Essay Writing Service http://StudyHub.vip/Aristotle-And-Longinus-On-Good-Writing- 👈

1. 1
Aristotle and Longinus on Good Writing
Paul Bullen. In progress. April 12, 2019 Nov. 21, 2021.
Please send suggestions for improvement to bullenpaul@mac.com
THESIS AND PROOF: Aristotle, Rhetoric III 13 1414a–b 2
INTRODUCTIONS: Aristotle, Rhetoric III 14 7
CLARITY: Aristotle, Rhetoric III 2 1404b1–3 13
ORIENTING READERS: Longinus, On the Sublime 14
GOOD STYLE: Aristotle, Poetics 22 1458a 15
ARRANGING INCIDENTS: Aristotle Poetics 7 1-7, 1450b21–34 17
CLINGING TO A THESIS: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I 5 1096a2 18
TIMELY SUBLIMITY FLASH: Longinus: On the Sublime, chapter 1 19

2. 2
THESIS AND PROOF: Aristotle, Rhetoric III 13 1414a–b
[The grey highlighting is the opposite of highlighting—it means most people can skip that part, at
least on first readsing.]
ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη:
A speech (logos) has two parts.
ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποδεῖξαι.
• For it is necessary to
• assert something (to te pragma eipein peri hou) [make a claim, say
something about something], and
• demonstrate it (tout apodexai) [show how it is the case; support the
claim].
διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδεῖξαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι μὴ προειπόντα ἀδύνατον:
Thus (dio), it is not possible to have
• assertions (eiponta) without demonstrations (apodexai) [that follow] or
• demonstrations without [prior] assertions (proeiponta);
ὅ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι προλέγει.
• For
• demonstrations demonstrate something [that something is the case—and
that something must be made known in the claim], and
• initial statements (prologoi) are [made] for the sake of demonstrations
(apodeixai) of what was initially stated (prolegei) [because your purpose
is not just to inform the listener of what you believe, but to have them
believe it too].
τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσίς ἐστι τὸ δὲ πίστις,
Of these [parts of a speech],
• one is the proposition [thesis, claim] (prothesis),
• the other the proof [reasons to believe the proposition] (pistis),1
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα τὸ δὲ ἀπόδειξις.
1 In rhetoric, pistis is a technical term, often translated ‘proof’. In ordinary contexts the word means
trust or belief. The “proof” gives you a reason to believe or accept or trust a proposition. Proof should
be understood loosely as reasons to believe something. It doesn’t have to be proof in the beyond-a-
reasonable doubt sense. You can see another English translation and the original Greek, with each
word linked to dictionaries at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0060:book=3:chapter=13
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0059%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D13

3. 3
just as if we distinguish
• some problēma (thesis? See footnotes) from
• its apodeixis (demonstration).2
νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως:
The current divisions [of the speeech as taught by rhetoricians] are absurd.
διήγησις γάρ που τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν,
2 Since apodeixis does not get used with dialectic, and probēma frequently means thesis or
proposition in Aristotle, the thesis or proposition could either be a proposed solution to a
mathematical problem or it could be a proposed solution to a “physics” problem. Both allow of strong
proofs, unlike dialectics, which only allows of probable proofs. See Paul Slomkowski, Aristotle's
Topics (Brill, 1997), pp. 16–17. // Topics 104b35: “Almost (schedon) all dialectical problems
(dialektika problēmata) are now called theses (theseis).” In a stricter sense, a protasis (proposition)
has the form “Is P the case?”, while a problēma has the form “Is P the case, or not?” It is a question
that takes a yes or no answer. 105b15: “Propositions (protaseis) are what arguments (logoi) arise
from, while problems are what reasonings [syllogisms] (syllogimois) are about [the subjects].” // If
this is a mathematical allusion, it only makes sense in the following way: In math, problems (either
intractable puzzles that mathematicians face or quasi-puzzles given to students) have proposed
solutions for which proofs are necessary. [In fact, Aristotle commonly uses problēma to mean thesis.
It is a proposed solution to a math problem that corresponds to the thesis (prosthesis) in rhetoric,
and it is the proof of the proposed solution that corresponds to the proof (pistis) in rhetoric. (In the
passage for which this is a footnote, the prosthesis and pistis of rhetoric are being compared to the
problēma and apodeixis (demonstration) in another realm.) In science, there are explananda for
which there is a hypothetical explanantia. The former corresponds to the prosthesis and the latter
corresponds to the pistis. In engineering and technology practitioners also face problems. Proposed
solutions require some argument before being accepted. In some cases, the argument may involve
pointing to actual trials. (So people in each of the so-called STEM components face problems of one
sort or another. And they all seek solutions to the problems. For a solution to be accepted, it must
have something like a proof. When teaching, students can be given problems to solve that the teacher
already knows the answer to. This does mimic the situation of the non-student expert who is facing
problems he does not know the answer to. What the significance of this parallel between the
situation of the practitioner and the student is, I don’t know. Not all teachers are practitioners. But
they do know things the student does not. And that knowledge is one basis for their position as
teachers. The other is their ability to teach. Not everyone with knowledge has the ability to teach.
Teaching is its own technē. But you do want a teacher with the knowledge. None of the comments
given by others on this passage that I’ve seen are satisfactory: Footnote in the Buckley (1851)
translation: “That is, to adopt the language of mathematicians, the statement [prothesis, translated
‘proposition’ above] corresponds to their problem, the proof to their demonstration.” Kennedy, in his
translation (1991), provides this footnote: “as, e.g., in geometry.” For its interpretation as a dialectical
problem, see Topics Book I, chapter 1 101b28, chapter 11 104b1ff? and Poetics 25 1460b6. Using the
English meaning of problem, making this interpretation cohere is a challenge, as it would seem that a
problem is what precedes a thesis (proposition, assertion, statement), while a demonstration is what
follows it. So while demonstration corresponds to proof, problem does not correspond to a thesis.
One would expect this: problem (question) thesis (answer, solution) proof/demonstration. If so,
problem introduces a third part. On the meanings of the Greek word problēma, see
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=pro%2Fblhma&la=greek&can=pro%2Fblhma0&prior=pi/stis&d=Perseus:te
xt:1999.04.0080:book=3:chapter=13:section=2&i=1#lexicon. For a discussion of this passage, see John Walt
Burkett, “Aristotle, Rhetoric III: A Commentary” (2011) [dissertation], pp. 313–315/
https://repository.tcu.edu/bitstream/handle/116099117/4295/Burkett.pdf?sequence=1

4. 4
• For narration (diēgēsis) surely belongs only in a law-court [speech]
(dikanikos).
ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ καὶ δημηγορικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἵαν λέγουσιν,
• How can there be what is called narration [diēgēsis] in
• a public assembly [speech] (dēmēgorikos) or in
• a display [speech] (epideiktikos)?
ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον,
• Or a rebuttal (antidikon) [in either of these types of speeches]? [1414b]
ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν;
• Or a conclusion (epilogos) in display [speeches].3
προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία
ᾖ.
• Introduction (prooimion) and
• reply-by-comparison (antiparabolē) and
• recapitulation (epanodos)
sometimes occur in public assembly [speeches] when there is a dispute
(antilogia).
καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολλάκις,
• For there is often accusation (katēgoria) and defense (apologia).
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή:
But [when accusation and defense appear in public assembly speeches it does]
• not [do so] qua (hē) deliberation (symboulē).4 And
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός,
• not every law-court [speech] has a conclusion (epilogos);
οἷον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐμνημόνευτον:
• For instance, those in which
• the speech is short, or
• the subject-matter (to pragma) easily remembered (eumnēmoneuton).
συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.
• For the effect of omitting [a conclusion is to] shorten [a speech].
3 Assuming the apo in apodeiktikon should be epi. Othewise, it would be translated demonstrative.
4 “Symboulē, the coming together of the council, which is the real objective of public debate”—
translator’s note in Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, translated, with Introduction,
Notes, and Appendices by George Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 259 n173.

5. 5
ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις
The necessary parts [of a speech], then, are
• proposition (prothesis) [thesis, claim] and
• proof (pistis) [reasons to believe or trust that what has been proposed is the
case].
ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα,
While these [two parts] are proper to [characteristic of] (idia) [every speech],
τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος:
[normal speeches could be said to have] at most:
• introduction (prooimion) [what you say before you make your proposition],
• proposition (prothesis),
• proof (pistis), and
• conclusion (epilogos) [what you say after you’ve proved your proposition].
τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν πίστεών ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὔξησις τῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε
μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων
• For
• reply to the opposing litigant (ta pros ton antidikon) belongs to the proof
(pistis), and
• reply-by-comparison (antiparablē) is the magnification of one’s [position],
and is a part, as it were, (meros ti) of the proof (pistis).
（ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο）,
• (For the one who does this [engages in reply-by-comparison] shows
something [i.e., proves the thesis].)
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδ᾽ ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναμιμνήσκει.
• But the introduction (prooimion) does not [belong to the proof (or the
thesis)];
• nor the conclusion (epilogos), which reminds [us of what has already
been said] (anamimēskei). [So these constitute distinct parts of the
speech, when present.]
ἔσται οὖν, ἄν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον,
If we were to make such distinctions [as reply to the opposing litigant and reply-by-
comparison], we would end up like Theodorus and his followers,
διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις, καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος.
who distinguish
• another narration, a post-narration, and a pre-narration, and

6. 6
• a refutation (elenchos) and a final refutation (epexelenchos).
δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα τίθεσθαι:
But one ought posit a name [for a part of a speech] when one can point to
• a sort of species (or form, eidos), i.e. (kai),
• [to something with] differentiae (diaphora) [characteristics that give it a
‘form’ distinct from other parts].
εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες,
If not, [naming] becomes empty, frivolous,
οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους.
as [it was when] Licymnius created in his manual (technê), naming [as parts of a
speech]
• wafting (epourōsis) and
• wandering (apoplanēsis) and
• ramifications (ozoi).

7. 7
INTRODUCTIONS: Aristotle, Rhetoric III 14
The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as
• the prologue in poetry and
• the prelude in flute-playing;
• for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving the way for what follows.
The prelude resembles the exordium of epideictic speeches;
• for as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can execute skillfully and
attach it to the key-note, so also in epideictic speeches should be the
composition of the exordium;
the speaker should say at once
• whatever he likes,
• give the key-note and then
• attach the main subject.
And all do this, an example being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates;
• for the eristics and Helen have nothing in common.5 [footnote info starts p. 10]
At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from the point, this is more
appropriate than that the speech [should] be monotonous.
[2] In epideictic speeches, the sources of the exordia are praise and blame, as
Gorgias, in the Olympiacus, says, “Men of Greece, you are worthy to be admired by
many,” where he is praising those who instituted the solemn assemblies. Isocrates
on the other hand blames them because they rewarded bodily excellences, but
instituted no prize for men of wisdom.
[3] Exordia may also be derived from advice,
• for instance, one should honor the good, wherefore the speaker praises
Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor worthless, but who, although
they are good, remain obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam; for this is a piece
of advice.
[4] Again, they may be derived from forensic exordia, that is to say, from appeals to
the hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, difficult, or commonly known, in
order to obtain indulgence, like Choerilus6:
5 1 The subject of the oration was the praise of Helen, but Isocrates took the opportunity of attacking
the sophists. This exemplifies his skill in the introduction of matter not strictly proper to, or in
common with, the subject. The key-note is Helen; but the exordium is an attack on the Eristics, with
special allusion to the Cynics and the Megarians.
6 2 Of Samos, epic poet, author of a poem on the Persian war, from which this half-line and the
context preserved in the Scholiast are taken. He complains that whereas the poets of olden times had

8. 8
“But now when all has been allotted.”
These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—
• praise,
• blame,
• exhortation,
• dissuasion,
• appeals to the hearer.
And these exordia7 may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech.
[5] τὰ δὲ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταὐτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ
πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια:
[5] As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it must be noted that they produce the
same effect as
• dramatic prologues (prologoi) and
• epic exordia
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν διθυράμβων ὅμοια τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς:
• （for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia):
“διὰ σὲ καὶ τεὰ δῶρα εἴτε σκῦλα”.
“For thee and thy presents or spoils.8”
ἐν δὲ προλόγοις καὶ ἔπεσι δεῖγμά ἐστιν τοῦ λόγου,
[6] But in [judicial] speeches9 and epic poems the exordia provide a sample of the
subject [deigma…tou logou: sample of the argument],
ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ ᾖ ὁ λόγος καὶ
in order that [the hearers]
• may know beforehand what it is about [in proeidōsi peri hē ho logos: may have
pre-knowledge (pre-know)` what the speech is about], and that
μὴ κρέμηται ἡ διάνοια:
• the mind may not be kept in suspense [mē kremētai hē dianoia: (their)
thoughts not be left hanging],
plenty to write about, the field of poetry being as yet untilled, it was now all apportioned, and he, the
last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find “a new chariot for the race-course of his song.”
7 3 ἐνδόσιμα = προοίμια.
8 4 A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic exordia are different. Those of a forensic
speech are like prologues and epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic, which may be wild,
high-flown, as in the example given from an unknown author.
9 5 That is, forensic speeches. δράμασι has been suggested for λόγοις.

9. 9
τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ:
• for that which is undefined leads astray [to aoriston plana(i): the unlimited
wanders];
ὁ δοὺς οὖν ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ.
so then he who puts the beginning (archē), so to say, into the hearer's hand enables
him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story (logos).
διὰ τοῦτο
Hence the following exordia:
“μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά” Hom. Il. 1.1
“ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα” Hom. Od. 1.1
“ἥγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὅπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης
ἦλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.”
“ Sing the wrath, O Muse.10
” “ Tell me of the man, O Muse.11”
“ Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into
Europe.12”
καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ οὗ τὸ δρᾶμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ,
ἀλλά πού γε, ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς “ἐμοὶ πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος.” Soph. OT 774
Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their drama, if not at the outset,
like Euripides, at least somewhere in the prologue, like Sophocles, “ My father was
Polybus.13”
καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία ὡσαύτως.
It is the same in comedy.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο,
So then the most essential (anankaiotaton: most necessary) and special (idion:
specific, proper, peculiar) function (ergon: task) of the exordium is
δηλῶσαι τί ἐστιν τὸ τέλος οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος
to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech [ti estin to telos hou heneka ho
logos: what the end is for which the speech (is being given)];
10 6 Hom. Il 1.1.
11 7 Hom. Od. 1.1.
12 8 From Choerilus （sect. 4）.
13 9 Soph. OT 774. But this can hardly be called the prologue.

10. 10
（διόπερ ἂν δῆλον ᾖ καὶ μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐ χρηστέον προοιμίῳ）:
wherefore [= as a result of which] the exordium should not be employed if the
subject is quite clear or unimportant.
[7] All the other forms of exordia in use are only remedies,14 and are common to all
three branches of Rhetoric. These are derived from
• the speaker,
• the hearer,
• the subject, and
• the opponent.
From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps to destroy or create prejudice.
But this must not be done in the same way; for the defendant must deal with this at
the beginning, the accuser in the epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant,
when about to introduce himself, must remove all obstacles, so that he must first
clear away all prejudice; the accuser must create prejudice in the epilogue, that his
hearers may have a livelier recollection of it.
The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make him
• well disposed or
• to arouse his indignation, and sometimes
• to engage his attention or the opposite;
• for it is not always expedient to engage his attention, which is the reason
why many speakers try to make their hearers laugh.
As for rendering the hearers tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person
wishes, including the appearance of respectability, because respectable persons
command more attention. Hearers pay most attention to things that are important,
that concern their own interests, that are astonishing, that are agreeable; wherefore
one should put the idea into their heads that the speech deals with such subjects. To
make his hearers inattentive, the speaker must persuade them that the matter is
unimportant, that it does not concern them, that it is painful.
[8] But we must not lose sight of the fact that all such things are outside the
question, for they are only addressed to a hearer whose judgement is poor and who
is ready to listen to what is beside the case; for if he is not a man of this kind, there is
no need of an exordium, except just to make a summary statement of the subject,
so that, like a body, it may have a head.
[9] Further, engaging the hearers' attention is common to all parts of the speech, if
necessary; for attention slackens everywhere else rather than at the beginning.
14 10 That is, special remedies in the case of the hearers suffering from“ååinattention, unfavorable
disposition, and the like” å（Cope).

11. 11
Accordingly, it is ridiculous to put this15 at the beginning, at a time when all listen
with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one must
say, “And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as myself”; and, “I will
tell you such a thing as you have never yet” heard of, so strange and wonderful. This
is what Prodicus used to do; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in
a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture.
[10] But it is clear that one does not speak thus to the hearer qua hearer;16 for all in
their exordia endeavor either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own
apprehensions:
“O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come breathless].”17
“ Why this preamble?”18
This is what those also do who have, or seem to have, a bad case; for it is better to
lay stress upon anything rather than the case itself. That is why slaves never answer
questions directly but go all round them, and indulge in preambles.
[11] We have stated19 how the hearer's goodwill is to be secured and all other
similar states of mind. And since it is rightly said, “Grant that on reaching the
Phaeacians I may find friendship or compassion,”20 the orator should aim at exciting
these two feelings.
In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares the praise,
either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some way or other. For
Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that “it is easy to praise Athenians in the
presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of Lacedaemonians.”21
[12] Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from forensic, but naturally they are
very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the subject, so that
the case needs no exordium, except for the orator's own sake, or on account of his
adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too little importance to the
question according to his idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove
prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance of the subject. Such are the
reasons for exordia; or else they merely serve the purpose of ornament,
15 11 i.e., to claim the hearer's attention at the beginning, for everyone is keen to listen then, but later
on attention slackens.
16 12 The hearer qua hearer should be unbiased, but in fact hearers often suffer from the defects
referred to in sect. 7, for which certain forms of exordia are remedies.
17 13 Soph. Ant. 223.
18 14 Eur. IT 1162.
19 15 2.1.7, 8.
20 16 Hom. Od. 7.327.
21 17 See 1.9.30.

12. 12
since their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For such is the encomium on
the Eleans, in which Gorgias, without any preliminary sparring or movements, starts
off at once, “Elis, happy city.”
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and
London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0060%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D14

13. 13
CLARITY: Aristotle, Rhetoric III 2 1404b1–3
ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι （σημεῖον γάρ τι ὁ λόγος ὤν, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ οὐ ποιήσει
τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον）
My translation:
Let the virtue of good style (lexis) be defined as clarity (saphē).
• For speech (logos) is a sort of indication (sēmeion) and it fails to perform its
proper task (to heautou ergon) if it is not clear (dēlos).
Roberts trans.:
Style to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech which fails to
convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has to do.
Freese translation:
In regard to style, one of its chief merits may be defined as perspicuity. This is
shown by the fact that the speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not
perform its proper function.

14. 14
ORIENTING READERS: Longinus, On the Sublime
From near the beginning.
εἴγ̓ ἐπὶ πάσης τεχνολογίας δυεῖν ἀπαιτουμένων,
[1] προτέρου μὲν τοῦ δεῖξαι, τί τὸ ὑποκείμενον,
[2] δευτέρου δὲ τῇ τάξει, τῇ δυνάμει δὲ κυριωτέρου,
πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ
δἰ ὧν τινων μεθόδων κτητὸν γένοιτο, ὅμως ὁ
Two things can be demanded of every book about a science/art (technologia):
• first, explanations (deixai) of the subject (to hypokeimenon);
• second (in order, although first in worth), [indications of]
• how, i.e.,
• by what routes (methodoi),
we ourselves can come to acquire (ktēton) it [sc. the subject-matter].
[There is more on Longinus below]

15. 15
GOOD STYLE: Aristotle, Poetics 22 1458a
λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σαφεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων
ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ [20] ταπεινή:
The virtue of style/diction (lexis) is to be clear without banal (saphē kai mē tapeinēn
einai). The clearest style/diction is that made up of standard [literal?] terms (tōn
kyriōn onomatōn), but it is commonplace (tapeinē). [20]
παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφῶντος ποίησις καὶ ἡ Σθενέλου.
An example is the poetry of Cleophon and of Sthenelus.
σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἡ τοῖς ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη:
By “unfamiliar” [or foreign or alien, xenikos] I mean
• a rare word, a metaphor,
• a lengthening, or
• anything beyond ordinary use.
ξενικὸν δὲ λέγω γλῶτταν καὶ μεταφορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον.
That which employs unfamiliar [xenikos] words AND METAPHORS? is dignified and
outside the common usage.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἢ αἴνιγμα ἔσται ἢ [25] βαρβαρισμός:
But if a poet writes entirely in such words, the result will be either a riddle or
jargon;
ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἴνιγμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός.
if made up of
• metaphors, a riddle and if of
• rare words, jargon (barbarismos).
αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι:
The essence of a riddle consists in describing a fact by an impossible combination of
words.
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν <ἄλλων> ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν
μεταφορῶν ἐνδέχεται,
By merely combining the ordinary names of things this cannot be done, but it is
made possible by combining metaphors.
οἷον “ἄνδρ᾽ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν [30] ἐπ᾽ ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα,” καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
For instance, "I saw a man weld bronze upon a man with fire," and so on.
τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός.
A medley of rare words is jargon.

16. 16
δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως τούτοις:
We need then a sort of mixture of the two.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει μηδὲ ταπεινόν, οἷον ἡ γλῶττα καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ
κόσμος καὶ τἆλλα τὰ εἰρημένα [34] εἴδη, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν.
For
• the one kind will save the diction from being prosaic and commonplace,
the rare word, for example, and the metaphor and the "ornament,"
while
• the ordinary words give clarity.

17. 17
ARRANGING INCIDENTS: Aristotle Poetics 7 1-7, 1450b21–34
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν
πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγῳδίας ἐστίν. κεῖται δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν
τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι [25] μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος: ἔστιν γὰρ ὅλον
καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος. ὅλον δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὃ
αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ᾽ ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι:
τελευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μετ᾽ ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ [30] ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν: μέσον δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ᾽ ἄλλο καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. δεῖ
ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους μήθ᾽ ὁπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἄρχεσθαι μήθ᾽ ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν,
ἀλλὰ κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἰδέαις. [Aristotle, Poetics 7 1-7, 1450b21–34]
After these definitions, we must next discuss the proper arrangement of the
incidents since this is the first and most important thing in tragedy. We have laid it
down that tragedy is a representation of an action that is whole and complete and of
a certain magnitude, since a thing may be a whole and yet have no magnitude. A
whole is what has a beginning and middle and end. A beginning is that which is not a
necessary consequent of anything else but after which something else exists or
happens as a natural result. An end on the contrary is that which is inevitably or, as
a rule, the natural result of something else but from which nothing else follows; a
middle follows something else and something follows from it. Well constructed plots
must not therefore begin and end at random, but must embody the formulae we
have stated.

18. 18
CLINGING TO A THESIS: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I 5 1096a2
“He is, in Aristotle’s words, ‘maintaining a thesis at all costs.’” (I forgot who I was
quoting).
This is apparently taken from Nicomachean Ethics I 5 1096a2
It’s the translation found in the Ackrill collection (Ross?).
This is the Greek:
εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων.
Here’s the Rackam translation:
“unless for the sake of maintaining a paradox.”
I don’t see how you can translate ‘thesin” as “paradox.” I gather the “at all costs” is
added to have the statement make sense.”
But can we attribute this to Aristotle?
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1096a&fromdo
c=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054

19. 19
TIMELY SUBLIMITY FLASH: Longinus: On the Sublime, chapter 1
[1]
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς εὑρέσεως καὶ
• [a] Inventive skill / craft of conception / experienced creation
(empeirian tēs eureseōs) and
τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν
• [b] the
• [proper] order / due disposal (taxis) and
• disposition / marshalling / [effective] management (oikonomia)
• of material/ facts (tēn tōn pragmatōn)
οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὐδ̓ ἐκ δυεῖν,
do not show themselves / are not manifested / in one or two touches / in a
good touch here and there:
ἐκ δὲτοῦ ὅλου τῶν λόγων ὕφους μόλις ἐκφαινομένην ὁρῶμεν,
but reveal themselves by / they gradually emerge from / slow degrees as
they / run through the whole texture of the composition / the whole tissue
of the composition/,
[2]
[while,] on the other hand,
ὕψος δέπου καιρίως ἐξενεχθὲν τά τε πράγματα δίκην σκηπτοῦ πάνταδιεφόρησεν καὶ
• a well-timed flash/ stroke of sublimity (hypsos depou kairiōs
exenechthen)
scatters everything before it like a thunderbolt/bolt of lightning, and
τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος εὐθὺς ἀθρόαν ἐνεδείξατο δύναμιν.
in a flash/ at a single stroke / reveals the full power (dynamin) of the speaker
(rhētoros).
"Inventive skill and the proper order and disposition of material are not manifested
in a good touch here and there, but reveal themselves by slow degrees as they run
through the whole texture of the composition; on the other hand, a well-timed
stroke of sublimity scatters everything before it like a thunderbolt, and in a flash
reveals the full power of the speaker.”
—Longinus, On the Sublime, chapter 1; as found in the excellent Classical Literary
Criticism, Translated by Penelope Murray and T. S. Dorsch, with an Introduction and
Notes by Penelope Murray (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 114.

20. 20
W. Hamilton Fyfe translation (the old Loeb edition):
“Again inventive skill and the due disposal and marshalling of facts do not show
themselves in one or two touches: they gradually emerge from the whole tissue of
the composition, while, on the other hand, a well-timed flash of sublimity scatters
everything before it like a bolt of lightning and reveals the full power of the speaker
at a single stroke."
The Greek:
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς εὑρέσεως καὶ τὴν τῶνπραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν οὐκ ἐξ
ἑνὸς οὐδ̓ ἐκ δυεῖν, ἐκ δὲτοῦ ὅλου τῶν λόγων ὕφους μόλις ἐκφαινομένην ὁρῶμεν, ὕψος δέπου
καιρίως ἐξενεχθὲν τά τε πράγματα δίκην σκηπτοῦ πάνταδιεφόρησεν καὶ τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος
εὐθὺς ἀθρόαν ἐνεδείξατο δύναμιν.
The same passage with some context:
“The extent to which we can be persuaded is usually under our control, but these
sublime passages exert an irresistible force and mastery, and get the upper hand
with every hearer. Inventive skill and the proper order and disposition of material
are not manifested in a good touch here and there, but reveal themselves by slow
degrees as they run through the whole texture of the composition; on the other
hand, a well-timed stroke of sublimity scatters everything before it like a
thunderbolt, and in a flash reveals the full power of the speaker.”
—Longinus, On the Sublime, chapter 1; as found in the excellent Classical Literary
Criticism, Translated by Penelope Murray and T. S. Dorsch, with an Introduction and
Notes by Penelope Murray (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 114.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0639