Presentation by Prof. Yuichi Ono, Tohoku University, Japan. The workshop on “Learning from crises and fostering the continuous improvement of risk governance and management”, jointly organised with the governments of the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, was held in Oslo, Norway on 17-18 September 2014. More information is available at www.oecd.org/gov/risk/high-level-risk-forum-oslo-workshop-2014.htm

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Special focus on the lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
Yuichi Ono
Assistant Director and Professor,
International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS)
Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan

2. Thank OECD countries for providing warm support to disaster victims and affected areas in Tohoku

3. Introduction It has been more than three and a half years since the 11 March 2001 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Focus: Review policies and changes

4. In 1896, 22,000 people were killed by tsunami in Tohoku (Death rate: 40%) In 2011, nearly 20,000 people were killed by tsunami in Tohoku (Death rate: 4%)

5. Significant decrease in the death rate: 40 to 4 % in 100 years Positive factors: - Increased capacity to cope with the disaster (both structural and non-structural measures) Negative factors: - Memory loss, more exposure to the risk with increased population - Dependency on modern technology

6. Changes in DRR related policy 〔Basic Acts〕 1. Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (1961) 2. Act on Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disaster (1970) 3. Act on Disaster Prevention in Petroleum Industrial Complexes and other Petroleum Facilities (1975) 4. Act on Special Measures for Large-scale Earthquakes (1978) 5. Act on Special Measures for Nuclear Disasters (1999) 6. Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Tonankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management (2002) 7. Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench- type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches (2004) Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was revised (June 2013)

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Capacity building for quickly responding to a large-scale disaster which affects large areas
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Smooth and safe evacuation of the residents
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An improvement in protecting disaster victims
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Strengthening of the measure for the disaster prevention from ordinal time
Key points in revision of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act

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The Reconstruction Agency officially debuted on February 10, 2012, following the previous Headquarters of Reconstruction, which was set up in June 2011. The Reconstruction Agency was created under the Act Establishing the Reconstruction Agency and is planned to operate for 10 years. This agency is primarily responsible for coordinating various ministries’ budgetary and reconstruction procedures so that reconstruction efforts in all localities can proceed in a timely manner.

10. 〔Disaster Prevention and Preparedness〕 1. Erosion Control Act (1897) 2. Building Standard Law (1950) 3. Forest Act (1951) 4. Act on Temporary Measures for Disaster Prevention and Development of Special Land Areas (1952) 5. Meteorological Services Act (1952) 6. Seashore Act (1956) 7. Landslide Prevention Act (1958) 8. Act on Special Measures for Disaster Prevention in Typhoon-prone Areas (1958) 9. Act on Special Measures for Heavy Snowfall Areas (1962) 10. River Act (1964) 11. Act on Prevention of Steep Slope Collapse Disaster (1969) 12. Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes (1973) 13. Act on Special Financial Measures for Urgent Earthquake Countermeasure Improvement Projects in Areas for Intensified Measures (1980) 14. Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures (1995) 15. Act on Promotion of the Earthquake-proof Retrofit of Buildings (1995) 16. Act on Promotion of Disaster Resilience Improvement in Densely Inhabited Areas (1997) 17. Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas (2000) 18. Specified Urban River Inundation Countermeasures Act (2003)

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After the GEJE, the Japanese government actively established the new acts and amended existing acts.
- Two new acts for tsunami disaster management (June and December 2011)
- A revision of the Act on Special Measures concerning Urban Regeneration (April 2012)
- A revision of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (June 2012 and June 2013)
- A new act concerning the reconstruction from major disasters (June 2013)
- A new act of countermeasures for the Tokyo Inland Earthquake (November 2013)
-A fundamental revision of an act for promotion of countermeasures for the Nankai Trough Earthquake (November 2013)
- A new basic act of national resilience for disaster

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Dedicated and Adequate Resources
for Disaster Management in Japan
Helping each other: Nation-wide assistance

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BCP

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Why earthquake damages were reduced during the 11 March 2011 Disaster?

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Accommodation issues of disaster victims for a long time

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Relocation Regional Urban Recovery Types Proposed after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

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Change of Housing Location in Hongo, Touni Village, Iwate Pref. (1948–2010)
After the 1933 Killer Tsunami, most people relocated to higher ground, but
they gradually returned --- Exposure to tsunami risks

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Do not build houses in lower areas (a stone monument in Rikuzentakata built in 1935)
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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The Education Sector
Education + self-action with flexible thoughts

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Frequent drills at school and communities

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Ancient Japanese words have might have hidden meanings:
Kama-: tsunami eaten beaches
e.g. Kamaishi, Shiogama, Kamakura
Nami-/Namiita
Wata/watari-
Ona
Suka
Aka/Ake: Water

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Name of places
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e.g. funakoshi (boat crossing over to the other beach): two neighboring beaches became one by tsunami
Funakoshi, Yamada-machi, Iwate Pref

27. Efforts in the 19th century 27
Tsunami Recovery in Wakayama
A great leader
Education and awareness
First tsunami levee in the world?

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He saved the lives of many of his fellow villagers of Hiro, Kii Province (current Hirogawa, Wakayama), when a massive tsunami struck the Kii Peninsula in 1854. He set fire to stacks of rice sheaves as landmarks to guide villagers to safety. Lafcadio Hearn wrote a story about him in Gleanings in Buddha-Fields: Studies of Hand and Soul in the Far East (1897), called "Inamura no Hi: The burning rice fields". The story chronicled Goryo's heroism and accounts of his efforts were also introduced into Japanese textbooks. Hamaguchi participated in various recovery efforts in Hiro, including the construction of a sea wall more than 600m long, 20m wide and 5 m high, which minimized damage from tsunamis in later years. He spent his own money on the project the equivalent of 1,572 ryō (gold coins) and hired a total of 56,736 villagers to work on it. In 2012, a private housing firm, Ichijo Co., Ltd.(Ichijo Komuten) --- offered USD 300M to construct a sea wall in Hamamatsu, Shizuoka Pref. (17.5 km)
Goryo Hamaguchi, 1820-1885 Inamuranohi museum Photo taken by Yuichi Ono
Historical tsunami warning and recovery efforts

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Historical tsunami warning and recovery efforts
1854 Ansei Tsunami – description of Hiromura Village
Inamuranohi museum Photo taken by Yuichi Ono

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Historical tsunami warning and recovery efforts
Hiromura sea wall built by Hamaguchi, 1855-58 (3 years and 10 months) Height 5 m, width 20 m, length 600 m
Photo: Yuichi Ono
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Tsunami Warning System
First of all, tsunami warning system operated by JMA saved many lives on the occasion of the 11 March 2011 Japan Tsunami. If no EWS, the number of deaths would have been recorded with one more digit.

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Tsunami Warning System
The JMA’s already sophisticated TWS was further revised in March 2013 after
a series of consultations
What happened on tsunami EWS on the day?

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Tsunami Warning System
It is easy to criticize things after they occur.
-Initial estimated tsunami heights based on the early evaluations of earthquake magnitude were significantly underestimated. --- The EQ rapturing continued for 3 minutes and the actual magnitude had not been observed. Lessons: Do not depend only on the initial magnitude of EQ as a large one has significant duration Technical modifications in observation:
A new method to evaluate a large EQ magnitude
Based on the analysis on the EQ wave length
Pay more respect on the Ocean bottom tsunamimeters da
and GPS wave gauges data
Source: JMA
Source: JMA

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Tsunami Warning System
Issuance of tsunami warning
Before
Now (after March 2013)
Source: JMA
Source: JMA

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Tsunami Warning System
Issuance of tsunami warning
If not technically sure on the estimated tsunami heights, JMA would not use numerical
values but words such as enormous/gigantic (higher than 3m), high (1-3 meters), or
none if less than 1 meter.
If confident, JMA will use the
above-displayed categorized
tsunami heights
Note that the announcement
will be made at the maximum
value in each category
Source: JMA

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Tsunami Warning System
Dissemination of warning
Estimated time of tsunami arrival with estimated height per location will be announced by JMA,
Source JMA

37. Local FM Radio Station at Rikuzentakata 37
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Only 30% of people evacuated quickly. Why not others?
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The initial estimate of tsunami height announced by JMA was not high enough
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The corrected information soon after did not reach people due to electric failures
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The magnitude of the earthquake (9.0) was beyond imagination even for seismologists
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The earthquake made a gigantic electronic failures and most people depended tsunami warning on TV
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Many elderly people and disabled people could/did not evacuate on time.
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Some of the designated evacuation sites became under water (tsunami risk map)
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Past tsunami experiences might have hindered a decision making process
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New comers to the coastal area did not think of tsunami risk
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Some people took risks to reach their family members, friends, colleagues, and neighbors
Why so many people were killed?

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Population data in Minami-sanriku as of February 2011
17,666 940 5.3%
789 112 14.0%
What are these numbers?
Source: 障がい者制度改革推進会議

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Casualties, by Age, due to the 2011Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the 1995 Great Kobe Earthquake

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Hazard mapping

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Evacuation

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Evacuation
Evacuation by cars? GPS records analysis to identify what happened on 11 March 2011 Always some people are left out from evacuation practices How can we motivate those? Disabled people? Supporters take high Risks too. Critical infra and vulnerable people to be located in safer area as much as possible Structural measures would help especially immediately near the coast (e.g. Shizuoka Pref. Where tsunami might come less than 1 minute after the EQ)

44. Early warning system and evacuation would save lives but not protect properties
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Structural measures

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A sea wall in Ohtanaba, Fudai-village, Iwate Pref. Length 155 m, height 15.5 m, Approx. USD 0.6M Right side: beach Built by Iwate Pref. but strong call by the Village Mayor in 1967
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Kotoku Wamura, 1909-1997 Mayor of Fudai Village
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Insisted on building 15m high sea wall because he heard that th 1896 Tsunami was with 14m high - Iwate Pref. supported
100 people working in the port area were all saved during the 11 March 2011 Tsunami

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

48. Source: Takahashi, Port and Airport Research Institute of Japan
Level 1 Tsunami
Level 2 Tsunami

49. Investment in research – Japanese tradition (planting a tree with proper cares) The trees would produce many fruits later for a long time 49

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IRIDeS created in the process of Build Back Better
- Established in April 2012 as a response to the disaster
- 36 areas of research under 7 divisions
- More than 70 full-time researchers (total more than 100)
- One of the largest and most comprehensive DRM research institutes in the world
- Secured 10-year budget by the Government with USD 100 Million
Research institutes, Governments, and International Organizations such as UN
Private Sector
Affected local governments
International Research Institute of Disaster Science(IRIDS)
Reconstruction of disaster prevention and reduction technologies based on reality of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster
Construction of “Disaster area supportology” in the event of a disaster
Advancement of anti-hazard performance and upgrading for multiple-fail-safe in urban areas as disaster recovery projects
Establishment of disaster medical relief service system of responding appropriately to wide area massive disaster
Rehabilitation regional and urban and creating disaster digital archive pass for the next generation
Major Research Issues
Research on mechanism of mega earthquake and tsunami generation and developing of next-generation of early detection technology of tsunamis

52. Use of science for policy making in disaster recovery in case of Sendai City
Prof. Shunichi Koshimura’s work

53. Damage in Sendai city
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In Sendai
Exposed population 29,962
Death Toll
704 (2.4% of exposed population)
Missing
32
Injured
2,269
Completely collapsed
29,469
Severely damaged
26,064
Partial damaged
78,086
Minor damaged
115,949
Fatality/Missing/Insured
Structural damage

54. The 2011 Tsunami in Sendai
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Mapping of flow depth

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Mapping of building damage

57. Structural vulnerability Tsunami fragility curve
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58. Structural vulnerability
Over 2 m tsunami flow depth potentially causes severe damage on houses or may devastate. Over 6 m tsunami flow depth will cause total devastation. Implication to land use management and tsunami risk evaluation.
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59. Sendai city’s reconstruction plan Multiple protection to minimize losses
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Nature (2012)

60. Elevated prefectural road
+6m
Coastal Levee
7.2 m
Final plan in Sendai city
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Coastal Levee
4.4 m

61. How the multiple protection works …
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62. The prefectural road (10 km) to be elevated Height : 6m, Width 30 m 12 billion JPY (120 million $) 62

63. Sendai city’s reconstruction plan
Tide : MHW Sea wall : 7.2 m Road level : 6 m
Flow depth
Flow depth of less than 2 m at the west of the raised road.
The sea wall and raised road increase the area of more surviving possibility.
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A special way to support recovery efforts By hosting the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, 14-18 March 2015 (Sendai) - Parts of our campus will be used as a venue Our key messages to the Post-HFA are:
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Build back better (for resilient recovery) to increase DRR capacity for not to repeat the same disaster
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Importance of constant investment on DRR (Japan: 1% of GDP since the late 1950s)
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Governance, including the development of national disaster statistics by NDMOs
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Support the proposed numerical targets in DRR in conjunction with the SDGs
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Integration of DRR science into national and local level policy

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Slide show:
photos from tsunami-affected areas

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Disaster at Disaster Management Center of Minamisanriku, Miyagi Pref.
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Minamisanriku Temporal City Office and Evacuation Center
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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A first restaurant built after the tsunami in Minami-sanriku
Recovery of local shops and restaurants does matter
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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A volunteer center combined with a local shop in Rikuzentakata
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Aid Takata , an NPO in Rikuzentakata is having a meeting to support affected communi
NGOs, NPOs, and local organizations do matter
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Public (prefectural) hospital in Rikuzentakata
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Temporally relocated but operational now
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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‘Capital Hotel 1000’ a 7-story building hotel near the coast in Rikuzentakata was damag
up to the 4th floor --- to be moved to 700m inland on the top of the hill supported by
Government ’s assistance and a private recovery fund (USD 8.6M)
Public accommodation does matter
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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A bridge near the coast, Minamisanriku, Miyagi Pref.
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Sendai Port
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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A railroad track and its bridge
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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JR Rikuzentakata Station (operated by the East Japan Railway Company)
Public Transportation does matter
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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--- recovered as the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) for now

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Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Education Sector
Elementary school in Arahama, Sendai
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Education Sector
Elementary school in Arahama, Sendai
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Recovery at Tohoku University
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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Demolishing the damaged building of the Civil Engineer’s Department at Tohoku Unive - Nobody was hurt from the quake itself
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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We welcome you to the 3rd World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Japan, 2015
Photo: Yuichi Ono

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http://irides.tohoku.ac.jp/media/files/HFA_IRIDeS_ReviewReport_Web_20140612(1).pdf
Or just google it: IRIDeS HFA Review