that a goal has been lost, but, unlike
sadness, goal attainment is possible with the removal of an
obstacle (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler,
Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001; Carver, 2004; Carver & Harmon-
Jones, 2009; Frijda, 1986; Gross
Functions of Emotion 13

& Levenson, 1995; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001; Lench et
al., 2011; Levine, 1996; Levine &
Pizarro, 2004; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). As with
sadness, some theories focus
specifically on social situations that elicit anger, which are
often characterized by the perception
of injustice committed by another person (Keltner et al., 1993).
Consistent with these accounts,
anger is effectively elicited by emotion elicitations involving
films and pictures that portray social
injustice (Lench et al., 2011), and appraisals that someone else
is to blame for a negative situation
predict the experience of anger (Siemer et al., 2007; Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985).
However, a social context involving injustice does not appear to
be a necessary condition for
anger to occur. Anger is also experienced in nonsocial
situations involving obstacles to goals
(Averill, 1983; Oatley & Duncan, 1994) and effectively elicited
by imaginative tasks, texts, recall
tasks, and real life experiences that involve obstacles (Lench et
al., 2011). For instance, travelers
were video recorded reporting their lost luggage at an airport
and then asked questions about
their perception of the situation, with the result that the
perception that goals were obstructed
predicted greater anger expression and behavior in the travelers
(Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). In
studies with infants, anger is frequently elicited by taking away
or blocking an attractive toy
or video (Buss & Goldsmith, 1998; Stifter & Braungart, 1995).

Similarly, young children predict
that a protagonist will experience anger in situations involving
goal loss when the protagonist
can take action to reinstate the goal (Levine, 1995). Anger as
the result of perceived obstacles
to goal attainment is also consistent with findings from
appraisal studies. Appraisals of individual
control and certainty predict the experience of anger (Lerner &
Keltner, 2000, 2001; Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985), suggesting that anger is elicited in situations
characterized by the possibility of
goal attainment with additional effort. Together, the available
evidence suggests that anger is
elicited in situations that involve obstacles to goals, and that
other people can be the obstacle.
What Changes are Associated with Emotions?
Once an emotion is elicited by the perception of a problematic
situation, what changes occur?
Emotions have been conceptualized as coordinated responses
across cognitive, physiological, and
behavioral systems to changes in the environment (Ekman,
1992; Levenson, 2014; Mauss et al.,
2005; Pinker, 1997; Scherer, 1984). In other words, negative
emotions are responses to the percep-
tion of problematic situations, described above, that represent a
mismatch between what people
want and what they have. According to this perspective,
emotions represent coordinated changes
that draw attention to information relevant to the problem and
prepare for action to resolve the
problem (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). It is important to note that
the changes associated with an
emotion are not considered to be deterministic but rather
probabilistic, such that individual re-

sponses can be affected by a number of moderators (Buck,
2010; Frijda, 1987; Izard, 2007; Lelieveld,
van Dijk, van Beest, & van Kleef, 2013; Levenson, 2011;
Panksepp, 2007; Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013).
For example, people do not reflexively attack every time that
they become angry. Rather, the
proposition is that anger is associated with an increased
likelihood of aggressive behavior, with indi-
vidual responses moderated by experience and the situation.
This perspective is also consistent with
the reasoning based on evolutionary theory that underlies many
functional accounts, in that the
expression of any evolved feature (the genotype) is altered by
individual specific experiences (the
phenotype; Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000;
Gould & Lewontin, 1979).
Across emotions, there is evidence supporting the proposition
that emotions represent coordi-
nated changes across systems, although sometimes those
relationships are small in size (Lench et al.,
2011). Computer algorithms can reliably predict the emotions
that people report based on input
from behavioral and physiological changes (Bailenson et al.,
2008; Kragel & LaBar, 2013). These
findings suggest that discrete emotions are associated with
unique changes across systems and that
changes tend to co-occur. There is also evidence that emotions
represent coordinated responses

across systems in the sense that changes correlate during
emotional episodes (Bonanno & Keltner,
2004; Hsieh et al., 2011; Levenson, 2014; Lewis, 2011; Mauss
et al., 2005), although correlations
may vary across the life span and in different contexts (Izard &
Abe, 2004; Izard, Hembree, &
Huebner, 1987; Mauss et al., 2005; Shiller, Izard, & Hembree,
1986). Additionally, discriminant
neural pathways have been demonstrated for specific emotions,
consistent with the idea that emo-
tions represent coordinated responses (Kassam, Markey,
Cherkassky, Loewenstein, & Just, 2013).
Sadness
The changes across systems that are associated with sadness
have frequently been characterized as
“deactivation” or the absence of behavior (Averill, 1968;
Cunningham, 1988; Frijda, 1986).
This deactivation after a sadness-eliciting goal loss (i.e., a
failure) is thought to promote a focus
on understanding the causes of goal failure and to reduce goal
pursuit and distraction in an en-
vironment that is not conducive to success (Andrews &
Thomson, 2009; Cunningham, 1988).
In a recent meta-analysis that examined the effects of emotions
across systems, sadness was asso-
ciated with moderate changes ( g=0.41) across all outcomes
compared to neutral conditions, in
a manner consistent with this deactivation account (Lench et al.,
2011). Sadness also differed
from other emotion conditions on measures across systems with
small effect sizes compared
to other negative emotions and large effect sizes compared to
happiness.

Cognitively, sadness has been demonstrated to change the way
that information is processed,
prompting a relatively deliberative, analytic reasoning style that
is thought to promote an under-
standing of the causes of past failures and to prevent future goal
failures (Ambady & Gray, 2002;
Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Forgas, 1998; Markman & Weary,
1996). The downstream con-
sequences of this more analytic reasoning style include more
accurate memories (Bless, Schwarz,
& Wieland, 1996; Forgas, Laham, & Vargas, 2005; Park &
Banaji, 2000), and less biased judg-
ments (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Forgas, 1998). In addition to
more deliberative processing,
sadness also directs attention specifically to the outcomes and
causes of goal failures. In one study
demonstrating this focus, participants who were made sad and
then read a narrative about a
failure were more likely to recall information about the event
outcomes than happy or angry
participants (Levine & Burgess, 1997; Levine & Pizarro, 2004).
Sadness is also related to more
pessimistic thinking, in the form of greater estimates of the
likelihood of losses and negative
outcomes (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000).
Sadness associated with loss generally results in reduced
physiological activity (Ekman,
Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Kreibig, 2010; Levenson, 2011,
2014), and the profile associated
with sadness is distinct from other emotional states (Rainville,
Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio,
2006). This decreased physiological arousal is thought to
promote reduced psychomotor activ-
ity, permitting sad people to concentrate on the source of their

failure without becoming dis-
tracted (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Forgas, 1998). In one
study, sadness was elicited by
having participants pose facial expressions consistent with
sadness, resulting in a deactivation
in muscle activity (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). A
review of studies that elicited emo-
tion to examine physiological consequences found that sadness
without crying was associated
with decreased heart rate, electrodermal activity, heart rate
variability, finger pulse amplitude,
and finger temperature, as well as increased respiratory activity
(Kreibig, 2010). Although sad-
ness is generally associated with decreased physiological
activation, sadness that is elicited when
there is the possibility of avoiding loss and accompanied by
crying behavior is typically associated
with increased physiological activity (Kreibig, 2010),
suggesting a different physiological pattern
when loss might be avoidable with help from others.
Behaviorally, emotions can be expressed through facial
expressions, posture, and vocaliza-
tions, and any of these expressions can be consistently
identified by others as reflecting a
particular emotional experience (Buck, 1994; Darwin, 1872;
Ekman, 1992, 1993; Horstmann,
2003; Tracy & Robins, 2004). The majority of research on

behavioral expression has focused on
facial expressions, with a particular focus on the subsets of
muscle movements associated with
different emotions. The characteristic facial expression of
sadness includes a frown, eyebrows
lifted in the center of the forehead, and relaxed eyes (Ekman,
Friesen, & Hager, 2002). Com-
puter modeling has revealed that the pattern of facial muscle
contractions associated with sadness
is distinct from patterns for other emotions, which makes facial
expression particularly effective
for communicating emotion to others (Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin,
& Schyns, 2005).
Anger
The consequences of anger for responses across systems have
been characterized as a “readiness for
action,” which is thought to facilitate the ability to respond
quickly to attain goals or remove obsta-
cles to goals (Frijda, 1986; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001;
Kreibig, 2010; Lench et al., 2011).
This activation during the blockage of a goal is believed to
encourage focus on achieving the goal
and decrease the pursuit of alternative goals until the current
goal has been achieved, or is lost with-
out opportunity to recover (Levine & Pizarro, 2004). In a recent
meta-analysis that examined the
effects of emotions across systems, anger was associated with
moderate changes (g=0.51) across
all outcomes compared to neutral conditions, in a manner
consistent with this activation account
(Lench et al., 2011). Anger also differed from other emotion
conditions on measures across systems
with small to moderate effect sizes compared to other negative
emotions (in some cases the number

of available comparisons was small, however), and large effect
sizes compared to happiness.
Cognitively, anger impacts information processing by
encouraging a relatively heuristic rea-
soning style, resulting in more biased and more optimistic
judgments (Bodenhausen et al., 2011;
DeSteno et al., 2000; Lench & Levine, 2005; Lerner & Keltner,
2000, 2001). In addition to
more heuristic processing, anger appears to direct attention to
goals and the actions of others
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Levine & Burgess,
1997; Levine & Pizarro, 2004)
and reduces self-focused attention (Green & Sedikides, 1999).
Additionally, anger results in
greater estimation of the likelihood of negative outcomes as a
result of obstacles to goals (e.g., late
due to traffic; DeSteno et al., 2000), suggesting greater
attention to goal-relevant information.
Physiologically, anger due to a blocked goal results in increased
physiological activity (Kreibig,
2010; Levenson, 2014; Levenson et al., 1990), and the profile
associated with anger is distinct
from other emotional states (Rainville et al., 2006). This
increase in physiological activity is pro-
posed to prepare people to take action to recover a blocked goal
(Harmon-Jones & Sigelman,
2001; Lench et al., 2011; Pinker 1997). Consistent with this
proposal, anger has been found to
be strongly related to the cardiovascular system (Levenson,
1992; Miller, Patrick, & Levenston,
2002) and to possess a unique physiological profile (Miller et
al., 2002). A review of studies that
examined the impact of elicited emotion on physiological
outcomes found that anger was asso-

ciated with increased heart rate, systolic blood pressure,
diastolic blood pressure, total peripheral
resistance, electrodermal activity, skin conductance level, and
respiratory activity (Kreibig, 2010).
Behaviorally, the intensity of anger, as well as factors such as
trait anger-proneness and gender,
moderate the expression of anger (e.g., verbal, physical
aggression, facial expression;
Deffenbacher, Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 1996). As with
sadness, the majority of research on be-
haviors associated with anger has focused on facial expression
and found that anger is associated
with lowered brows, glaring eyes, and tightened lips (Ekman et
al., 2002). The facial expression
of anger has been found to be identifiable in seven-month old
infants and to become more pro-
nounced with increased intensity (Stenberg, Campos, & Emde,
1983). A meta-analysis of studies
examining the recognition of emotion expressions suggested
that both the verbal and facial
expressions of anger can be recognized across cultures
(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).
To What Extent do Emotions Result in Better Outcomes?
The thread tying functional theories together is that emotions
serve a purpose, namely, that emo-
tions represent coordinated responses that help to resolve

particular problems (Ekman, 1992; Lazarus,
1991; Lench et al., 2011; Levenson, 2014; Mauss et al., 2005;
Pinker, 1997; Scherer, 1984).
Theoretically, the problem that specific emotions serve to
resolve should match the situation
that elicited that emotion. Therefore, this resolution can be
demonstrated in studies that reveal
that the cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioral changes
associated with an emotion result in
better outcomes in situations characterized by the perceived
mismatch between goals and the
environment that elicits the emotional response. Although many
studies demonstrate that
emotions change responses in ways that appear functional, as
reviewed above, studies have infre-
quently assessed whether those responses are functional (Gould
& Lewontin, 1979). So, what is
the evidence that emotions do something for us, in that they
help resolve challenges to goals?
Sadness
Given that the changes associated with sadness result from
situations involving goal loss that is
beyond one’s ability to address, the critical question for
functional accounts is the extent to
which changes associated with sadness result in better outcomes
in situations involving goal loss
beyond one’s ability to address.
Interpersonal effects. Better outcomes could result because of
interpersonal effects of emotion, in which
changes associated with sadness alter the behaviors of others in
ways that promote better outcomes
related to goal loss. Because interpersonal effects are by
definition the result of social exchanges,

behavioral expression of emotion is particularly likely to be
relevant to interpersonal outcomes
(Fridlund, 1991). However, the degree to which expression of
emotion results in better outcomes
is necessarily dependent on the perception of the other person
and their relationship to the expresser.
Evidence suggests that the facial or verbal expression of
sadness can elicit help from others, at
least under some conditions. In situations that involve goal loss
beyond one’s ability to address,
recruiting help from others to attain goals results in better
outcomes. Indeed, evidence suggests
that crying, a behavior typically associated with sadness, can be
an effective signal to caregivers to
provide help to infants (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972). In
investigations with adults, participants were
more likely to make concessions to an opponent who displayed
a digital facial expression of
sadness (Dehghani, Carnevale, & Gratch, 2014). However,
participants only made concessions
when sadness was displayed over an object of moral
significance, suggesting that the expression
of sadness elicits helping behavior primarily when there is a
rationale for requesting concessions.
There is also evidence that verbally conveying that one is
experiencing disappointment (similar
to sadness, although there is an element of blame to expressing
disappointment that is likely
absent in sadness) can increase support from others. In one
investigation, participants were
paired with an ingroup or outgroup member (actually a
computer program) and bargained over
the distribution of chips with differing payoff structures
(Lelieveld et al., 2013). In some condi-
tions, the opponent indicated disappointment with an offer made

by the participant, and
consequently, the participants viewed the opponent as weaker
and offered more chips, but only
when the opponent was described as a member of their group.
This suggests that people were
more inclined to support someone in their group who had
expressed a sad emotional response.
Thus there is evidence that signaling one is experiencing
sadness during social exchanges, either
verbally or by sending a facial expression, can change others’
behavior in ways that promote
one’s goals. However, the impact of expressing sadness on goal
protection outcomes is
unknown when sadness is expressed in other ways or in other
contexts that do not involve
direct negotiation.
Intrapersonal effects. Better outcomes could also result because
of intrapersonal effects of emotion,
in which the changes associated with sadness promote better
outcomes in situations involving
goal loss beyond one’s ability to resolve. In one study, Wrosch
and Miller (2009) found that
the experience of depressive symptoms (including sad mood)
predicted increased goal
disengagement capacity over time, and that this disengagement
capacity predicted reduced
depressive symptoms. This study provides tentative support for
the notion that sadness can result

in better outcomes in situations involving goal loss and/or
failure, although it was unclear in this
investigation if goal disengagement was necessary. The only
other evidence supportive of this
possibility are findings that sadness promotes ways of thinking
that seem likely to support goal
protection, although that link has not been assessed. For
example, sad people meet conversa-
tional norms during speech more than happy people (Koch,
Forgas, & Matovic, 2013), sad
people are better able to detect deception than happy people
(Forgas, 2013), and sad people
are less optimistic about their futures than happy people
(Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).
The vast majority of predictions regarding the intrapersonal
consequences of sadness that can
be derived from a functional account, including that sadness
should promote learning from past
mistakes and blocking goal disruptions, remain to be tested.
Anger
Given that the changes associated with anger result from
situations involving obstacles to goals
that are still attainable, functional accounts would predict that
anger should result in better
outcomes in situations involving obstacles to goals.
Interpersonal effects. If anger promotes overcoming obstacles to
goals, then expression of anger should
elicit responses in others that make goal accomplishment more
likely, potentially through removing
themselves as obstacles or supporting one’s position. As with
sadness, these interpersonal effects are
necessarily dependent on the perception of the other person and
their relationship to the person ex-

pressing anger. Expressing anger has been described as a signal
to others that one is serious and might
lose control or take aggressive action (Pinker, 1997), and people
experiencing anger versus other
emotions are more likely to act aggressively toward others after
an insult (Harmon-Jones &
Sigelman, 2001; Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor,
1999). People seem to be intui-
tively aware of this connection, as supervisors report
strategically using the expression of anger to
resolve issues with employees (Lindebaum & Fielden, 2011). In
one investigation, participants were
paired with another player (actually a computer program) who
stated in writing that they were an-
gry or happy about an offer made by the participant during a
negotiation (or wrote nothing; Van
Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Participants facing an
angry opponent were more likely to
concede to the demands of the opponent, suggesting that
verbally expressing anger can result in
people capitulating to one’s desires. Similarly, participants
indicated that they would be more likely
to comply with the demands of an angry person who left a
message for them (Tamir & Ford, 2012).
There is evidence, however, that capitulation to the desires of a
person who expresses anger in a ne-
gotiation is dependent on a number of moderators. In one
investigation, participants conceded more to
an angry person,but only if they wantedto maintain
acontinuedrelationshipwiththe person(Sinaceur
& Tiedens, 2006). Similarly, participants conceded more to an
angry person if that person had relatively
high power, in the sense that their satisfaction would have an
impact on the participant (Van Kleef, De
Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). The expression of anger can

also result in rejection during nego-
tiations that involve multiple parties who form coalitions to
promote better negotiating power (Van
Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). Together, these findings
suggest that the expression of anger
can result in better outcomes in negotiations with others, but
that it is only effective to the extent that
the expresser has the ability to carry through on the implied
threat associated with anger expression.
The facial expression of anger might also convey cues that
compel others to comply. Partic-
ipants who viewed faces posing the different components of an
anger expression (i.e., browridge
lower, brow lower, cheekbones higher, nose wider, mouth
raised, lips thinner, chin raised) at-
tributed significantly greater strength to the person than when
the person had a neutral expres-
sion (Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014; see also Hess, Helfrecth,
Hagen, Sell, & Hewlett, 2010).
Thus, expressing anger might convey strength to others, making
it more likely that they would
remove themselves as obstacles to one’s goals. There is
evidence, however, that only expressing
anger facially is insufficient to motivate others to capitulate.
Participants engaged in a negotia-
tion with a confederate (a professional actor) who was
instructed to display fake anger (only
modifying facial expression, but not internal experience or tone)

or intense anger (modifying
experience; C té, Hideg, & van Kleef, 2013). Participants were
more likely to give into the de-
mands of an opponent expressing anger, but not if that anger
was only expressed facially, and
this difference was the result of a decreased sense of trust when
the opponent appeared to be
faking anger.
There is some evidence that expressing anger increases others’
support for one’s position. In
one investigation, participants watched a video of a politician
expressing anger or sadness
(Tiedens, 2001). Those who viewed the angry versus sad
politician had more positive attitudes
toward the politician, indicated that they were more likely to
vote for the politician, and viewed
the politician as a better leader. Similarly, people report that
they experience anger most often in
their close relationships and that one consequence of expressing
anger within those relationships
is that the target gained respect for the angry person (Averill,
1983).
Thus there is evidence that expressing anger verbally or facially
can change others’ behavior
in ways that promote overcoming obstacles to goals, although
the impact of expressing anger in
other ways is unknown and the impact on achieving better
outcomes outside of a negotiation
context, which is inherently contentious, is unclear.
Intrapersonal effects. Intrapersonally, anger should be
characterized by responses across systems that
enable overcoming obstacles and goal attainment. In one study,
participants who had been in-

duced to be angry kicked with more force on a physical task
than happy or neutral
participants, which might be effective in removing obstacles to
goals in physical encounters
(Woodman et al., 2009). Similarly, Darwin (1872) suggested
that the baring of teeth common
during angry expressions might ready the expresser to bite if
necessary, which might help people
overcome obstacles in physical fights. Frijda (1986) argued that
the lowered brow and frown that
are common in angry expressions reflect expressions that
promote focused visual attention and
might help angry people focus on a particular problem or target.
As with sadness, however, the
evidence that anger and responses that characterize anger
actually result in overcoming obstacles
and goal attainment is meager. There is correlational evidence
that people experiencing anger
persist longer on difficult tasks and consequently are more
successful on cognitive tasks that re-
quire persistence (Lench & Levine, 2008; Mikulincer, 1988).
However, because of the nature
of correlational research designs, it is also possible that
persisting longer elicits greater anger. In
one investigation, participants were induced to feel emotions
and then played a game that in-
volved confrontation (shooting enemies) or a non-
confrontational game (Tamir, Mitchell, &
Gross, 2008). Angry participants performed better during the
confrontational game than the
other game, and better than participants induced to feel
excitement or in a neutral condition.
If the enemies in the game can be conceptualized as obstacles,
then these findings would support
the notion that anger facilitates overcoming obstacles. Again,
the vast majority of predictions that

can be derived from a functional account remain to be tested,
including that anger should
promote better outcomes related to focused attention on goal
pursuits and concerns, reduced
moral restrictions, and greater physical responsiveness.
Functional Accounts in Context
Propositions that emotions are functional is often interpreted
within a broader evolutionary
account, with the assumption made that emotions resulted from
natural selection because they
provided a benefit in terms of survival or reproduction (Ekman,
1992; Lench, Bench, & Flores,
2013; Lench et al., 2011; Mauss et al., 2005; Pinker, 1997).
However, evidence that emotions
are functional, in the sense that they result in better outcomes in
particular situations, is only one
piece of evidence that is necessary to claim that emotions are
adaptations from natural selection
(Lench et al., 2015). Emotions can also be functional and result
in better outcomes because
people have learned that expressing or experiencing specific
emotions is useful in particular
situations (Averill, 1983; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett,
2013). Arguments that emotions
are adaptations in an evolutionary sense must draw on multiple
lines of evidence, and function-
ality is only one piece of supporting evidence (see Lench et al.,

2015, for a review of
this evidence). From an evolutionary perspective, however,
evidence of functionality is
considered particularly important for evaluating if a feature is
an adaptation. Such evidence is
equivalent to a “performance check,” to evaluate the likelihood
that a feature conveyed a
benefit that could have been selected for through evolutionary
processes.
The purpose of this review was to illustrate how a functional
account of emotions can be
implemented to organize predictions related to the causes and
consequences of emotion, and
to examine the evidence that two negative emotions – sadness
and anger – are functional.
Evidence suggests that sadness results in situations that involve
goal loss beyond one’s ability
to resolve and that sadness is associated with cognitive,
physiological, and behavioral changes.
Limited evidence further demonstrates that the changes
associated with sadness can result in
better outcomes in situations involving goal loss, either by
recruiting others to assist or by
promoting changes conducive to resolving goal loss such as
disengagement. Available evidence
reveals that anger results in situations that involve potential
goal loss than can be resolved by
overcoming obstacles to goals, and that anger is associated with
cognitive, physiological, and
behavioral changes. Evidence further suggests that the changes
associated with anger can result
in better outcomes in situations involving obstacles, either by
intimidating or impressing others,
or by promoting changes conducive to overcoming obstacles
such as physical force. Obviously

more work is needed that examines whether changes associated
with these emotions actually
result in better outcomes in particular situations. In other
words, research has defined the scope
of the tools, but it is not yet clear if or when the emotional tools
of sadness and anger are actually
effective in resolving problems.
Acknowledgement
The first author was supported during preparation of this article
by the National Science Foun-
dation (award #1451297).
Short Biographies
Heather Lench is an associate professor at Texas A&M
University. She conducts research on the
impact of emotions on thoughts and behavior. She received an
APA New Investigator Award
for work on affective reactions and optimism. She teaches
graduate seminars in Affective Sci-
ence and an undergraduate statistics course. She earned her BA
from Florida State University
and PhD from the University of California, Irvine.
Tom Tibbett is a graduate student at Texas A&M University.
His research interests include
decision-making, the function of emotion, and ostracism. He
earned his BA at the College of

William and Mary; he is currently completing his doctorate in
College Station. He has com-
pleted a graduate-level certification in Applied Statistics in
conjunction with his degree.
Shane W. Bench is a post-doctoral research associate at Texas
A&M University. His research
interests include the functions of emotions and social cognition,
with specific areas of interest
including boredom as a functional emotion, predictions of the
future, perceptions of the self
and others, and altruistic behavior. He has taught undergraduate
courses in social psychology,
prosocial behavior, and introductory psychology. He earned his
BS from Weber State
University and PhD from Texas A&M University.
Note
* Correspondence: Department of Psychology, Texas A&M
University, College Station, TX 77843-4235, USA. Email:
[email protected]
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