A public lecture on the March 11, 2011 Japanese disaster in the northeast.

1. Wayne Greene, Ph.D.
President, Pacific Northwest
Preparedness Society

2. VANCOUVER SUN DECEMBER 26TH
"No place on earth was better prepared for
something like the 9.0-magnitude
earthquake and monster tsunami that
struck northeast Japan in March and few
could match the organization and
resources deployed in its aftermath.”
Don Cayo, Vancouver Sun December 26, 2011

3. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
CYCLE
Preparedness Respons
e
Mitigatio Recovery
n

4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PLANNING SPIRAL
Time

5. PACIFIC PLATE MOVEMENT

7. MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND
TSUNAMI - DIMENSIONS OF THE DISASTER
• Magnitude 9 quake and tsunami (4th largest)
• 27,600 people dead or missing
• 90% of deaths due to drowning
• Previous tsunami in 1896, 1933 and 1960
• Some communities had up to 50% of their land destroyed
• Destruction of 100,000 buildings, 1,500 roads, 48 bridges,
15 railways, ports, sewage treatment plants and schools
is estimated at $200-$300 billion
• A total of 387,000 evacuees were at 2,200 shelters
without water and heating and low supplies of food and
medicine
• A month after the disaster 130,000 people still in shelters

8. MIYAKO CITY (IWATE PREFECTURE) PROF. Y. ASAI

10. RECOVERY EXAMPLES
The following photos are from:
• March 2011
• June 2011
• September 2011

11. (1) ISHINOMAKI –(MAR 2011)

12. (1) ISHINOMAKI – (JUNE 2011)

13. (1) ISHINOMAKI – SUNKEN SHIPS REMOVED
FROM THE HARBOUR (SEPT 2011)

14. (1)KESSNUMA
(MAR 2011)

15. (2) Kessnuma
(June 2011)

16. (3) Kessnuma –
(September 2011)

17. (3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE
HOUSE (MARCH)

18. (3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE
HOUSE (JUNE)

19. (3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE
HOUSE (SEPT)

20. MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND
TSUNAMI
(2) Direct Lessons from Kobe?
• Rapid deployment of 100,000 SDF forces to
Sendai; 120,000 blankets, 120,000 bottles of
water; 100,000 liters of gasoline, plus food
• Quick acceptance by Japan of international
assistance, and better efforts for getting
overseas teams on-site rapidly
• US military assistance from Okinawa and Yotsuya
• Many other local governments sent aid in the
form of food, medicine and emergency
personnel

21. MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE
AND TSUNAMI (CONT.)
(3) Crisis Management Problems
• Nuclear power plant drama distracted national
government from the humanitarian crisis in
the Sanriku coast
• Local governments along the coast (mainly less
than 100,000 popl.) overwhelmed and lost
mayors, staff and capacity to respond

22. MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE
AND TSUNAMI (CONT.)
(4) Surviving the Tsunami: what worked and what didn’t?
(a) Structural measures:
• Sea walls (10m high in Taro) NO
• 3-storey evacuation buildings NO
(b) Non-structural measures:
• Early warning systems (EQ occurred at 14.46; tsunami
warning at 14.49) (YES)
• Pre-disaster education (schools in Ishinomaki-city)
YES
• Sanriku culture of “Tendenko” (look out for yourself)
YES

23. KOBE - JANUARY 17TH, 1995

24. KOBE AND MARCH 11 EARTHQUAKES
Kobe March 11th
Earthquake Earthquake
Mag. 6.9 Mw (7.3 JMA) 9.0 Mw
Date January 17, 1995. March 11, 2011. 2:46 pm
5:46 am
Location Urban area Coastal and rural region
Hazards Seismologic, fires Seismologic, tsunamis,
fires
Deaths 6,434 15,844 (+ 3,451 missing)
Buildings 104,906 117,542
Cities, 25 (cities and towns) 241 (cities, towns, and
towns villages)
White Paper 2011: 22

25. POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES
(1) Structural Reforms to Japan’s Crisis Management
System and Preparedness:
• Revised Anti-Disaster Basic Law in December 1995
changed many structural and legal problems
attached to dispatching troops for disaster relief and
rescue work
• National government instituted an Office of Crisis
Management in 1998 under the direct control of the
Prime Minister
• Many local governments upgraded their disaster
management systems, incorporating new
information technologies

26. POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES
(2) Nation-wide Support System for Disaster
Emergency Response:
• National Police Agency
• Fire and Disaster Management Agency
• Coast Guard
• Self-Defense Forces
• Inter-prefectural support agreements
• Medical transportation action plan
• Designation of emergency hospitals
• Designation of heliports

27. POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES
(3) Support for Retrofitting Older Infrastructure:
• Seismic Building Retrofitting Act, 1995
• Subsidies for seismic diagnosis of buildings
• Seismic retrofitting of large buildings
• Seismic retrofitting of houses in dense
residential areas

28. POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES
(4) Other:
• Support system for volunteer activity
• Promotion of community self-defense organizations
• Revision of Compensation Framework for victims
(Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law, 1999)
• Revision of Local Tax Laws

29. “CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS DEMAND A
DIFFERENT NATIONAL RESPONSE THAN DO
`ROUTINE’ DISASTERS”
(1) preparedness and response
(2) communicating risks
(3) international assistance
(4) critical infrastructure

30. FUKUSHIMA DISASTER
On 11 March 2011 the Prime Minister of
Japan declared a nuclear emergency
following a problem with the cooling
system power supply at nuclear
reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant. The emergency
declaration followed the 11th March, 9.0-
magnitude earthquake off the country's
northeast coast.

31. FUKUSHIMA
Before the earthquake
Of 6 reactors: 4 were running normally and 2
were in cold shutdown for maintenance
First few minutes after the earthquake
The 4 active reactors „scrammed‟ or shut
down
External power was lost but the auxillary
power kicked in to keep the water moving

32. FUKUSHIMA
After the earthquake:
Tsunami flooded parts of the plant, shutting
down the auxiliary power
No cooling to take the residual heat outside the
reactor core.
Heat inside the fuel elements generated steam
Water levels decreased gradually uncovering
parts of the fuel elements
Cladding breached leading to release of fission
products and generated hydrogen
Several explosions occurred because of
Hydrogen
Loss of water in the spent fuel pool leading to
release of gaseous and aerosol fission products

33. FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR
POWER GENERATING STATION

34. Fukushima Nuclear Plant March 25,
2011

38. B.E.I.R. HUMAN EXPERIENCE
Early martyrs
Radium Dial Painters
Tuberculosis Patients
Survivors of Atomic
Bombings
Ankylosing Spondylitis
Patients
Uranium Miners

39. EFFECTS: SOMATIC AND GENETIC
Radiation effects are called
somatic if they become
manifest in the exposed person
and
genetic if they affect their
descendants.

40. SOMATIC EFFECTS, RISK FACTORS
Cancers indistinguishable from those caused
naturally
Solid tumours (breast, lung, thyroid and GI ) greater
numerically than leukemia
Risk is greater for women - breast and thyroid
cancer
Age effects are important, age independent risk
estimates may be inappropriate.
Synergistic effects may be important

41. ANNUAL DOSE RATES
Cosmic 0.45
External 0.26
Internal 0.27
Other <0.01
~1.0 mSv/ year

42. MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DOSES
Workers (members of public)
5 mSv per year
Atomic Radiation Workers
(ARWs )
50 mSv per year

43. RADIATION FIELDS

44. JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARY PANEL- JULY 5, 2012
a. Disaster was “made in Japan”
b. Japanese culture: Reflexive Obedience
Reluctance to Question Authority
“Sticking with the Program”
c. Collusion between Government, the Regulators and
Tepco
d. Government and Regulators not fully committed to
protecting public health and safety
e. The central government failed to convey severity of
accident

45. PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS, JULY 5, 2012
1. Permanent committee in National Diet
2. Reform of the crisis management system
3. Establish system to deal with long-term public health
effects
4. Dramatic corporate reform of Tepco*
5. New regulatory body
6. Develop a system of independent investigation
commissions
*Tepco: Tokyo Electric Power Company

46. IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA
(1) More federal/provincial resources to
protect against catastrophic disasters;
importance of protecting critical
infrastructure and local government
buildings
(2) Customize risk reduction at the local
level based on topography, physical
features and land-use planning
(3) Early warning systems are effective
when they are properly perceived

48. THANK YOU