Serrano V. Priest and Educational Equalization in California

Hedley, “Serrano v. Priest and Educational Equalization in California”
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Serrano v. Priest
and
Educational Equalization in California
David M. Hedley
Educ. 401
K. Collins
Chapman University
September 25, 2002

Page 2 of 14
Table of Contents
Table of Contents................................................................................................................ 2
Equal Protection Cases prior to Serrano............................................................................. 3
California and Serrano I...................................................................................................... 4
Between Serrano I and Serrano II....................................................................................... 6
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez., 411 U.S. 1 (1973)...................................... 6
Senate Bill 90 and Assembly Bill 1267.......................................................................... 8
Serrano II ............................................................................................................................ 8
Post Serrano II..................................................................................................................... 9
Taxes............................................................................................................................... 9
Private Schools................................................................................................................ 9
Equalization .................................................................................................................. 10
Other methods of funding............................................................................................. 10
Conclusions....................................................................................................................... 10
Works Cited ...................................................................................................................... 12

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Equal Protection Cases prior to Serrano
In the infamous decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Justice
Brown, writing from the majority, sites the case of Roberts vs. City of Boston, 5 Cush.
198. In that case, the Massachusetts supreme court “held that the general school
committee of Boston had the power to make provision for the instruction of colored
children in separate schools established exclusively for then, and to prohibit their
attendance upon other schools.” Roberts was decided before the adoption of the XIV
amendment to the United States Constitution but the court, in Plessy, explicitly rejected
the equal protection argument put forth by Plessy. The doctrine of “separate, but equal”
was firmly cemented in American jurisprudence from the next 60 years.
A very different court in 1950 decided Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). In
that case, the court explicitly avoided reexamining Plessy. Yet, the court in a unanimous
decision author by then Chief Justice Vinson, found that an effort by Texas to create a
public law school for Negroes could not be equal to the University of Texas Law School,
and therefore violated the equal protection clause of the XIV amendment. The court
looked at “those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but make for
greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the
faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, traditions
and prestige.” Clearly this was a break in the judicial wall, which had kept an unequal
system functioning for so long.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was an amalgamation of a
number of similar cases. Those cases all argued that the school for black children were,
by their very nature, inferior and, therefore, violated the equal protection clause. Chief
Justice Warren spoke clearly on the court’s opinion of the “fundamental” right of
education:
“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms. (Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court found that segregated schools by their very nature violated the equal
protection clause.

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The court that had decided Painter was made up of five Associate Justices
appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt, and three Associate Justices and the Chief
Justice appointed by President Truman. The court that decided Brown had only one
change and that was the appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice, by President
Eisenhower. The Brown decision did not de-segregate schools by itself. It merely found
segregated schools unconstitutional and forced the states to reconstitute their schools in a
manner that would not discriminate by race.
California and Serrano I
The next major issue for educational equity was based in the very foundations of
the educational system. The equity of the State School Finance system was challenged in
the courts.
California like many other states depended heavily on local property taxes for the
primary financing of public schools. Each district could tax at its own rate. Because each
district contained a different tax base dependant on the assessed value of taxable
property, some districts could raise a great deal of revenue with a low tax rate while
others could raise very little with a high tax rate. The State of California provided
addition funds from two sources,
“The state contribution is supplied in two principal forms. "Basic state aid"
consists of a flat grant to each district of $125 per pupil per year, regardless of the
relative wealth of the district. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 6, par. 4; Ed. Code, §§
17751, 17801.) "Equalization aid" is distributed in inverse proportion to the
wealth of the district.” (Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, hereafter Serrano I)
Equalization depended on the concept of a “foundation level”. The “foundation level”
was an arbitrary amount of revenue per student for which the State guaranteed to provide
aid to each school district which could not raise that much revenue from the combination
of “basic state aid” and property tax revenue which was calculated at a standard (low)
rate for all districts. The amount was only $355 per year for an elementary student and
$488 for each high school student. Since districts could raise the property tax rate, some
poor districts could exceed that “foundation level” by assessing themselves at a higher
rate while still receiving the “equalization aid.” There were statutory limits to tax rate,
voters could approve an override and “nearly all districts” had “voted to override the
statutory limits.” Districts such as Beverly Hills Unified chose to spend $1,231.72 per
student in 1968-69, Pasadena Unified chose to spend $840.19 per student, and Baldwin
Park chose, or was able to spend, only $577.49.
In 1968 (Ed-Data, “A Primer on School Finance”) John Serrano, Jr. sued the Los
Angeles Unified School District asking the Court for
“(1) a declaration that the present financing system is unconstitutional; (2) an
order directing defendants to reallocate school funds in order to remedy this
invalidity; and (3) an adjudication that the trial court retain jurisdiction of the

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action so that it may restructure the system if defendants and the state Legislature
fail to act within a reasonable time.” (Serrano I)
The Court had to decide
“As a direct result of the financing scheme ... substantial disparities in the quality
and extent of availability of educational opportunities exist and are perpetuated
among the several school districts of the State.... [Par.] The educational
opportunities made available to children attending public schools in the Districts,
including plaintiff children, are substantially inferior to the educational
opportunities made available to children attending public schools in many other
districts of the State...." (Serrano I)
and whether this constituted a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the XIV
Amendment and under the California Constitution.
The trial court dismissed the original case. The first Serrano ruling, 5 Cal. 3d 592
(1971), was an appeal based on the trial court’s dismissal.
In Equal Protection cases the U.S. Supreme Court had adopted a standard for the
application which was:
“The United States Supreme Court has employed a two-level test for measuring
legislative classifications against the equal protection clause. "In the area of
economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation
with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions
drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable
legitimate state purpose. …
“On the other hand, in cases involving `suspect classifications' or touching on
`fundamental interests,' … the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical
analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. … Under the strict
standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only
that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions
drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.” (Serrano I)
The California Supreme Court believed that the tax base of a district was directly
related to wealth. The defendants vigorously asserted that this was not the case; and even
if it was that it was not purposeful or intentional discrimination. The Court argued that
the wealth of a district is very much “shaped and hardened by zoning ordinances and
other governmental land-use controls.” The Court’s majority saw that rich districts could
taxes at rates much lower than poor districts at the same time providing significantly
more for their children’s education.
The Court quoted Brown in recognizing the “Fundamental Interest” in education.
They also cited California cases which recognized the influence of education on future
employment prospects and, therefore, income. The California Constitution was also cited,
specifically Article IX. Sec. 1 states:

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“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral,
and agricultural improvement.”
The final question was whether the financing system was necessary to accomplish
a compelling state interest. The defendant argued that local control of education was a
compelling state interest. The plaintiff’s argument was that poor districts had no local
control because they could not choose to provide a better education than provided by the
state “foundation levels” since they could not afford to tax themselves sufficiently to
make a difference. A specific example was that of Baldwin Park provided half the
revenue of Beverley Hills while taxing themselves at two and a half times the rate.
In the end, the Court found “the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint legally
sufficient” and returned “the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.”
By remanding the case to the trial court, the California Supreme Court had given
the California Legislature the opportunity to act with regards to the concerns raised in
their decision. Yet, the fact that the case was remanded meant that the funding system
was not immediately affected. The trial court would get a chance to hear out the
arguments in more detail.
Between Serrano I and Serrano II
The Trial commenced on December 26, 1972. The trial lasted for 60 days. It was
not until April 10, 1974 that the trial court issue its “Memorandum Opinion RE Intended
Decision” and the final findings of law and of fact were not issued until August 30,1974.
The trial court’s decision was appealed.
The Courts decision in Serrano was followed by two important events which
affected this appeal. The first was the U.S. Supreme Court decision in San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez., 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The second was the passage of Senate
Bill No. 90 (S.B. 90) and Assembly Bill No. 1267 (A.B. 1267) by the California
Legislature.
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez., 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
The Rodriguez case had implications for cases through out the U.S. that had
challenged state school financing schemes based on the Equal Protection Clause. The
makeup of the Court had changed greatly since Brown. President Nixon in his first three
years in office had been able to name four Justices to the Court including a new Chief
Justice, Warren Burger. Nixon had been clear that his nominations must share his view of
“strict-construction.” The four Nixon appointees, along with the one remaining
Eisenhower appointee, Justice Potter Stewart, formed the majority in the Rodriguez
decision.

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In Rodriquez, the majority could find no “suspect class” and found that education
was not a “fundamental” right or liberty. Therefore, the standard that they applied was
only that the funding system had to have a “rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.” An important part of the argument was:
‘The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they
are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children in districts
having more assessable wealth. Apart from the unsettled and disputed
question whether the quality of education may be determined by the amount
of money [411 U.S. 1, 24] expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees'
argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.” (emphasis
added) (San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez., 411 U.S. 1 (1973) hereafter
Rodriguez)
The philosophical change by the court was clear. “It is not the province of this
Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws.” The majority also showed great concern when they
“acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity
with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues.” Yet, the court was not asked to change the
system of funding. It was asked whether, in the face of extreme differences in the ability
of some districts to raise revenue for education, while others could provide amply for
students at a very low rate of taxation, these systems of financing violated the equal
protection clause of the XIV Amendment.
The Court by applying the lesser standard found that the local control of
education was a legitimate state purpose and that the funding system had a rational
relationship to that purpose. Therefore, the case was overturned. Yet, the Court also
recognized:
“It cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the District
Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today would occasion in Texas
and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in public education. Some
commentators have concluded that, whatever the contours of the alternative
financing programs that might be devised and approved, the result could not avoid
being a beneficial one. But, just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional
issues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or certain about predicting
the consequences of massive change in the financing and control of public
education.” (Rodriguez)
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a stinging dissent. His finding very much
followed the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Serrano. He also makes some
telling observations:
“Authorities concerned with educational quality no doubt disagree as to the
significance of variations in per-pupil spending. … We sit, however, not to

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resolve disputes over educational theory but to enforce our Constitution. It is an
inescapable fact that if one district has more funds available per pupil than
another district, the [411 U.S. 1, 84] former will have greater choice in
educational planning than will the latter. In this regard, I believe the question of
discrimination in educational quality must be deemed to be an objective one
that looks to what the State provides its children, not to what the children are
able to do with what they receive. That a child forced to attend an underfunded
school with poorer physical facilities, less experienced teachers, larger classes,
and a narrower range of courses than a school with substantially more funds - and
thus with greater choice in educational planning - may nevertheless excel is to the
credit of the child, not the State….” (Rodriguez)
Rodriquez put in doubt the California Court’s prior decision as the Federal Court
had then excluded the XIV Amendment argument from consideration.
Senate Bill 90 and Assembly Bill 1267
In the mean time, the California Legislature had made some changes to the school
finance system. S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 raised the “foundation” levels to $765 for
elementary students and to $959 for high school students. There were also limitations
placed on the growth in spending of high spending districts while districts below the
foundation level could raise much more revenue. The concept was that districts would
converge their spending levels over time. Yet, districts could vote overrides of these
limits.
Serrano II
The California Supreme Court ruled again in Serrano II 18 Cal.3d 728 on
December 30,1976. Following the Rodriquez decision, the trial court had relied on the
equal protection provisions of the California Constitution rather than the XIV
Amendment. The trial courts finding were in line with Serrano I other than no longer
citing the XIV Amendment argument mentioned above.
The trial court also had to decide if A.B. 1267 and S.B. 90 had so altered the
system as to bring it to “fiscal neutrality.” The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court
that these measures were unlikely to achieve the stated goals due to the ability for
districts to vote overrides.
The trial court further went on to describe the compelling state interest “to be
chimerical from the standpoint of those districts which are less favored in terms of
taxable wealth per pupil, and we ourselves, after a thorough examination of the record,
are in wholehearted agreement with this assessment.”

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The California School finance system was, therefore, found to deny plaintiff the equal
protection of the law and, therefore, was Unconstitutional. The state was then required to
reform the system with the goal of “fiscal neutrality.” This did not mean fiscal equality.
Post Serrano II
Taxes
In 1978, California voter’s approved Proposition 13. This was the infamous
“taxpayer revolt” which rolled back property tax assessments, capped the property tax
rate, and limited the rate of increase. The effect on California Schools was dramatic, as a
primary source of funding was reduced in half and had to be made up from General Fund
Revenues of the state. Some authors argue that Serrano caused Proposition 13 because of
the decoupling of the connection between property taxes and local schools. (Fischel, npn)
Professor Fischel of Dartmouth College argues that “district power equalization
eliminates much of the fiscal incentive that any local district has to improve educational
quality.” The argument is that better schools increase property values even for
homeowners without children. If schools are equalized then voters are less likely to
support higher taxes for schools because they will likely not receive the full benefit of
any increase. Poor district might see a decrease in state aid and rich districts will have
more money redirected.
Spending on Education in California has declined relative to the rest of the nation
since Serrano. California was ranked 11th
in statewide spending per student in 1970 and,
by 1990, California had fallen to 30th
.
Fabio Silva and Jon Sonstelie use a statistical analysis to argue that Serrano is
culpable for only part of the decline in state spending for Education. California had seen a
growing student population during the period of study. Silva and Sonstelie argue that
growth in student population will tend to decrease spending per student in the short run as
class sizes increase, and there is normally a lag between the authority to build new
facilities, the availability of those facilities, and finally, the hiring of teachers for those
new classrooms. Their model asserts that $1,066 per student was due to growth in the
number of students while $1,354 was due to equalization. (Silva and Sonstelie)
Private Schools
Eric Brunner of San Diego State University and Jon Sonstelie of U.C. Santa
Barbara, show that California has seen a growth in Private School enrollment as a result
of Serrano. For the period from 1972 to 1992, California has had a higher percentage of
students enrolled in private schools than the national average. They quote a study by
Downes and Schoeman (1993) which attributes 75% of the growth to Serrano. (Brunner
et al., p.10)

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Equalization
Under the “Serrano Ban” certain types of funding are limited and the variation
between funding must be kept within court mandated limit. California has been very
successful in equalizing funding. In 1972, California was ranked 45th
and had moved to
the 5th
most equalized state by 1987. By 1992, Categorical aid to address differences in
needs and costs had moved California to 27th
place. (Brunner, et al., p.7) They argue that
California remains one of the most equalized states when considering non-categorical
funding.
Other methods of funding
Prior to 1971, there were 6 educational foundations in the state. By 1978, there
were 22 educational foundations, and, by 1995 there were over 500. (Brunner, et al.,
p.14) These foundations are able to funnel money into schools and by-pass the Serrano
ban revenue limits. These foundations can include booster clubs, parent-teacher
organizations, and the PTA. (ibid, p.15) In their study, Brunner and Sonstelie could not
identify all the organizations, as only those with revenue in excess of $25,000 are
required to report to the IRS. Yet, of those foundations that could be identified to a
particular school or district, those, which support the most “constrained” districts, “were
the most successful in raising private contribution.” (ibid, p.17) Those districts, which
had a negative revenue growth due to equalization, had an average infusion of $148 per
student, while districts, which showed a 0 to 20% growth, only averaged $59 per student.
(ibid.) It is even more striking when looking at Average Family Income for a district.
Those districts with an AFI of $70,000 and above, received on average $244 per student
with 79% of those district having Non-profits reporting revenues. Those with an AFI of
$30,000 to $49,999 received only $25 per student and only 25% of the districts had non-
profits reporting revenue. (ibid, p.20) It is clear parents want the best education possible
and will use whatever means they can to insure it. Those with the most meager means
simply cannot support their schools in the same way.
Conclusions
By 1997, all but 6 states had filed some sort of challenge to their school financing
systems. 15 states had their systems declared unconstitutional by their state supreme
courts, including California. Many states have taken decades to enact reform. The New
Jersey court first handed down a decision (Robinson v. Cahill) in 1973, but the more
recent case of Abbot v. Burke was decided in 1985, 1990, and 1994. (Hickrod, et al.)
In California, after Serrano the state has changed greatly. Serrano combined with
Proposition 13 have changed the basic way in which schools have been funded.
California has seen its position as a leader in educational spending fall, as well as a
decline in relative spending.
Yet, there are some winners. In comparing Baldwin Park and Beverly Hills, the
ethnic difference is still pronounced. Dropout rates still favor Beverly Hills as do SAT-I

Page 11 of 14
scores and AP Test results. (Educational Demographics Unit, various) Yet Beverly Hills
was spending well over twice as much per student in 1969 as Baldwin Park and is now
only spending just over one-third more. (Educational Data Partnership, District Finance
Statement) It is clear that Baldwin Park has been able to offer a variety of Advanced
Placement Courses.
There is still so much more to equalization. Beverly Hills has teachers who are on
average more experienced than the L.A. Unified Average, and are more likely to be fully
credentialed. Baldwin Park students are offered a rich array of AP classes yet less than
half of the test takers pass the exam while over 85% pass in Beverly Hills. (Educational
Demographics Unit, various)
Serrano was the first case to succeed in forcing a change in school finance. The
California Supreme Court has unequivocally declared education to be a fundamental
constitutional right. By 1997, 15 other states had followed California in successfully
challenging existing financing systems. 21 other states had either failed or no case had
been brought forward, while 14 had not yet been decided. (Hickrod, et al.) The Federal
Court is unlikely to change its position with regards to the position of education as a
fundamental constitution right, until the make up of the court is altered.
Clearly equalization has many pitfalls. However, Equalization did achieve one
goal which was to provide a more equal financial playing field for school districts to offer
similar opportunities to students across the state. There is a great deal to be done before
we can provide equal opportunity for all students. The California Court has recognized
the essential place education holds for the future of our democracy. Let us hope that we
continue to try and improve the educational equity for all of our students.

Page 12 of 14
Works Cited
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Brunner, Eric, and Sonstelie, Jon. “Coping with Serrano: Voluntary Contributions to
California’s Local Public Schools.” Proceedings of the 89th
Annual Conference on
Taxation. National Tax Association, 1997. 21 Aug 2002. <http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/ebrunner/research/Coping.PDF>
Educational Data Partnership. California Department of Education. “A Primer on School
Finance” 21 Aug. 2002. <http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/Finance/chronology.asp>
“District Financial Statement: Baldwin Park Unified: Fiscal Year 2000-01” 3
Sept. 2002. <http://www.ed-
data.k12.ca.us/Navigation/fsTwoPanel.asp?bottom=%2Fprofile%2Easp%3Flevel%3D06
%26reportNumber%3D16>
“District Financial Statement: Beverly Hills Unified: Fiscal Year 2000-01” 3
Sept. 2002. <http://www.ed-
data.k12.ca.us/Navigation/fsTwoPanel.asp?bottom=%2Fprofile%2Easp%3Flevel%3D06
%26reportNumber%3D16>
Educational Demographics Unit, California Department of Education. “Advance
Placement Test Results: Baldwin Park Unified, 2000-01” 3 Sept. 2002. <
http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/AP-3a.asp?cYear=2000-01&cSelect=1964287 --
BALDWIN^PARK^UNIFIED&cChoice=AP3>
“Advance Placement Test Results: Beverly Hills Unified, 2000-01” 3 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/AP-3a.asp?cYear=2000-01&cSelect=1964311 --
BEVERLY^HILLS^UNIFIED&cChoice=AP3>
“Classroom Teacher Credential and Experience Report by District by School for
the year 2001-02: 1964287 – Baldwin Park Unified.” 3 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/NumTchDst.asp?cSelect=1964287%A0--
%A0BALDWIN+PARK+UNIFIED&Radio2=T&cChoice=DstTchExp2&cYear=2001-
02&cLevel=District&submit1=Submit>
“Classroom Teacher Credential and Experience Report by District by School for
the year 2001-02: 1964311 – Beverly Hills Unified.” 3 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/NumTchDst.asp?cSelect=1964311%A0--
%A0BEVERLY+HILLS+UNIFIED&Radio2=T&cChoice=DstTchExp2&cYear=2001-
“Course Enrollment by District for the year 2000-01: 1964287 – Baldwin Park
Unified.” 24 Sept. 2002.

Page 13 of 14
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/crselist3.asp?cSelect=1964287%A0--
%A0BALDWIN+PARK+UNIFIED&AP=on&cYear=2001-
“Course Enrollment by District for the year 2000-01: 1964311 – Beverly Hills
Unified.” 24 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/crselist3.asp?cSelect=1964311%A0--
%A0BEVERLY+HILLS+UNIFIED&AP=on&cYear=2001-
“1 Year Dropout Rate (Grades 9-12) in California Public Schools-Baldwin Park
Unified”. 3 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/ASPGraph3.asp?Level=District&cName=BALDWIN
^PARK^UNIFIED&cCode=1964287>
“1 Year Dropout Rate (Grades 9-12) in California Public Schools-Beverly Hills
Unified”. 3 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/ASPGraph3.asp?Level=District&cName=BEVERLY^
HILLS^UNIFIED&cCode=1964311>
“SAT-I Report: Baldwin Park Unified, 2000-01” 3 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/SAT-I3.asp?cSelect=1964287%A0--
%A0BALDWIN+PARK+UNIFIED&cChoice=SAT3&cYear=2000-
“SAT-I Report: Beverly Hills Unified, 2000-01” 3 Sept. 2002.
<http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/SAT-I3.asp?cSelect=1964311%A0--
%A0BEVERLY+HILLS+UNIFIED&cChoice=SAT3&cYear=2000-
Fischel, William A. “How Judges Are Making Public Schools Worse.” City Journal,
Volume 8, Summer 1998, Pages 30-42 11 Sept. 2002.
<http://www.act60.org/fischel2.htm>
Hickrod, G. Alan, McNeal, Larry, Lenz, Robert, Minorini, Paul, and Grady, Linda.
“Status of School Finance Constitutional Litigation: The Boxscore” April 1997. College
of Education, Illinois State University, Normal, IL. 21 Aug. 2002.
<http://www.coe.ilstu.edu/boxscore.htm>
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584. (1971) (Serrano I)
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728 (1976) (Serrano II)

Page 14 of 14
Silva, Fabio, and Sonstelie, Jon. “Did Serrano cause a decline in school spending?”
National Tax Journal Vo. 48 June 1995. Wilson Select Plus. Chapman University
Library. 21 Aug. 2002. <http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org>
Supreme Court of the United States, “Members of the Supreme Court of the United
States.” 30 Aug. 2002. <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf>
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)

Serrano V. Priest and Educational Equalization in California

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