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1. The article below is the English version of my “Einstein und
Religionskritik” (see my Academia.edu website). A largely
re-written and enlarged English version of this article can be
found in:
Nicolaas A. Rupke (ed.), Eminent Lives in Twentieth-Century
Science and Religion (Second Revised and Much Expanded
Edition), Frankfurt: Peter Lang 2009, pp. 155-177.
Albert Einstein:
Religion and the Criticism of Religion1
Gebhard Löhr
I. Introduction
The religious views of Albert Einstein have played an important
role in the debates on the relations between science and religion
in the 20th and 21st centuries (e.g. Haught 1995, 5-6, 29-30;
Dawkins 2006, 33-41). One reason for this may lie in the fact
that Einstein can be regarded as one of the most important
physicists in human history and so has also been considered an
expert on fundamental human problems in general (cf. Wickert
2003, 102-105). Another reason may be that Einstein’s physical
views have consequences specifically for our general picture of
the world; accordingly, Einstein has also been looked upon as an
expert with respect to worldviews or all-encompassing pictures
of the world, i.e. non-religious equivalents of religion (cf.
Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 8; Wickert 2003, 104). Finally
Einstein's inclination to comment on all sorts of subjects of
1
I wish to thank Dr. David Orton of Deo Publishing for extensive help with
the translation of this article.

2. - 2 -
public interest seems to have played an important role
(Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 3; cf. Fölsing 1995, 576).2
Einstein’s views on religion and religious issues were subjects
of heated debate already during his life-time, as it was not at all
clear what his position on these matters was, or whether he was
taking a positive or a critical stance towards religious belief.
Thus on the one hand Einstein was claimed, by the defendants
of religion, to be a supporter of their position, i.e. as having
advocated the view of the compatibility of religion with a
scientific outlook (Audretsch 1995). Furthermore, it was
claimed that Einstein had confessed to a personal religious faith
(Muschalek 1960).3
On the other hand, however, Einstein was
also claimed, by critics of religion, to have been an opponent of
religion, in fact an atheist, a physicist who represented scientific
materialism and was deeply opposed to the churches (Vogel
1956, 592). This view has also been voiced in recent
publications, for instance by the much discussed critic of
religion, Richard Dawkins (Dawkins 2006, 33-41). Both sides in
this ongoing debate make appeal to original documents by the
hand of Einstein himself, such as personal letters, and to
anecdotal evidence such as oral statements.
As a matter of fact Einstein seems to have commented very
differently on religion on different occasions, both as a supporter
of religion and as an opponent. Thus he emphasized the
correspondence of scientific research with a sort of “cosmic
religiousness”, and in some places he even characterized the
2
His inclination to air his views on all kinds of issues was commented upon
iti all al ead Ei stei ’s o te po a ies, e.g. olleagues a d even
by close friends such as Max Born. See e.g. Einstein/Born 1991, 61-78; Born
2005, 36-49.
3
It is rather amusing, but also a bit disquieting, to see that Jürgen Audretsch
(a theoretical physicist and outspoken Christian) underlines the religious
chara te of Ei stei ’s worldview precisely in the foreword to a book
(Jammer 1995) which tries to prove almost exactly the contrary, namely the
critical view of Einstein towards religion or, at least, the independence of
Ei stei ’s eligious ie s f o offi ial religion, i.e. the religion of the
churches or organized religious bodies.

3. - 3 -
practice of science as a kind of exercise of religion (Einstein
1954, 40). In other places, however, Einstein also expressed a
sharp condemnation of religion: thus, for instance, he
maintained that belief in a personal God stands in contradiction
to the scientific worldview, and he strongly denounced the
religion of the priests and the religion of the churches (Einstein
1954, 37). It is not surprising, therefore, that both sides in the
debate on his religious views should employ his statements in
support of their own position.
What is more, it seems crucial, in discussing the attitude Einstein
took towards religion, to deal with his attitude towards Judaism,
especially Judaism as a religion, as he was brought up in a liberal
Jewish family. It is commonly assumed that Einstein was only
superficially influenced by religion in his parental home and in
his youth, as he grew up in a freethinking, non-religious
atmosphere. On the other hand, we have his comments from a
later time which betray a certain closeness to Judaism, including
its religious beliefs. Finally, consideration needs to be given to
the extent to which Einstein allowed his religious views to have
an influence on his scientific worldview and to the extent to
which his scientific worldview took priority over his religious
views. The relationship between these two factors requires
analysis.
In the following discussion the religious views of Einstein will
be presented with consideration for the question whether he
actually believed religion and the natural sciences to be
compatible or not. We shall first review Einstein’s critical views
on religion and then introduce his positive views on religious
belief. We shall then make a comparison between Einstein’s
different remarks. In the final section of this paper attention will
be paid to the question whether Einstein should after all be
considered a critic of religion, and what his comments mean for
a provisional definition of the concept “critique of religion” (or
“religious criticism”). It will be evident that an adequate

4. - 4 -
understanding of Einstein's views can only be achieved if the
conceptual questions are solved, e.g. if the concept of “criticism
of religion” is clearly grasped and sufficiently nuanced.
II. Main Section
1. Introduction
Einstein’s attitude towards religion can best be analysed by
dealing with the attitudes he took towards theism, i.e. towards
the belief that there is a single, omnipotent and morally perfect
God or the belief that there are several personal gods. For in his
own view religion was characterized first and foremost by belief
in the existence of a single deity or a plurality of divine beings.
It was only later in his life that Einstein attempted to dissolve the
close association of his understanding of religion with theism
and to develop a concept of religion of his own, making it
independent of belief in a god or gods. However, this
observation, significant though it is, is a matter of analysis of
Einstein’s religious development, and so will be treated in later
paragraphs and not taken as a starting point for this discussion.
2. Einstein's criticism of theism
In his published articles on the subject of religion Einstein
expressed sharp criticism of belief in God (i.e. of personal
theism). Thus in his well-known article “Religion und
Wissenschaft”, which appeared in 1930 in diverse newspapers
and magazines both in Germany and the USA he stated that the
idea of a personal God distinct from the order of nature but
capable of intervention and influencing natural events is
incompatible with the physical view of nature and in particular
a causal (deterministic) conception of the natural order (Einstein
1954, 39). In a later article Einstein asserted that the idea of a
personal God stands in contradiction to the idea of order in

5. - 5 -
nature, i.e. the idea of orderliness and regularity of the individual
natural processes, an idea which (according to him) is
presupposed in all scientific research (Einstein 1956, 26). In this
paper Einstein also points out that the idea of a personal God
stands in contradiction to a fundamental principle of scientific
research, namely the principle that natural causes are sought for
all processes and events in nature, and the assumption that these
causes can in principle be found (Einstein 1956, 25-26). In this
remark Einstein again presupposes a concept of god according
to which he is able to intervene in the natural order and to
influence processes in nature for his own purposes.
Einstein's criticism of belief in a personal God as being in
contradiction to the scientific worldview was based especially
on the observation that theism presupposes divine intrusions into
the natural order and, as a consequence, interruptions of the
causal processes. The idea of god thus violates the principle
according to which all processes in nature are strictly causally
determined. In addition, a presumed intervention of God in
nature would represent a singularity in the natural order whereas
physical research attempts to uncover the regular, law-like
character of natural processes without regard for any
presumption of special cases. Finally, the assumption of divine
intervention in nature would also represent the impact of a
spiritual entity (i.e. the deity considered as spirit) upon natural
events, an assumption which would of course be in contradiction
to the presupposed materialism of the physical concept of reality
(Einstein 1956, 25). Thus belief in a personal God or personal
gods is, in Einstein’s view, incompatible with the so-called
mechanistic worldview.
Einstein did not, however, direct his criticism only to the
physical consequences of belief in a personal God. He also
pointed out the negative consequences of belief in God for the
basic human existential attitude. Thus, a person believing in a
personal God is inclined to assume the attitude of a little child

6. - 6 -
expecting parental reward or punishment for his or her actions
(Einstein 1954, 40). Einstein was referring here to the idea of a
moral sanction of human actions on the part of a personal deity.4
Furthermore Einstein pointed out that belief in God generates
and presupposes an egoistic attitude of the human being in the
selfish attempt to attain good things from the deity for him- or
herself (Einstein 1954, 38, cf. Einstein 1956, 22-23, 24, 27).
Finally Einstein characterized persons who believe in God as
“religiously naïve”, thus ascribing to them an unenlightened,
backward state of mind (Einstein 1954, 40; Einstein 1956, 24-
25).5
In sum Einstein considered people who believed in a
personal God or gods as childish, backward and immature.
His sharpest condemnation, however, Einstein aimed at the
moral consequences of belief in God. Einstein assumed that the
idea of god implied the view that the deity rewards or punishes
human actions according to their moral worth.6
Connected with
this is, according to Einstein, the idea of a reward or penalization
of the human being after death and as a consequence the idea of
a life after death. It is this cluster of ideas that Einstein criticized
with special incisiveness (Einstein 1954, 39, 40; Calaprice 2005,
206-207).
In his article “Religion und Wissenschaft” Einstein noted that
the idea of a god rewarding or punishing human deeds is
untenable since it stands in contradiction to the presupposed
physical view of reality. Such an idea presupposes that the
4
See also the statement on belief in God to M. Berkowitz, reprinted in
Calaprice 2005, 206.
5
The idea that belief in a personal god is religiously naïve is not only found
in Einstein, but also in the writings of other intellectuals of his time. To take
a famous example Max Planck, in his article on science and religion also
presupposes that belief in a personal god is religiously naïve. In distinction
to Einstein, however, Planck considered naïve belief in a personal god to be
a positive attitude; he declared that he did not want to shatter it in his
lecture (just mentioned) by recourse to scientific ideas. In his later years
however Planck, too, turned sharply against personal theistic belief. See
Planck 1969b, 318-319.
6
This is hat Ei stei alled the moral idea of god , see elo fo fu the
description and analysis.

7. - 7 -
human being is responsible for his or her own actions, but this
cannot be true since all processes in nature, including all human
actions, are strictly causally determined (Einstein 1954, 39; cf.
Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 32). As a result, the idea of divine
punishment is immoral since the deity punishes the human being
for something for which he or she is not at all to blame (Einstein
1954, 29; Einstein 1956, 25). Therefore, on closer inspection,
the idea of a god rewarding or punishing human deeds is
incompatible with the physical worldview. In this context it
should also be mentioned that Einstein did not believe in human
free will but took the view that the human will, like all events in
nature, is strictly causally (pre-)determined (Einstein 1954, 8-9;
Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 32, 81-82).7
Einstein has criticized the idea that God rewards or punishes
human actions also in his essay “Naturwissenschaft und
Religion” (Part II) (Einstein 1956, 22-29). In this article,
however, he did not primarily discuss the opposition between
belief in a god and the physical worldview but rather emphasized
the internal inconsistency of this idea. Thus the idea that a god
rewards or punishes human deeds presupposes that the human
being is responsible for his or her actions. However, in
Einstein’s opinion this cannot be the case even according to the
internal requirements of personalistic theism itself since in such
a view God is considered as an omnipotent being and the creator
of all. Therefore all human actions and intentions ultimately go
back to his creating and causing them so that a human being
cannot be responsible for them after all (Einstein 1956, 25; see
also Calaprice 2005, 193).
Thus, even more than in his former article Einstein makes it clear
that according to this kind of belief God ultimately condemns
7
It seems likely that, philosophically speaking, Einstein took this idea over
from Arthur Schopenhauer, for whom he had a high regard both as a writer
and a philosopher. However it is of course also an outcome of his physical
worldview.

8. - 8 -
his own actions when penalizing human actions – but wrongly
attributes responsibility for this to the acting human being
(Einstein 1956, 25). Thus, Einstein here exposes not only the
internal inconsistency but also the moral dubiousness of theistic
belief.
Thus, Einstein did not believe that belief in God can justify or
motivate human moral conduct. Rather he supposed that the
basic moral norms are simply there as given in society, as
requirements for living together and as products of tradition and
education (Einstein 1956, 21). Moral norms thus have, in
Einstein’s view, a social and historical foundation, not a
religious one (Wickert 2003, 127-128; cf. Dukas/Hoffmann
1981, 39). The function of religion is to teach these moral norms,
especially to the young, and to remind society of their existence.
This is the idea behind his contention that the priests of religion
should cease discharging their religious functions and become
teachers of morality instead (Einstein 1956, 27-28; cf. Wickert
2003, 129). Einstein obviously wanted to assert that it is only in
a role such as this that they would perform a useful function
within the organism of society.
It can, therefore, be stated that Einstein took a fundamentally
critical attitude towards religion, at any rate to religion of a
certain type. This attitude was based on his rejection of belief in
personal deities because, in his opinion, such a belief stands in
contradiction to the physical view of the world and moreover is
morally unacceptable. A few scattered references to useful
functions of religion for society, for instance its function in the
education of the young, suggest however that Einstein could also
imagine himself passing a positive judgment on religion
provided that it would be freed from belief in God and its
institutional consequences (e.g. the formation of a priesthood).8
However he would first have to separate the notion of religion
8
On the institutional consequences of theism see Einstein 1954, 37.

9. - 9 -
from the concept of god and then extend the concept of god
beyond the conceptual limits of traditional theism. As it turned
out, these were precisely the consequences he was eventually to
draw.
As a matter of fact, Einstein also supplied an explanation for the
emergence of human religion in which he paid particular
attention to the question of the emergence of belief in God. This
is consistent with a general principle of his worldview, as in his
opinion all events in nature are causally determined; therefore it
must be possible to find natural causes for all events in nature.
Hence it must be possible also to find natural causes for the rise
of religion. Einstein’s theory is an attempt to point out these
causes.
In Einstein’s view the emergence of religion was ultimately
caused by human fear, e.g. the fear of wild animals, frightening
events in nature such as thunder and lightning, illnesses and
death (Einstein 1954, 36-37). In reaction to such experiences the
humans at the beginning of history conjured up deities which
supposedly had control over the dreaded phenomena and could
influence them. The people of ancient times then attempted to
exert influence upon the deities by means of prayers and
sacrifices so as to be spared from being affected by the dreaded
phenomena. A priesthood came into being to mediate divine-
human contacts so as to bring about the desired outcomes
(Einstein 1954, 37). In time the priesthood developed into
institutionalized religious organizations, such as the churches.
This reveals that ultimately Einstein intended to describe the
origin and development not of religion in general, but more
specifically of the official organized religions and/or churches
(especially the Christian churches) of his own time.
Einstein characterized this first step in the development of
human religion, in terminology taken over from Schopenhauer
and the ancient Sophists, as the “religion of fear” (German:

10. - 10 -
Furchtreligion) since it owes its origin and rise to the human
fear of the dreaded natural phenomena (Einstein 1954, 37).
Accordingly fear characterizes the beginning of the
development of human religion, and Einstein points out again
and again that this element has never completely disappeared
from the history of religions (cf. Einstein 1954, 40). In addition,
however, the origin of human religion – which is the origin of
belief in God or the gods – also goes back to human selfishness,
namely the wish to gratify certain basic human needs, initially
(at the first stage of development) vital needs. Einstein often
pointed out that human religions, i.e. the official
institutionalized religions with their belief in a personal God,
have always carried with them an element of human selfishness,
even of human greed (cf. Einstein 1954, 36-38; Einstein 1956,
22-23, 27).
Human need (or greed) played a crucial role also in the
formation of the second stage of human religion. For in this
second phase, according to Einstein, people invented deities who
were supposed to satisfy their social and moral needs, such as
desire for love, security, guidance, governance, management of
their affairs, etc., i.e. needs which human authorities, for
example parents or political leaders (human “Führer”!), could
fulfil only temporarily and imperfectly (Einstein 1954, 37).9
As
a result Einstein refers to this second stage of the development
of human religion as “social” or “moral religion” (German:
soziale or moralische Religion). Einstein observes that most of
the so-called “higher religions” (= religions of culture) of the
Near East, that is Judaism, Christianity and Islam, belong to this
second stage in religious development (Einstein 1954, 37);
however he adds that none of the types of religion is realized in
a pure form so that the moral or social religions also contain an
element of fear (Einstein 1954, 37-38). Taking as an illustration
9
This is clearly an indirect criticism of the leader cult in Germany at the
egi i g of the 9 ’s.

11. - 11 -
the Psalms of David and the Prophets, Einstein then points out
in the Scriptures of Judaism elements indicative of the transition
from the religion of fear to moral religion (Einstein 1954, 38).
Einstein's theory of the origin and development of human
religion does not only represent a causal explanation of the
emergence of belief in God or the gods. Rather this view also
implies a severe criticism of religion, in fact a vigorous rejection
of religion. Thus the theory contains the implicit claim that
religious belief does not have its origin in divine revelation but
goes back to human projection, and that for the mere purpose of
the gratification of (vital or social) needs (Jammer 2002, 76). In
addition the theory implies that human religion, and in particular
theistic religion, always contains an element of fear and an
element of suppression of the individual, which has been
exploited by the priesthood (cf. Einstein 1954, 37; Einstein
1956, 26-27). Finally the theory also contains the implication
that religions are untrue philosophically speaking because the
presumed deities simply do not exist. Thus religions – in
contradistinction to the sciences – are simply not true; they
convey not true but false images of reality.10
3. Einstein’s positive comments on religion
3.1 Introduction
In numerous places, however, Albert Einstein comments
favourably on religion, even in the same treatises which contain
also his critical utterances. In addition, on a number of occasions
he even makes personal confessions of faith, i.e. he confesses to
being religious or having certain religious beliefs. In all of these
cases, however, his religious views clearly differ from those of
official religion, i.e. the religious views held by average middle-
10
As a matter of fact religions are, according to Einstein, not entitled to
make any assertions about reality – this is the domain of science. Religions
are only entitled to give moral advice, nothing else. See Einstein 1956, 22-
24.

12. - 12 -
class members of the churches or religious communities in
Berlin in the first decades of the 20th century. Thus Einstein
shows the same creativity and independence of judgment in
religious matters that he displayed in the scientific field. This is
not particularly surprising, however, because his views on
religion were closely connected with his scientific worldview.11
So it cannot safely be maintained that Einstein rejected religion
as such or took a fundamentally hostile attitude towards it,
though this has been argued by some commentators and critics
(see Weinberg 1994, 242). Rather, Einstein was critical only of
a certain form or type of religion and of certain religious views
that go with it, views which were predominantly held in the
ruling bourgeois circles of the great cities of his time. However,
his critical attitude was construed, by the defenders of
conventional Christianity, as a rejection of religion as such, and
it could be publicly branded as such.12
This, however, was
nothing but a normative perspective from a specific religious
standpoint, and in describing Einstein’s views on religion one is
not forced to share this perspective or adopt its position. Rather,
it is the task of cultural studies to present several possible per-
spectives and to analyze their interplay in the subsequent
debates, not to spell out a particular theological viewpoint.
Einstein’s positive views on religion are found mainly in his oral
statements which have been recorded by contemporaries or have
been delivered in anecdotic ways. In addition, positive or at least
differentiating statements are also found in personal
correspondence as well as in other private documents. Lastly,
Einstein also comments positively on religion in his published
treatises on the subject of science and religion – in fact in some
of them he elaborates a positive theory of the development of
11
This will have to be shown elsewhere, but it seems obvious in his reaction
to the Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum phenomena.
12
For a contemporary example see Haught 1995, 5-6.

13. - 13 -
religion. All of these aspects will be touched upon in the
following discussion.
3.2 Anecdotal and oral evidence and evidence from personal
letters
In many of his oral statements Einstein can be seen to have taken
a predominantly critical view of religion and especially of belief
in God. Thus, there are several verbal statements in which he
rejects belief in a personal God and instead defines his
religiousness as belief in the beauty and regularity of the
physical laws (Seelig 1954, 52; Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 43;
Calaprice 2005, 208). Moreover, several anecdotes prove that
Einstein took a rather critical attitude towards the idea of god in
the established religions, especially Christianity and Judaism
(Seelig 1954, 133, 150). It does not, therefore, immediately
seem necessary to treat Einstein’s verbal statements separately.
It seems striking, however, that in numerous statements Einstein
makes a rather positive use of the concept of god and that he
even articulates a positive understanding of the task of scientific
research with the help of this concept. In fact the Swiss poet
Friedrich Dürrenmatt once declared that Einstein used to talk
about God so frequently that one could well believe that he was
a theologian (Audretsch 1995, 7; Jammer 2002, 6-7). The
physicist and theologian Jürgen Audretsch ascribed to Einstein
a “systematic theology of nature” in so far as Einstein studied
the thoughts of God in nature and sought knowledge of God “in
the book of nature” (Audretsch 1995, 8-9). It could therefore be
worthwhile examining Einstein’s remarks on belief in God more
closely, especially as some of them seem to contradict the
critical remarks about the idea of god in his written treatises.
If one looks more closely at his oral statements and at the
anecdotal evidence, it seems remarkable how Einstein’s attitude
towards the idea of god changed in the course of his life. In fact

14. - 14 -
Einstein’s views seem to have undergone a development, in the
course of his life, from a critical attitude towards belief in God
to a positive attitude during his later years. In some of his
statements from the last years of his life Einstein seems even to
have confessed to a personal belief in God and to have expressed
some ideas which seem hardly compatible with his earlier
views.13
Einstein’s colleague and biographer Philipp Frank took the view
that Einstein’s use of the concept of god had, at least during his
earlier years (until the early 1930s) a rather playful character
(Frank 1989 [1953], 280-288). The concept of god was either
used ironically or served as a metaphorical mode of expression
for the absolute validity of the physical laws. Afterwards, during
his later years, Einstein used the concept of god more and more
in a serious sense; by the use of this concept he wanted to
express the rule-like character of the physical laws in contrast to
the statistical interpretation of the physical laws by the quantum
theorists (cf. Wickert 2003, 122-123). It is in this context that
Einstein stated, in a much repeated and (in many variants) well-
known saying: “God (or: ‘the Old Man’) does not throw dice”.
Einstein used these and similar statements to express his deepest
scientific convictions (cf. Pais 1994, 112-122).
It seems, therefore, that it was with the help of the concept of
god that Einstein expressed his deepest and most fundamental
scientific convictions. The concept of god was used to lend
expression to the almost religious character of his basic
scientific convictions.14
It seems therefore too simplistic to
contrast Einstein’s criticism of religion with his positive
statements about pure science and conclude that Einstein was an
adversary of religion, as Richard Dawkins does in his
13
See the interview reprinted in Muschalek 1961, 29.
14
See also the following statement, describing his motivation for doing
s ie tifi esea h: I a t to k o ho God eated the o ld. I a ot
i te ested i this o that phe o e o …. I a t to k o his thoughts. The
est a e details. “ee Calap i e , 9 .

15. - 15 -
presentation of Einstein’s views. He fails to see that for Einstein
science itself had a religious, almost existential character.
Einstein’s fundamental conviction, held with an almost religious
fervour, was that the laws of the universe are regular and
orderly, and that these laws can be discovered with the help of
scientific research, i.e. with the help of the methods of science
(cf. Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 69-70). In other words, the concept
of god was used to express the almost “absolute” character that
scientific discoveries and the fundamental principles of
scientific research had for him. In fact this seems to have been
one of the reasons for his use of the concept of god.15
In this vein
he stated: “My comprehension of God comes from the deeply
felt conviction of a superior intelligence that reveals itself in the
knowable world” (Calaprice 2005, 195).
Hence Einstein seems to have radically changed his opinion
about the notion of god: while the concept of god is used, in his
earlier years and in his written statements, as an expression of
the contradiction between religion and the scientific worldview
(cf. Pais 1994, 118), in his verbal statements from a later time
the same concept becomes an expression for the regularity and
orderliness of physical reality (Pais 1994, 114). While Einstein
initially saw a contradiction between the idea of a personal God
who intervenes in the physical order of nature and the
acceptance of a deterministic worldview (Einstein 1954, 39),
God later became for him the guarantor of the unconditional
validity of the causal-deterministic worldview of classical
physics (Seelig 1954, 51; cf. also Fölsing 1995, 579).16
As he
15
The same ideas can be found in some of Max Planck’s iti gs. I fact,
Planck, too, could employ a religious category in that he spoke of the
i a le of the atio alit of atu e with which the human mind seems
compatible.
16
The same idea can also be found in Max Planck, and it may well be that
Einstein was influenced in this by his senior colleague. For Planck the idea
of a personal God has precisely the function of guaranteeing the validity of
the causal-deterministic worldview in all areas of reality, even in those
corners which are not accessible to human inspection and observation. See
Planck 1969a, 162-165.

16. - 16 -
said in a statement to a student in 1936: “Everyone who is
seriously involved in the pursuit of science becomes convinced
that a spirit is manifest in the laws of the universe, one that is
vastly superior to that of man …” (Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 33;
Calaprice 2005, 202). Thus Einstein’s own religious views seem
to have undergone a radical transformation, especially those
concerning belief in God: a slow but discernible change that has
received almost no attention in scholarly literature on the
subject.
In this context a further observation seems important: in later
years Einstein apparently modified his understanding of the
concept “God” itself, i.e. his own idea or image of God. For in
his later years he understood by “God” not a personal subject
able to intervene in the context of nature, as did, for instance,
one of the leading theorists of quantum mechanics, Pascual
Jordan (Jordan 1963, 161-164), but as a being guaranteeing the
regularity of nature as described in the scientific worldview.
Thus, it can be said that Einstein used a “spinozistic” (Jammer
2002, 43-48) or “pantheistic” notion of god (Jammer 2002, 48;
cf. Seelig 1954, 51; Rosenthal-Schneider 1988, 91). It seems
therefore that Einstein’s own understanding of the concept of
god rather than his attitude towards belief in a personal God
underwent a transformation in the course of his life. Perhaps it
is therefore inaccurate to speak about a transformation from a
negative to a positive attitude towards religion and belief in God
the later years of Einstein’s life. Dürrenmatt’s identification of
Einstein as a “disguised theologian” (versteckter Theologe)
(Jammer 2002, 6-7) would therefore be inappropriate.
Even so the development of Einstein’s religious views can be
considered as remarkable, as it stands in a marked contrast to
the religious development of his colleague and older
contemporary Max Planck. For while Planck, in his earlier and
middle years, explicitly confessed to belief in a personal God
and considered the idea of a personal God to be compatible with

17. - 17 -
the deterministic worldview of physics (Planck 1969a, 160-
168), Einstein, as we have seen, maintained the incompatibility
of the idea of a personal God with the deterministic worldview
of physics. However, Planck’s attitude towards belief in God
underwent a change, and in one of the last documents from his
life he explicitly denied that he believed or ever had believed in
a personal God (Herneck 1958; 1960). Einstein, on the other
hand, took a more positive attitude towards belief in God in his
later years and in fact made positive use of the notion of god
(Muschalek 1961, 29). So, the lines of religious development of
the two physicists apparently crossed and continued in opposite
directions. Personal contact between the two may have played a
role and may have led to a rapprochement in their religious
views.17
However, the difference in the religious development
of the two physicists may have also to do with the different kinds
of lives they lived: thus Planck was probably put off from belief
in the meaningfulness of life and a god who oversees and steers
it as a result of experiencing unusually severe strokes of fate,
such as the death of all his children, the murder of his son by the
Nazis just a few weeks before the end of the war and the
bombing of his house in Berlin, with the destruction of all his
scientific documents and letters.18
Einstein, on the other hand,
was able from his exile in the USA to observe the defeat of Nazi
Germany and the course of justice without having to be
concerned about his own safety and without being afflicted by
personal misfortune like his colleague Planck. This may go
some way to explaining why the two physicists adopted a
different attitude towards life, and in consequence a different
attitude towards religion, especially towards belief in a god who
has control over human life.
17
“ee the e tio of the o te po a , ho Ei stei is uoti g ith
the statement that in his day and age the serious scientific workers are the
only profoundly religious people; this contemporary may well have been
Max Planck. See Einstein 1954, 40.
18
Joh Heil o app op iatel gi es the hapte o Pla k’s last ea s the
headi g: I “hip e k . “ee Heil o , 9-204.

18. - 18 -
Now it is striking that Einstein expressed a positive attitude
towards belief in God almost exclusively in oral statements
while in his written documents, even in later years, he continued
to maintain a predominantly critical stance (cf. the documents in
Einstein 1956). The reason for this could be that in his verbal
remarks Einstein paid less attention to his being identified as a
supporter of religion, especially of traditional religion as
realized in the churches and established religions. Moreover, he
seems to have believed (erroneously, as we now know) that he
ran a lower risk of his oral statements being taken as the static,
official opinions of the physicist on these matters. Finally
Einstein himself seems to have felt that his oral statements had
a rather playful character so that he did not fear being identified
with the opinions expressed in them. Thus, the differences in
Einstein’s statements about God in his oral and written
statements seem partly to be rooted in the differences of the
media used to express them.
Another reason for the positive use of the concept of god in
verbal statements could also be that Einstein used this concept
only to refer to a single function, namely the function of
guaranteeing the orderliness and regularity of the physical order
(cf. Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 68-69). As a matter of fact he
nowhere uses it to describe any other aspect. In his written
treatises, on the other hand, he dealt with the subject of religion
in a more systematic and comprehensive manner, analyzing
different functions and aspects of belief in God (e.g. the moral
function and the institutional aspect). Hence, he had to describe
his own attitude carefully vis-à-vis different aspects of belief in
a personal God, many of which he criticized incisively. This in
turn led to his critical statements.
Finally, the public context seems to have played a part in
defining Einstein’s different attitudes towards religion. Thus
Einstein seems to have believed that he could express central
aspects of his physical worldview with the help of the notion of

19. - 19 -
god. He could draw attention to these aspects by connecting
them with the concept of god in a sometimes provocative,
sometimes ironic way. In his written treatises, on the other hand,
he did not have to give an abbreviated, popularized presentation
of his main ideas, as they could be read again and again. Hence,
he could also manage without invoking the concept of god. As
a consequence, he could deal with religion in a more analytical
manner, and he could discuss the various aspects of belief in
God with a more rational, sober attitude.
It seems, therefore, that Einstein was very skilful in the use of
media and public marketing: he was aware that he had to
connect his scientific views with a striking concept to get them
the public attention they deserved. At the same time, with the
help of the concept of god he expressed some of his most deeply
ingrained scientific convictions, such as his belief in the rational
character of the physical worldview and also his belief in the
universal validity of physical determinism. The notion of god in
his oral statements thus expressed, so to speak, Einstein’s
religious belief in the unlimited, absolute validity of the physical
worldview, i.e. the classical worldview of physics at the end of
the 19th century. This is why he employed a religious notion –
his scientific convictions indeed had a religious character (cf.
Rosenthal-Schneider 1988, 78-79, 82-84).
The example of Einstein’s oral statements demonstrates that it
is sometimes difficult to make a precise distinction between
religion and natural science (in order then to determine the exact
relations between the two factors). For Einstein as for some of
his colleagues, the physical worldview had acquired an almost
religious quality (cf. Rosenthal-Schneider 1988, 82-84), as
seems to be clear from the fact that he used the concept of god
to describe or characterize it. At the same time Einstein’s views
on the physical world were also, of course, scientific
convictions, in that he held them on the basis of physical
observations and reflections and also in that he conceived

20. - 20 -
thought experiments by which to justify them. In fact one of
these thought experiments was later physically realized, in the
form of the so-called “Aspect Experiment”, which, however did
not confirm but rather disproved Einstein’s views (Mansfield
1989). Nonetheless Einstein’s views about the physical world
order can be seen as not only religious but also scientific
convictions, although he employed a religious notion to
comment on them in his famous saying: “God does not throw
dice” (cf. also Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 68).
These considerations show that it is not possible to grasp the
complicated relations between science and religion only with
the help of models usually employed for determining the
relationship between the two factors, e.g. in terms of the
definition of certain main concepts in order to classify the
possible relations of the two entities (e.g. Haught 1995). It even
becomes clear that these categories are inexpedient in principle,
because they contain a concealed “essentialism” with regard to
the dimensions “religion” and “natural science” which is not
compatible with historical reality. The real historical relations
between the two factors were in fact much more complicated, as
the example of Einstein makes so abundantly clear: thus religion
and the natural sciences can be closely intertwined with each
other, and science itself can even take on a religious quality (and
religion can take a scientific turn, as indicated in “Christian
Science”). These possibilities are contained in rudimentary form
in Einstein’s religious statements (cf. also Dukas/Hoffmann
1981, 32-33).
Hence, in the treatment of the relations of science and religion,
it is advisable not to start from an essentialist confrontation of
both elements, as if they were separate substances or entities,
but to make use of “thick descriptions” of the concrete historical
relations of both dimensions so that the complexity of the field
comes into view (see Brooke 1999). In this manner not only the
different historical possibilities (models) of the relations of both

21. - 21 -
dimensions can be determined, but creative possibilities for
shaping present-day relations between the two factors can be
discovered.19
3.3 Einstein's positive comments on religion in published
documents
Perhaps surprisingly (especially in the light of Dawkins’s
interpretation) Einstein made positive comments on religion, not
only in oral statements, but also in his written treatises. Some of
these positive comments can even be found in exactly the same
documents in which he also made his critical remarks, as when
he explains his theory of the development of religion. In some
places he even gives the impression of having made his critical
remarks on religion merely or largely in order to prepare the
reader for some positive comments. It could therefore be the case
that the critical passages themselves contain a hidden positive
message or positive meaning. If that were so it would show the
need to examine carefully, in each case, the reasons for critical
statements on religion, the need to uncover their real, sometimes
hidden meaning, and the need for an assessment as to whether
they are made with a mere critical intention or in order to fulfil
a more positive, constructive task. This latter seems to be the
case, on close analysis, with many of Einstein’s statements on
religion and belief in God.
In his article “Religion and Science” Einstein develops the idea
of a “cosmic religiousness”20
that differs in many respects from
19
It seems to me that the dialogue between science and religion in our time
has come to a point (in fact reached an impasse) where it urgently needs
some inspirations from the complex historical perspectives elucidated by
the methods of cultural studies (e.g. in Science of Religions and History of
the Sciences).
20
Translated “o ja Ba g a , the t a slato of Ei stei ’s Ideas and
Opinions, as os i eligious feeli g , thus i gi g out o l o e aspe t,
namely the aspect of feeling, of the German original. The expression chosen
by Einstein is kosmische Religiosität os i eligious ess , hi h
certainly comprises the dimension of feeling, but also other aspects like an
aesthetic judgment, a personal attitude and also certain rational beliefs, e.g.

22. - 22 -
the forms of religion criticized by him, namely “religion of fear”
and “moral religion” (Pais 1994, 119-120; Jammer 2002, 76-78;
Wickert 2003, 120-121). In particular cosmic religiousness
differs from the other two forms of religion in that in it no single
personal deity or a plurality of personal gods is assumed; rather
the object of reverence are the beauty and harmony of the
universe and the order of the causal connections in nature
(Einstein 1954, 38). Therefore, cosmic religiousness comes
without many of the features associated with belief in God (that
is, in a personal God or gods) and which Einstein describes in
detail when characterizing the other two forms of religion (cf.
Wickert 2003, 121).
Thus, in cosmic religiousness there is no priesthood mediating
the commerce between the humans and the gods (Einstein 1956,
27-28; cf. Einstein 1954, 38-39). As a result, there is also no
official organization of the priesthood, in other words no church
or churches (Einstein 1954, 38). In contrast, cosmic
religiousness is practised by a few exceptional individuals that
form a sort of “invisible community” known only to those who
belong to it (Einstein 1954, 38-40). Moreover, in cosmic
religiousness other features invariably connected with belief in
God and the official churches are absent, such as the acceptance
of a body of sacred writings as a basis of belief or the definition
of official teachings, i.e. of an official, binding theology as an
ideological basis (Einstein 1954, 38). All things considered,
Einstein's description of cosmic religiousness comes down to the
claim that all the negative, fearful and selfish traits
characteristic, in his view, of the theistic religions or churches of
his time, are absent from it.
Cosmic religiousness is realized in the admiration and
veneration of the beauty of the universe (Einstein 1954, 11, 38-
39). This awe is mainly produced, as Einstein explains, in
the belief in the rationality and orderliness of the cosmos. See Einstein
1993a, 16, compared with Einstein 1954, 38.

23. - 23 -
scientific research (Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 32-33), but it finds
expression also in artistic representations of reality like music,
painting or architecture (cf. Einstein 1954, 38; Wickert 2003,
129-131; cf. Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 37-38). Accordingly,
scientific research and/or artistic activities are the equivalents of
a religious service (Gottesdienst) in the context of cosmic
religiousness. A sentiment of awe and wonder arises in the
practice of cosmic religiousness, an emotion similar to religious
emotions (Einstein 1954, 11, 38; Calaprice 2005, 193). What is
more, the mere fact that we can make discoveries about nature
with the help of our scientific methods, discoveries which we
can then express with the help of mathematical laws is as such
already a miracle, namely the miracle of the rationality of nature
itself (cf. Calaprice 2005, 194-195).21
The practice of cosmic
religiousness can therefore, according to Einstein, dominate the
whole life of a person; it can give it a sense and meaning. In this
respect cosmic religiousness is able to fulfil a central function of
religion in general.22
As a matter of fact, nowhere in his published articles does
Einstein use the notion of “cosmic religion”, as many of his bio-
graphers and commentators have suggested (and as the term has
often been translated), but he always speaks of “cosmic
21
Einstein stated: I found no better expression than religious for
confidence in the rational nature of reality, insofar as it is accessible to
hu a easo … (Calaprice 2005, 206). See also this state e t: To [the
sphere of religion] belongs the faith in the possibility that the regulations
valid for the world of existence are rational, that is, comprehensible to
reason. I cannot conceive of a genuine scientist without that profound faith
(Calaprice 2005, 202).
22
See Einstein 1954, 39-40. Max Planck, too, presented science, i.e. a
scientific way of life, as an alternative to a life dominated by religion, i.e.
Christianity. In fact he uses the term faith , a central concept of Martin
Luthe ’s description of Christian existence, to characterize a life in the
service of scientific research. It seems that he wanted to give a non-Christian
alternative to Nazi ideology, on the rise in the late 1920s. It seems significant
that he presented this idea in an article composed specifically for Christmas
of 1930: thus on close scrutiny the legend that Planck was a devout Christian
scientist is shattered by this document. See Planck 1969c.

24. - 24 -
religiousness” (in German: kosmische Religiosität).23
The
reason for this was perhaps that the concept of “religion” was
too closely associated with belief in God or gods for him to
associate his cosmic piety with religion as he understood it.
Schopenhauer's notion of an “atheistic religion”, used with
reference to early Buddhism (a concept Einstein seems to have
been acquainted with) seems to have been too daring to him to
be of much use (von Glasenapp 1966, 12-13). Besides, Einstein
may have used the concept of “religiousness” because cosmic
piety was a matter of the individual, a form of personal
devoutness rather than an official, organized religion (Einstein
1954, 38-39). So, by employing the concept of “cosmic
religiousness” (or, as the words have also been translated,
“cosmic religious feeling”) Einstein might have wanted to
express the special character of cosmic piety as over against the
other variants of religion he described in his theory of religious
development.
Einstein asserted that cosmic religiousness does not consist in
reverence for a personal God, and in this aspect he saw one of
its most important advantages over the other kinds of religion
(Einstein 1954, 39). For him cosmic religiousness is the last and
highest stage of the development of religion, a stage at which the
idea of belief in a personal God or gods has finally vanished.
Einstein’s theory of the rise of religion is thus not merely a
descriptive hypothesis, an assumption to be tested in the light of
further historical research, but it contains also a normative,
evaluative element, which also finds expression in the fact that
he mentions only a few well-known, exceptional individuals as
representatives of cosmic religiousness (Einstein 1954, 38).
Hence cosmic religiousness can be seen as a kind of elite
religion, the religion of some outstanding intellectuals and
artists. There can be no doubt that Einstein considered himself
23
This has been wrongly rendered, to mention a case in point, in Jammer
1995, 44-45.

25. - 25 -
as a member of this invisible religious community, all the more
so since in his confession The World as I See It he describes
himself as a “lone traveller”, i.e. as an individualist with no
deeper links to his fellow citizens or a nation (Einstein 1954, 9).
Even if a cosmic believer can do without belief in God, in
Einstein’s characterization of cosmic religiousness there are still
some traits which are reminiscent of a belief in God, a sort of
personal theism. At least some of the concepts used by Einstein
sound strangely familiar to anyone well versed in the Western
theistic tradition and its terminology. Thus Einstein states that in
experiencing the beauty and harmony of the natural order one
discovers that they are the manifestation of “a spirit” (or
“reason”) infinitely superior to ours (Einstein 1954, 40;
Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 33).24
In another passage he speaks of
the “superior mind” which “reveals” itself in the beautiful
construction of the universe (Einstein 1954, 39). In a particularly
emotional passage he speaks of “the mysterious” that one
experiences when one concerns oneself with the structures and
laws of nature (Einstein 1954, 11; cf. also Hermann 1994,
338).25
Einstein could even use the word “God” for the
description of his own cosmic piety – with reference to the idea
of god in Spinoza.26
His ideas on religion are neatly summarised
in the following statement: “I cannot conceive of a personal God
who would directly influence the actions of individuals. ... My
religiosity consists of a humble admiration of the infinitely
24
Again something has to be said about the English translation of Sonja
Bargmann: the German word used by Einstein is Geist, best translated as
reason or spirit (in the Aristotelian sense) and not, as Bargmann does,
as intelligence for that again (as above) renders only one aspect of the
(rather more complex) meaning of the German original with its rich
references to philosophical tradition. Cp. Einstein 1954, 40 with Einstein
1993a, 18.
25
“ee also his e a k elated i Calap i e , : … e e e ease to
stand like curious children before the great Mystery into which we were
o .
26
Not however in one of his published articles, but in a personal letter to
the writer Eduard Büsching in October 1929; see Jammer 1995, 34; cf. also
Jammer 1995, 54. See also the statements rendered in Hermann 1994, 338,
Wickert 2003, 121, and Calaprice 2005, 195.

26. - 26 -
superior spirit that reveals itself in the little that we can
comprehend of the knowable world. That deeply emotional
conviction of the presence of a superior reasoning power which
is revealed in the incomprehensible universe, forms my idea of
god” (Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 66; Wickert 2003, 121; Calaprice
2005, 195-196). Here we have it all together: on the one side a
clear and pungent refusal of belief in a personal God, on the
other hand the use of expressions like “reasoning power” (in
German: Vernunft) and “superior spirit” (Geist) as well as the
central religious notion of revelation (offenbaren).27
The concepts used by Einstein, such as “reason”, “spirit” and
also “the mysterious”, all have their roots in the Western
religious tradition, or to be more precise, in the concepts of god,
the soul and the spirit in classical Western metaphysics.
Moreover, the idea of revelation, i.e. the assertion that in the
order of nature a superior reason or mind is “revealed” (Einstein
1954, 39), has its roots in the Western religious tradition, i.e. in
the Christian doctrine of the self-revelation of God in the world.
Thus, it seems that Einstein speaks of God in some however
weak sense also in the context of cosmic religiousness; in any
case his oral statements about “God” or even “dear God” (lieber
Gott) do not seem so surprising after all in the light of these
observations. It is all the more remarkable, though, that Einstein
avoids the use of the word “God” itself in his published papers.
Perhaps Einstein's view can best be described as being motivated
by a wish to hold on to some concept of god – not, however, the
god concept of the classical theistic traditions. In particular he
wanted to avoid the anthropomorphic associations of the god
concept and also all associations of fear and trembling connected
with it.28
On the other hand Einstein did not want to be an atheist
27
See also the statement rendered in Calaprice 2005, 208.
28
In this Einstein contradicted the definition of religion given by Rudolf Otto
in his famous The Idea of the Holy, according to which religion contains an
ele e t of t epidatio a d e e fea . Ho e e Ei stei ’s idea of os i
religiousness also contains some elements of what Otto defined as religious

27. - 27 -
and materialist (or even close to being one), as was sometimes
suggested by representatives of the official churches (or their
adversaries such as Richard Dawkins) (e.g. Jammer 2002, 48;
Dawkins 2006, 39-41). As he expressly stated: “I am not an
atheist...” (Jammer 2002, 150; Calaprice 2005, 196).29
Rather he
tried to find a concept of god which avoided the features of the
traditional concept criticized by him so strongly. In this way,
however, he ran the risk of being regarded as one who denies
God, an atheist and opponent of religion (cf. Jammer 2002, 48-
50).30
Einstein's statements demonstrate how difficult it is to use
religious concepts if the associations of the ruling cultural
traditions, i.e. the ideas of the dominant cultural context, are
rejected. In the culture Einstein lived in, the concept of god was
connected with the ideas of personal theism and the theistic
religions, which, however, Einstein refused in important
regards. He advocated another notion of god for which one
perhaps could have found parallels in other religious or cultural
traditions (for example in the “area gods” of classical Greece or
in the Hindu and Buddhist traditions). Since, however, Einstein
was not sufficiently versed in these traditions (e.g. in the history
of the religions of the East), he avoided the use of the concept of
god in his published articles altogether and took to replacement
concepts instead. Paradoxically, however, these replacement
experience, viz. the feeling of awe and wonder. See Otto 1979 [1936], 14-
22.
29
E e o e fo eful is his follo i g state e t: I ie of su h ha o
in the cosmos which I, with my limited human mind, am able to recognize,
there are yet people who say that there is no God. But what makes me really
a g is that the uote e fo suppo t of su h ie s Calap i e , .
30
Is it too polemical to quote, against Dawkins and his followers, the
follo i g state e t of Ei stei : The there are the fanatical atheists
whose intolerance is the same as that of the religious fanatics, and it springs
f o the sa e sou e … The a e eatu es ho a ’t hea the usi of the
sphe es Calap i e , ? This see s to e a state e t f o his later
years (1941), so Dawkins should at least admit that Einstein seems to have
changed his views on religion and hence that there is no such thing as the
(one and single) view of Einstein on religion or belief in God.

28. - 28 -
concepts ultimately led him back to the conceptuality and ideas
of the Western theistic traditions.
In his oral statements Einstein dealt with the concept of god
more freely. It is surprising, however, to see that he uses the
concept in exactly those cases in which he spoke about the
regularity and order of the causal connections in the universe.
To him, the concept of god became almost another expression
for the order and regularity of nature. Einstein presumably
believed that he could not be misunderstood because he used the
concept as a name for the lawful character of nature, not as an
expression of the violation of the laws of nature by divine
intervention. In his later years he seems to have been less
concerned about being regarded as a representative of belief in
a personal God or being presented, by church propaganda, as
having finally converted to theism.
Einstein’s examination of religion, especially his criticism of the
concept of god, raises an interesting question, namely whether it
is possible to speak of God without sharing the conceptual
presuppositions of Western personal theism, or whether, on the
contrary, the concept of god in the Western tradition exhausts
everything that is to be said about God. In 20th century
philosophy and theology several attempts were made to
overcome the traditional understanding of God as a personal
being or to modify it in such a way as to make it understandable
and compatible with the modern worldview. These attempts
were not only made outside but even more so inside the Christian
tradition, as such figures as Paul Tillich, Bishop John A.T.
Robinson or Alfred North Whitehead demonstrate. Others drew
more radical consequences from the implausibility and
incoherence of personalistic theism and completely abandoned
belief in God. Thus, Christian theologians such as Don Cupitt or
Thomas Altizer or atheist philosophers such as Bertrand Russell
propagated a religion without belief in God, a mysticism of

29. - 29 -
nature or a “Christian Buddhism”.31
The majority of the natural
scientists wanted to find a way in between these two alternatives
by modifying the traditional concept of god and making it more
compatible with the scientific worldview. However, the
misinterpretations to which the religious views of Einstein and
others, e.g. Max Planck, were exposed (and are exposed even in
our time), raise the question whether such a middle way – a kind
of “third way” between the alternatives of personal theism and
atheism – does in fact exist and can be clearly defined.
4. Einstein’s attitude towards Judaism
It seems obvious that it is incumbent upon the writer of this
paper, in the context of a treatment of Einstein’s views on
religion, also to analyse and discuss which attitude he took
towards Judaism. For as a Jew Einstein should have taken, or so
one could reason, a positive stance not only towards religion as
such but also towards the kind of theistic religion he was so often
criticizing, i.e. the theism of the Western religious traditions. So
how are his critical remarks about belief in God, especially about
the monotheistic beliefs of the “moral religions” (Judaism
included), to be understood in light of his Jewish upbringing?
How can they be reconciled with his Judaism, understood as
Jewish belief?
As an adult Einstein was made aware of his own Judaism
primarily not through contacts with Jews but through the
growing anti-Semitism in Germany in the years after the First
World War.32
As a youngster he went through a short phase of
31
The latter concept comes from Don Cupitt: he calls a Christianity without
elief i God Ch istia Buddhis , si e i Buddhis elief i God,
especially in a first god who created the universe and is responsible for
human destiny, is strictly denied. See Cupitt 1980.
32
Nicely expressed by Grundmann 2004, 151: Under these circumstances
Einstein very quickly understood that he, too, was a Jew; not the Jews but
the Anti-Semites taught him that y translation from the original). As a
young boy Einstein went through a phase of religious fervor in which he

30. - 30 -
religious romance (during which, as he himself related, he used
to sing Psalms) which, however, ended abruptly when, at about
the age of 12, he became acquainted with the scientific
worldview through the widely popular Naturwissenschaftliche
Volksbücher of a Jew named Aaron Bernstein.33
Einstein had
grown up in a relatively free, religiously unbound atmosphere
(cf. Calaprice 2005, 125); his parents had been proud of the fact
that the Jewish rites were not observed in their house (Levenson
2005, 20).34
In those years Einstein never became a member of
the Jewish community, he was not bar mitzvahed (Jammer 2002,
25); in fact he consciously left the Jewish congregation at the
age of 17 (Jammer 1995, 26; cf. Fölsing 1995, 564).35
It was in
Germany, in the Berlin of the 1920s and 1930s, that he was made
aware again of his own Jewish roots (Fölsing 1995, 564;
Calaprice 2005, 125).
Anti-Semitism began to flare up in Germany as a result of the
defeat in the First World War: Jews were used as scapegoats
(Grundmann 2004, 150). At the same time the domestic social
and economic conflicts were reflected in the growing anti-
Semitism of the bourgeois and upper class circles, for some of
the most visible Jewish intellectuals of the time such as Rosa
Luxemburg belonged to the revolutionary left (Grundmann
2004, 150). Furthermore, Jewish businessmen and economic
leaders (such as the representatives of leading companies) were
made responsible for the disastrous economic situation in
Germany in the 1920s, which, however, was a result of the war
and of a worldwide economic crisis. Einstein, as a publicly
tried to keep the religious laws of Judaism, but this phase came to an end
after about a year.
33
See Jammer 1995, 25; Calaprice 2005, 125, 208-209. It is interesting to
note that these books were edited by a Jew (namely Aaron Bernstein). They
e e the ou te pa t to the the idel popula Religio sgeschichtliche
Volks ü he hi h t eated the diffe e t eligio s of the o ld.
34
See also Frank 1989, 4; Jammer 1995, 19-20; Wickert 2003, 9.
35
“ee also Ei stei ’s e a k o religious education in schools in which his
hild e had to pa ti ipate: I do ot like the idea e u h that
hild e ill e su je t to tea hi g that is alie to s ie tifi thi ki g
own translation from the German). See Jammer 1995, 27.

31. - 31 -
known, highly visible intellectual was more and more drawn into
these discussions, since he did not shy away from political
statements in favour of leftist positions, for instance in favour of
pacifism and internationalism.36
Public attacks against Einstein
died down somewhat towards the end of the 1920s, only to flare
up again after the assumption of power by the National Socialists
at the beginning of the 1930s. They did not even come to an end
when Einstein decided to leave Germany and go into exile.37
Einstein was forced, by these attacks, to become aware of his
Judaism and to define his own attitude towards it (see Calaprice
2005, 126-127). He did this by identifying himself as a member
of a community which was connected by a common culture,
common moral values and a common history (Einstein 1954,
185; Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 60-62; Wickert 2003, 105;
Calaprice 2005, 126, 132-133, 138; cf. also Fölsing 1995, 567).
Hence he also endorsed the idea that this community deserved,
as much as other nations, a safe homeland, a geographic place
on earth. Thus in time Einstein became an open supporter of the
Zionist cause (Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 62-64); he vigorously
promoted the right of Jews to make their home in Palestine (Pais
1994, 163-164; Fölsing 1995, 567-568, 571-574, 580; Calaprice
2005, 126). He was also closely involved in the foundation of
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (Dukas/Hoffmann 1981,
62-63; Fölsing 1995, 568-569, 571-573, 577, 580, 582) and held
one of the first lectures there at the opening celebration (Pais
1994, 161; Calaprice 2005, 126-127).
However, Einstein never supported the cause of Zionism with
militancy (Einstein 1954, 188-190; Fölsing 1995, 574). He
opposed plans to use violence against the Arabs in order to
36
Einstein was considered a socialist by many; see Grundmann 2004, 148-
149.
37
This happened in December of 1932; see Pais 1994, 190-191. A little
earlier he preempted his exclusion from the Academy of Sciences by
resigning from it. It has to be noted that in all of this Max Planck played a
very dubious role.

32. - 32 -
secure a home for the Jews in Palestine (Einstein 1954, 172-
174). As a matter of fact, he was at first opposed to the
foundation of a specifically Jewish state in Palestine; rather, he
envisioned a state in which Jews and Arabs would live together
peacefully (cf. Wickert 2003, 106-107; Calaprice 2005, 130,
133, 136-137, 139). Later, however, he accepted the necessity of
founding a Jewish state. After the death of the first president of
Israel38
he was even asked to take over the presidency himself;
but he declined, citing old age and waning powers.39
Einstein continued to hold on the moral values of his earlier
years (such as peacefulness, generosity and tolerance) when he
became aware of his Judaism. In fact, he asserted that Jewish
identity consisted precisely in the upholding of these values
(Einstein 1954, 185-187; Calaprice 2005, 135). In this way he
connected his personal identity with his Jewish background. He
could summarize Jewish belief by declaring that protection and
sanctification of life were the heart of Judaism (Einstein 1954,
187; Calaprice 2005, 131-132). As another element he
mentioned the cosmological dimension, i.e. the admiration of
the beauty and orderliness of the physical world order as
expressed, for example, in the Psalms of David (Einstein 1954,
38, 186-187). Thus, for Einstein the Jewish worldview has an
anthropological and a cosmological side.
On the other hand, Einstein did not accept the Jewish conception
of God but regarded it as a metaphorical account of the moral
values of Judaism. In a polemical remark directed against the
Jewish idea of god he stated that the Jewish God “is simply a
negation of superstition, an imaginary result of its elimination”
(Einstein 1954, 186; Calaprice 2005, 131). The idea of a god
judging human beings by his own moral standards and keeping
up his rule by inspiring fear of his judgment is characterized by
38
Chaim Weizmann was the first President of Israel and died on November
9, 1952.
39
Einstein 1993b, 264; Pais 1994, 225; Wickert 2003, 107-109.

33. - 33 -
Einstein as a particularly infamous chapter of Jewish religion
(Einstein 1954, 186).
Thus, Einstein did not give up his criticism of belief in God when
he became aware of his Jewish identity. Rather he used the
Jewish tradition as a means of expressing his criticism by
defining not faith in God but certain moral values as the core of
Jewish religion. Einstein explicitly stated that these moral values
came into the world not by means of divine revelation but as
products of human teaching and of the traditions of peoples
(Einstein 1956, 20-21), wishing to rule out any appeal to belief
in God or divine revelation in legitimation of moral values.
Besides, in Einstein’s reflections Judaism also fulfils another, as
it were more historical function. For all three stages of the
human development of religion are embodied in the history of
the Jewish religion. So according to Einstein, the concept of god
in the Hebrew Bible represents in some important respects the
“religion of fear”, the supposed first stage of human religious
development. But in the writings of the Bible, especially in the
books of the great Prophets, the transition from the “religion of
fear” to “moral religion”, the second stage of human religious
development, can be observed (Einstein 1954, 37). Judaism, at
its core, in its most important documents, is a “moral religion”
(although with some traces of the “religion of fear”). In this role
it has fulfilled a positive function in the development of
humanity: it has led the development of human religiousness to
a higher stage, and in so doing it has etched certain important
moral values on the collective consciousness of humanity.
Moreover, in some passages of the Hebrew Bible yet another
stage of human religious development can be found, namely the
stage of “cosmic religiousness”. Einstein mentions the Psalms
of David, where awe and wonder about the beauty and
orderliness of the cosmos are given expression. Thus, in the
writings of the Hebrew Bible not only the two earlier stages, but

34. - 34 -
also the final stage of human religious development can be
identified, namely the highest or, according to Einstein, the only
genuine form of religion (Einstein 1954, 39). Einstein even hints
that it is here, in this form of religiousness, that Judaism has
discovered its own identity (Einstein 1954, 186-187).
Therefore all stages of human religious development can be
demonstrated in the history of Judaism. Hence the history of
Judaism is, as it were, the history of human religious
development in a nutshell. Moreover, in Judaism, according to
Einstein, the highest stage of human religious evolution, namely
cosmic religiousness, has been realized, a stage to which only a
small elite of individuals has belonged. Judaism and, what is
more, human religion as such have found their own identity only
at this stage of development, and it is only this form of religion
that is compatible with the scientific worldview. However,
Einstein made it clear that the moral values represented in
Judaism which have already developed during previous stages
are still valid and should serve as guidelines of human behaviour
also in the present.
Thus, Einstein’s view of religion may be characterized as
follows: he has taken his theology from cosmic religiousness
and his ethics from the Hebrew Bible. This was precisely the
concept of religion of the Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza
(cf. Rosenthal-Schneider 1988, 91). As a matter of fact, Einstein
several times confessed to being indebted to “this great man”
(…). Thus he expressly stated: “I believe in Spinoza’s God who
reveals himself in the harmony of all that exists…” (Calaprice
2005, 197; see also 209). However, he was also aware that
Spinoza’s views were disputed even within his own community
and that he was considered a heretic and expelled from the
Synagogue (cf. Einstein 1954, 38). Probably Einstein considered
himself, seemingly not without a certain pleasure, as a religious
heretic in the vein of Baruch Spinoza.

35. - 35 -
Thus, for Einstein reference to Judaism was a means of
continuing his controversy with religion, especially with
personal theism, and not a means of returning into the arms of
organized, official religion. In a way, Einstein interpreted his
atheism as a form of Judaism and presented cosmic religiousness
as the core of Jewish religion. He was compelled to do this
because he was identified as a Jew in public and could find no
way out of this public role. In later years he held on to Judaism,
as a religion too, and in fact increasingly identified with it out of
solidarity with the fate of his Jewish fellow citizens under Nazi
rule. The moral dimension was thus decisive for his holding on
to Judaism. This may be the reason why he interpreted Judaism
rather one-sidedly as a moral standpoint or existential attitude.
Einstein’s views show that religion can be criticized also in the
name of religion, not only in the name of atheism or the refusal
of religion. Thus Einstein criticizes belief in a personal God by
asserting that it does not belong to the central views of Judaism
as a religion. As the centre of Jewish beliefs, he mentions the
idea of unconditional protection and sanctification of life which,
however, was violated so frequently in religious history in the
name of belief in God. Thus, his idea of religion is not, as is
customary, characterized by a certain faith or certain religious
beliefs, but rather by a moral attitude or moral stance.
Now it seems striking that many of the moral values that Einstein
identified as distinctive of Judaism were shared, in his time, by
other, non-Jewish intellectuals. So, it is natural, on reading
Einstein’s statements about the absolute sanctity of life, to be
reminded of Albert Schweitzer. Similar statements can also be
found in the writings of Einstein’s colleague Erwin Schrödinger,
the successor to Planck’s chair in Berlin. Schrödinger, too,
affirmed the absolute sanctity and inviolability of life, and he
appealed to Schweitzer as an authority. Moreover Schrödinger
derived from these assumptions the call for better protection of
animals, and he illustrated his point by describing animal

36. - 36 -
transports in Europe (Schrödinger 1963, 133-135).40
In contrast
Schrödinger did not justify the absolute sanctity of life by an
appeal to Judaism or Jewish values (let alone Christian values)
but with an appeal to Hinduism, or more precisely to the
philosophy of Vedanta, i.e. the assumption that everything, and
thus every being in the world, is ultimately one with the absolute
Brahman. Similar to Einstein, he expressed sharp criticism of
Christian theism because in his view belief in a personal God
could not justify the mutual love of all beings because it
presupposed that all beings are atomic entities separated from
each other and incapable of intimate relations with each other
(Schrödinger 1963, 143-146). So, with arguments different from
those of Einstein and with reference to the ideas and concepts of
a different religious tradition, Schrödinger took a similar moral
stance and existential attitude.
The comparison of Einstein’s views with Schrödinger’s (and
with those of other intellectuals of his time) shows that critical
intellectuals took a common moral attitude and upheld a
common ethics which lay counter to the religious traditions and
in particular to the borders of the official religions, especially of
Christianity and Judaism. In this respect the appeal to a number
of non-Christian traditions and their moral values fulfilled a
distinctive cultural function, namely to show the critical
potential of ethics in contrast to the values of the dominant
culture. This also represented a protest by intellectuals against
the prevailing ethical and intellectual attitudes of their time.
Schrödinger, for instance, explicitly stated that his appeal to
Vedanta philosophy and the principle of the sanctity of all life
was meant to be an expression of resistance against the growing
atavism and brutality of his time (Schrödinger 1963, 17-18). In
the fate of animals transported all over Europe he seems to have
40
Compare the assertion of Einstein (with reference to W. Rathenau), that
a Jew who goes hunting (and thus kills animals) cannot really be a Jew at all.
See Einstein 1954, 187.

37. - 37 -
seen a foreshadowing of the fate of human beings transported
around the continent during the war.41
It seems necessary, therefore, in each individual case, closely
and critically to examine the reasons for a critical statement on
religion and to study the historical and social background in
order to define the concept. In a second step it will be necessary
to examine whether a specific critical statement is or was
justified, e.g. whether Christianity in fact did not offer means of
resistance against the rise of brutal ideologies in the 1920s and
1930s. The answer to this question, however, does not fall within
the area of competence of Science of Religions or the History of
the Sciences – these disciplines can only investigate the contexts
in which these questions originated.
III. Concluding Section
1. The religious views of Albert Einstein
These considerations show that Einstein's attitude towards
religion can be judged differently, depending on which concept
of religion is presupposed or which understanding of religion is
maintained in the analysis. Thus Einstein can be regarded as an
opponent of religion if a concept of religion is used in which the
notion of religion is defined in terms of belief in a personal God
or transcendent beings, as was the case, for instance, in the
religious writings of Einstein's senior colleague Max Planck
(Planck 1969b, 321). On the other hand, Einstein can be
considered a supporter of religion, indeed as a highly religious
individual if the concept of religion used in the description is not
41
Much criticism of religion seems to have been generated by the failure of
Christianity to resist war, brutality and oppression in the first decades of
that century. Thus it was not so much the religious worldview that seemed
to have triggered the critical stance of intellectuals towards religion but the
ethical failure of Christianity. See the following statement of Einstein:
O ga ized eligio a egai so e of the espe t that it lost i the last
war if it dedicates itself to mobilizing the good-will and energy of its
follo e s agai st the isi g tide of illi e alis Calap i e 2005, 201).

38. - 38 -
associated with the concept of god but non-theistic worldviews
are regarded as religions as well (cf. Löhr 1995). Furthermore, a
distinction has to be made whether Einstein speaks about
religion descriptively or whether he is confessing his own
religious beliefs. All of these aspects have to be taken into
account in a careful analysis of his religious attitude.
In this regard his understanding of “cosmic religiousness” seems
to be decisive. If cosmic religiousness – in which, according to
Einstein, no personal God is presupposed or revered – is
considered a kind of religion then Einstein himself can be seen
as a religious believer, since he considered himself an adherent
of this cosmic piety (Einstein 1954, 11; cf. Dukas/Hoffmann
1981, 33). If, however, cosmic religiousness is viewed as a sort
of vague mysticism, a kind of enthusiastic worship of nature, as
has been done (for instance) by the American theologian John
Haught (Haught 1995, 5-6), then Einstein cannot be considered
a religious person in the strict sense of the word but rather as an
adherent of a non-religious general worldview. In this context it
has also to be taken into account that Einstein himself considered
a view in which human needs and cravings are disregarded in
favour of a veneration of objective values to be a true religion in
contradistinction to the childish, egotistical forms of religion of
naïve believers in God (Einstein 1954, 39-40; 1956, 22-23).
There can be no doubt, then, that Einstein himself considered
cosmic religiousness to be a kind of religion, in fact the true form
of religion.
As we see in the case of Einstein, different levels of
consideration and analysis have to be distinguished in order to
reveal their presence in analysis: (a) the level of the object(s) of
considerations (e.g. Einstein’s religious views in his published
writings) and (b) the level of the theorizing about the object of
analysis (i.e. theories of religion and of what makes up a
religion, applied to Einstein’s religious views). These two levels,
to which others could easily be added (e.g. the level of normative

39. - 39 -
influences on the analysis deriving from the religious views of
the author of this article), have to be distinguished in order to
prevent unidentified normative influences from the object level
from inadvertently influencing the descriptive and analytical
account on the meta-level of analysis.
Moreover, an assessment of Einstein's attitude towards religion
does not merely depend on the concept of religion, but also on
the concept of god presupposed in the analysis (cf. Berner 1994).
In a conceptual framework in which the notion of religion is tied
to the idea of a personal God Einstein cannot be considered a
religious man as he expressly objected to such an idea. On the
other hand, Einstein’s writings contain some traces of an
alternative concept of god, such as belief in something
mysterious, in the workings of a higher, superior reason in the
universe or a higher spirit revealed in the natural order. The
explanations of Einstein in the relevant passages can be
interpreted, as has frequently been done, as expressions of a kind
of pantheism, an identification of God and the natural order, but
they also could be taken as expressions of a non-
anthropomorphic understanding of God, the concept of a “God
above God” (i.e. the anthropomorphic, theistic God). In this case
his understanding of God might not have been much different
from the notion of god in the Western theistic traditions, as is
suggested by the expressions employed by him in the
descriptions of his religious views.
Hence the question as to whether Einstein was religious or not
and whether he believed in God or not cannot be answered with
a simple “yes” or “no”. For the answers depend on the concepts
and categories used in the description. Moreover normative, i.e.
theological interests can be reflected in the meanings ascribed to
the categories and concepts employed in the analyses. Thus
Einstein was, for instance, called an atheist because he was a
public supporter and adherent of an unconventional kind of
religion not in tune with the official, culturally accepted religion

40. - 40 -
of the churches (cf. Rosenthal-Schneider 1988, 91). On the other
hand Einstein could also be viewed as a religious believer, a
theologian even (F. Dürrenmatt), because, in the description of
his own religious attitude, he was drawn into the history of the
concept of god in Western tradition and employed its
terminology (Audretsch 1995, 8-9).
It is the task of an analysis of Einstein's utterances in Science of
Religions (Religionswissenschaft) to bring to light the concepts
and categories presupposed in the different descriptions and thus
to draw attention to the conceptual background of the different
judgments.
2. The relevance of Einstein’s religious views for the concept
of “criticism of religion”
Einstein’s views on religion can also be used for an evaluation
of the concept of “criticism of religion”. Einstein’s statement
about religions, especially about the theistic religions of the
Middle East, but also about the so-called “primitive religions”
(an expression he uses in reference to the indigenous religions
of non-literary cultures42
) were certainly criticisms of religion,
especially of belief in God. But Einstein also subjected the
ethical attitude in religion, especially the morality associated
with belief in God, to sharp, penetrating criticism. Finally,
Einstein also subjected the political and social impact of the
religion to criticism, e.g. when he refers to the cooperation
between priesthood and political rulers. So, we can certainly
speak of the presence of criticism of religion in Einstein’s
writings.
However, it also seems clear that one cannot speak of the
presence of unconditional criticism (critique) of religion in
42
Einstein uses the expression religion of the primitives , which was
current in his day. See e.g. Einstein 1954, 36-37. The English version tries to
improve on the German original by translating primitive religions (and not
the expression just mentioned).

41. - 41 -
Einstein’s writings, and for an adequate analysis the concept of
“critique (or criticism) of religion” itself has to be examined
more closely. Thus, Einstein criticized, or so it seems, not
religion in general, but merely certain religions or forms (types)
of religion. To put it more precisely, Einstein launched his
attacks specifically against the theistic religions, polytheistic as
well as monotheistic ones. On the other hand, Einstein did not
criticize non-theistic religions; he even mentioned one of them
appreciatively, namely Buddhism. In fact Einstein did not go so
far as (for instance) the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer; he
did not speak of Buddhism as an atheistic religion (von
Glasenapp 1966, 12-13), but referred to it only as an example of
cosmic religiousness. However, he still integrated Buddhism
into his scheme of the development of human religion, as
representative of its highest and final stage, and this shows that
he regarded it as a religion and not as a mere sort of mysticism,
as Haught suggested.43
However, Einstein did not criticize only the religious ideas of
the theistic religions, but also commented critically on other
aspects, such as their ethics, existential attitude and social
consequences.
In a short article with the title “The Religious Spirit of Science”
(“Die Religiosität der Forschung”) Einstein asserted that belief
in God produces a childish attitude in the individual. For the
believer expects from the deity reward or punishment for his or
her actions – just as a child from his or her father. Einstein
apparently meant to suggest that such an attitude is unworthy of
an adult, mature person (Einstein 1954, 40; cf. also
Dukas/Hoffmann 1981, 33).
In his article Religion and Science (“Religion und
Wissenschaft”) Einstein asserted that belief in a personal God
presupposes each person’s being a mere object, not the subject,
43
See Haught 1995, 5-6.

42. - 42 -
of divine action. Since the human being is seen as subjected to
the divine will he or she becomes a mere passive object of divine
capriciousness, a degrading view of a person. Thus Einstein
criticized the basic attitude towards the human being that is
presupposed in personal theism (Einstein 1954, 39).
In his article “Science and Religion” (“Naturwissenschaft und
Religion”) (Part II) Einstein censured the moral attitude
underlying belief in a personal God. Thus, belief in a personal
God presupposes that the person tries to influence the deity for
the mere gratification of selfish needs. True religion, on the other
hand, consists in the individual’s overcoming his or her own
selfish needs in the service of a regard for the objective world
(Einstein 1956, 22-23). As examples of such religiousness
Einstein explicitly mentions Spinoza and the Buddha, as these
two did not connect their religiousness with belief in a personal
deity (Einstein 1956, 23). Thus Einstein criticized theistic
religion not only on the level of religious beliefs but also on the
level of moral values and existential attitudes.
Furthermore, in his article “Religion and Science” Einstein
stated that religion is also used to suppress people, especially the
young. Thus, belief in God leads to the formation of a priestly
caste which monopolizes the intercourse between the humans
and the gods. The political rulers of all times have often formed
alliances with the priests or even have themselves taken on
priestly functions in order to preserve their rule and to legitimize
it (Einstein 1954, 37). Probably Einstein is here thinking of the
alliance of throne and altar in the Wilhelmine Empire in
Germany.
Thus, Einstein criticized not only belief in a personal God but
also the moral and existential attitudes connected with it. His
criticism of religion thus relates not only to the religious
assertions of theism but also to the human attitudes connected

43. - 43 -
with it and the individual and social consequences that flow from
it.
It follows from this that criticism of religion may not only be
directed towards the worldview or the belief contents of a
religious system, but it may also be directed towards other
aspects. These different aspects can lie on different levels of
reflection and analysis, e.g. on the level of worldviews, of ethics
or of the social and political consequences of a religion. What is
more, these different levels can overlap, so to speak, or lie
counter to each other so that it may not be possible to indicate
clearly whether an author rejects religion or not.
Hence, in describing the attitude of an author towards religion
one has always to indicate exactly which level or aspect of
religion he is referring to, and which aspect or dimension of
religion he is criticizing. For criticism cannot only be concerned
with the intellectual dimension, the assertions or beliefs of a
religious system but also with a number of other dimensions, as
has been shown above. Putting the focus merely on the religious
worldviews or the body of religious beliefs betrays a certain
prejudice, the prejudice that beliefs are the central or most
important aspect of religion – an assumption that goes back to
the origins of the Western, albeit Jewish and Christian traditions
of religion and plays a central role in it. Thus, a concentration on
religious beliefs alone would import a certain religious judgment
into the description of the dynamics of religion and criticism of
religion, a normative judgment that belongs to the object level,
not to the theoretical or meta-level of analysis.
Perhaps the situation is even more complicated: for it is perfectly
conceivable that an author may criticize one aspect of religion
while recommending or supporting another, or that he should
recommend an entire religion for one of its aspects but condemn
it for another feature. Thus, the worldview or religious assertions
of a religion may be criticized while at the same time the moral

44. - 44 -
attitude connected with its beliefs may be commended. As a case
in point Max Planck’s so-called “Christmas Article” may be
mentioned which he published under the title “Wissenschaft und
Glaube” (“Science and Faith”) in 1930: while using the occasion
of Christmas to refuse the religious worldview as such he
explicitly commended the existential attitude of a religious
believer, which he called “faith”. This attitude he claimed to be
at the foundation of science, being the frame of mind required
for producing new, creative results in scientific research. Thus
Planck did not reject religion as such, as might be said, but he
rejected the religious worldview while recommending a
religious attitude, the attitude of a religious believer (Planck
1969c, 246-249).
Hence criticism of religion can refer to quite different aspects of
religion: such criticism can be directed not just towards religious
views or assertions (or aspects of these views) but also towards
other aspects of religion such as its ethics. Moreover, criticism
can also be directed towards the consequences or implications
of a religious attitude or religious belief. Thus, Einstein has
drawn attention to the childish attitude that is produced by belief
in a personal God (Einstein 1954, 40). Einstein’s colleague, the
physicist Erwin Schrödinger has pointed out that it is impossible
to justify real charity and love of one’s neighbour in the
framework of theistic belief (Schrödinger 1963, 143-146).
Einstein himself described the negative social and political
consequences of personal theism (e.g. Einstein 1954, 37). Hence
in each case it has to be carefully analysed which aspects of
religion are to be subjected to criticism or critical analysis. Such
caution is missing in some of Dawkins’s statements on Einstein.
Einstein, however, did not only criticize one specific form of
religion, i.e. the theistic religions, but he also commended a form
of religion and described it positively. It was already explained
above that he comments positively on the so-called “cosmic
religiousness” in which no personal deity is venerated. However,

45. - 45 -
in describing this state of consciousness, Einstein did not call it
a religion, presumably because for him the concept of religion
was too narrowly associated with belief in God, the formation of
an institutionalized church and a dogmatic theology – all of
which are absent from cosmic religiousness (Einstein 1954, 38-
39; cf. Rosenthal-Schneider 1988, 91). Still, Einstein’s
religiousness can, from a standpoint of critical analysis, be
described as a form of religion because his motives for avoiding
the concept of religion are obvious (cf. Calaprice 2005, 198-
202). Moreover Einstein, as was also illustrated above,
integrated cosmic religiousness into the history of human
religion and contrasted it with the two other (theistic) forms of
religion. Therefore, it seems evident that he wanted to present
cosmic religiousness as an alternative, superior form of religion,
not as a form of atheism. This speaks against Dawkins’s
presentation of Einstein as a witness to atheism and scientific
materialism. As Einstein formulated succinctly: “Try and
penetrate with our limited means the secrets of nature and you
will find that, behind all discernible concatenations, there
remains something subtle, intangible, and inexplicable.
Veneration of this force beyond anything that we can
comprehend is my religion. To that extent I am, in point of fact,
religious” (Calaprice 2005, 195).44
In another statement he
demonstrates clearly that he had no wish to reject religion as
such but rather to replace it by a more valuable version: “It is
this…symbolic content of the religious traditions that is likely to
come into conflict with science. … Thus it is of vital importance
for the preservation of true religion that such conflicts be
avoided when they arise from subjects which, in fact, are not
44
This quotation also shows that Einstein, unlike Dawkins, did not believe
that science can, in principle at least, discover and reveal everything in the
universe. According to Einstein there are aspects in the universe that are in
principle undiscoverable even by continued scientific research. See also the
emphatic statement rendered by Calaprice 2005, 199-200: …The eal
nature of things - that we shall never know, never.

46. - 46 -
really essential for the pursuit of religious aims” (Calaprice
2005, 205).
In some places the impression even arises that the favourable
presentation of cosmic religiousness was the real purpose of
Einstein’s short outline of the history of human religion. It seems
that the theistic religions were only mentioned in order to call
attention to the highest form of religion, the final step of human
religious development, i.e. the cosmic religiousness which
represents a development rising beyond the earlier forms of
religion. It may have played a role that Einstein considered
himself a cosmic religious person, that he associated himself
with this final stage of religious development (cf. Einstein 1954,
11). It may be that Einstein, in this particular presentation of
cosmic religion, gives a veiled testimony to his own religious
convictions and his own religious faith.45
These observations suggest that the critical statements on
religion were not made for the sake of it, i.e. just for the sake of
being critical, but that they had a preparatory function. These
statements were probably made to present cosmic religiousness
as a positive counterpart to theistic religion. Thus Einstein’s
criticism of belief in God probably did not stand alone but served
as a preparation for the commendation of “atheistic” cosmic
religiousness. In other words, Einstein’s criticism of religion
45
In fact in some places Einstein seems even to identify scientific research
with cosmic religiousness or at least the practice of cosmic piety. Thus, in
one statement he says: I am of the opinion that all the finer speculations
i the eal of s ie e sp i g f o a deep eligious feeli g. … I also elie e
that this ki d of eligious ess… is the o l reative religious activity of our
time (Calaprice 2005, 199). Therefore, it may be wholly unclear where
religion begins and science ends and, as a consequence, it may not be
possible to distinguish science and religion in preparation for assessing their
relations. And then the further question arises whether a science imbued
with religious quality can still be regarded as science or whether it has lost
its scientific character. So, i the stud of Ei stei ’s state e ts o eligio
a whole array of important systematic questions arise – making close
examination of them so worthwhile.

47. - 47 -
should not be taken as a general rejection of religion as such, as
has been done by Dawkins.46
Attention must therefore always be paid to the reasons and
motives of a particular critical statement or a particular critical
utterance on religion. Such a criticism can be voiced in order to
fight against religion and abolish it because it is considered
harmful, as was the case with some of the Sophists of antiquity
and as is the case with such contemporary authors as Richard
Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens. However, criticism can also
be voiced with the intention of deepening or improving religious
views.47
In light of this it seems to have been Einstein’s intention
to deepen rather than to abolish the religious views in his time,
e.g. by overcoming the anthropomorphism of common belief in
God.48
In sum it seems that criticism of religion has not, in general,
served to combat religion, and it also did not necessarily involve
a negative attitude towards religion in the critic. On the contrary,
such criticism was more often than not an expression of a
positive attitude towards religion as such or towards a particular
form of religious belief, and in many cases, it was motivated by
46
Again, it has to be emphasized that this assertion of course depends on
how the concept of religion is defined. It should be observed, though, that,
in a late interview, Einstein explicitly refused to be called an atheist himself.
47
A case in point is the Pre-Socratic philosopher Anaxagoras, who criticized
and in fact tried to abolish traditional astral religion by stating, for instance,
that the sun is a burning lump of metal, i.e. of material quality, and not a
divine being. He was trying to fight traditional religion (indubitably
superstitious in his eyes), but at the same time, in his theory of cosmological
development, he developed a new concept of the divine, i.e. as Nous or
absolute Mind that oversees and controls the process of rotation that
ultimately leads to the formation of the world as we know it. This concept
was a precursor of the modern theistic concept of god. See Löhr 1995, 151.
An interesting point is that Anaxagoras was accused of atheism by his
contemporaries – much as Einstein was in his own day. This parallel is
striking.
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In this respect Einstein can be compared with the Anglican bishop John
A.T. Robinson, who tried to reform Christianity in the 1960s by combating
the anthropomorphic image of God in the belief of his contemporaries. Like
Einstein he was accused of atheism by the more traditionally minded
Christians as well as by atheists, who seemed to regret the loss of a
convenient adversary. See the brief summary of his case in Löhr 1995, 153-
154.