CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in an Emirati-backed Yemeni operation to secure populated areas and oil pipelines in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. The operation aims to degrade the ability of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to coordinate external attacks from safe havens in Yemen. AQAP militants withdrew from Shabwah to strongholds in neighboring Abyan governorate in response. The operation is unlikely to affect AQAP’s capabilities in the long term.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) forces in Libya mobilizing outside of Sirte city, the group’s former stronghold on the Mediterranean coast. ISIS retains the capability to recruit and train fighters despite losses inflicted by the U.S.-backed campaign to retake Sirte and subsequent airstrikes.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ransoms hostages to fund its broader efforts to destabilize and replace West African states, as well as expel Western influence from the region. AQIM received at least $4.2 million in exchange for the release of Swedish and South Africa hostages in the past two months. AQIM will likely plan or support additional attacks on sites frequented by Western expatriates, continuing a campaign resumed by an AQIM affiliate in Mali in June.
2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
3
2
1
1) U.S. forces supported an Emirati-backed operation to degrade al Qaeda’s
support zone in southern Yemen.
2) The U.S. struck ISIS targets in central Libya, temporarily disrupting the
reconstitution of ISIS’s fighting force.
3) AQIM’s ransoming of two hostages will fund its campaigns to destabilize
West African governments and drive Western influence out of the region.
3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda increased its rhetorical support for al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Al
Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri eulogized two militant leaders killed by Pakistani security
forces in 2014 in an audio recording released on August 2. Zawahiri lauded AQIS’s efforts
against Pakistani security forces and encouraged further action.
Outlook: Al Qaeda leadership will release periodic statements to support AQIS as it
competes with other militant groups in Pakistan.
Tehrik-e-Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
The party of ousted Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is consolidating power ahead of
the 2018 elections. Party leaders intend to keep Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s brother, in
his position as Chief Minister of Punjab Province, a critical electoral region. Interim Prime
Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi appointed strong allies of Nawaz Sharif to his cabinet.
Separately, Pakistani security forces increased pressure on militant groups in Karachi in
response to attacks on police.
Outlook: Sharif’s party will maintain its dominance during the 2018 general elections.
Militant groups in Karachi will move to conduct attacks currently in the planning stage.
4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN intensified efforts to reach a deal with the al Houthi-Saleh faction in order to transfer
al Hudaydah port in western Yemen to a neutral administrative body. Al Houthi-Saleh
representatives met with UN, Omani, and EU officials to discuss the plan.
Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh faction will reject current UN ceasefire proposals.
Security
Yemeni security forces backed by American and Emirati Special Operations Forces secured
cities and energy facilities in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. AQAP militants
withdrew from Shabwah into neighboring Abyan governorate in response.
Outlook: U.S. support for Yemeni forces will temporarily disrupt AQAP’s local operations.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS militants sustained their military support for local tribes against al Houthi-
Saleh forces in northwestern al Bayda governorate, central Yemen. AQAP and ISIS militants
broke an al Houthi-Saleh siege on tribal areas in late July.
Outlook: Popular support for AQAP and possibly ISIS will increase in al Bayda.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 02 AUG: AQAP
militants attacked
Emirati-backed
forces in Shabwah.
2) 03 AUG: A
reported U.S.
airstrike targeted
AQAP in Ma’rib.
3) 03-04 AUG: U.S.-
and Emirati-backed
forces secured key
sites in Shabwah.
4) 07 AUG: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
claimed to fire a
ballistic missile into
Saudi Arabia.
5) 08 AUG: AQAP
conducted a
complex attack on
a Yemeni army
base in Abyan.
3
5
4
1
2
6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Millions of Kenyans peacefully voted in general elections, despite fears of civil and ethnic
unrest and attacks on polling stations. The election results will determine the future of
Kenya’s intervention against al Shabaab in Somalia.
Outlook: Kenyans will refrain from rioting, despite potential reports of fraudulent polling.
Security
The premature withdrawal of AMISOM forces creates opportunities for al Shabaab to
expand. Al Shabaab severed a ground line of communication linking Mogadishu to Baidoa
after Ugandan AMISOM forces withdrew. Ethiopian forces will deploy to recapture the area.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will withdraw temporarily when Ethiopian forces arrive.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab ambushed motorists and attacked telecommunications infrastructure in eastern
Kenya in an effort to reduce voter turnout. Al Shabaab also undermined security operations
in Mogadishu by detonating SVBIEDs along highways patrolled by security forces.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue attacks on Kenya after the election.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
1
32
5
1) 03 AUG: Al
Shabaab attacked
police in Lafey,
Mandera County.
2) 04 AUG: Al
Shabaab captured
Lego town, Bay
region after
AMISOM withdrew.
3) 04 AUG: Al
Shabaab killed a
regional governor
in Mogadishu.
4) 06 AUG: Al
Shabaab attacked
communications
infrastructure in
Lamu County.
5) 07 AUG: Al
Shabaab hijacked
three vehicles in
Mandera County.
8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is rallying popular support by
opposing an Italian anti-migration mission in Libyan waters. Saif al Islam Qaddafi, the son of
deceased Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi, criticized the mission as neo-colonialist.
Outlook: Haftar and returning regime figures will present themselves as guardians against
foreign intervention to challenge the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA).
Security
The proxy war within Libya threatens economic recovery. Gunmen disrupted production from
Libya’s largest oil field in an effort to secure the release of relatives detained in Saudi Arabia.
Outlook: Militias will defend their interests by blockading oil infrastructure and occupying
state buildings as long as they lack representation in a political process.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
An ISIS fighting force threatened positions held by GNA-allied militias near Sirte city, ISIS’s
former stronghold. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS positions in response.
Outlook: U.S. strikes will delay but not prevent ISIS’s reconstitution.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA
9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
2
3
1
1) 27 JUL: Likely U.S.
airstrikes struck
ISIS militants near
Jufra road, south of
Sirte city.
2) 31 JUL: LNA
forces advanced
toward a
checkpoint in
eastern Sirte city.
3) 03 AUG: LNA
Saiqa Special
Forces advanced
outside of Derna
city.
4) 08 AUG: An Italian
naval ship arrived
in Tripoli.
4
10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
ISIS in Tunisia resumed media production after two months of inactivity in order to deter
threats to its safe haven in western Tunisia. The group claimed responsibility for an IED blast
targeting security forces and released a video of the June 2 beheading of an informant.
Outlook: ISIS will attack security forces at the periphery of its safe haven but will not expand
in the near term.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (JNIM, Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
AQIM is using hostages as a primary source of funding. The group received at least $4.2
million in two months for the release of Swedish and South African hostages.
Rival Boko Haram factions are competing for dominance in the Lake Chad region. The ISIS-
linked faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi released a video condemning rival leader
Abubakr Shekau for killing civilians. Shekau’s faction attacked towns in an area occupied by
Barnawi’s faction.
Outlook: AQIM will fund attacks on both security forces and Western targets in the Sahel.
Rival Boko Haram factions may clash near Lake Chad.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 01 AUG: AQIM
claimed an IED
attack on security
forces in Chlaalaa,
Batna Province.
2) 01 AUG: Two
hundred African
migrants stormed
the border fence in
Ceuta.
3) 05 AUG: AQIM
militants raided a
house in Jebel
Ouergha, Kef
Governorate.
4) 06 AUG: Tunisian
fisherman stopped
a European anti-
migrant ship from
docking in Zarzis.
2
3
1
4
12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
2
1
1) 04 AUG: Likely
Macina Liberation
Front militants
stormed Oudeïna
village, Mali.
2) 05 AUG: A likely
Boko Haram-
Shekau suicide
bomber detonated
a SVEST in Ouro-
Kessoum,
Cameroon.
3) 05 AUG: Likely
Boko Haram-
Shekau militants
raided several
towns in the Lake
Chad basin.
4) 06 AUG: Gunmen
attacked a church
in Onitsha, Nigeria.
3
4
13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Maher Farrukh
al Qaeda analyst
maher.farrukh@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
Marie Donovan
senior Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569