Academic Year 2019/20 Assessment Guide Term 2 Budget Analysis

Academic Year 2019/20
Assessment Guide
Term 2 20th January 2020 - 08th April 2020
Module Leader
Name: Dr Lazarus T. Mabvira
Email: [email protected]
Room: US2.33
Student Hours: Monday 15-1700hrs
Wednesday 14-1600hrs
Other Tutors
Kwabena AGYEMANG-BADU
Igbekele OSINUBI
Aini SHAHAR
Hatem ELFEITURI
Nurat AJIBADE

Assessment
Individual Coursework
10th April 2020 @ 2359hrs
This assignment accounts for 50% of the module marks.
Your Task:
The Fleet Highlands Café is a company that prepares meals for
tourists and citizens in its kitchen located next to the local
airport. The company’s planning and actual budgets for March
appears below:
The Fleet Highlands Café
Planning and actual budgets for the month ended March 31,
2019
PLANNING ACTUAL
Budgeted meals quantity (q)20 000 18 000
Revenues (£5.00q) £100 000 £90 000
Expenses:

Raw material (£2.50q) 50 000 45 000
Wages and salaries (£5 500+£0.25q) 10 500 10 000
Utilities (£2 500 + £0.05q) 3 500 3 400
Facility rent 5 000 5 500
Insurance 2 800 3 200
Fuel 2 500 2 800
Net Operating Income£25 700 £20 100
Required:
a) What is the objective of preparing a budget for Fleet
Highlands Café? (10 marks)
b) Prepare a report showing the company’s revenue and
spending variance for March? (20 marks)
c) Which variances should be of concern to management?
Explain (40 marks)
d) Advise the Fleet Highlands Café on what they need to do to
maintain their profitability and sustainability going forward. (20
marks)
The word count for this assignment is 1,500 words and will not
include the title page, executive summary, contents page or
bibliography.
It is important that you show knowledge of key debates within
the wider literature. Also, it is strongly advised that you are
critical in your writing and ensure a good level of integration
and coherence in applying theories. Please work on, and ensure
an excellent level of criticality, coherence, and flow of your
report. This will require effective discussion and clarity.
Please note that a significant amount of the marks is awarded
based on wider reading, critical and logical presentation, quality
of argument, referencing, academic integrity and academic
writing conventions. Please see Assessment Criteria on the
Moodle.

Reassessment
The reassessment will be a resubmission of this report, with
tracked changes made in response to the feedback given. The
date for Reassessment is 30th May 2020.
The Learning Outcomes assessed by this assessment are:
Knowledge
1. Demonstrate an understanding of different markets and
sources of finance; and the role of budgeting in an organisation.
2. Be able to assess budgets based financial data to support
organisational objectives (CMI Los 2).
Thinking skills
3. Analyse the information contained in a company’s annual
report; and appraise finance and investment decision.
Skills for life and work (general skills)
4. Demonstrate an understanding of the context within which
accounting operates, and the various local and international
standards that need to be complied with.
Subject-based practical skill
5. Effectively apply key ratios appropriate for analysing the
financial performance of the organisation.
6. Effectively apply budgets and investment appraisal
techniques.
We strongly suggest that you try to submit all coursework by
the deadline set as meeting deadlines will be expected in
employment. However, in our regulations, UEL has permitted
students to be able to submit their coursework up to 24 hours
after the deadline. The deadline is published in this module

guide. Coursework, which is submitted late, but within 24
hours of the deadline, will be assessed but subjected to a fixed
penalty of 5% of the total marks available (as opposed to marks
obtained). If you submit twice, once before the deadline and
once during the 24-hour late period, then the second submission
will be marked and 5% deducted. This rule only applies to
coursework. It does not apply to examinations, presentations,
performances, practical assessments or viva voce examinations.
If you miss these for a genuine reason, then you will need to
apply for extenuating circumstances, or accept that you will
receive a zero mark.
Further information is available in the Assessment & Feedback
Policy at
https://www.uel.ac.uk/Discover/Governance/Policies-
Regulations-Corporate-documents/Student-Policies (click on
other policies)
a) Assessment criteria for the task:
Assessment Criteria
Maximum Mark
Objectives of Preparing a Budget
10
Revenue and Spending Variance Report
20
Variance which should concern Management
40
Advising Twin Rivers Café
20
Clarity & Structure: i.e. detailed, coherent and formal structure
should be demonstrated. It also should be well presented

5
Referencing: appropriate application of Harvard referencing
should be evident
5
Total Mark
100
b) Guidance on referencing
As a student you will be taught how to write correctly
referenced essays usingUEL's standard Harvard referencing
system from Cite Them Right. Cite them Right is the standard
Harvard referencing style at UEL for all Schools apart from the
School of Psychology which uses the APA system. This book
will teach you all you need to know about Harvard referencing,
plagiarism and collusion. The electronic version of “Cite Them
Right: the essential referencing guide” 9th edition, can be
accessed whilst on or off campus, via UEL Direct. The book can
only be read online and no part of it can be printed nor
downloaded.
Further information is available at:
https://uelac.sharepoint.com/LibraryandLearningServices/Pages/
default.aspx
c) Details of submission procedures:
Notice is hereby given that all submissions for this component
must be submitted to Turnitin.” If you fail to submit component
to Turnitin, in accordance with the guidance provided on the
Virtual Learning Environment (Moodle), a mark of 0 will be
awarded for the component.
Submitting Assessments Using Turnitin:
Turnitin is required for coursework assessments, such as

report/research papers or projects in Microsoft Word,
PowerPoint, and in PDF format. There are two main reasons we
want you to use Turnitin:
· Turnitin can help you avoid academic breaches and plagiarism.
When you use Turnitin before a submission deadline, you can
use the Originality Report feature to compare your work to
thousands of other sources (like websites, Wikipedia, and even
other student papers). Anything in your work that identically
matches another source is highlighted for you to see. When you
use this feature before the deadline, you will have time to revise
your work to avoid an instance of academic breach/plagiarism.
· Turnitin saves paper. When using Turnitin to electronically
submit your work, you will almost never have to submit a paper
copy.
Late Submissions Using Turnitin
UEL has permitted students to be able to submit their
coursework up to 24 hours after the deadline. Assessments that
are submitted up to 24 hours late are still marked, but with a 5%
deduction. However, you must be very careful when you are
submitting your assessment. If you submit your work twice,
once using the original deadline link and then again using the
late submission link on Turnitin, your assignment will be
graded as late with the 5% deduction.
Turnitin System Failure
Best Advice: Don’t wait until the last minute to submit your
assessments electronically. If you experience a problem
submitting your work with Turnitin, you should notify your
lecturer / tutor by email immediately. However, deadlines are
not extended unless there is a significant systems problem with
Turnitin. UEL has specific plans in place to address these
issues. If UEL finds that the issue with the system was
significant, you will receive an email notifying you of the issue
and that you have been given a 24-hour extension. If you don’t
receive any email that specifically states you have been given

an extension, then the original deadline has not been changed.
d) Feedback and return of work:
Work should be submitted on Turnitin and all feedback will be
on Turnitin. This will be released to students on 01st May 2020
at 1700hrs.
You may submit formative work to your seminar tutor by 03rd
April 2020. Generic feedback will be given to the whole class.
1
Updated January 2020
GENERAL COMMENTS—CASE 3
Incorporate statesmanship model within case. Apply the model
rather than just state it.
Importance of planning and implementation of policy/programs
applied to character(s) and
organizations in case, not just mentioned.
Much of text is not supported by citations but opinion.
Integrate Biblical principles within the analysis of the paper not
just added at the end of case.
Importance of Program Evaluation not just mentioned but
analyzed as part of case.
Importance of Conflict resolution/Consensus building not just
mentioned but analyzed as part of case.

Importance of Covenant not just mentioned but analyzed as part
of case.
Importance of Statescraft not just mentioned but analyzed as
part of case.
The case is fabricated or an opinion of the student. Choose
specific case with characters,
organizations, events, decisions, actions, etc.
Does not use most of previous articles/materials offered in the
course.
Check Box1: OffCheck Box3: OffCheck Box4: OffCheck Box5:
OffCheck Box6: OffCheck Box8: OffCheck Box9: OffCheck
Box10: OffCheck Box11: OffCheck Box12: Off
GENERAL COMMENTS—CASE 3
Incorporate statesmanship model within case. Apply the model
rather than just state it.
Importance of planning and implementation of policy/programs
applied to character(s) and
organizations in case, not just mentioned.
Much of text is not supported by citations but opinion.
Integrate Biblical principles within the analysis of the paper not
just added at the end of case.
Importance of Program Evaluation not just mentioned but

analyzed as part of case.
Importance of Conflict resolution/Consensus building not just
mentioned but analyzed as part of case.
Importance of Covenant not just mentioned but analyzed as part
of case.
Importance of Statescraft not just mentioned but analyzed as
part of case.
The case is fabricated or an opinion of the student. Choose
specific case with characters,
organizations, events, decisions, actions, etc.
Does not use most of previous articles/materials offered in the
course.
Check Box1: OffCheck Box3: OffCheck Box4: OffCheck Box5:
OffCheck Box6: OffCheck Box8: OffCheck Box9: OffCheck
Box10: OffCheck Box11: OffCheck Box12: Off
Evidence in Public
Administration
Thomas J. Catlaw is the Frank
and June Sackton Professor of Public
Administration and associate professor of
public affairs in the School of Public Affairs

at Arizona State University.
E-mail: [email protected]
Margaret Stout is associate professor
of public administration at West Virginia
University. Her research explores the role
of public and nonprofi t practitioners in
achieving democratic social and economic
justice, with specifi c interests in administra-
tive theory and sustainable community
development. She comes to these topics
from a career as a community development
practitioner, now coordinating a master of
public administration degree concentra-
tion in local governance and community
development.
Governing Small-Town America Today: The Promise and
Dilemma of Dense Networks 225
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 76, Iss. 2, pp. 225–229. © 2016 by

The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12520.
dynamics that lend a unique quality to governing that
deserves more attention from researchers.
In this sense, Trautman’s article is particularly wel-
come in this new section of Public Administration
Review. First, while the United States is an increas-
ingly urbanized society, 1 in 10 Americans still lives
in a small town; yet small-town government is one of
the least researched arenas of governance. Second, the
intertwined issues that she raises point to the chal-
lenge of mobilizing evidence in a straightforward,
instrumental manner to address governance dilemmas.
Th is confi rms that we do need practitioner stories
to guide both what we research and how we teach
(Hummel 1991).
Responding to the complexity of issues that con-
front leaders in small-town government is like a
game of pick-up sticks.2 Myriad issues overlap; pull
on one and another shifts place, and getting that
winning black stick out of the pile can seem nearly
impossible. Small-town government is complicated
because it is where nearly every issue of society comes
home to roost, often in one-on-one “public encoun-
ters” (Bartels 2015) that are magnifi ed and quite
personalized.
In this response, we comment on some of the “sticks”
in the pile. We want to emphasize, however, that
there is great variation in the political, economic, and
historical specifi cs of each small town, and we do not

know much about Trautman’s town and its context.
Th us, we off er relevant evidence from social research
Abstract: Th is essay examines the governance of small towns in
the United States. Small towns have received little
attention in the public administration literature to date, yet 1 in
10 Americans still lives in one, representing roughly
75 percent of all municipalities in the United States and some
33 million people. Small towns are characterized as
dense, multiplex networks that lend unique dynamics to local
politics. However, they face signifi cant social, economic,
technological, and demographic trends that compromise towns’
prevailing frame of reference, fracture their networks,
and alter the traditional setting of small-town governance. In
the face of these issues, “thicker,” more active ways of
engaging the public are needed to reknit community bonds and
build civic capacity. Service learning for master of
public administration students is proposed as a way to develop
the emotional intelligence necessary to make sense of the
complex social dynamics of small towns and to facilitate the
hard work of building enabling relationships.
Governing Small-Town America Today:
Th e Promise and Dilemma of Dense Networks
Kimberley R. Isett, Brian W. Head, and Gary VanLandingham,
Editors
Thomas J. Catlaw
Arizona State University
Margaret Stout
West Virginia University
Small towns occupy an ambiguous place in the American
political imagination. Th ink, for example, about the 1998 fi lm

Pleasantville.
In Pleasantville, life is orderly, predictable, and, as
many of the characters confi rm, downright pleasant.
Neighbors know one another and seem to treat one
another with care and concern. But there is a dark
underbelly. Th e residents are also closed-minded
and unwelcoming of change and diff erence. In his
recent study, sociologist Robert Wuthnow writes
that a similar duality characterizes media coverage of
small towns. On the one side, there are “wouldn’t it
be nice?” nostalgia pieces, and on the other, portray-
als of a “sorry remnant of an America that has been
left behind . . . [home] of hapless, poorly educated
Americans who have little better to do than watch the
grass grow” (2013, xii).
In contrast to these stereotypical portrayals in fi lm
and the media, Rhonda Riherd Trautman off ers an
on-the-ground view of the challenges of governing
in a real small town today in her article “Small-Town
Policy Makers.”1 She shows that these towns share
many of the same issues as large cities: how to encour-
age broader public involvement, work with conten-
tious residents and overcome factionalism, and make
the most of new information technologies. Other
research indicates that small towns also deal with “big
city” issues such as racial polarization, drugs, poverty,
immigration, and increasing diversity (Carr, Lichter,
and Kefals 2012; Lichter and Brown 2011). But, as
Trautman writes, small towns do remain distinctive:
their social and geographic scale can create particular
226 Public Administration Review • March | April 2016

(Stout, Dougherty, and Dudley, forthcoming). Th ird, they can
lead
to incivility among factions that do not engage with one another
personally or through business dealings. Fourth, just as in any
other
instance of pressure politics, they lead to preferential policy
deci-
sions based on social and business ties. Th us, small towns can
vacil-
late between “rancorous confl ict” and “superfi cial harmony”—
both
of which hamper eff ective policy making and implementation
(Flora
and Flora 1993, 51).
The Changing Nature of American Small Towns
For many residents of small towns, the town is its people. But
many
small towns today are changing rapidly and facing new stressors
that
push and pull on interpersonal relationships. In other words,
“the
people” are changing in important ways (Catlaw 2007), and this
creates new challenges and opportunities for government.
For starters, over the last several decades, there has been
consider-
able out-migration of the more highly educated, human-capital-
rich
members of small towns. Th is “brain drain” (Lichter and
Brown
2011; Weber et al. 2007) often leaves behind an aging
population
and an anemic economy. Yet this vacuum invites new migration
trends.

While small towns have rarely been as homogeneous as
Pleasantville
(Macgregor 2010, especially chapters 4 and 5), small towns are
more diverse than ever. For example, many are new destinations
for predominantly poor Latino/a immigrants that bring with
them
new languages, norms, and transnational social ties (Lichter and
Brown 2011). Th is can threaten people’s sense of “belonging”
and
alienate new arrivals from social and political engagement
(Chavez
2009; McConnell and Miraftab 2009). Th ere can be strong
social
pressures to conform to dominant largely white, middle-class
norms
(Leitner 2012).
At the other end of the economic spectrum, small-town America
is
increasingly desirable as providing recreational, leisure, and
retire-
ment amenities for urban dwellers. Th ese “external” audiences
shape
gentrifi cation dynamics that can, for instance, pit economic
devel-
opment against environmental and agricultural protection. Th is
can
also entail an infl ux of newcomers—often affl uent and
educated—
with “urban” sensibilities and expectations. Th ese demographic
changes generate new cleavages to bridge before communities
can
benefi t from the infusion of new kinds of human and social
capital
(Lichter and Brown 2011; Salamon 2003).

Finally, as Trautman notes, information technology is an ever
more
important part of government today (Mergel 2012; Zavattaro
and
Bryer 2016). While we can constructively use the Internet to
build
community (Castells 2015), technologies are shaping small-
town
life in complex ways. First, information technologies can
further
unsettle the boundedness of small-town networks. Even
residents
in remote areas now access infi nite news, media, and
information
sources from around the globe. Th is complicates “the local” as
the
prevailing frame of reference at the same time that it opens
com-
munities to new ideas and information. Second, the anonymity
of
many online platforms can cut against the power of visibility
and
familiarity in small-town networks (Borah 2013). For example,
one
of the more toxic platforms is Topix.com, which ostensibly
exists to
bring to light “Your Town. Your News. Your Take.” While
laudable
and Margaret Stout’s own experience doing community develop-
ment work in small-town Appalachia that, we hope, speaks to
issues
in both small-town America generally and Trautman’s
experience in
particular.

Small Towns as Dense Networks
One way to understand small towns and their dynamics is to
view
them as dense, multiplex networks of relationships; as the
saying
goes, “everyone knows everyone.” It is rarely the case, of
course,
that everyone really knows everyone. But this phrase works as
shorthand to describe a situation in which “enough interaction
does occur over suffi ciently extended periods that people gain
familiarity with one another, become visible in the community,
and share background information with each other” (Wuthnow
2013, xv). In other words, even if everyone does not know you,
“everyone knows your business” (Macgregor 2010, 3). To say
these
networks are multiplex is just to give a technical name to the
reality
that Trautman captures when she writes that elected offi cials
may
also be bankers, lawyers, doctors, business owners, teachers,
pas-
tors, and so on: people in small towns encounter one another
across
multiple roles.
As in the case Trautman describes, research shows that dense
networks and multiplex relations have their upsides and
downsides
(Portes 1998). Advantageously, dense networks can be eff
ective at
enforcing and maintaining social norms. Th is can help produce
solidarity and the kind of “we’re in it together” community
spirit
that small-town life conjures. Dense, overlapping networks can
also help the fl ow of information and increase the likelihood
that

people hear the same information from more than one source.
Th is,
in turn, can speed diff usion of information and actually
encourage
behavior change (Centola and Macy 2007). Well-known areas of
research on these kinds of benefi ts are immigrant enclaves in
cities.
In these communities, various kinds of social, human, and fi
nancial
capital fl ow through the networks, enabled by regulating
norms. In
theory, small towns’ dense, multiplex relations can create norms
that
are empowering and community oriented.
However, these same dense relationships and norms can be
exclu-
sionary and constraining. For example, one of the typical expec-
tations in small-town America is self-suffi ciency and “not to
be
burden on the community . . . unless you are in desperate
straits”
(Wuthnow 2013, 120). Sherman’s (2006) study of a small town
in
Northern California demonstrates how relational pressures
encour-
aged poor residents to develop “socially acceptable” coping
strategies
outside the welfare system. Th is can create unique diffi culties
for
poorer members of small towns.
Trautman’s commentary attributes similar social norms and
politi-
cal dynamics to “proximity.” Her depictions of small-town
politics

are substantiated in other studies, where a thicket of
interpersonal
dynamics complicates attempts at collaborative governance
between
residents and formal groups (Stout 2015; Stout and Kunz 2015).
First, small-town norms of civility and conviviality (Wuthnow
2013) may discourage direct confrontation and open confl ict,
thereby encouraging backroom dealings that may break open
meeting laws and generating gossip and rumors that quickly
spread
across town. Second, these dense relations may discourage
people
from public service in both elected and formal volunteer
positions
States in large cities, experiences in Latin America and Canada
show
it can be done in small towns. Indeed Clarkson, Georgia
(popula-
tion about 7,500), launched its fi rst participatory budgeting eff
ort
in July 2015. It is critical, though, that public managers be clear
about the purpose of these eff orts, and thoughtful in the design
and
implementation of them. Disingenuous, poorly planned, or half-
hearted eff orts to involve the public can do more harm than
good
(Bryer 2011).
“The Blame Game”
Understandably, Trautman might fi nd some of these

suggestions
unworkable. If people do not read informational fl yers, how
can we
expect them to come to participatory meetings? She attributes
the
public’s lack of participation in governance to “indiff erence,
lack
of time, or information.” However, the story is more
complicated.
“Apathy” is often attributable to repeated experiences of ineff
ectual
participation (Stout 2010). Other research generally confi rms
that
there is an increasingly strong class infl ection in American
political
participation (Leighley and Nagler 2013; Gilens and Page
2014).
Institutional experiences at home, work, and school also can
con-
tribute to whether people engage in political and civic life
(Kupchik
and Catlaw 2015; Rawlings and Catlaw 2011).
Clearly, government cannot control all the factors that shape
whether people participate. But it needs to shoulder its share of
the
blame for a lack of constructive public engagement and limited
suc-
cess in including its full community. A much more active,
informed,
and committed eff ort from government is needed to strengthen
civic capacity.
Getting Administrators Ready to Go
In closing, we want to echo Trautman’s concerns about the edu-
cation of master of public administration (MPA) students. One

fruitful response to the limited public management literature on
small-town governance is fi eld-based experiential learning.
Indeed,
the inability of theory to meet the complexities of real world
prac-
tice is one motivation for service learning through MPA
capstone
courses, applied research assignments, and internships (Stout
and
Holmes 2013). It also speaks to the importance of
“pracademics”
(Posner 2009), clinical professors, and professors of practice.
Service learning is designed to produce curriculum-driven
learning
outcomes and applied research knowledge (Stout 2013).
Analytical
refl ection on those experiences fosters the linkage of theory
and
practice (Collier and Williams 2005; Cunningham 1997;
Imperial,
Perry, and Katula 2007; Stout and Holmes 2013). Th ese
pedago-
gies prepare students for real-world expectations of self-
direction,
teamwork, and interorganizational confl ict and collaboration
(Abel
2009; Bushouse and Morrison 2001; Dicke, Dowden, and Torres
2004; Imperial, Perry, and Katula 2007; Killian 2004;
Lambright
and Lu 2009; Waldner and Hunter 2008; Whitaker and Berner
2004). Perhaps of greatest interest here is the opportunity to
develop
the emotional intelligence (Kramer 2007) necessary to make
sense
of the complex social dynamics of small towns and to facilitate

the
hard work of building enabling relationships.
In the end, we suggest that the unique interpersonal dynamics of
small towns are under great strain, making it ever more
challeng-
ing to govern and build community. In the face of new
challenges,
in theory, posts often contain diatribes and misinformation
about
anyone who dares step into a community leadership role.
However,
it may be possible to moderate such online forums in ways that
encourage civil, productive exchanges without censoring
criticism
(Lampe et al. 2014).
In short, to varying degrees American small towns are being
shaped
by economic and demographic forces that complicate the
potential
of dense networks to stage positive change. But the
opportunities
aff orded by the small scale and multiplex relationships of small
towns remain.
Rebuilding Civic Infrastructure though Thicker
Participation
To make the most of this potential, small-town governments
need
to think broadly about the importance of building and
strengthen-
ing community capacity (Chaskin et al. 2001). Trautman seems
to
support this idea when she writes of “building a strong

community
base.” While they often get the most attention, fi nancial,
techni-
cal, and physical resources are not always the missing
ingredient.
Paradoxically, while community members frequently laud “the
people” of their towns as their most treasured asset,
dysfunctional
relationships among them hinder their ability to collaborate—
even
when ample opportunities for economic growth and
revitalization
are at hand (Stout 2015). Th us, the challenge is to build bridges
across diff erence through relational attitudes, cooperative
inter-
personal styles, and participatory modes of association that
enable
integrative approaches to collective action (Stout and Love
2015).
Th is work can leverage the potential of the social and
geographic
scale of small towns.
Indeed, fl ourishing communities provide the civic
infrastructure
necessary to build robust bridging networks (National Civic
League
1999), enabling other resources to be mobilized. Flora and
Flora’s
(1993) extensive fi eldwork on social infrastructure in rural
commu-
nities confi rms this. Stout’s (2015) preliminary study of
Appalachian
towns explores specifi c barriers to the development of eff
ective social
and civic infrastructure that are similar to the challenges

Trautman
describes. Without question, strengthening these networks
requires
patience and the ability to engage diff erence and confl ict as a
crea-
tive opportunity. But it can be done. Th e work emphasizes
process
rather than winning or losing; depersonalizing politics;
cultivating a
broad, diversifi ed sense of who “we” are in community; and
sharing
leadership and decision-making roles beyond established civic
and
political leaders (Flora and Flora 1993).
Unfortunately, traditional public engagement typically
constrains
dialogue to serial one-way statements between the public and
deci-
sion makers. Building civic infrastructure requires robust, face-
to-
face public encounters and “thick” forms of public engagement
(Nabatchi and Leighninger 2015). Th ese participatory practices
aim
to foster mutual understanding and meaningful policy infl uence
(see, e.g., King 2011; King, Feltey, and Susel 1998; Roberts
2004).
Well-known examples include citizen assemblies, citizen juries,
and
study circles. In the context of small towns, participatory
budgeting
may hold promise because it involves opening up both the
decision-
making and resource-allocation process for specifi c portions of
the
local budget (see http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/).

While
participatory budgeting has been used only selectively in the
United
228 Public Administration Review • March | April 2016
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to
reknit community bonds and build civic capacity.
Notes
1. It is hard to defi ne “small town” in a single way that is
satisfying for all purposes.
Population, population density, commuting rates to a central
metropolis, and
levels of “urbanization” are used. Th e issue has become even
more diffi cult as the
line between urban and rural blurs (Lichter and Brown 2011).
For purposes of

this article, we follow Wuthnow (2013, 8) and loosely defi ne
“small towns” as
jurisdictions of fewer than 25,000 residents that are not
considered part of an
“urban fringe.” Th is represents roughly 75 percent of all towns
and cities in the
United States and includes some 33 million people.
2. In the game of pick-up sticks, also called jackstraws or
spillikins, a bundle of
multicolored sticks is held vertically on a fl at surface and then
released. Th e
sticks fall at random, creating a jumbled, disordered fi eld or
pile of sticks. Players
remove as many sticks as possible without disturbing the other
sticks. Th e goal is
to remove a single black stick.
Acknowledgments
Th e authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the
follow-
ing colleagues in the preparation of this article: Spiro Maroulis,
Staci Zavattaro, Daniel Schugurensky, Josh Lerner, Erik
Johnston,
Ines Mergel, and Linda Williams. Xuefan Zhang provided
valuable
research assistance. Responsibility for the fi nal content of the
article
belongs to the authors.
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Donald P. Moynihan is professor in
the La Follette School of Public Affairs,
University of Wisconsin–Madison. He is
fellow of the National Academy of Public

Administration, author of The Dynamics
of Performance Management:
Constructing Information and Reform
(Georgetown University Press, 2008), and
winner of the ASPA/NASPAA Distinguished
Research Award.
Joe Soss is the inaugural Cowles Chair for
the Study of Public Service at the University
of Minnesota, where he holds faculty
positions in the Hubert H. Humphrey School
of Public Affairs and the Departments of
Political Science and Sociology. His research
and teaching explore the interplay of
democratic politics, societal inequali-
ties, and public policy. His most recent
coauthored book is Disciplining the
Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the
Persistent Power of Race (with Richard

C. Fording and Sanford F. Schram; University
of Chicago Press, 2011).
320 Public Administration Review • May | June 2014
Vol. 74, Iss. 3, pp. 320–332. © 2014 by
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12200.
Rosemary O’Leary, Editor
Donald P. Moynihan
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Joe Soss
University of Minnesota
Th is article surveys the policy feedback framework
developed in political science and clarifi es its implications
for public administration. A feedback perspective encour-
ages us to ask how policy implementation transforms the
webs of political relations that constitute governance.
Administrators play a key role in shaping the political
conditions of bureaucratic performance and the organi-
zation of power in the broader polity. At the same time,
this perspective underscores that policies are more than
just objects of administrative action. Policies are political
forces in their own right that can alter key components of
administration, including phenomena such as organiza-

tional capacity, structures, rou-
tines, authorities, motivations and
cultures. Th ese sorts of admin-
istrative themes have received
little attention in policy feedback
research, just as the political eff ects
of policies have been overlooked
in public administration studies.
Bridging these perspectives off ers a basis for exciting new
agendas and advances in public administration research.
What is the relationship between admin-istration and politics?
Few questions in the study of bureaucracy are as vexed and
enduring. Many scholars sidestep it, opting to remain
silent on politics and, thus, drain it from their accounts
of administration. Yet it is rare today to fi nd explicit
Wilsonian claims that the two exist in separate spheres.
Indeed, the dialogue between administrative and polit-
ical analysis has grown decidedly richer in recent years.
Scholars increasingly recognize that bureaucracies must
serve many political masters at once (Derthick 1990).
Political interests design bureaucratic structures to
advance political goals (Moe 1989). Administrators
are politically situated in governing networks (Lynn,
Heinrich, and Hill 2001) and are often called on to
bring stakeholders together in participatory processes
(Feldman and Khademian 2007).
In this article, we aim to deepen this dialogue by
introducing students of administration to the concept
of policy feedback and elaborating its implications
for the fi eld. Policy is typically studied as an outcome
of politics. Feedback research complements this view
with its opposite, asking how “new policies create
new politics” (Schattschneider 1935). Conceiving the

relationship between policy and politics as an ongoing
interplay, researchers analyze how each shapes the
other over time (Soss, Hacker, and Mettler 2007).
As with any eff ort to import a concept, ours requires
some bridging assumptions. Th e administrative
signifi cance of the claim that “policies shape politics”
depends on how one con-
ceives policies and politics,
respectively.
First, we assume that a policy
is more than the letter of the
law: it also includes administra-
tive practices of translation and
implementation. If one accepts this assumption, then
the claim “policy shapes politics” implies the subclaim
“administration shapes politics.” Th is assertion directs
scholars to study not just how political forces impinge
on administration but also how administrative organi-
zations act on and transform political relations. Th e
political eff ects of policy implementation, in this view,
can matter for a society at least as much as the social
and economic impacts that scholars typically study. At
the same time, because political forces aff ect admin-
istration, a feedback perspective suggests an evolving
transaction of the two: bureaucracies are not only
creatures but also creators of the political forces that
impinge on them.
Second, we assume that administrative organizations
are, in their own right, sites of politics. Th ey are other
things as well, of course. But they are political insofar
as they entail phenomena such as power relations,

authority structures, ideological commitments, rights
and obligations, and decisions regarding “who gets
what, when, how” (Lasswell 1936). If one accepts
this idea, then the claim that “policy shapes politics”
Policy Feedback and the Politics of Administration
Th e administrative signifi cance
of the claim that “policies shape
politics” depends on how one
conceives policies and politics.
Policy Feedback and the Politics of Administration 321
Contemplating the welfare state, Marshall (1964) argued that
poli-
cies institutionalize social rights in ways that transform civil
and
political rights, while Piven and Cloward (1971) argued that
welfare
policies function as tools for pacifying political unrest, shoring
up
political legitimacy, and setting the terms of power relations
between
labor and capital. Lipsky (1980) suggested that the experiences
of
street-level bureaucracy infl uence citizens’ political beliefs and
orien-
tations, and Edelman (1977) argued that administrative
categories
and divisions could structure political cognitions in mass
publics.
Beginning in the early 1990s, scholars began to connect these

themes and develop policy feedback as a distinct approach to
politi-
cal analysis. To understand what emerged, it is helpful to
concep-
tualize the literature along two dimensions. Th e fi rst
distinguishes
between eff ects on political elites and mass publics (Pierson
1993).
Focusing on elites, institutionalist scholars emphasized how
new
policies aff ect the positions, capacities, and beliefs of actors in
inter-
est groups and at various levels of the state (Skocpol 1992;
Pierson
1994; Th elen 2004). Even minor policy changes, they demon-
strated, can set “path-dependent” processes in motion that
constrain
political possibilities and future policy development (Pierson
2000;
Mahoney 2006). Policies establish templates for governance that
offi cials learn to use refl exively, even when alternatives are
avail-
able (Heclo 1974). Th ey shape institutional capacities in ways
that
raise or lower the diffi culty of pursuing new initiatives
(Skocpol
1992). As organized interests adapt to new
policies, they often grow dependent on them
and become invested in their continuation
(Hacker 2002). In these and other ways, poli-
cies can reshape the assumptions, positions,
interests, identities, and capacities of elite
actors in the state, surrounding issue net-
works, and interest group systems.

At the mass level, feedback research has explored how policies
“make citizens” and infl uence publics (Mettler and Soss 2004).
As
Campbell summarizes, policies shape patterns of citizen
participa-
tion by “aff ecting levels of politically relevant resources, aff
ect-
ing feelings of political engagement such as political effi cacy
and
political interest, and aff ecting the likelihood of political
mobiliza-
tion by interest groups and other political entrepreneurs” (2012,
336). Policies convey cues to the public about civic standing,
group
deservingness, and the nature of social problems (Schneider and
Ingram 1997; Soss and Schram 2007). As the GI Bill provided
educational benefi ts to military veterans, for example, it
cultivated
political beliefs, identities, and skills that bolstered civic
engagement
(Mettler 2005). By contrast, experiences with criminal justice
and
paternalist welfare policies contribute to negative views of
govern-
ment and political marginalization (Bruch, Ferree, and Soss
2010;
Weaver and Lerman 2010).
Along a second dimension, feedback scholarship can be seen as
encompassing both causal and constructivist approaches to
expla-
nation. For many, it represents a causal proposition in eff orts
to
explain political outcomes and policy trajectories. In feedback
research, as Pierson (1993) explains, “eff ect becomes cause.”
Th rough the political dynamics they set in motion, earlier

policy
outcomes play a causal role in constraining or promoting later
policy developments. Th ey operate as state-crafted institutions
that
implies the subclaim “policy shapes administration.” Th is
assertion
directs scholars to study not just how administrators transform
policy but also how policies shape administrative organizations.
Most studies in the fi eld treat administrators as agents who use
their
discretion to reshape policy objects. Feedback scholarship
suggests
a more dialogic relationship. As organizations implement a
policy,
they transform it and are themselves transformed.
Administrators
shape policy outcomes, but policies also have the power to
disrupt
and reconfi gure administration. Th ey can restructure
authorities,
alter routines, redistribute resources, and reframe culture,
identity,
and motivation.
Our article proceeds in four stages. Th e fi rst defi nes policy
feedback
and outlines its implications for political analysis. Th e second
clari-
fi es how administration matters for the broader polity and oper-
ates to transform political relations and environments. Th e
third
describes how public policies operate as active forces in the
order-
ing of administration. Th e fourth section presents a more
concrete

discussion of how policies infl uence administration by
exploring
the eff ects of welfare reform in three areas: organizational
culture,
worker discretion, and personnel motivation.
What Is Policy Feedback?
Policy feedback denotes the potential for policies to transform
poli-
tics and, as a result, infl uence future courses of policy
development.
Political scientists have long acknowledged
that policies can have political repercus-
sions. For example, conventional models of
democratic politics—from pluralist models
of group grievances (Dahl 1971) to rational
choice models of retrospective voting (Fiorina
1981) to systems models in which citizens
respond to policy outputs (Easton 1957) —
entail dynamics of public accountability in
some form. Yet policies in these sorts of analyses are rarely
studied as
more than objects of political approval or disapproval. Political
actors
respond to policies after enactment just as they would have
before
passage: they take action or do not, they reward or punish
public
offi cials, and so on, because, for reasons that are exogenous to
the
policy itself, they approve or disapprove of particular
governmental
actions.
In contemporary political science, the concept of policy
feedback

suggests that policies can transform the political landscape in
ways
that are far more fundamental and varied. Policies, in this view,
are not just political objects; they are political forces that
recon-
fi gure the underlying terms of power, reposition actors in
political
relations, and reshape political actors’ identities,
understandings,
interests, and preferences. Indeed, to explain policy outcomes,
this
approach suggests, one must often look to the political
dynamics set
in motion by policy actions at earlier points in time.
Recent scholarship in this area builds on a variety of
intellectual
foundations. In an early landmark, Schattschneider (1935)
argued
that new policies reconfi gure the terms of pressure group confl
ict.
Lowi (1964) suggested that terms of political interaction depend
on
whether the policy at issue is distributive, redistributive, or
regula-
tory. Wilson (1973) theorized that patterns of political
engagement
depend on the ways that policies distribute costs and benefi ts.
Policy feedback denotes
the potential for policies to
transform politics and infl uence
future courses of policy
development.

provide the most formal rendering of this perspective, but its
logic is
deployed widely in the fi eld (Waterman and Meier 1998).
Th e second conception identifi es politics as a terrain that
adminis-
trators navigate in their eff orts to achieve goals. Th us, agency
direc-
tors are forced to think about how to serve “multiple masters” at
once (Derthick 1990). Th e polity is an “authorizing
environment”
that public managers must approach creatively if they hope to
secure
legitimacy and support for their visions of the public good
(Moore
1995). Active eff orts to engage stakeholders and acquire
political
support are seen today as central to eff ective public
management
(Moynihan and Hawes 2012). Th us, politics is not only a force
that
shapes bureaucracy; it is also an obstacle course that
administrators
must traverse to achieve their goals.
Th e concept of policy feedback does not deny these insights. It
incorporates them in an analysis of how administration fi ts
into,
and matters for, the broader interchange of politics and policy
in a
society. To develop this kind of analysis, scholars must specify,

fi rst,
how policies shape the political environment for administration
and, second, how administration of a policy can transform
broader
relations in the polity.
Policy implementation can reorganize power relations in a
society,
redefi ne terms of political confl ict, mobilize or pacify
constituen-
cies, and convey cues about group deservingness.
Administrative
categories can divide one social group from another and frame
perceptions of societal problems. As policies are put into
practice,
they can produce new social identities and political interests or
establish new confi gurations of rights and obligations.
Bureaucratic
encounters can teach citizens lessons about the state, mark them
in
politically consequential ways, alter their political capacities,
and
reposition them in relation to other citizens and dominant
institu-
tions. Th rough these and other processes, bureaucracies shape
their
own political environments and alter the broader organization
and
functioning of the polity.
As students of administration have left these dynamics
unattended,
scholars in other fi elds have pointed the way toward promising
avenues of research. Th eir eff orts provide a foundation for
exciting
new agendas in the fi eld of public administration.

Feedback research suggests, for example, that more attention
should
be paid to the political consequences of administrative divisions
and categories. Census categories, for instance, have repeatedly
redefi ned racial distinctions in the United
States, often with profound consequences for
political identities, solidarities, and inter-
ests (Hochschild, Weaver, and Burch 2012;
Yanow 2002). Out of the continuous process
of aging, the Social Security Administration
delineated, and thereby produced, “seniors” as
a distinct social and political group (Campbell
2003). Military, welfare, and immigration agencies specifi ed
“the homosexual” as a knowable and governable political
subject
(Canaday 2009). Th ese and related cases underscore how
adminis-
trative categories can become embedded in normative
assumptions,
functioning as seemingly natural “principles of vision and
division”
that organize perception, choice, and action (Bourdieu 1999).
structure political interaction and have both intended and unin-
tended causal eff ects on political actors (Pierson 2006).
A second strand of argument stresses more constructivist and
relational themes. Here, feedback scholars build on
participatory
democratic arguments that citizens—both as individuals and as
collectives—are constructed through experiences with political
institutions and relations (Dewey 1927; Pateman 1970). Many
also draw on the work of Edelman (1964, 1977), who theorized

governmental actions as moves in an ongoing political transac-
tion. Policies, Edelman argued, can threaten or reassure,
cultivate
beliefs, and evoke mass arousal or quiescence—not so much as
a
causal eff ect but rather as one statement elicits a response in an
ongoing dialogue. Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) theory of
“target
populations” can be seen as a prominent inheritor of this
tradition.
Feedback scholarship in this vein analyzes how policies fi t into
ongoing political transactions and construct objects and subjects
of
governance.
Across these diff erences, feedback scholarship off ers a
coherent
prescription for political analysis: public policy must be
analyzed
as a political outcome and as a force that infl uences political
actors,
organizes political understandings, and structures political
relations.
“Th e same political process that assembles [public policy] is,
in turn,
reshaped by its own products” (Soss 1999, 377).
In political analysis, the concept of policy feedback poses a
direct
challenge to systems theories that treat citizen demands as
inputs
and public policies as outputs (Easton 1957). In policy analysis,
it is
equally hard to square with models that envision “the policy
proc-
ess” as a linear series of stages (Bardach 1977). In normative

political
theory, it complicates eff orts to use “responsiveness to
citizens” as
a yardstick for evaluating representative democratic systems
(Disch
2013). In the sections that follow, we explore its implications
for the
study of public administration.
Policy Implementation Matters for the Polity
Implementation is often a pivotal moment in the interplay of
politics and policy—a moment with signifi cant consequences
for
the polity as a whole. Yet students of administration rarely
study it
from this perspective. In the fi eld today, two conceptions of
politics
prevail instead.
Th e fi rst locates administration at the receiving end of
politics.
Political forces, in this view, create bureaucracies and act on
them
as they implement policy. “Governance can
be delineated as a hierarchy of relationships”
that moves from politics to management to
administrative performance (Lynn, Heinrich,
and Hill 2001, 239). “Responding to citizen
and stakeholder interests,” “enacting coali-
tions” design bureaucracies to “stack the deck”
in their favor (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001,
137–38). Political principals impose agendas on administrators
at
unpredictable intervals, based on limited understandings of
bureau-
cratic capacities, cultures, and operations (Derthick 1990; Light

2007; Moynihan and Lavertu 2012). Th ey strive, often with
mixed
results, to oversee and control multisided networks of
implementing
organizations (Meier and O’Toole 2006). Principal–agent
models
More attention should be paid
to the political consequences
of administrative divisions and
categories.
Policy Feedback and the Politics of Administration 323
common employment benefi t. Responding to this administrative
“fact on the ground,” employers designed their private plans to
take
advantage of Social Security’s potential to absorb business
costs.
In the process, they developed interests in supporting the Social
Security Administration and its programs. By contrast, private
health
care plans emerged earlier than public programs. Th us, state
offi cials
were forced to adapt in ways that “created an expensive,
fragmented
system of health care fi nance and delivery that undercut the
con-
stituency for reform while raising the political and budgetary
costs
of policy change, eventually pressing reformers to focus on
residual
populations left out of private coverage” (Hacker 2002, 278).

Building on these insights into group preferences and powers,
policy
feedback research encourages scholars to ask how
administrative
changes may infl uence state preferences and powers. Th e
corrupt
administration of Civil War pensions, for example, weakened
sup-
port for expansions of the welfare state and
created presumptions of waste, fraud, and
abuse that have plagued social welfare admin-
istrators for generations (Skocpol 1992). More
generally, administrative eff orts to impose
categories, compile social data, and organize
social and physical environments can alter the
“legibility” of landscapes for state interven-
tion (Scott 1998). In the process, they defi ne
parameters for the state’s “power to” serve the
citizenry, as well as for its “powers over” the
citizenry, understood in both coercive and
productive forms. From this perspective, the fi eld of public
admin-
istration encompasses the study of how administrative eff ects
defi ne
possibilities for state action and set terms of power relations
linking
state and society.
Market interventions are particularly important as modes of
state
intervention that defi ne patterns of citizen standing, opportu-
nity, and power. Social policies in the mid-twentieth century,
for

example, ameliorated the negative eff ects of market forces in
ways
that shored up and, in some ways, deepened racial and gender
inequalities (Katznelson 2005; Mettler 1998). A particularly
stark
example is provided by the Federal Housing Authority’s promo-
tion of “redlining,” which structured mortgage banking behavior
in
ways that exacerbated race-based segregation in neighborhoods
and
schools (Freund 2007). Th is development, in turn, played a key
role
in “race making” itself, altering the meanings, practices, and
powers
associated with racial classifi cations (Hayward 2013).
As this example suggests, feedback research encourages
scholars to
pay particular attention to administrative eff ects on citizens
and
citizenship. “Mass feedback” eff ects have been reviewed
extensively
elsewhere (e.g., Campbell 2012; Mettler and Soss 2004). Yet
few
scholars have pursued their implications for the fi eld of public
administration.
Policy feedback research contests the conventional treatment of
citizen interests, preferences, and attitudes as exogenous
“inputs” in
governance. Under German unifi cation, for example, the exten-
sion of West German administrative arrangements moved the
welfare state preferences of former East Germans closer to
those of
former West Germans over time (Svallfors 2010). Likewise,
when

Structural divisions in the administrative state can be equally
con-
sequential. More egalitarian and universal welfare institutions,
for
example, promote political trust and solidarity, social capital,
and
broader coalitions of public support (Kumlin and Rothstein
2005;
Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Svallfors 2007). In the United
States,
by contrast, administrative divisions—for example, between
Social
Security and means-tested welfare—encourage bifurcated
“deserv-
ing versus undeserving” public understandings, isolate poor
families
as a vulnerable group with few coalition partners, and facilitate
racial framings of social policy confl icts (Soss, Fording, and
Schram
2011).
A feedback perspective also highlights how policy
implementation
can generate powerful new political interests. Civil War
pensions
stimulated the growth of new veterans’ organizations that
pressed
for expanded benefi ts (Skocpol 1992). Similarly, modern
welfare
states have created administrative constitu-
encies that act today as powerful defenders
of their programs, often inhibiting reform
eff orts (Pierson 1994). In the United States,
the Social Security Administration anchored
a political process that gave rise to power-

ful advocacy groups, such as AARP (Béland
2010; Campbell 2003). Th e American Farm
Bureau, a dominant agricultural interest
group since the New Deal, arose as a direct
result of publicly funded cooperative exten-
sion services (Olson 1965). Such cases under-
score that studies of how administrators engage stakeholders
can be
signifi cantly enriched by attention to how administrative
actions
produce stakeholders.
Feedback research also suggests how organized interests and
bureaucracies can develop through relations of reciprocal
empower-
ment. On one side, administrative agencies mobilize
collaborators
and constituents as allies to bolster their eff ectiveness and
advance
their agendas. Th e Social Security Administration is often cited
as
an example (Béland 2010), and recent research suggests that the
U.S. Department of Education benefi ted from a similar
dynamic as
it implemented Title IX (Sharrow 2013).
On the other side, political groups may enjoy reciprocal benefi
ts as
the administrative agency becomes a political resource
empowering
the group and generating terms of political confl ict more
favorable
to its interests. As bureaucracies disseminate policy-relevant
analyses,
they alter political distributions of knowledge and expertise. As
they

make rules and acquire capacities, they become tools that inter-
ests can deploy against their opponents in the “organized
combat”
of politics (Hacker and Pierson 2010). Th ese and other mutual
political benefi ts are rarely addressed in studies of
collaborative
governance or even bureaucratic capture. Th ey encourage
scholars
to study the complex reciprocal ways that administrative infl
uence
and capacity can be related to an interest group’s power to
defeat its
opponents.
In addition to aff ecting a group’s ability to get what it what it
wants,
administrative arrangements can change what a group wants in
the
fi rst place. Jacob Hacker (2002), for example, explains that
public
pension implementation took root before pension plans became
a
Th e fi eld of public administra-
tion encompasses the study
of how administrative eff ects
defi ne possibilities for state
action and set terms of power
relations linking state and
society.

negative eff ects on beliefs about government and levels of
civic and
political engagement (Weaver and Lerman 2010).
Administrative
encounters with paternalist welfare programs have similarly
negative
eff ects (Bruch, Ferree, and Soss 2010; Soss 1999, 2000).
In sum, administrative operations can matter greatly for the
scope,
meaning, and practice of democratic citizenship. Feedback
research-
ers have shone a light on these eff ects but have rarely pursued
their
implications for the study of administration. Some recent works
have begun to fi ll the void, asking, for example, how
experiences
of “red tape” may aff ect citizens’ political beliefs and
behaviors
(Moynihan and Herd 2010) and how performance measures
might
incorporate civic and political eff ects (Wichowsky and
Moynihan
2008). As a fi eld, however, public administration continues to
devote little attention to the ways citizens are positioned and
shaped
by policy implementation.
In pursuing these questions, students of administration should
bear
in mind that the kinds of eff ects described earlier are variable
out-
comes of contingent processes. Policy implementation can
empower

a constituency (e.g., Campbell 2003), marginalize it (Soss
2000), or
have no observable eff ect at all (Patashnik and Zelizer 2013).
Major
changes to welfare administration have shifted public attitudes
in
some cases (Svallfors 2010) but have also failed to generate
attitudi-
nal change in some cases in which expectations of feedback eff
ects
were high (Soss and Schram 2007). New administrative
categories
may fail to achieve cultural resonance and political
institutionaliza-
tion (Hochschild, Weaver, and Burch 2012). More generally,
policy
implementation may fail to generate feedbacks because of
design
fl aws, poor timing, or inadequate or confl icting institutional
sup-
ports (Patashnik and Zelizer 2013). Indeed, administrators may
play
a key role in stifl ing feedback eff ects, just as they may play a
part in
their production.
To note these various possibilities is to underscore how much
work
there is to do. For scholars of administration, the policy
feedback
concept is an invitation to clarify the conditions under which
administrative organizations transform political landscapes—for
themselves, for stakeholders and political principals, for
organized
interests and citizens, and for citizenship and democracy as a
whole.

Policies Matter for Public Administration
Why do administrative arrangements come into being and per-
sist, and what explains the timing and direction of change when
it
occurs? Th ere are many …
700 Public Administration Review • September | October 2016
Vol. 76, Iss. 5, pp. 700–711. © 2016 by
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12605.
Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly
Bingham) is the Keller-Runden Professor
of Public Service in the School of Public
and Environmental Affairs, Indiana
University Bloomington and Saltman Senior
Scholar in the William S. Boyd School of
Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. An
elected fellow of the National Academy of
Public Administration and recipient of the

American Bar Association Section of Dispute
Resolution Award for Outstanding Scholarly
Work, her research addresses collaborative
governance, public engagement, public law,
and dispute resolution.
E-mail : [email protected]
Public
Administration
and the
Disciplines
Abstract : Scholars have engaged in an ongoing dialogue
about the relationships among management, politics, and
law in public administration. Collaborative governance presents
new challenges to this dynamic. While scholars have
made substantial contributions to our understanding of the
design and practice of collaborative governance, others
suggest that we lack theory for this emerging body of research.
Law is often omitted as a variable. Scholarship generally
does not explicitly include collaboration as a public value. This
article addresses the dialogue on management,
politics, and law with regard to collaborative governance. It
provides an overview of the current legal framework for
collaborative governance in the United States at the federal,
state, and local levels of government and identifies gaps.
The institutional analysis and development framework provides
a body of theory that incorporates rules and law into
research design. The article concludes that future research on
collaborative governance should incorporate the legal
framework as an important variable and collaboration as a

public value.
Practitioner Points
• In designing public engagement and collaborative processes,
public managers must consider the legal
framework that governs their action.
• Relevant law varies across the federal, state, and local arenas
and shapes design choices.
• Collaboration itself is an important value to the public and
stakeholders.
• Public managers must acquire an understanding of basic
constitutional and administrative law to plan
effective public engagement and collaborative governance.
• In seeking to innovate, public managers should consider what
the relevant legal framework is and consult
with legal counsel. However, they should also consider the
likelihood that in-house counsel may be risk
averse.
• When innovation presents a case of first impression, one for
which there is no case law, managers should ask
not whether they can innovate by using participatory and
collaborative processes but how to do it consistent
with their legal authority.
Public administration scholars have engaged in an ongoing
dialogue about the relationships among management, politics,
and law in public
agencies’ work (Christensen, Goerdel, and Nicholson-
Crotty 2011 ; Rosenbloom 1983 , 2013 ). Collaborative
governance presents a new challenge for this dialogue.
As an umbrella term, it describes various system
designs and processes through which public agencies

work together with the private sector, civil society,
and the public to identify problems, issues, and
potential solutions; design new policy frameworks for
addressing them; implement programs; and enforce
policies.
Public law is an important variable that is often
missing in collaborative governance scholarship.
Moreover, some scholars question whether adequate
theory exists to motivate public administration ’ s
collaborative governance research program
(Rosenbloom 2013 ). Additionally, the public
administration literature generally has not explicitly
addressed collaboration as a public value.
This article reviews the current dialogue on
management, politics, and law as a framework for
public administration research and reviews the role
of law and public values. It suggests that a body of
theory, the institutional analysis and development
(IAD) framework (Ostrom 2005 , 2011 ), can frame
our collaborative governance research explicitly
around law as rules. The article argues for explicitly
including collaboration as a public value. It provides
an overview of the existing legal framework for
collaborative governance at the federal, state, and local
levels of government and identifies gaps and public
values reflected in administrative laws. Administrative
Rosemary O’Leary, Editor
Lisa Blomgren Amsler
Indiana University, Bloomington
Collaborative Governance:

Integrating Management, Politics, and Law
Collaborative Governance: Integrating Management, Politics,
and Law 701
law provides rules as variables for future research using the
IAD
framework on the relations among management, politics, and
law
in collaborative governance.
The Dialogue on Management, Politics, and Law
in Public Administration Research
Running federal agencies requires expertise in public law
(Campbell
2005 ). Agencies function as a “fourth branch of
government”: they
act in both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial ways in
executing law
(Schwartz 1991 ) and develop policy by filling in details left
open
in legislation and serving as supplementary lawmakers
(Schwartz
1991 , §§ 1.7–1.9). Agencies administer their legislative
scheme
through their enabling statute; they adopt and implement rules
and
regulations and manage projects and programs (Rosenbloom
2015 ,
63–88; Rubin 1989 , 387–97). Through informal agency
action and
informal and formal adjudication resulting in orders, they
enforce

rules and regulations (Rosenbloom 2015 , 89–122). Agencies
affect
the legal rights and obligations of the public and stakeholders
(Rubin 1984 ).
The three branches supervise agency action through various
means:
the executive branch using executive orders, judicial branch
using
judicial review, and Congress through legislation and oversight.
Congress may control administrative agencies through the
budget, legislative instructions, and structural constraints, using
legislation to react to agency action and committees, hearings,
and
investigations for oversight (Shipan 2005 ). Congress can use
an
agency ’ s individual legislative authorization to limit it
procedurally
or use crosscutting statutes on public information, public
participation, due process, and judicial review to control all
agencies
(Shipan 2005 , 442–44). Understanding basic administrative
and
constitutional law is essential for public managers (Cooper and
Newland 1997 ; Rosenbloom 2015 ).
David Rosenbloom ( 1983 ) provided a framework for public
administration theory suggesting three lenses: management,
politics, and law, reflecting action by the executive, legislative,
and judicial functions of government, respectively. Management
focuses on efficiency and effectiveness, analogous to private
sector
organizations. Politics examines legislative representativeness,
responsiveness, and how interest groups shape policy and its
implementation. Law focuses on accountability, procedural
integrity, individual constitutional rights, and judicial review.

One approach to management, the New Public Management
(NPM), rose to prominence in the 1980s as a reform movement
(Hood 1991 ; Osborne and Gaebler 1992 ) to allow public
agencies
to move toward results-based accountability rather than
compliance
with rules and processes (Hood 1995 ). NPM uses
professional
managers as principals dealing with contractors as agents. It
employs
performance measures, tools such as output controls,
competition,
and market-like instruments to achieve public values of
efficiency
and results-based accountability (Hood 1991 ). Public
agencies
around the globe have adopted and institutionalized NPM
practices
(Dunleavy et al. 2006 ; O ’ Leary 2014 ).
Rosenbloom ’ s ( 1983 ) managerial perspective encompasses
NPM,
although he notes (Rosenbloom 2013 ) that NPM disregards
certain
values that fall outside the narrow scope of an agency ’ s
mission.
Other critics observe that NPM ’ s privatization of public work
through contracts and partnerships removes administrative law ’
s
legal oversight, threatening democratic values, such as
accountability
and citizen participation (Freeman 2000 ). O ’ Leary ( 2014 )
reports
on how full implementation of NPM has created agency silos in

New Zealand and interfered with interagency collaboration.
In response to perceived weaknesses in NPM, the New Public
Governance (NPG) and/or public value movement arose
(Bryson,
Crosby, and Bloomberg 2014 ; Morgan and Cook 2014 ).
NPG
encompasses public values and considers “collectively
expressed,
politically mediated preferences consumed by the citizenry”
(O ’ Flynn 2007 , 358), including both value added to the
public
interest and processes that promote trust and fairness (Moore
1994 ; O ’ Flynn 2007 ). The public value approach calls for
more
public opportunities to deliberate and participate in
administration
(Nabatchi 2012 ) and identify public values (Stoker 2006 ).
Drawing
on Rosenbloom ’ s ( 2013 ) category of the political
perspective, it suits
postcompetitive, collaborative, and networked forms of
governance
by using dialogue to build relationships in the context of mutual
respect and shared learning (Stoker 2006 ). O ’ Leary ’ s (
2006 ) analysis
of guerilla government illustrates conflict over values when
public
employees seek goals contrary to those of their supervisors;
dialogue
and conflict management are important within the agency as
well as
with the public in NPG.
However, some observe that law is often overlooked in public
administration (Box et al. 2001 ; Moe and Gilmour 1995 ;

Rosenbloom 2007 ). Wright ( 2011 ) and Rosenbloom and
Naff
( 2010 ) find that public administration underutilizes legal
resources.
Newbold ( 2014 ) advocates a constitutional approach to
reintegrate
law and management to build civic literacy, preserve sectoral
boundaries and accountability, embed constitutional values in
management, and advance NPG ’ s normative agenda. Recent
reviews of collaborative governance scholarship (Ansell and
Gash
2008 ; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2015 ; Emerson,
Nabatchi, and
Balogh 2012 ) and collaboration in environmental planning
and
management (Margerum 2011 ) acknowledge the role of rules
and
law but generally do not address specific statutes.
Recently, Rosenbloom ( 2013 ) revisited his tripartite
framework in
light of developments in collaborative governance and
reinventing
government. This article responds to his query regarding
collaborative governance theory. For law and collaborative
governance, he focuses on government work, state action, and
more
formal collaborative relationships such as contracting.
However,
collaborative governance encompasses a broader reach of
networks
and collaborative public management; many are informal and
not
reduced to a contract (e.g., Gazley, Chang, and Bingham 2010
).

Christensen, Goerdel, and Nicholson-Crotty ( 2011 ) review
the perceived conflict between law as a necessary constraint on
government power and management as an essential source of
innovation in the public interest. Law enables managers to do
the
public ’ s work (Cooper 1997 ) and to address democratic
values,
including public participation, pluralism, and representation;
involving public managers in legislation or litigation may
advance
democratic values and the public good (Christensen, Goerdel,
and Nicholson-Crotty 2011 , i131–33). This lawmaking role
may
provide a synthesis for management, politics, and law;
indirectly,
it recognizes the increasingly networked and intersectoral, and
therefore collaborative, context.
In public administration ’ s ongoing dialogue on the
relationship of
law to management and politics, some public values may
compete
with others. Rosenbloom ( 2013 , 3) suggests management ’ s
values
are market-based efficiency such as cost effectiveness and
customer
orientation; politics’ values are representation, responsiveness,
and
political accountability; and law ’ s values are constitutional
integrity,
rights, and procedural due process. He observes elsewhere that

values such as “social equity, social capital, citizen
engagement,
and vibrant democracy” (2013, 7) need more salience in law and
practice.
Although scholars urge public managers to collaborate, they do
not
expressly list collaboration as a public value. Moore ( 1994 )
uses
the word “collective” but not “collaborative.” O ’ Flynn ( 2007
) and
Stoker ( 2006 ) use “collaborative” as a public management
process
for achieving public value, but not as a value in itself. Thomson
and Perry ( 2006 , 21) unpack collaboration as a process with
five
dimensions: governance, administration, organizational
autonomy,
mutuality, and norms of trust and reciprocity, citing Ostrom ’ s
( 1990 ) extensive work on collective action in managing
common
pool resources. Fung ( 2015 ) discusses how citizen
participation may
advance effectiveness, legitimacy, and social justice. Nabatchi (
2012 )
provides a broader, pluralistic range of public values that
emerge
from deliberative democratic discourse yet treats collaboration
as a
process in designing participation to identify public values.
Collaboration, like participation, is indeed a process, and it has
instrumental value as a means to an end. However, it also has
intrinsic value as an end in itself, unlike conflict or adversarial
governance. As an end, collaboration represents broader
acceptance

of a policy or decision. Omitting collaboration from public
values
is significant because collaboration is both
explicit and implicit in constitutional and
administrative law. It is inherent as an end
in the constitutional structure for separation
of powers, which prevents meaningful
action absent collaboration within and
across the branches of U.S. government. The
Federalist Papers illustrate that the founders
anticipated and designed for collaboration in
government ’ s work (Bingham and O ’ Leary
2011 ). In sum, the ongoing dialogue on management,
politics, and
law has not sufficiently addressed rules as independent
variables or
collaboration as a public value in collaborative governance.
Management, Politics, Law, and Collaborative
Governance
Rosenbloom ( 2013 , 8) observes that traditional hierarchical
Weberian organizations remain dominant in government;
contracting may be in decline in public cross-sectoral
collaboration.
Scholars have not reached consensus on what collaborative
governance means (Rosenbloom 2013 , 8). Emerson,
Nabatchi, and
Balogh ( 2012 ) acknowledge that the term is amorphous and
its
use inconsistent. Bryson et al. ( 2013 ) provide an analysis of
design
for public participation but refer largely to stakeholder
processes.
Ansell and Gash ( 2008 ) perform a meta-analysis of case
studies on

public policy and environmental dispute resolution as
collaborative
governance; their literature largely ignores collaborative public
management (O ’ Leary, Bingham, and Gerard 2006 ). Some
see
collaborative governance as a descriptive term, not a theoretical
construct.
Despite this terminological ambiguity, collaboration is here to
stay.
To respond to Rosenbloom ( 2013 ) on whether existing theory
can
help clarify collaborative governance research, this article uses
a
broad conception of collaborative governance as an umbrella
term;
it describes a family of governance processes that entail voice
and
collaboration among government, the private and nonprofit or
civic sectors, and/or the public to accomplish the public ’ s
work.
It encompasses public voice: the public and stakeholders
working
together across the policy continuum. It includes policy making
in the legislative branch upstream. Within the executive branch,
it includes the quasi-legislative arena upstream, implementation
and management midstream, and quasi-judicial adjudication
downstream. In the judicial branch, it includes adjudication
downstream. It includes system designs through which public
agencies can work with private and nonprofit sectors, civil
society,
and/or the public. Collaborative governance differs from
traditional
command and control arrangements in its use of negotiation,
dialogue, deliberation, and consensus.

Scholars made substantial theoretical contributions to our
understanding of collaborative governance in work predating
use
of the term. Examples include earlier work on new governance
(Bingham, Nabatchi, and O ’ Leary 2005 ; Salamon 2002 ),
networks
(O ’ Toole 1997 ; Provan and Milward 2001 ), collaborative
public
management (Agranoff 2007 ; Agranoff and McGuire 2003 ;
O ’ Leary, Bingham, and Gerard 2006 ), and consensus-
building
processes involving public, private, and nonprofit stakeholders
(O ’ Leary and Bingham 2003 ; Susskind, McKearnan, and
Thomas-
Larmer 1999 ).
Broadly conceived, collaborative governance
encompasses public and stakeholder voice
influencing decisions across the policy
continuum; figure 1 (adapted from Bingham
2009, 287) provides a map of collaborative
governance from upstream to downstream in
the policy process.
The stream can include all three branches of government or
focus
within a single agency (Bingham 2009). Upstream entails a
broader
spectrum of participants; generally, the stream moves from the
diffuse public, to stakeholders, to parties to a dispute. Upstream
in the quasi-legislative policy-making arena, it includes public
engagement (Rosenbloom 2013 , 8; Yang and Bergrud 2008
),
dialogue, and public deliberation (Fung 2006 , 2015 ;
Nabatchi

and Leighninger 2015 ). Midstream in policy implementation
and
management, all three families of voice overlap, incorporating
collaborative public and network management with stakeholders
(Agranoff 2007 ; Agranoff and McGuire 2003 ; Bingham
and
O ’ Leary 2008 ; McGuire 2006 ; O ’ Leary and Bingham
2009 ;
O ’ Toole 1997 , 2015; Provan and Milward 2001 ) and
potentially
public engagement and environmental dispute resolution
Th e ongoing dialogue on man-
agement, politics, and law has
not suffi ciently addressed rules
as independent variables or col-
laboration as a public value in
collaborative governance.
Collaborative Governance: Integrating Management, Politics,
and Law 703
(Margerum 2011 ; O ’ Leary and Bingham 2003 ; Podziba
2012 ;
Susskind and Cruikshank 1987 ). Downstream, in the
executive
branch quasi-judicial arena, it includes negotiation, mediation,
and
other forms of dispute resolution involving a government actor
(Bingham 2008–09; Susskind, McKearnan, and Thomas-Larmer
1999 ).
Some suggest that we lack theory to frame our research on

collaborative governance (Rosenbloom 2013 , 8) and would
benefit
from an explicitly systemic approach to the relationship among
management, politics, and law. We actually do have sufficient
theory, but we have not always used it. We can find it in the
work of
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom.
In one of the 75 most influential articles published in Public
Administration Review, Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom
(1971)
addressed Wilson ’ s advocacy of hierarchical organizations to
produce
efficient management outcomes and Simon ’ s
alternative of empirical studies to test theory
in a variety of organizational forms. They
elaborated on public choice theory (Buchanan
and Tullock 1962 ) as substituting “man the
decision maker” for “economic man” (Ostrom
and Ostrom 1971 , 205). They provided a way
to integrate management, politics, and law by
incorporating how rules shape decisions: “[P]ublic choice
theory is
concerned with the effect that different decision rules or
decision-
making arrangements will have upon the production of those
events
conceptualized as public goods and services” (205). Law
provides
a set of decision rules; management and politics provide and
shape
decision-making arrangements.
Anticipating networked governance in 1961, Vincent Ostrom
introduced the concept of polycentricity to describe “multiple
levels

and diverse types of organizations drawn from the public,
private,
and voluntary sectors that have overlapping realms of
responsibility
and functional capacities” (McGinnis and Ostrom 2012 , 15).
The
Ostroms observed that overlapping jurisdictions may be more
efficient in some circumstances:
Once we contemplate the possibility that public
administration can be organized in relation to diverse
collectivities organized as concurrent political regimes, we
might further contemplate the possibility that there will
not be one rule of good administration for all governments
alike. Instead of a single integrated hierarchy of authority
coordinating all public services, we might anticipate the
existence of multiorganizational arrangements in the public
sector that tends to take on the characteristics of public-
service industries composed of many public agencies
operating with substantial independence of one another.
(Ostrom and Ostrom 1971 , 212)
They anticipated public managers negotiating to coordinate
across
different collectivities.
The Ostroms built the institutional analysis and development
framework, a set of variables and relationships among variables
(Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012 , 8). Elinor Ostrom
( 2005 ) described a set of universal building blocks and a
method
for studying how institutions function: participants or actors,
positions filled by participants, allowable actions and their
linkage
to outcomes, the range of potential outcomes, participant
control,

accessible information, and costs and benefits. Using the IAD
framework, an analyst can focus on the simplest unit of
analysis,
the action situation, which can vary in scale. Action situations
and
institutions are nested; families, firms, communities, industries,
states, nations, and transnational alliances are all structures that
can
be viewed in isolation or as part of a larger whole (Ostrom
2005 , 6).
Beyond the initial action situation, a researcher can “zoom out”
to
understand the exogenous variables. Ostrom ( 2005 ) suggested
three
exogenous categories: (1) the rules that participants use to order
their relationships, (2) the biophysical world ’ s attributes that
the
arena acts upon, and (3) the structure of the arena ’ s more
general
community. Ostrom defined rules as “shared understandings by
participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what
actions
(or outcomes) are required, prohibited,
or permitted” (2005, 18). Rules can
emerge through processes of democratic
governance or through groups that organize
privately, such as corporations, membership
associations, families, or work teams (18–19).
Working rules can evolve as functions of
individual decisions in practice. Rules can be
rules on paper or rules in use.
Researchers have used the IAD framework extensively to study

collaborative community systems for managing common pool
resources such as forests and seas (Ostrom 1990 ; for a
searchable
database of studies, see
https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/library/
database ). Based on extensive empirical research, Ostrom (
2000 ,
151–52) identified eight key design principles for effective and
enduring collaborative institutions:
1. Boundary rules are clear.
2. Local rules in use assign costs proportional to benefits.
3. Members participate in making and modifying the rules.
4. Members select their own monitors, who are accountable.
Figure 1 Collaborative Governance: Voice
Processes across the
Policy Continuum
Law provides a set of decision
rules; management and politics
provide and shape decision-
making arrangements.
5. Sanctions are graduated.
6. Users have “access to rapid, low-cost, local arenas to
resolve conflict among users or between users and officials”
(Ostrom 2000 , 152).
7. National or local governments recognize the right to

organize.
8. Governance activities are nested in multiple layers of an
enterprise.
These principles suggest a framework for
collaborative governance research that
incorporates law, politics, and management.
Formal rules and rules in use are a critical
piece of institutional infrastructure in
IAD. All forms of law are rules within this
framework, whether in a constitution,
statutes, regulations, executive orders, or
court decisions. Similarly, rules in use can be
contracts, policies, or text to codify practices.
Scholars are using Ostrom ’ s work to analyze collaborative
governance
(Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012 ) and collaboration in
land use, urban, and environmental planning and management
(Margerum 2011 ); they expressly reference rules within the
IAD
framework. Other scholars are explicitly examining the
institutional
structures embedded in legal text. For example, Feiock et al.
( 2016 ) use IAD to analyze city charters to identify structural
and institutional diversity in the mayoral position, a question of
management and politics. They propose a research agenda using
this approach (Feiock and Scholz 2010 ) and intend to code
for
meaningful avenues for citizen input into public decision
making,
in part a political question. Siddiki et al. ( 2015 ) use a content
analysis of policies and IAD to determine how policy rules
affect
collaborative governance arrangements in local food systems.

Other
theoretical approaches to empirical research on rules as law or
rules
in use, including sociolegal studies on procedural justice,
legitimacy,
and compliance (Tyler 1990 ), use the IAD framework.
Emerson,
Nabatchi, and Balogh ( 2012 , 2, 6, 14–15) incorporate Ostrom
’ s
notion of rules in their work on collaborative governance
regimes.
We do, then, have a theoretical framework that brings together
management, politics, and law. In the IAD universal building
blocks, arguably politics includes participant control,
management
includes costs and benefits, and law includes allowable actions
and
accessible information. Ostrom ’ s ( 2000 ) design criteria
include
members participating in making rules and selecting their own
monitors, which are questions of politics. Monitor
accountability,
graduated sanctions, and contexts in nested layers of
governance
are all questions of management. Moreover, Ostrom ( 2000 ,
2005 )
makes controlling for rules and laws as independent variables
an
essential part of comprehensive empirical research on
governance
systems. To advance research on public administration
generally, we
need to examine formal rules and rules in use that constitute the
legal framework and practices for management and governance.

Collaboration as a Public Value: The Federal Legal
Framework for Collaborative Governance
Collaboration is both a process and an outcome, both a means
and
an end in itself. As an end, it is a public value that is reflected
in
the history and language of administrative law. Rules in law and
practice vary across national contexts. They shape the
institutional
structure on which we conduct public administration research.
For this reason, scholars should both control for and be explicit
regarding rules as variables. An agency ’ s enabling statute may
be an
independent variable as to the agency ’ s work; however, the
agency ’ s
regulations may be dependent variables shaped in part by the
enabling statute.
In the United States, administrative law
reflects six key public values: those commonly
addressed in the literature—accountability,
efficiency, effectiveness, transparency,
participation—but also collaboration
(Bingham 2010, 303–5). Administrative law
at the federal, state, and local levels has similar
features but varies substantially. Moreover,
collaborative governance may involve
intergovernmental relations across these
three arenas. The following is an overview of
these arenas of administrative law and how specific statutes
either
facilitate or obstruct collaborative governance.
Over time, Congress has modified how it controls

administrative
agencies, particularly in relation to participation and
collaboration.
Independent from their enabling statutes, executive branch
agencies must comply with many general crosscutting laws that
affect collaboration. These include the Administrative
Procedure
Act (APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–6, …
JPART 2 5 :5 - 2 5
Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic
Politics
Daniel Carpenter,* George A. Krausef
*Harvard University; University o f Pittsburgh
ABSTRACT
Bureaucratic politics research couched within the new
institutionalism paradigm has largely
focused on principal authority rooted in formal (institutional)
mechanisms that are ulti-
mately both devised and chosen by politicians. A nascent
literature has emerged over the
past two decades whose underpinnings reflect increasing
gravitation towards a transactional
authority perspective, one that is compatible with behavioral
theories of organizations. This
transactional authority perspective departs from an exclusive
reliance on formal mecha-
nisms insofar that agent compliance is motivated by either
mutual or bilateral agreement
for both the principal and the agent. This perspective is rooted
in not only the agent's "sanc-

tioned acceptance" of the principal's authority but also the
principal's "sanctioned accept-
ance" of the agent's legitimacy. We explore the logical
implications of this transactional
authority perspective for better understanding principal-agent
relationships in the study of
bureaucratic politics. We conclude by recommending that future
research should redirect
scholarly attention towards analyzing informal compliance and
resistance mechanisms in
bureaucratic politics, as well as offer a richer pluralist
conception of bureaucratic governance
in a democracy.
"........ authority nevertheless rests upon the acceptance or
consent of individuals...........
authority fails because individuals in sufficient numbers regard
the burden involved in
accepting necessary orders as changing the balance of advantage
against their interest,
and they withdraw or withhold the indispensable contributions.”
(Chester I. Barnard, 1938: 163-164)
‘Authority that is viewed as legitimate is not felt as coercion or
manipulation, either by
the man who exercises it or by the man who accepts it.”
(Herbert A. Simon, 1957: 106)
This essay is based on George A. Krause’s 2012 Herbert A.
Simon Award Lecture entitled “Organizations,
Transactional Authority, and the Study o f Bureaucratic
Politics” to the Midwest Political Science Association.
We thank Dan Berkowitz, Anthony Bertelli, David Lewis,
Denise Rousseau, and the anonymous JPART

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