This is a thesis dissertation presenting arguments that the self ownership thesis is a valid moral argument to reform the global usage rights of natural resources required for subsistence.

1. `
Does the self-ownership thesis support global usage
rights to natural resources required for subsistence?
StudentNumber: 200825673
Date: September 02, 2015

2. Introduction
The central questionthatI will be addressinginthisdissertationis;Basedonthe rightsdefended
by JohnLocke’s self-ownershipthesis(SOT) andRobertNozick’sEntitlementTheory - whatform
of usagerightsare morally defensiblewith respect to ourgloballife supporting naturalresources
- such as fresh air and water.
In the firstsectionof Chapterone I will presentasummary anddiscussion of JohnLocke’s
Self-ownershipThesis(SOT). I will discussthatthe SOT suggeststhata definitionof ownership
isrational,andof the three ownershipalternatives - un-owned,self-ownedorownedby
another- the onlymorallydefensibleoptionis self-ownership. I will argue thatself-ownership
isa validmoral premise fromwhichtwobasichumanrightsare derived; exclusiveusagerights
to oneself and theright to appropriateresourcesnecessary forone’ssubsistence. I will discuss
twocommon counterarguments tothe SOT; the firstof which isthe argumentreasoned by
JohnRawls. Rawlsarguedthat because self-ownership mustinclude ownershipof one’sinnate
talentsandabilities,whichare granted(ornotgranted) tous basedon the luck of the natural
lottery,which couldleadtounjustinitial distributionsof advantage and benefits(Rawls,A
Theoryof Justice,1971, pp. 12-15).. The other counterargumentisarguedbyCarole Patemen.
Patemenargues thatbecause the SOTestablishesindividualsasself-ownedproperty,with
unalienable self-property rights, atechnical conflictariseswithhow,inthe economicmarket,
howsuch property istransferredorsold – as one cannotsell somethingthatis unalienable –
such as the rightto self. I will demonstrate thatneitherof these argumentsissufficientto
successfullynegate the SOTasa justmoral premise fordefending the moral humanpremise of
self-ownership andthe rightsof self-usage andresource appropriationforsubsistence.
In the secondsectionIwill provide abrief summaryof Locke’sargumentforthe derivation of
propertyrightsthroughjustappropriationandthe mixingof one’slabourwith natural
resources1
. I will thendiscussLocke’s moral justificationforhow one cantransformthe
natural resourcestheyappropriatedforsubsistence - intoprivate property –or the fruits of
one’slabour(FOL). I will argue thatthe FOL are a derived extensionof the self bywayof the
rightof self-ownership - andas such have ownershiprights - suchas exclusive usage rightand
the right to transferandsell.
In the thirdsectionIwill discusshowinadditiontothe property rightsderivedfromthe SOTwe
alsohave at leasttwo derived obligations;the negative obligationof non-interference of just
appropriation (NO1),andthe positiveobligation to,undercertaincircumstances, constrain
certainresource appropriationactivitiesthatare not required forsubsistence (PO1). I will
furtherpositthatthere isarguably an additional positive obligationtopromote sustainmentof
certaininimitablenatural resourcesthatare alwaysrequiredforsubsistence (PO2).
In the fourthsectionIwill differentiateabeyondsubsistence usage motive,which isresource
appropriationandusage forbeyondsubsistence interestssuchas usage for surplusbenefitsor
profits(UFP). I will argue thatLocke’sSOT and the derivedrightsforresource appropriation
for subsistence,whichprovide amoral premise forUFS, cannotalways defend UFP,asto do so
can, undercertaincircumstances,conflictwithindividual rightstoappropriate resourcesfor
UFS.
1 SecondTreatise. Chapter V (Locke, Ch. V Sec. 25-51)

3. In the fifthandfinal sectionof Chapter1,I will argue that certainresource attributesand
attribute arrangementsmake certainresourcesvulnerable tooverexploitation. I will discuss
three natural resource attributes,excludability,subtractability,andrivalry,andargue that
certainarrangementsof these attributescategorize aresource as special astheyare inimitable,
necessary forsubsistence,andvulnerabletoover-exploitation. I will argue that certainusage
motives(UFP) caneffectivelytransformanatural resource, whichinitiallymayhave been
invulnerable (tooverexploitation)–intovulnerable. I will furtherargue that withoutproper
attribute categorization,these inimitable resources are misappropriatedand thiscreatesmoral
and empirical bad(s).
In section one of Chapter2 I will provide anoverview of RobertNozick’sentitlementtheory (ET)2
nd argue that the principlesof ETare a defensible moral premise withwhichtodefend some
constraintsonUFP - beyondsubsistence usage of resources. Byappeal to the principlesof
Nozick’sET,I will expandmyearlierdiscussionof circumstantial UFPconstraintsandargue that
these principles provide the moral premisenecessaryfordetermining the circumstances that
UFP morallyrequiresusage constraints.
In sectiontwo Iwill firstprovide anillustrativescenariotoilluminate the moral challengesthat
can resultfromunconstrainedUFPof natural resources. I will thenprovide ananalysis,
leveragingNozick’sETandLocke’sSOT, of how UFP violatesNO1andPO1,and failstoachieve
the circumstancesnecessary,accordingtoNozick’sprinciples,forjustappropriationandusage.
In sectionthree Iwill discussapropertyrightsregime thatcontrastwiththe regulated
open-accessregime Ihave arguedfor– the universal privatizationmodel of resource
management. I will discussthe central criterionof thismodel,including itsinherent
assumptions andthe keyclaims of efficiencyandimproved fairnessandquality of life. By
appeal toNozick’sET principles,Iwill challenge these criterion, claimsandassumptions,and
argue that implementingaprivatizationmodelwouldinvolve seriousinjustices,suchas
expropriation,cost-prohibitivegovernance,accessinequalities, aswellasfurtherinjusticewith
no inherentmechanismtocompensate forthe appropriationinjusticesthatthe redistributionto
a privatizedresource regimewouldrequire.
In the fourthsectionIwill furtherargue thatthe assumptionsuponwhichprivate property
regimesare based are bothtechnically unrealisticandunachievable,andmorallyungroundedin
whatSOT and ET require. I will furtherargue that throughfailed assumptionsthe privatization
model doesnotachieve whatisrequiredforajustand balancedpropertyregime. I will argue
that givenourcurrentmarketdynamics,the privatizationregime would continuallygenerate a
decrease indistributionfairness aswell as perpetualandforeseeable conflictswith whatis
thoroughconflictswithwhatis requiredforthe SOT,NO1,and PO1, as well asthe circumstances
for justappropriationandownershipthatNozick’sETprinciplesdefend.
Chapter 1: The Self-ownershipThesis, Resource Appropriation, PropertyRights,Derived
Moral Obligations,and Resource Attribute Arrangements
JohnLocke believedthatthe earthanditsresourcescouldbe consideredthe propertyof all
2 From (Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 151)

4. people “incommon”. He arguedthat all individualshadarightto self-preservation,andin
pursingthistheyhada natural claimto use the resourcesof the earth -Locke referredtothisas
a natural primitiverightora natural right of acquisition andappropriation. Withoutsuch a
right,to acquire andmake use of what appearsinnature,survival would aconstantchallenge as
there wouldbe nocertainmethodsof acquiringwhat needed –the constantclashingwould
create a prohibitivelyinefficient world. Locke arguedthat natural resources,astheylay in
nature,had noinitial exclusivityrightstothem –these resourcesare initiallypropertyof the
people incommonandanygivenindividual hasarightto use themin the pursuitof one's
subsistence –whichis one’sresponsibility. Locke arguedthat by mixingone's labourone could
transformthese resourcesintopropertytowhichtheyhad exclusive rightsandownership.
(Locke,Ch.V Sec.25-51)
1.1 The Self-ownershipThesis
John Locke saidthat everymanownshimself aswell as the productof himself. Locke’s
argumentforself-ownershipstarted withhispremisethatGodownshimself andall makersown
whattheyhave made. Locke thoughtthat God gave land andall inferiorcreaturestoman –
and hence man was a co-ownerof these creations - withGod. Locke arguedthat God made
man like himself inakeyway, where like God, manwasalsoa maker,and as a maker manwas
full ownerof whathe made. Hence - everythingthatexistsiseitherownedby Godor by man -
or un-ownedbyGodand man. From thisLocke derivedthat a freeman isun-ownedand only
underthe powerof the natural law - free fromthe dominionof othermenandtheirlaws. To
enslave orbe enslaved,wouldrequire thatone transferownershipof one’sself –wrongly – as
such as transferwouldtransferapart ownership(manisco-ownedbyself andGod) to an
exclusiveownershiptothe enslaver - whichisbeyondwhataman has the powerto do (Day,
1992). Locke arguedthat if man isunderthe powerof any law - it isonlywithhis ownconsent
Slaverythenisa state of war betweenthe conquerorandthe conquered asbeingownedby
someone else,otherthanGod,isalwaysunjust – hence noone can morallybe ownedby
someone else.3
Locke arguedthat like God,manwho was un-ownedbyanyotherand was
hence self-owned(Day,1992, p. 1) (Locke,Ch.V Sec.25-51). To commitsuicide,notpursue
subsistence –one’sresponsibility - wouldbe amoral wrongand sin,as man - inkillinghimself -
was alsodestroyingGod’s property.4
FromthisLocke alsoderivedthatsubsistence was man’s
responsibility.
Locke’sself-ownershipthesis(SOT) claimsthatIownmyself andI am I hence self-directedand
alone determinethe wayinwhichIpursue living. If I ownmyself thenIalsoownmy abilities
and talentsandhence the productof those talentsandabilitieswhenIexercisethem.
AlthoughLocke’sjustificationfor self-ownershiprests significantly ontheology,his argument
suggestsa strongrational justification aswell. That isthat either;humansare 1. Ownedby
3 AlthoughLocke does argue that there are legitimate forms of slavery – where there are agreedto terms – slaveryis
always illegitimate where it is just accomplishedthroughbrute force. Locke argues that due to the joint nature of
ownership(manand Godownman)man would be acting outside the bounds of hisentitledpowers to transfer
ownershipof self to another – whichwouldresult ina move frompart owner to exclusive ownership ofthe enslaved
bythe enslaver.
4 Suicide couldeither be througha direct means, such as hangingoneself, or throughother means – suchfailure to
appropriate anduse life dependant resources – soa hunger strike would in some circumstances be considered suicide
– and a moral wrong

5. someone else 2.Ownedbyone’sself or3.Ownedbyno one. (Kuznicki,2012)5
. 1 equatesto
slavery,andslavery,asarguedbyLocke,to an undeservingman - isalwaysunjust(Locke,Ch.IV
Sec.22-35). 3 posessome potential obstacles thatconflictwith havingany rightsatall - if you
are un-ownedhowcananyrightsbe assignedtoyou(propertydesignation isnecessaryfor
rightsof propertytobe assigned) –thiswouldessentiallymeanthatany actionyoutake is
un-rightful asyouwouldhave noexclusive righttodirectyourself (Kuznicki,2012). Since we
have no choice butto use our bodies,andbeingcompletelyun-ownedwouldpreventdefining
usage rights(there isnoone from whichto obtainuse permission),thisrationally,cannotbe the
true state of us. Thisleaves 2- self-ownershipasthe onlyrational option,andthe onlyoption
that can defend usage rights –such as the right to exclusively use my ownbody.
A counterargumentto self-ownership isthatnotall usage rightsrequire identificationof an
owner,andhence we mayhave use rightsoverourselveswithouthavingtoascribe any
ownership tous. Thiscannot be the case though,asin realitywe dohave usage rightsto
ourselves –infact we can’t helpbutuse our bodiesandminds – andthere is nowell-known
controversyorsuccessful counterintuitiontothisclaim.Locke alsoargues thatit isa natural law
that menshouldbe able toappropriate resources,asappropriationisnecessaryinorderto
make use of them. Since appropriationof somethingrequiresarightto do so,self-ownership
isdefensible asitaffordsthe necessaryrightsto doso (Locke,Ch.V Sec.25-51). Self-ownership
thenconveysa rightof usage,of one’sself,aswell asthe rightto appropriate whatisnecessary
to supportone’ssubsistence.
There are several counterargumentstothisthesisof self-ownership. One isthe fairness
objectionbyRawls – Rawlswasconcernedthatto supportthe SOTwouldmeanthat as part of
self-ownershipone wasownerof one’sattributesandtalents –andthat thiscouldbe unfairas
some are bornwithadvantagesinthese areasthathow well we fairinlife couldthenbe a
matterof luck6
. If I am born strongand able (goodluck) andyou are born withoutlegsorsight
(badluck),the fruitsof my labourprovide me anadvantage (andyoua disadvantage)that
neitherof us deserve asitis unearned. Rawlsbelievedthatone’sfate shouldnotbe
determinedbymorallyirrelevantfactors - such as the luckof a social or geneticlottery,andas
self-ownershippermitsthe fullownershipof one’stalents –self-ownershipcouldleadtounfair
distributionsof advantage (Rawls,A Theoryof Justice,1971,pp. 12-15). The questionthis
illuminatesisdoesatheoryof ownershiphave tofullyaddressluckin the lotteryof nature or
can we accept self-ownershipwithoutdetailingacompensationmodelforit?
G. A. CohenprovidesacounterargumenttoRawls,which isthat fate isdetermined byone’s
choicesandefforts –and notour initial talentsandabilities (CohenG.,77-96)7
. Cohen’s
argumentthat choice andeffortsare central,alignwithempiricallyandintuitivelywhatwe
5 Althoughthisis onlya blogreference I couldn’t actuallyfindanacademic source that suggestedthis exact (and
effective)form ofthinking about self-ownership – that is that either we are unowned, ownedbyanother or ownedby
oneself. In developing myargument for self-ownershipI wanted to present thisform as a wayof thinking about
oneself and Kuznicki is the onlysupport I couldfind.
6 (Rawls, A Theoryof Justice, 1971, pp. 12-15)
7 Cohen writes that “anyone who thinks that initial advantage andinherent capacityare unjust distributors thinks so
because he believes that theymake a person's fate depend toomuchonsheer luck” and “the fundamental
distinctionfor anegalitarianis betweenchoice and luck in the shapingof people's fates” (Cohen2011, 4).

6. oftensee playoutinreality. I may be born beautiful butnotpursue acareerthat being
beautiful isanadvantage – ratherI mightpursue a careerin philosophy. I may be born blind
but mychoicescan compensate forthisina way that maynot hinder myabilitytosurvive and
thrive. That isthat some blindatbirth individualswillmake choicesandinvestefforts that
benefitthemmore thanotherchoicesandinvestedeffortswould. Cohenalsoarguesthat
whatis requiredthen,isnota distributive patternthatcompensatesforthe inequalitiesof the
natural lottery,ratheritis justthat we all treat eachother, regardlessof the outcome of the
natural lottery,asequals (CohenG., 77-96). This requirementof equality isamoral obligation
as part of our recognitionthatwe are all the same. Locke arguesthat as part of membership
to the humanspecies – itis requirementthateachof us isaware that the othersof us are the
same as us – notto be treatedasan animal and bynature - entitledtothe same rights8
. Rawls
concern can be overcome bythis,andhence doesnotundermine the moral argumentof
self-ownership. It does however, illuminatethe needforconsiderationof fairnesswithrespect
to undeservedadvantages aswell developmentof moral obligationswe have toone anotheras
part of the same species –whichI will discussfurtherinthischapter,asthese derived
obligations canofferaresolution tobalancingthe greatestof anyunfairadvantagesthatare
bestowedbyeitherthe natural or social lotteries.
An additional commonobjectiontothe argumentfor self-ownershipisthatthe rightsbased
nature of thisthesis,where these rightsare inalienablerights,whichcannotbe revoked,waived,
transferredorforfeited - grantsthe rightholder(self) an entitlementwhichcan’tbe undone
(Patemen,2002). This introduceschallenge ininhow we use property –whichcan be sold,
rented,ortransferredatthe discretionof the owner(alienablerights) inthe marketplace. For,
as Patemenargues,aninalienablerightcannotbe extinguishedorseparatedfromitsholder–
and hence cannotbe tradedin the marketplace. One counterargumentto this,isthat
althoughwe recognize inalienable rightstothe self,theyare arguably,alienable tothe fruitsof
one’s labour. Thismeansthat I cannot departthe rightsof myself (mymind) butImightbe
able to trade the fruitsof myminds labour– such as my poetry. This isessentiallywhatthe
marketismade upof, all productionisarguablytraceable tothe fruitsof someone’s labour.
Thiswouldrequire though,thatinadditiontousage rightsandappropriationrights of self and
for self,we also require the righttodelegatesome usage rights –to the fruitsof our labourfor
example. Locke argued thatone hadthe rightto delegate suchusage asitwas withinthe
boundsof one’s ownpower,asthe FOLwere exclusvielyowned(notjointlyownedwithGod).
So althoughslaverywouldrequrie atransferthatwasout of those bounds,asit wouldtransfer
the inalienable rightof self-ownership,othertransfersmightbe defensible –suchas the rightto
delegate (throughsaleortransfer) the usage of the fruitsof my labour- withoutconflictingwith
the SOT.
1.2 The SOT & Property Rights
Althoughinstitutingpropertyrightshas empirical value,the valueis more significantthanjusta
convention forsortingouttechnical details. The original propertyright,self-property,ensures
a way of securingfurtherrightsof usage to whatwe have appropriated,andrequire, for
self-subsistence. Self-ownershipprescribesthe right of self-sovereigntyandautonomy,which
isa moral rightof a personto theirownmindandbodilyintegrity-andasthe exclusive
8 (Locke, Ch. V Sec. 25-51)

7. controllerof self. As arguedinthe previoussection the moral righttoappropriate resources to
supportsubsistence isaderived rightfromthe SOT,as isthe right of self-use. As self-owner,
withthe rightof self-use,itintuitively andrationally follows thatthe resultsof self-use,my
actions,will be self-directed. Thisintuition suggeststhatthe actionsof self-use and
self-direction, atminimuminthe appropriationof resourcesrequiredforsubsistence, are
furtherderivedrightsastheyare an extensionof self-ownership. Locke arguedthat our
actionswere a rightful extensionof self,andthis extension iswhatpermitsusto,rightfully, carry
out the livingof life –or subsist9
. Locke argued that inadditiontoa rightof appropriation,
mixingoneself withthe resources innature, labourmixing, wasmorallydefensible onthe
grounds of self-ownership10
. Thissuggeststhatthe product of our labour,on natural
resources,isa positiveright– an extendedrightof the right of self. Ascertainresourcesare
necessary tosupportthe actionsof the self thatpermitliving(eatingforexample). It also
suggeststhatexistsafurthermorallyjustifiedrighttowhatisderivedfromresource
appropriationandone’sactivityof usingwhatisappropriated –that isthe external product
[property] of self-directed,self-use –thefruits of labour. Thisright doesdifferfromthe rights
defendedbySOTinthatit isa right to an externalthing(external property to“self-property”),
but itis justownership - asit isderived throughthe justrightof appropriationof whatisneeded
for subsistence,the rightof self-use,andthe rightof self-direction. Simplyput,anexternal
natural resource acquiredforsubsistence,mixedwithone’s labour(FOL) istransformedinto
one’s exclusive use property.
Thisargument,forrightsto external propertythat isderivedfromthe mixingof one’s labour
witha natural resource appropriatedforsubsistence,alsodistinguishes the rightswe have to
natural resources fromthe rightswe have to the product of our labour– the FOL whichis thus
rightfully ourexclusive use property. This argumentispremisedonthe factthat althoughI
have usage rights to take what isneeded fromnature,throughthe SOT,I am notan ownerof
natural resources – It isa usage rightto use what isneededforsubsistence,butarguably – no
furthermoral claim– certainlynotone of ownership. To FOL propertyhowever, whichIhave
transformed froma natural resource,I have a bundle of rights,includingthe rightsof exclusive
use,transfer,and sale. In additiontothese rightshowever,Ialsohave some derivedmoral
obligations. Locke arguedthat individualsare able tosee thattheyare of one species,that
theyare of the same kind11
– and therefore theycannotmorallytreatotherslike animals-as
animalshad,whatwas argued - instrumental use only. Locke argued thatbecause of this,all
individualsare entitledto“the same advantagesof nature”,andthat thisinturn imposesonus
all the “obligationtomutual love”aswell asthe obligationsof justice andcharity (Locke,Ch.V
Sec.25-51) (Lazarski,2013, p. 51)
9 Locke writes;“everymanhasa propertyinhis own person:this nobodyhas anyright to but himself. The labour of
his body, andthe workof hishands, we maysay, are properlyhis. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state
that nature hathprovided, andleft it in, he hathmixedhislabour with, andjoinedto it somethingthat is his own,
and therebymakesit hisproperty. It beingbyhimremoved fromthe commonstate nature hath placed it in, it
hath bythis labour something annexed to it, that excludes the commonright ofother men:for this labour being
the unquestionable propertyof the labourer, noman but he can have a right to what that is once joinedto, at
least where there is enough, andas good, left incommonfor others. SecondTreatise – Ch. V Sec. 25-32
(Lazarski, 2013)
10 SecondTreatise – Ch. V Sec. 25-32
11 SecondTreatise – Ch. II Sec. 4

8. 1.3 SOT and DerivedMoral Obligations
As introducedinthe previoussection,with the SOTrightsthere are at leastthree morally
derivedobligations. These derived obligationsare aresultof whatLocke arguedwas our
abilitytorecognize the sameness we have toeachother– andhence we are initiated[born]
withthe samenatural rights. AlexanderKant,RobertNozick, andJeremeyBenthamall argued
for a versionof propertyrightsthatisfundamental tonotbeingtreatedasmerelyameans. In
itssimplestformthisobligationisto nottreat each otheras merely a meansbutasan end onto
each of ourselves12
- and isnowarguably so establishedthatitis a first principle – meaninga
moral argumentthat isso uncontroversial thatit isa givenpremise - anestablishedmoral
baseline fromwhichotherworks are furthered.
If we all have a natural right to make use of the resourcesof thisearth,and we recognize
ourselvesasthe same, itintuitivelyfollowsthat we mustalsorecognize the universalityof this
right– that isthat all humanshave thisright andthe derivedobligations. The firstof these
obligationsisanegative obligation(NO1) of non -interference (directorindirect) of the morally
justappropriationof subsistence resources thatall manhas. NO1is derivedfromthe SOTas
the rightsof self-ownershipandsubsistence appropriation forall – that isthat if one man has
the right to self-ownershipthenall mendo – anyunjustinterference woulddissolvethisfor
someone –and thiswouldrequire usto expandbeyond the powerimbuedwith self-ownership
as it woulddissolve aninalienable rightof self-direction,self-use,andthe rightsof
self-ownership –effectively enslavinganothertoanother’swill –whichisunjust.
In additiontothisNO1 of non-interference,there are furtherpositive obligationsthatare also
derivedobligationsof the SOT,which isthe positive obligation(PO1) toconstrainappropriation
activitiesthatare notpursuantof subsistence,if notdoing sowouldeitherdirectlyorindirectly
interfere withothersabilitytoaccessthe resources necessary forsubsistence. PO1is a positive
obligationinthatitmay require,incertaincircumstances,ustoimpose usage constraintsonour
resource appropriationwhennotdoingsowouldviolate NO1. This obligationisderivedfrom
my rightto appropriate whatisneededforsubsistence,astotake more than I require while you
have insufficienttowhatis required,violatesyoursame rightof appropriation. I may not,
morally,take all the waterinthe worldas my own(assumingone could). Althoughitismorally
justto appropriate waterformy subsistence,toappropriate all of itisbeyondwhatIneedand
directlyinterfereswiththe rightof othermento appropriate itfortheirneeds. Not
appropriatingall the waterwouldnotinterfere withmyabilitytosubsist,Icouldtake a smaller
amountwithoutanyimpactto my subsistence. If however,there isonlyenoughwaterfor
one person,Imay take it as part of myright to take whatis neededforsubsistence. It would
not be morallyrequiredof me tosacrifice myselfsoasto not interfere withyourrighttosubsist
– andletyou take the water. Thismight actuallyviolate anatural law moral responsibility,
whichLocke acknowledged asthe responsibilitytoact tolive andnot commitsuicide.
NO1 and PO1 are ourminimumobligationsaspartof SOT. Arguably however, we alsohave an
additional positivePO2- to prolongglobal subsistence accessandchoose andinstitute
sustainability conservations forcertaininimitable resourcesthatare always necessaryfor
subsistence. P02 differsfromPO1in thatit requiresuniversal social actionto promote

9. methodsof a sustainedrepositoryof whatisglobally requiredforsubsistence. Thisobligation
ismarginal inthat it appliesmosttothose whohave contributedtotheirdepletionbywayof
UFP withoutconstraint. To achieve all of these obligations,orat minimumNO1andPO1, what
isrequiredisa morally appropriate governance regimethatis consistentwith ourrights(derived
fromthe SOT) as well as these moral obligations. As the demandforcertainlife supporting
resources,byall humans,isperpetual - PO2isalso a sharedmoral,global, social responsibility,
as longas these resourcesare finite insupply. The followingsummarizesthe moral argument
for the circumstances PO2mightbe required;
a. In summarythen,PO2is sometimesmorallydefensiblebecause; if self-ownership isa
moralright - and appropriation of resourcesforsubsistenceisnecessary fortheexercise
of self-ownership,then appropriation of whatisneeded forsubsistenceis morally just.
b. If a naturalresourceA is a finite and inimitable resource necessary forsubsistence,then
usageof A is a derived right and necessary forself-ownership.
c. As ournaturalresourceA is alwaysneeded forsubsistence (inimitable) then a sustained
supply of A is a moralgood.
d. For an individual(ororganization of individuals) to notconductPO2(institute
sustainabilitymeasures) and to conductunconstrained UFP(exploitinimitableresources)
will eventually interferewith UFS,asA is finite and demand forA is perpetualand
universal.
1.4 Usage Rights beyond Subsistence (UFP)
Our currentnatural resource and propertyappropriationconventionsare heavily basedin
capitalismandfree enterprise. The capitalist economicmodel promote acontinuous andever
increasingproductionandprofit growthmodel. This growthmodel notonly requiresnatural
resource acquisitionandusage thatiswaybeyondwhatisneededforsubsistence. The current
free marketmodel isbasedona prime directive toachieve acontinual andconsistently
increasing inprivate profits,fora selectgroupof owners(share/stakeholders),throughthe
productionandsale of goods. Thisgoal obtainsitsbestoutcome,accordingtothe model,
whenthere are outcomesof sustainedexponentialprofitgrowthrates. Anyforce that acts to
constrainthe base objective of capitalism(suchasconstrainingforprofitusage of production
inputresources,actsinsuch a way as to compromise the maximumprofitpotential thatthe
capitalistmodel pursues. Put anotherway,anyregulationsthatseektoconstrainUFP,evento
protectour commonsubsistence appropriationrightstothese resources,actstoconstrainand
undermine the goal of the capitalistfree market. The ideal conditionsforcapitalismandfree
markets,isto be leftunconstrainedandpracticallyunregulated. Onlythencan thismodel
truly achieve itsoptimal outcome –everincreasingprofit. (Carpenter,1998)
Locke did acknowledgethe place forsurplus benefitsand profits - butit wassecondinpriorityto
whatwas requiredforsubsistence. Locke arguedthat one couldacquire and use resources,as
needed,butonlywithinthe reasonable boundsof the law of subsistence-- thatisthatpeople do
not have the rightto take more thantheycan use (Notes,2015). AlthoughLocke supported
the ideaof surplus,asone havingthe rightto the benefitof one'sefforts,he alsoarguedthat
such surpluswouldalsohave toserve the commongoodand serve alsotothe benefitof those
injustifiableneed. Locke acknowledgedthatthe evolutionof moneycouldprovide a ground
for acquiringandstockpilingsurplus(asthe goodswere effectively abstractedandnotsubjectto
spoilage andwaste),he didnotlive inatime suchas ours withsuchextreme usage and
appropriations,andata time where critical inimitablenatural resourcesare onsucha rapid

10. decline. Regardlessthough,hisSOTrequiresthatthe surplusshouldserve the commongood
and benefitthose injustifiable need.13
An intuitive follow onquestionis doesthismoralclaim remain when usageis not forsubsistence
– butforother interests? One intuitive rational answertothisquestionwouldbe yes, usage
for excessbenefitdoesn’tseeminitself amoral wrong,at leastnot as longas it doesnot
interfere withNO1orPO1. If for instance freshwaterandfreshairwere infiniteinsupplyit
wouldbe hard to justifyusage constraintsas –no matterhow muchI use of these resourcesit
will neverinterfere withyourabilitytouse them– due to the infinite supply. Thisisnot the
circumstance withwhichwe are currentlyfaced,infactit has become painfullyclearthatthese
resourcesare not infiniteinsupply,theycanbe reducedthroughoverexploitation. Giventhis
circumstance – and empirical truth – that these resourcesare notinfinite- andthe moral rights
derivedfromSOT,NO1and PO1, itis a rational deduction thatanymorallydefensible usage
motives –such as UFP – couldonlybe justifiedwhenthere isno interfere withresource
appropriationforsubsistence –or anyinterference is compensated14
Since SOT, NO1 andPO1
are universal,inthatthey applytoall humans,UFPcan onlybe morallyjustifiedwhenitdoes
not interfere withanyhumansrighttoSOT, NO1 and PO1,or again– the interference is either
morally counterbalance orcompensated. Thissuggeststhatusage regimesthatconflictwith
thisrequirementinterfere withthe basic,global,humanrightsdefendedbySOT.
My argumentisbasedonan assumption,thatthese life givingresourcesare finite –whichis
empiricallysometimeschallengingtobelieve giventheir seemingly ubiquitous global
distribution. Our global commonresourcesare ubiquitous,andasIhave arguedby appeal to
Locke’snatural law,initially un-owned. Theyare natural resourcessuchas our wilderness,the
oceans,the atmosphere,andspace,all of which forma special categoryof resourcesdue toa
numberof attributes andattribute arrangements. Theyare inimitable,all necessary forlife,
and all ubiquitous. Many scholars(Buck,1998) (Ostrom, 1990) (ClarkC. Gibson,2000) define
these commonpool resourcesassubtractable resourcesthatare managedundera property
regime inwhicha legallydefineduserpool cannotbe efficientlyexcludedfromthe resource
domainwithinwhichthe resource resides(Buck,1998,p. 12). This meansthatalthough
ubiquitous, theyare un-excludable andreducible(finite) –puttingthematthe mercy of
whicheversocial arrangementisregulatingtheiruse. If the arrangementvaluesUFPover
global UFS seriousglobal moral transgressionsare likelytoresult –such as the violationsof NO1,
PO1 and PO2.
1.5 Attribute Arrangements: Inimitable Natural Resources
Natural resource usage and managementhasbeen,historically,verycomplex andIthinkitis
uncontroversial tosay,inmanyinstancesinappropriate15
. Many of the complexitiesand
inappropriate managementregimes centeron a lackof clarityaboutthe true nature of these
resources, aswell as a justconcept of what accessand entitlementswe should have tothem,
bothof whichhelpis regulate how,how much,andforwhat purpose we make use of them. I
13 Locke would not have supportedanundeservedbenefit, meaningthat if I choose not to help myself and pursue
subsistence it is not the obligation ofothers to do it for me.
14 I will discuss thiswith Nozick’s Entitlement TheoryinChapter 2.
15 A few eexamples are the historical over hunting ofbuffalo, to the over fishingof Atlantic cod populations ofthe
70s, to the depletionof the ozone inthe 90s.

11. arguedearlierforpropertyrights throughlabourmixing–whichcan resultin privatelyowned
property withexclusive usage - FOL. There are otherformsof property, - publicproperty for
example. Thismightbe the bridge thatconnectsthe islandtothe mainland,orit couldbe our
national defense force. Thiscategoryof propertymightmeanthatthere are exclusive usage
rightsfor a group or community,where the propertyisthe groups labourcombined –suchas a
communitybuiltbridge16
. Additionally, there iscommonpool property –thiscouldbe a smelt
swimminginthe PacificOcean rightnow, towhichno one currently hasownership- butitisstill
a resource,as once captured - ithas humanvalue. Some propertyrights,suchas private
propertygainedthroughsubsistence appropriationand labourmixingare fairlyeasytodefend
interms of rights – whichI argued the SOT clarifies. Othersforms,suchas those resources
that are beyondthisusage right(UFS),whichare still incommonbutremainun-heldare more
ambiguousand historically controversial toassess intermsof appropriate usage.
SusanBuck definespropertyassomethingof aninstitutionof managingresource rights,where
these rightsare not fixed orabsolute –theyare subjectivebundlesbasedon certainkey
attributesof the resource inquestion.The bundleof rightstheoryarguesthatthere isnosingle
propertyrightthat manageshowwe accessand use a givenresource;ratheritisa bundle of
rights,suchas; the rightof exclusion,access,extraction,sale17
,orthe rightto transfer
ownership(Buck,1998, p. 12), and these rightsare subjectivelyappliedbasedonresource
attributes. The firstright,exclusion, isalsoanimportant resource attribute,andthe firstof the
three that I will discuss. Excludabilityismeasuredbythe feasibilityof beingable to
successfullyexclude othersfromusage of the resources,where highexcludabilitymeansthatit
isquite easyto exclude othersfromaccess. Contrastinglylow excludabilitymeansitisvery
difficultorimpossible[costprohibitive]todoso. The right of exclusionallowsthe property
ownerto have absolute governanceoverwhom mayormay not use or access a givenresource.
If a givenresource hasa lowexcludability,suchasthe air,thena right of exclusionwill be very
costlyor impossibletoenforce (Buck,1998, p. 11) (FAO:ClarkGibson,Margaret A. McKean,and
ElinorOstrom,2000). I mighthave a vegetable gardenthat Igrow formy exclusiveuse,Ican
restrictyour accessto my gardenbylockingitbehinda fence. The vegetable gardeninthis
case isa private resource uponwhichIcan exercise agivenbundlingof rights,the firstof which
isto exclude you. In the processof tendingmygardenhowever,Imake use of several other
resources,waterfromthe lake,andair fromthe atmosphere. Althoughitisveryeasyforme to
exclude mygarden,itwouldbe verydifficultforanyone toexcludeme fromusingthe airaround
my gardenor the watertable underit. These latterresourcesare essentially open access
resourceswithlowexcludability. In Chapter1 I brieflyarguedthatthe SOT, andour derived
rightsand obligations,alsodistinguishnatural resourcesasdifferentfromFOLproperty. This
difference centersonmyrightstothem,as althoughI may have usage rights,inpursuitof my
subsistence,tonatural resources –I do not ownthem. Thismeansthat these ubiquitous
resources,withlowexcludability,Imay use undercertaincircumstances - butI do notown them
and hence have onlyalimitedsayoverthem – a say overwhat I appropriate,mix mylabour
with,inpursuitof my subsistence. Beyondthisusage,Ihave onlya verylimitedsaytowhat
16 Arguablya village communityliving in a territoryacrossthe worlddoesnot have a moral claimor anyownership
rights to this communitybridge.
17 These circumstances that define anarrangement for a bundle or rights will be further discussed inChapter two as
part of the discussion ofNozick’s Entitlement Theory.

12. beyondthissubsistence need,layinnature asa surpluscommonstock. Although Ido notown
them,I dohoweverhave obligationsthatpertaintothem – that isNO1, PO1,and possiblyPO2.
The second key is termed subtractability18
whichreflects how muchor little agivenresource
diminishesasImake use of it (Buck,1998, p. 11) (Ostrom, Governingthe Commons.The
Evolutionof InstitutionsforCollective Action,1990). AsI make use of the vegetablesinmy
vegetable gardenthe supplyof vegetablescontinuallydecreasesuntil there are nomore
vegetables,andthisisempirically easytovalidate. If I make use of the streamthat passesby
my driveway, forfishingandboattransportation,UFS, the streamresource doesnotreally
deplete the supplyof the streamresource foruse by others. Thisissomewhatempirically
validate-able. The streamhas an initial [natural] subtractabilityvalue of low,andthisvalue
generallypersistswithausage model of UFS(forgoingotherimpactsbynature). Hence I easily
achieve bothNO1and PO1 – as myusage doesnot interfere withyourabilitytouse this
resource. If however,Iwasto use the streamfor othermeans, suchas UFP, I mightuse bignet
to retrieve all the fish,use large transportboatstocarry the fish – bothof whicheventually
deplete andcontaminatedthe stream. I effectivelyhave transformedthisresource –through
my usage motive - intoa highsubtractabilityresource. The more I use the lessthere isforyou
to use – potentiallyuntilthere isnofishandonlya pollutedstream left.19
Likewise if Imisuse
the streamfor any otherreason,perhapsIdrainmy sewage intothe stream, Ialsocontribute to
an increase initssubtractability –whichpotentiallyviolatesNO1andPO1. Unlike mygardenand
the vegetable depletionthroughuse,whichisimmediatelyempiricallyobservable,the impacts
of thisstreamoveruse isusuallynotimmediatelyobservable –itiscumulative andsomewhat
time delayed.
So far we have consideredtworesource attributes,exclusivityandsubtractability. There isa
thirdkeyattribute thatis helpful incategorizingresources - rivalry. Rivalrymeansthatthe
more I use of something,thathasvalue tous both,the lessthere isof it foryou to use.
Althoughthissoundsverysimilartosubtractabilityitisrelevanttodistinguisha distinguishing
feature. There maybe resourcesthathave a highsubtractabilitybuttowhichno one cares –
as theirvalue asa resource isnot commonly recognized. Rivalryonthe hand,meansthat we
have a sharedneedforthese resources –and in fact mayeffectivelyhave tocompete forit.
Thismeansthat as the resource depletesthe rivalryincreases,asresource scarcityincreases.
In the streamexample above,withover-exploitationUFPI effectivelytransformedaninitially
lowsubtractabilitylowrivalryresource intoahighsubtractabilityhighrivalryresource. With
such open-accessresources,whereitisliterallycostprohibitivetolimitaccess, andnatural
resources are not “owned”a tragedyoftenplaysout. A thesisforthistragedy,the tragedyof
the commons,wasarguedby Garret Hardin. Hardin arguedthat commonnatural resources
that are ownedbyanyone tendtobe overexploited (Hardin,1968). It is a central positof this
dissertationthatalthoughthismaybe a historical truth, anditis alsotrue that we do institute
usage rulesto certainresources, clearerusage rightsand some UFPconstraintscouldhave a,
potentially, significantimpacton avoidingthistragedy.
18 Subtractabilityhas roots in bothLocke and Nozick moral theory, both made reference to thiswith enough and as
good left in common.
19 I will arguein chapter two that free market objectives have historically had insufficientmechanisms to
counteract this.

13. Commonpool resourcessuchas the atmosphere have several otherimportantand unique
characteristics. One such characteristicisthat “the outcomesof utilizationare collective,not
individual”,whereeveryonethatutilizescommonpool resourcesisinherentlydependenton
everyone else’sproperusage of the pooledresource (ClarkC.Gibson,2000). In our vegetable
gardenwe saw that as I use my vegetablegardenandconsume the vegetablesnobodyelse is
impacted – these resourceswere minealone andIalone benefitfromthemoram
disadvantagedbythem(perhapsablightruinedthemall,whichimpactsmycostof living). In
the streamexample,inthe startingposition,myusage of the stream hadnegligible impacton
others abilitytouse it. In the secondpositionhowever (UFP),myusage of the streamand your
usage of the stream(assumingwe bothexploitit) hasacumulative effectanda significant
impacton otherswhowoulduse the stream. Cleanfreshair,freshwater,the protective
character of the ozone,the C02 absorptionabilityof the atmosphere –these all have a
dependencyonproperusage asthe outcome of exploitationare collective. Thismeansthat
those whooveror improperlyexploitthem, increasetheirsubtractability whicheffectively can
transforman initially plentiful resource intoascarce or highrivalry resource. As I arguedwith
PO2, our commonpool resources hence have addependencyonhow andhow much other
people use them,whichresultsinafurtherderivedobligationforusnotto do eitheroveruse or
misuse them.
A “common-propertyregime”referstoparticularproperty-rightsarrangementinwhichagroup
of resource usersshare rightsanddutiestowarda resource (suchas NO1and PO1)20
. Proper
identificationof the typesof goodsinvolvedwithagivenresource isanimportantpre-requisite
to the developmentof properpropertyrightsarrangements(regimes). GibsonClark argues
that not achievingthisproperclassificationandarrangement canresultingrievousdepletion
rather than'sustainable use.(FAO:ClarkGibson,MargaretA.McKean,and ElinorOstrom, 2000).
Giventhe classificationIprovidedabove (highrivalry,low excludability) itseemsthat any
mis-managementof commonpool resources,evenasaform of publicgoodsuch as welfare-ism,
couldleadto an unwantedoutcome intheirdepletion. Clarkarguesthat the way we bundle
propertyrightsto resourcesresultinsetsof mutuallyrecognizedclaimsanddecision-making
powersoverthose resources.Propertyrightsare those thatare clearlyspecified(notvague),
secure (notsubjecttowhimsical confiscation),andexclusivetothe ownerof the rights (FAO:
ClarkGibson,Margaret A. McKean,and ElinorOstrom, 2000, pp. 4-5). Appropriate property
rightarrangementsencourage protectionandinvestmentinthe goodstowhichtheyattach
(P02). The mis-use and over-use,thatUFPcan, incertaincircumstances,generatesunjust
interference withUFSforthe global many.
20 The privatizationschool of propertyrights challenges this claim that there are rules (duties) to open-access
resource. AlthoughI have argued otherwise, with PO1, and I will provide a further argument inChapter 2, I have
insufficient space in this paper to discuss the implementation andformthis might actuallytake.

14. Chapter 2: EntitlementTheory,Usage Constraints, and Private Property Regimes
RobertNozick’sEntitlementTheory(ET) hasthree mainprinciplesthathave thatfairness
requiresinhowone comestoown resources. Nozickarguedthatan individualhasrightful
ownershiptoa givenresource theyhave inpossession - onlywhentheyacquiredthe given
resource throughone of the three principles. These principles then,can provide the
frameworknecessary todefinethe circumstancesunderwhichcertainsubsistence dependent
inimitableresource,mayhave justusage constraints againstUFP.
2.1 An Overviewof Nozick’sEntitlementTheory
1. Original “just”acquisition –asspecifiedbyprinciple 1,or
2. Justtransfer– as specifiedbyprinciple2,or
3. As compensationforapreviousinjustice - asspecifiedbythe thirdprinciple
Nozickbelievedthataslongas the three principals were achieved,the resultingdistributions
wouldbe just. Nozick’sprinciplesare summarizedasfollows;
1. Original “just”acquisition –
a. By “mixingone’slabour”withit
b. By leaving“enoughandasgood” forothers21
(Philpropsophy,2009)
c. By not makingothersworse off throughone’sactof appropriation
2. Justtransfer–
a. A transferof resourcesthatis willinglyconsentedtobythe original justowner
b. A transferinvolvingforce orfraudis unjustbecause sucha transferviolatesa
person’sownershipof himself andhisgoods,insofarashe nolongerdecides
whathe will do,orwhat will happentohisgoods
3. As compensationforapreviousinjustice - asspecifiedbythe thirdprinciple
a. Appliestocasesof unjustoriginal acquisitionsandcasesof unjusttransfers
b. Askswhatwouldhave happenedif the unjustacquisition/transferhadnot
occurred
c. Callsformeasures(e.g.,restitution,compensation) thatreturnthe victimtothe
conditioninwhichhe orshe wouldhave beenif the injustice hadnotoccurred
d. But doesnotallowcompensatorymeasuresthatwouldviolaterightsof
unconnectedthird-parties
(MIT, 2012) (Nozick,Anarcy,State,andUtopia,1974, 2013)
Principle1 (P1) - Just Appropriation
Nozick,throughappeal tothe LockeanProviso22
,23
, arguedthateveryindividualhasaright not
to be excludedfromuse of the commonstockas part of like andnatural law.It isnot that the
21 Locke’s proviso that an appropriationmust leave ‘enoughandas goodleft in common for others can seem too
demanding as it might suggest that all appropriations are disallowedunder Locke’s provisoonce a single person’s
situationwere worsenedbyan appropriation. Nozick interjects that thisargument actuallydepends onhow
stringentlythe provisois interpreted.
22 The Lockean Provisoargues that Natural resources, suchas land, come to be rightfullyownedbythe first personto
appropriate it, as longas she left "enough and as good" for others
23 The Lockeanprovisois oftenthought to be toodifficult to meet, if it is interpretedas howany act of
appropriationcould leave as much and as goodfor others whennatural resources are finite?Locke did
acknowledge this demandingrequirement and argued that the conversion ofresources from the commonstockto

15. earthbelongstoall men,ratherit belongstono one andeach man has the rightto obtain
exclusiveuse rightsby beingpaidhisdue,mixinglabourwiththe earth –and thisiswhat I have
arguedinChapter1. Nozick furtherarguedthata givendistributionwasjustif everyoneis
entitledtothe resourcestheypossessunderthe distribution. Nozick’sFirstprinciplespecifies
howun-ownedthingscancome to be ownedjustly. Justacquisitionmeansthatone can come
to ownpreviouslyun-ownedresourcesif principle 1istrue. AlthoughImaytake what
resourcesare freelyavailable innature - andrequiredforsubsistence (1a) anythingItake from
nature - beyondwhatisneededforsubsistence - mustabide by1b and 1c. Thismeansthat
beyondsubsistence,justmixingmy labourwithanatural resource,doesnotnecessarilycreate
the same entitlement,absolute ownershipthatUFSdoes. In thisscenario,effectivelyUFP, 1b
and 1c mustalsobe true. I maytake a piece of landbut I cannot morally take all the land,as
1b and 1c effectivelyinstitute constraints onwhatImay morallyappropriate andjustlyuse.
In Chapter1 I discusseda.as a derivedpropertyright of SOT- where the labourerhasexclusive
usage rightsoverthe resulting labourmixed resource whichistransformedtohisproperty.
What if the resource has alreadybeenacquiredand isbeingexpropriated –the expropriation
that wouldbe requiredforsomethinglikeauniversal privatizationmodel forexample –whatis
requiredforthistobe a justtransfer? Inthiscircumstance the resource isacquiredbya new
owner,notthroughdiscoveryandlabourmixing,butthrougha statue run initiativeof
redistribution24
that was definedtoimprove efficienciesof usage andimprove the qualityof the
life forall. The twoadditional principlesof Nozick’sEntitlementTheoryaddressthis scenario
withrespecttowhat wouldconstitute justtransferorexpropriationandre-appropriation.
Principle2 (P2) - Just Transfer
An ownedresource (property) maybe transferredtoanotherownerif the originaljustowner
willinglyandun-coerced, andishence fully complicitinthe transfer. Thisprinciple assumes
that principle 1isalsotrue and thatownership,whetherforsubsistence usage orother
interests,doesnotviolateanyof the axiomsof principle 1. Redistribution,through
re-appropriation andexpropriation,of ownedresourceswould require thatthe original just
owners were inagreementtothe transfer. Nozick’sargumenthere suggeststhatmanhas the
rightto that whichisneededforhisownsubsistence - thisfallswithinnatural law andthe SOT.
Beyondthis subsistence requirement Nozickprovidesjustificationforjustownershipthrough1b
and 1c, hence for this,beyondbasicsubsistence,condition1band1c must holdtrue. This
meansthat if the state were to implementaredistributionof resources,somethingthatwould
be requiredfora universal private property regime,thisregime musteithernotviolate P1in
howthe propertyisre-appropriated,orif itdoesviolate P1,thatP2 or P3 isachieved.
private propertydoesn’t, bydefinition, cause a set backof the subsistence interests of other humans, but could
actuallyadvance them (Zwolinski, 2013). Locke argued that “He who appropriates land to himselfbyhis labour,
does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind:for the provisions serving to the support of human
life, produced byone acre of inclosed andcultivatedland, are (to speakmuchwithincompass)tentimes more
than those whichare yieldedbyanacre of landof anequal richness lying waste in common…for his labour now
supplies himwith provisions out of tenacres, whichwere but the product of anhundredlying in common…”
(Locke, Ch. IV Sec. 22-35;Locke, Ch. V Sec. 25-51)
24 In a subsequent section I will argue that privatization, which claims to improve qualityof life for all through
productionefficiencies, violates the just transfer of resources as the efficiencyclaims the propertyregime claims
are unachievable.

16. Principle3 (P3) – As Compensationfora PreviousInjustice
Nozick’sthirdprincipleprovidesamechanismtoundopastinjustices,inthe case of unjust
original acquisitionsandcasesof unjusttransfers. An unjusttransfercouldbe the resultof a
redistributioninitiatewhere original ownersare expropriated. Thisprinciple requires
restitution thatreturnthe victimtothe conditioninwhichhe or she wouldhave beenif the
injustice hadnotoccurred. Thisprinciple doesnothowever,permitthese restitution measures
to violate anyadditional rights,northe rights of any other, unconnected,third-parties.
If the state implementedauniversal privatizationmodelandexpropriatedownersfroma
resource,compensatedthem,butinthe processof compensatingthem, saythroughataxation
imposedonthe general public,imposedunfairappropriations(taxes) onotherthirdparties –
thiswouldbe an unjustrestitutionanditmade unconnectedparties –worse off. To further
illuminatethe moral soundnessof these principles let’sconsideranillustrative scenario;
2.2 (A) An Illustrationof UnjustResource Appropriation and Usage
Let’simagine thatI am a potato farmerwithinthe townof Plenty. I have access to land,I work
the land,I plant,harvest,eat,andsell mypotatoes– the profitsenable mycontinued
subsistence. I use the groundwater,the atmosphere,andthe mineralsinthe soil –all
necessaryinputstogrowingpotatoes. I enjoyotherinterests thatthe benefitsof mypotatoes
affordme,the labourof myfellowtownspeople;musicfromAlbertwhosellshis labourasa
musician(andwhoalsobuysmy potatoes),Jennywhohasa cow farmand sellshermilk,cheese,
and meat(andalsobuys mypotatoes). I am able to secure the minimumsIneedfor
subsistence justthroughmyown labourandtradingforthe labourof otherslike Jenny. A
newcomercomestotown,a travelerthatmovesfromtownto town. Thistraveler,Mr. Profit,
verymuch valuesthe benefitsof money,which ishisdefinitionof the goodlife –as much
moneyas can be had. Mr. Profitsetsupa small temporaryshow,he hasmasteredthe ability
to make a veryefficientfuel byusinggroundwater,fresh air,andmineralsfromthe soil. Mr.
Profitalsohasa selectionof toolsthatuse the fuel he makes,andthese tools,fueled,automate
a lot of tasks that have beenmanual uptill now. Usingthese toolsdecreasesthe effortfora
lotof the townspeople,freeinguptime topursue otherinterests. At firsteveryone intownis
supportive,thesetoolsare helpful andthe free time isaddictive. Demandforthe fuel keeps
increasing,the resourcesgoingintoproducing italsokeepsincreasing,andthe pilesof
demineralized,deoxygenated,dehydratedsoilkeeppilingup,as do Mr. Profitsproceeds.
Overtime myowncropsseemtosufferas there islesswaterinthe ground,lessoxygeninthe
air,lessmineralsinthe soil. My potatoplantsstop thriving,theywiltanditbecomesever
more difficultforme to reap a decenthaul of potatoes. As I travel throughtownI notice that a
lotof the otherfarmersare impacted. Jennydoesn’tbuymypotatoes,Idon’tbuyhermeator
cheese –there justisn’tenoughtogo around. Folksstart workingforMr. Profit – producing
fuel sotheycan at leastprofit fromtheirlabourand subsist. This processcontinues,
un-interferedwith,andcycle aftercycle of fuel production(Mr.Profitisnow exportingthe fuel
as no-one intowncan buyit) the landgetsa little drier,alittle lessrich –until itsjustdepleted
of all itsnatural resource value. Asthe resourcesinthe areaare consumed Mr. Profitcloses
downhisshop,takeshisprofits, andtravelsonto the nexttown, where the cycle beginsagain.
2.2(B) Nozick’s ET - A Further Defence for PrioritizationofUFS over UFP
There are at leasttwomoral issueswiththe above scenariowhenwe considerwhatis required
by Nozick’sprinciples;

17. 1. The firstissue withthisillustration isthatthere was interference of self-ownership
rightsby one - onmany. Mr. Profit’s resource appropriationandusage was
unconstrainedbywhatisrequiredforall (UFS),hisusage wasbeyondsubsistence,UFP,
to such extreme thatitresultedinaninterference of self-ownershiprightsformany,as
discussedinChapter1 withSOT,NO1, PO1,and againwithNozick’sprinciple1of ET.
In thisscenariothere wasnomitigatingcircumstancestojustifythisinterference –soit
was arguably anunjustoverexploitationof the commonstock forcertaininimitable
resources.
2. Second, there wasno recompense forthe interference thatMr.Profitcommitted. The
manyotherslivinginthe townwere leftsignificantlyworseoff,nothavingsufficient
resourcesforsubsistence andnocompensationwithwhichtoappropriate themfrom
anothersource.
The illustrative scenarioabove,if itactuallyoccurred, wouldviolate all three principlesof
Nozick’sET,unjustappropriation,unjusttransfer,andnorecompense foreitherof these two
injustices. Italso wouldviolate the rightsof SOT,includingNO1,PO1– as Mr. Profithas
evidentiallyinterferedwiththe UFSrightsof the townpeople.
Jan Narvesonetal argue that that there are nofair share constraintsonuse or appropriation of
natural resources. Agentsmayappropriate,use,orevendestroywhatevernatural resources
theywant- as longas they violate noone'sself-ownership (Vallentyne,2014)25
. Ontheirview,
natural resourcesare initiallynotmerelyunprotectedbyapropertyrule (i.e.,permissibleuse
doesnotrequire anyone else'spermission);theyare alsounprotectedbya Nozickian
compensationliabilityrule.26
I have arguedthat natural resourcesare initiallyun-owned–so
the mainobjection tothispositionisthat as no humanagentcreatednatural resources,there is
no moral justification thatthe personwhofirstclaimsrightsovera natural resource - should
gainan unfairlylarge share of the profitsor welfare thatthe resource canprovide (asMr. Profit
does). AsNozick’s1b posits,““enoughandas good”for others iswhat isrequired. Any
alternate,suchaswithMr. Profit,wouldresultin appropriationwithoutrestrictions which
makesitpossible thatone personcouldownthe entire world. Thiswouldeffectivelyresultin
everyone else being property-lesspersons –andin the difficultconditionof requiringthe
owner'spermissiontodoanything27
. In additionto these challenges (Hardin,1968) there are
otherempirical issuesif individualsare morallypermittedtoruinnatural resourcesasthey
please. A moral defenseof forwaste usage or formy intereststodestroy usage seems
intuitivelyunlikelytobe widelyuncontroversial. What isconsistentwithwhatisrequiredfor
justownershipandusage isa fairshare conditionorusage constraintsthat restrictuse and
appropriation - where fairshare prioritizesusage andappropriationforsubsistence first,and
otherinterestsandbenefitssecond.
2.3 The Universal Private Property Regime Alternative
Privatizationispartof a neoliberal economicphilosophythatthe mostefficienteconomic
25 From Rothbard (1978, 1982), Narveson(1988:ch. 7;1999), and Feser (2005)
26 Arguablytheyalsocontest the Nozickianconstraints onpropertyusage – that ownership does not entitle one do
to just anything (such as destroy) withone’s property
27 I will discuss the moralchallenge ofmonopolies further oninthischapter

18. growthcan onlybe achieved byprivatization28
. The frame of reference thisphilosophyseems
to leverage issomewhatoversimplifiedandbasedon G.Hardin’stheoryof the tragedy of the
commons – andwhat man tends to dowithcommonresources (Platteau,1994, p.3). Priorto
presentingthe keycriterionof the privatizationmodel,itwouldbe helpfultounderstandthe
tragedyof the commonsthesisaswell assome historical perceptionswhichneoliberalismand
privatizationphilosophy draws.
Supportersof thisphilosophycite pre industrialmanasa more efficientandmore conservative
exploiterof resources. Theyargue that technological advancements,facilitatedbythe
industrial revolution, made the appropriationandacquisitionof resourcesmucheasier,and
cheaper– and thisresultedinlessconservatism, more waste,asresourcesonce limitednow
seemedplentiful (Demsetz,1967) (Smith,1981) (Platteau,1994) (Smith,1981). The industrial
revolution doesactuallymark aparticularly significanteraof developmentinacquisition
efficiencies –the advance of the steamengine alone replacedmanlabourhoursin both
productionanddistribution. All of a sudden large quantitiesof goodscouldbe massproduced
and deliveredacrossvastregions–effectivelyreducingthe costof acquisition. R. J. Smith
arguesthat wheneverthere have beenmotivestoover-harvestithas [always] takenplace,
primate or modernmanalike. Smithargues that “Inall of these cases,itisclear that the
problemof over-exploitationorover-harvestingisaresultof the resource’sbeingunderpublic
rather thanprivate ownership (Smith,1981). Supportersof privatizationof the global
commonsargue that the tragedyof the commonsisthe resultof an inappropriate property
regime,suchasan open-accessun-ownedregime. Smithargues that if we are to resolve the
over-exploitationandmisuse of the commons - a private propertyregime isnecessary,as
open-accessregimesare alwayssubjecttowhatGarret Hardinarguedwas the tragedy of the
commons.
The Tragedy ofthe Commons
The tragedyof the commonsis a theory thatsimplydescribedstatesthat wewill alwaysoptfor
an immediate benefitat theexpenseof less tangible valuessuch asthe availability of a resource
to futuregenerations.Hardinarguesthatwhenpropertyrightsare notwell defined,individuals
(andorganizations) will tendtooveruse those resourcesinanunbridledfashion. Hardin
argues;
“The rationalherdsman concludesthattheonly sensible courseforhim to pursueis to add
anotheranimalto his herd. And another;and another....Butthisis the conclusion reached by
each and every rationalherdsman sharing a commons.Therein isthe tragedy.Each man is
locked into a systemthatcompelshim to increase his herd withoutlimit--in a world thatis
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,each pursuing hisown bestinterest in
a societythat believesin the freedomof thecommons.Freedomin a commonsbringsruin to all”
(Hardin,1968, p. 1245)
Private propertyregime advocatesoftenargue thatthisregime is necessaryforeconomic
28 Ikos Astroulakis’s analysisof neoliberalistprivatization concludes that;“At the level of normative
ethics,neoliberal capitalismproposeseconomicgrowthbythe use of the private market
mechanism,notconcernedbysocial solidarity,equaldistributionof wealthanddiminishing
of inhumansituationsforpeopleandsocieties”. (Astroulakis,2014, p. 105)

19. development–which,granted,is a primarygoal of the state. Economicdevelopmentisusually
coinedasa collectivemoral good – to improve the quality of life forall throughthisincreased
productivityandcontinuedgrowthin development. Privatizationadvocates argue thata
private property regime will avertHardin’s’ tragedyof the commons,they believe thatthe more
membersof a communitythathave looser connections toproperty - the more free loading
[tragedyof the commons] there islikely tooccur(Ostrom, Private andCommonPropertyRights,
2000, p.335)29
. RichardPosnerargues; "The properincentives[foreconomicefficiency] are
createdby the parcelingoutamongthe membersof societyof mutuallyexclusiverightstothe
exclusiveuse of particularresources.If everypiece of landisownedbysomeone,in the sense
that there isalwaysan individual whocanexclude all othersfromaccesstoany givenarea,then
individualswill endeavorbycultivationorotherimprovementstomaximizethe value of land...”
(Posner,1977). Commonpropertyregimesare arguedtobe inefficientforthree mainreasons;
1. Rent dissipation
Rentdissipationis aninefficiencythatisthe resultof the resource beinginitiallyun-owned,
as seeninopen-accesspropertyscenarios. The thesispositsthatif everyone hasaright of
access withoutanyrulesconstrainingtheirbehaviour –rentsthat wouldhave been
generatedbyanefficientuse of the resource are completelydissipated. The rent
dissipationargumenthere isbasedonthe circumstance where the productsof aresource,
the wildmushroomsof the forestforexample,generatenoproceedsandsince there are no
rulesor costs,everyone wouldalwaysbe engaginginanunproductive race tocapture these
un-owned productsbeforeothersdo. Essentially,whethertheyneeditornot – theyare
inefficientlymotivated –as theyare incentivizedto grabit first. (Platteau,1994)
2. High transaction and enforcementcosts
These are the speculated costspredictedby privatization economistsif commonowners
were totry to devise rulestoreduce the externalitiesof theirmutual overuse(Demsetz,
1967). Supportsargue that overuse couldbe a runawayproblemaseachcommon user,
unconstrainedintheirusage, have acumulative effectof commonover-use. There is no
rentsachievedthroughopen-accessregimes,andhence nowaytogovernand resolve the
impactsof theiroveruse. They argue thatgovernance costsare highlyexpensive,andwith
privatizationthere will be nocostof implementationandgovernance. Theyclaimthat the
cost efficienciesintroducedbyprivatizationare fairer,asanysystemthat maximizes
productionalsomaximizesthe commongood – throughimprovementsinqualityof life.
Privatization,theyargue,ensure incentives tomaximizeproductivityandinternalize
externalities (Demsetz,1967, p. 348). Since externalitiesare inherentlyunfair intheir
transference of cost,theyfurtherargue thatprivatizationismorallybetterasitalsoleadsto
a faireroutcome byminimizingexternalities.
3. Low productivity
Supporterstheorize thatlowproductivitywill alwaysresult because noone hasan incentive
to workhard in orderto increase theirprivate returns(North,1990; Yang, 1987)” (Ostrom,
Private andCommonPropertyRights,2000)Thisargumentsuggeststhatwithoutdelegated
ownership,nobodyactuallyhasavestedinterestinhow productive the landis – as any
29 Ostrom also argues that althoughthere is empiricallya tighter connection betweenlabour efforts andbenefits
with privatelyownedproperty, and withcommonpropertythe connection is looser, but workingfor another
companyis alsolooser (Ostrom, Private andCommon PropertyRights, 2000)

20. effortmade toincrease productivityisdilutedbythe factthattheyhave no exclusiveuse
rightsto benefitfromtheirproductivitymeasures. Privatizationisclaimedtobe superior
to openaccessand commonpropertyinthat it securesincreasedproductivityand
managementefficiency,asownersare motivatedtomaximize the productivityof their
resourcesaswell asbeingmotivatednottoover-exploittheirresource insuchawayas
describedbythe unregulatedcommonproperty regimenotedearlier(toomanycowson a
pasture) (Platteau,1994). Posnerarguesthatall resourcesshouldbe ownedtoensure that
these propermotivationsare facilitated,andthatregimesthatprotectexclusivity,and
transferability(toshiftfromlesstomore productive states) are necessaryif resource
managementistobe brought intobalance (Posner,1977) (Platteau,1994). Posner’s
argumentisbasedon the premise thathigherproductivitywill resultinahigherqualityof
life forall,thatis thatincreasedprivate productionbenefiteveryone equally.
Posnerclaimsthathisproposedmodel of private propertymanagementwill overcome all of the
challengesraisedabove,andthatthere are three essentialcriterion of anefficientsystemof
property rightsregime [privatization] (Posner,1977: 10-3, as quotedinBromley,1989: 13)
(Platteau,1994) (Posner,1977);
1. Universality– For thismodel towork, all resourcesshouldbe ownedor own-able by
someone(s),exceptresourcessoplentifulthateverybodycanconsume asmuch of them
as he wants withoutreducing consumptionbyeveryoneelse.
2. Exclusivity– AsdiscussedinChapter1, exclusivityisthe abilitytofeasiblycontrol access
to a givenresource (airforexample hasalow exclusivity while myvegetable gardenhas
a highexclusivity). If a resource cannotbe controlledthere isnowayof commoditizing
it as universal privatizationrequires. Criterion1 providesabitof a loophole forthis
criterion, asresourcessuchas the air mightbe arguedto be soplentiful thatitneednot
be dividedupformanagement.
3. Transferability– Unlike Nozick&Locke’srightof transfer,transferabilityhere isa
technical mechanism formaximizingproductivityof resources,notamoral right. If a
propertyrightcannot be transferred,there isno feasible wayof shiftingaresource from
a lessproductive toa more productive use throughvoluntaryexchange.30
.
2.4. Moral & Empirical Impedimentsto the Private Property Regime
There are significant obstructions towhatprivatizationclaimsto be able toachieve,each with
respectto its moralclaim – an improvedqualityof lifeforall,its efficiency claims that I
discussedinthe previoussection,andthe criterion it needstosatisfy(1-3above). These claims
and criterionare basedin three intrinsicassumptions;
1. Universal privatizationimplementation andenforcementcosts wouldbe nil
2. Private propertyrightsare very well defined andgoverned
3. Markets are equal, complete,andcompetitive.
(Platteau,1994, p. 5)(Acheson,1987, p.61)

21. 1. Universal privatizationimplementationandenforcementcostswould be nil
Thisefficiencyclaim of privatization positsthatresource managementasawhole has
no real cost to the state (Posner,1977) (Platteau,1994, p. 5), and infact wouldhave a
positive influxof cashthroughrents(state securedincomesonprivate property
territories). This efficiencyisarguedtoresultina netbenefittoall – a moral good - as
it wouldreplace the costlyopen-accessmodel –which(asarguedabove) theyclaim
requiresanexpensivegovernancemodel thatwould seeminglyunfairly burdenthe
commonpopulation asunconnected third parties.
A firstnecessarystepinappropriatingresourcesforprivatization however, isevidently having
some methodof dividingtheseresourcesupintoresource territories. Asdiscussedearlier
excludabilityof certaininimitable necessaryresourcesisverydifficult. The costs for
attemptingtodefine anddefendplotsof oceanseemsintuitivelyimpossible andinfinite in
costs. Evenin a minimal state thisimpossibletaskwouldfall tothe state - whois responsible
for securingpropertyrights. Posner'sarguesthat onlythose resourcesthatare in limited
quantityneedbe managedunderapropertyregime (Platteau,1994, p.4) (Posner,1977), but
there are plentiful examplesof howthishasnot succeeded –such as whatIndiatriedwithto
privatize theirirrigationsystem31
. Seriousexternalitiesresultedfromunplanned pollutionof
groundwaterandthe commonpopulationwasunable to payfor the clean-up–effectively
resultinginaviolation the rightsof self-ownershipandjustpropertyrightsthatIhave argued
basedon the moral premise of bothLocke,SOT,NO1, PO1, and Nozick’s ET (P1-P3). I cannot
appropriate freshwaterif there isn’tanybecause someone pollutedit all –thisamountsto
unfairinterference withUFS. Since intuitivelythereisneveranyjustreasontopollute a
commonresource,thisoutcome isneverjust.
One of the mainreasonsa private propertyregime isproposedtobe superiortoopenaccess
and commonpropertyregimesisthatsupportersclaimithasa low or zerocost transactionto
enforce,makingitamore efficientsolutionthanopen-access. If thisassumptionwere true,it
wouldalsobe consistentwitharequirementof Nozick’sET – that inthe redistributionof
resources(whichprivatizationdoes) notonlyisjustcompensationrequiredbutnoimpact
shouldbe receivedbyotherunconnected thirdparties. So, a tax for example,thatwas
institutedtopayforcompensationof expropriationto a private propertyregime –wouldbe
arguablyunfairto the general publicbearingthe tax expense. If thiswas not a sufficientmoral
transgression,there isthe historical realitythat,throughoutantiquity, alotof private use
entitlementshave beenaccomplishednotthroughone’sownlabourmixingwiththe resources
appropriatedforsubsistence (SOT),itwasdelegated andimplementedthroughexpropriation
and violence (Platteau,1994, p.9). Expropriation,inmanycases,meansthatentitlementhave
beenconfiscatedfromitsmorallyjustownerwhominitiallyappropriateditjustly [withregardto
SOT]. A universal conversiontoaprivatizationmodelof propertymanagementwouldrequire
a lot of expropriation –creatinga fleetof formerowners(users) towhomamoral wrong has
31 Baland & Platteaucite anexample ofhowthe privatizationof an irrigationsysteminIndia led to the over
exploitation throughpollutionof groundwater to the doom of the actual irrigation system (Baland& Platteau, 1994,
pp. 12). The externalitycreatedhere was to ground water, which as a commonpool resource. Essentiallythe
privatizationof irrigationledto anunintendedoutcome of polluting a resource that was not privatized – the ground
water. As the ground water wasa commonopen-accessresource there was nomechanism to enforce any
compensationand the burden fell to the general population who were not equippedto resolve the pollutioncaused
bythe privatization ofirrigation. This was anexample ofthe impacts of imperfect implementationandincomplete
privatization, andas Posner argues, the reasonprivatizationmust be universal (Posner, 1977).

22. beencommitted,thatisinterferencewiththe righttoappropriate whatisneededfor
subsistence inthe exerciseof self-ownership. The cost of policingunderthese circumstances
would bothintuitivelyand empirically reasonedtobe veryhigh. A relevantmodernexample
of thisisthe current privatizationthatishappeninginthe AmazoninBrazil where this
privatizationmovementisbeingcarriedoutbyarmedconflictandthe genocide of natives.
The costs of privatizationandenforcingexclusivityisnotnil,violence islikelyandusually
withoutcompensationtothe previous andinmanycases,morallyjust,owners.
2. Property rights are well defined
The secondassumptionprivatization suggestsisthe privatizationprocessmustbe
perfectineliminatingexternalities,internalizingthe goodexternalities,andenforcing
the exclusive usage propertyrights (Platteau,1994, p. 10) Thiswouldrequire very
clearpropertyownershipandusage rights,onthe whole-resource32
as well asan
efficientgovernancemeans,which the model claimstonotrequire.33
As Jean-Phillippe BalandandJean-MariePlatteauargue,the eliminationof all externalitiesis
thencritical to the successof privatization,asif saidexternalitiesare notinternalized, costsuch
as those requiredbythe un-ownedopen-accessmodel –are generated. Thiswouldeffectively
violate akeyassumption of the lowornil cost of managingthe privatizedresource. The result
if costs are generatedisthattheyare unplannedcosts – whichwouldmostlikelyfall tothe state
to address – likelythroughataxationordiversionof funds –eitherof whichwouldhave an
impacton unconnectedparties –a potential violationof Nozick’sP3thatrequiresjust
compensationforinjusticessuchasunjusttransfersinownership. Baland& Platteau draw a
negative relationshipbetween –the impactsof an increase inproductivityof privatized
resources – and the otherresourcesthatare requiredforthe increase in productionbutnot
part of the actual privatelyheldresource. This isa centraland serious issue of privatizationif it
isnot implementeduniversally. Byonlypartiallyprivatizingresources(suchasthe irrigation
systeminIndia) unplannedimpactof the non-privatizedresource (waterinthiscase) is
inevitable. Private propertyrightsoversome resources(suchasgroundwater) are toohard to
define andwill alwaysremaintoatleastsome degree unregulated. As these resourcesare
typicallyneededinputsanddependenciesintomaximizingthe productivityof otherresource
(duringproduction) - itseemsthatbecause there isanempirical lackof abilitytofully
(universally) partitionandprivatize all resources, therewillalwaysbe new externalitiescreated.
3. Markets are complete and competitive
The third assumption Posnermakesisthatmarketsare complete and competitive. Thismeans
that no participantsare powerful enoughtohave the abilitytodictate and setthe price of a
givencommodityandhence itisonlyfaircompetitionthatregulatescommodity price. Baland
& Platteauargue that marketsare inherentlyimperfectforanumberof reasons;Information
32 By whole-resource Baland& Platteaumean that for a given oceanplot that is privatized, exclusive rights would
have to be to all that is containedthere andwithin.
33 Platteau and Balandargue that “exclusive rights have to be defined onthe whole resource. Otherwise, perverse
effects are boundto developandto leadto a worsening ofthe situation. For example, Gilles andJamtgaard
report that "the decline ofthe Englishcommons mayhave resulted from the exclusionof animals from
agricultural lands. Inthe Englishopenfieldsystem, animalsgrazed onthe commons during the summer months
and fedonstubble and hayduring the rest ofthe year. As fields became privatelyowned, animals had to spend
longer periods on the commons. The result was over-grazing." [Gilles andJamtgaard,1981 :138].

23. flowandconstraints,powerdynamics,andpolitical positioningare all empiricallyandintuitively
genuine issueswithmarketsandequitytradingface. Posner’sprivatizationmodel isweighted
inperfectmarkets,however,notall marketsare equal andevenif theywere accesstosuch
marketsisnot a universal guarantee - credittoenterthe marketusuallyrequirescollateral for
whichmanyindividualscanneverhave (Carpenter,1998). Baland & Platteauargue that
implementingasystembasedonthisassumptionis notrealisticas privatizationcaneasily result
inthe creationof local monopolies(Baland&Platteau,1994, p. 13). Monopolies are aclassic
case of inefficiency towhichprivatizationmodelsare highlyvulnerable. Baland& Platteaucite
an example fromBromley,Switzerland,andthe summerpastures. In thisexample if all
summerpastureswere owneditwouldbe very possibleforone of the fortunatelylocated
ownerstopreventall otherowners’ accesstofreshwater– as there isliterallynodimensionof
privatizationthatwouldprovide amechanismtoobjecttothis – or force thisownerto provide
access (Platteau,1994, p.9).34
The monopolythatresultswouldcause aworseningof
conditionsandwelfare of anentire communitygroup. Additionally,incaseswhere
monopoliesdodevelop,the partiesthatare generallymostimpactedare those whowere
expropriatedfromthe resource,thereby furtherincreasingthe disadvantage of those already
worse off (Platteau,1994, p.13). ReferringbackLocke andNozick’sET, this outcome isa moral
violationof Locke’srequirementforsurplususage - surplus,asonehaving therightto the
benefitof one'sefforts,healso argued that such surpluswould also haveto serve thecommon
good and servealso to the benefitof thosein justifiableneed as well asNozick’ssecond
principlesof propertyownership(P2) asthe creationof a monopolyisneithercomplicitwith
UFP that leaves“enoughandasgoodfor others”. Ratherthis seemslike itwouldgenerate a
scenariowhere surroundingfarmerswouldbe atthe mercyof the will of the monopolyholder,
whichisarguably[Locke] unjustenslavement. In additiontochallengessuchasthese, Baland
& Platteauargue that if ideal marketdynamics,are notinplace,whichislikelyin 2ndand3rd
worldcountries,privatizationmodelscanleadtoan increase ininefficienciesandover
exploitationof resources. What Baland& Platteauare arguingisthat privatization hasa
dependency onperfectandgloballyequalmarketdynamics –a dependencythat can neverplay
out equitablyacrossthe planet. Thissuggests,strongly,thatcertainpartieswould benefit
more than others – intuitivelythissuggeststhatthose countriesandindividualswhobenefit
mostfrom marketsnow – will benefitthe most. AsNozickargues,there isnothingaboutone
man that makeshimmore entitledtobenefitmore thananother. As AlanGoldmannotesthis
isa “recognitionof the moral equalityof othersgeneratesapresumptionof equalityof
conditions”,whichwouldnotholdif one were permitted toown“disproportionate sharesof the
world”(Goldman,1976, p.73) For privatizationtowork,especiallyagainstexhaustible
resources suchas the inimitableresourcesIdiscussedinChapter1,we wouldrequire aninfinite
supplyandmarketfor those resource,since aperfectmarkethasa clearobjective of constant
and consistent growth35
. This means thatthe resource managementregime mustbe able to
supporta constantlygrowingdemand –for evenresources thatare limitedinsupplyand
exhaustible - otherwise the marketwill eventuallybreakdown (Carpenter,1998). This
arrangementof requirementswill have toessentially leadtoresource exhaustionoversome
eventual timeline. This alsomeansthat withoutperfectmarketdynamicspricesforthese
resources will tendtoeitherbe toohighortoo low,whichwill encourage atooslow or toofast
34 The wrong incurred bysucha monopolyon fresh water wouldnot even require that the fortunate owner be
extortive andcharge for access,he couldmerelynot allow access at all - and stillbenefit from his locations
competitive advantage of havingwater.
35 I will discuss thisfurther insection2.5, but here, bygrowthI meanthat thisis the *ideal* market dynamic for any
good manufactured and sold, the continual increase inproduction and shareholder/stakeholder profits.

24. exhaustion of the resource –neitherof whichisthe perfectmarketrequiredforthisregime.
Baland& Platteau argue that markets,especially alone, are aninsufficientandunstable method
to manage some of the veryimportantrolesthatenvironmental resourcesplay(Platteau,1994,
p. 16) – not the least of whichis UFS!
There are technical andmoral flawswithprivatization –suchas the critical dependencyon ideal
or perfectmarkets, asthe marketis nota moral systemwithmechanismstoensure P1,P2,P3,
or any of the NO1,PO1 requiredbyself-ownership. Leftto theirowndynamicsthe market will
favourwhich resourcestovalue – whichas we have observedwithresourcessuchasthe
atmosphere,notamarkettradedresource,hasledto a damagingview of whatresourcesare of
mostvalue. Markets are arguedto create opportunity,orat minimumthe circumstancesfor
opportunity. Empiricallyandintuitivelyhowever,these opportunitiesare notsubjectto
distributivejustice. As discussedinChapter1 - Rawlsfairnessconcern, undeservedadvantage
oftenresultsinonlyasmall fractionof individualswhocanmake use of the circumstancesof
opportunities. If I inheritmoneyorposition,itisfarmore feasible thatIcan scoop up
resourcesofferedprivatelythanthe past-ownerwhowasexpropriatedanduncompensated.
Thisdoesn’tresultina greatergoodfor all,asprivatizationclaimsitwill. It effectively leadsto
a wideningof the gapbetweenthe poorandrichin termsof ownersand labourers. Baland &
Platteauarguesthatcountrieswhostruggle toobtaininternational credit(developingcountries)
fall vulnerable tothe temptationtosell national resourcestowealthyindustrializedcountries
(Baland& Platteau,1994, p. 17). The resultof such transactionscanbe seriousontwofronts;
Desperationmaypromote acceptinglowerthanfairprices,and second,because these
resourcesare positionedonoff-shore territories,there isincentiveforthe resource owning
corporationstoover-exploitliterallyjustbecause theycan. Many off-shore territoriesjust
don’thave the infrastructure tomonitorthe impactsof the richmulti-national corporationsthat
theysell resourcesto (Baland&Platteau,1994, p.17). The combinationof the profitand
growthmotivesof these corporationswiththe lackof governance andmonitoringinfrastructure
leadstosome veryseriousexternalitiesthat,like the general populationinIndiawhosuffered
groundwaterpollution,are justnotequippedtodeal with. Theyare leftwiththe resources
exploitedandotherresourcespolluted –much like the illustrative scenariothatIopened this
chapterwith. Althoughitisgenerallytrue thatthere isapositive correlationbetween
resource exploitationandanincrease insocial welfare –a moral good the privatizationthesis
laysclaimto, we mustrecognize thatthe current rate of resource exploitationis extremely high
and thiscreatescircumstancestodifferentiateandprioritizeusage motivesinordertoregard
our jointrightsandmorallyjustclaimstonecessaryinimitable resources. Privatization offers
a model of commoditization of commonpool resources36
,anditrequiresthe systematicdivision
of these resourcesintoprivatelyheldproductive units. Productionandresource usage are
effectivelyabstractedfromthe usage motive (UFS,UFP),treatingusage motivesforsubsistence
and forprofitas the same (UFS = UFP) - resultinginaform of conflationbetweenself-ownership
rightsand exploitationinsecuringone’sfurther - beyondsubsistence –interests,whichIhave
arguedmustmorallybe secondaryto the highermoral goodand rightto UFS.
Conclusion
In this dissertationIhave arguedthatcommonpool resourcesare more justlymanagedundera
collective use propertymanagementregime thathassome circumstantial usage constraints,
36 Although I have not cited a specific source for the notionof privatization as a commodification ofcommonpool
resources this seems to be a fairlybroadcharacterization – andas such is not anoriginal idea I am suggesting
claim to.

25. where the commonproperty(“the commons”) are effectivelyun-owned,andusage motivesare
differentiatedasusage forsubsistence (UFS) andusage forsurplusprofit(UFP). I have also
arguedthat to achieve subsistence fromthe usage of natural resources certainpropertyrights
are necessary. I have arguedthat althoughUFPmotivesare notinnatelyimmoral,theyare
morallyinferiorinprioritytoglobal subsistence usage. My defence of both of these central
arguments wasinitiallybasedonJohnLocke's SOT, whichI arguedwas a justpremise toderive
furtherrightsandobligations(NO1,PO1),includingexclusiveuse propertyrightsderived
throughlabourmixing,insofar andas much as needed tosecure one’ssubsistence. I then
arguedthat RobertNozick’sEntitlementTheoryprincipleswere amoral premise withwhichto
define circumstanceswhere usage constrainismorallyjust –such as whenUFPinterfereswith
UFS – withoutjustrecompense. I have arguedthat the objective of anyresource management
regime shouldbe toestablisharealisticandjustbalance [prioritizationof universalUFSwith
circumstantial usage constraintsonUFP] betweenpublicgood [UFS] andprivate beyond
subsistence interests[UFP
Nozickarguedthat inequalityinappropriation andpropertyinitself isnotunjust - assumingthat
the acquisitionsof saidresourceshasalwayshappenedinajustway. Justacquisition canbe
subjective tocertainrealitiesof circumstance,suchasinterference withbasichumanrightsor
the risk of depletionof inimitablelife supportingnatural resources. The fundamental
categoriesof propertyare userights (UFS) andincomerights (UFP). Use rightsare constitutive
to individualhumanidentity,but unrestrainedincomerightshave nonatural basis,norcan they
be justifiedbyreference tomarketrequirements,liberty,social utility,orjustdeserts
(Krueckeberg,1995, p. 306)37
.
37 From (Christman, 1994)

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31. Indexof Abbreviations
BM – Basic minimum
ET – EntitlementTheory
FOL – Fruitsof Labour
N01 – Negative obligationone
PO1 – Positive obligationone
PO2 – Positive obligationtwo
SOT – Self-ownershipThesis
UFS – Usage for subsistence
UFP– Usage forprofit