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Memory forensics and incident response

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Memory forensics and incident response

  1. 1. Memory Forensics and Incident Response Robert Reed
  2. 2. Frequently when we think of CyberCrime external intrusions immediately comes to mind, but we should remember that “insiders” represent a significant threat to organizations. Between 46 and 58 percent of the incidents resulting in the largest losses to organizations were “inside jobs.” This is particularly troubling because in these incidents the likely hood of identification of offenders and potential recovery of assets should be easier. Intrusions Insiders Outsiders Global Economic Crime Survey 2011, PriceWaterhouse Cooper.
  3. 3. 42% 40% 39% 12% 8% 6% 5% 4% 11% 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Damage level insufficient Could not identify the individual Lack of evidence negative publicity Concerns about liability competitors use for advantage Prior negative response law… Unaware crime was reportable Other Don't know Reason not Prosecuted Damage level insufficient Could not identify the individual Lack of evidence negative publicity Concerns about liability competitors use for advantage Prior negative response law enforcement Unaware crime was reportable Other In “insider” incidents, 40 percent of the time those responsible are never identified, or insufficient evidence was obtained for prosecution. This is particularly troubling because in these incidents the likely hood of identification of offenders and potential recovery of assets should be easier 2011 CyberSecuirtyWatch Survey, CSO Magazine, U.S. Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Deloitte, January 2011.
  4. 4. Why are so many incidents not producing sufficient information for prosecutions? To some degree this makes sense when we dig deeper into the numbers, 61 percent businesses suffering from CyberCrime indicated that “they don’t have, or are not aware of having, access to forensic technology investigators.” 61 60 46 0 20 40 60 80 Not Aware of access to forensic investigators No in-house forensics No forensic IR proceedures Business Forensic capabilities Forensic Capabilities Global Economic Crime Survey 2011, PriceWaterhouse Cooper
  5. 5. Objectives of incident response: • Collect as much evidence as possible • Minimize or eliminate changes made to evidentiary information • Maintain the integrity of the investigation • Minimize the disruption to business processes • Obtain a successful outcome
  6. 6. Striking a balance • Do we need to do a forensic examination? – Is there a statutory requirement to report? – Is there potential liability for not investigating? – Is there a broader objective in the investigation? – Is it fiscally responsible?
  7. 7. Typical Incident life cycle • Identify incident • Establish approach • Collect evidence • Analyze evidence • Document and report • Assess and follow-up
  8. 8. Traditional Computer Forensic Response • Secure location • Document the scene • Pull the plug • Collect evidence • Image the media • Analysis • Reporting
  9. 9. Pro’s of the Approach • Acceptable for most of the cases LE is presented with • Easy to validate the information for court purposes • Easy to establish and validate SOP’s
  10. 10. Con’s to Traditional Approach • Increasing drive capacities • Increased security awareness – Encryption – Passwords – “Personal Privacy” Software • Business Continuity • Misses /Destroys vital information in RAM
  11. 11. Better Approach • Secure location • Photograph and document scene • Collect volatile data • Isolate from network?? • Bring the machine down or live image?? • Bit stream image • Analysis • Reporting
  12. 12. Order of volatility 1. CPU cache and Register 2. ARP cache, Routing and Process tables 3. RAM 4. Temp file systems, Swap and page files 5. Fixed and removable media attached 6. Remotely logged data 7. Archives
  13. 13. Collection of volatile data Tool/s Utilities OSHardware Results
  14. 14. Concerns • Reliability of local tools • Root kits • Integrity of evidence – Authenticity – Integrity • Chains of custody • Security
  15. 15. Collection of Volatile data • cmd • tasklist • netstat • arp • Route • Net commands • etc * The problem with using native commands is that we can not trust their results*
  16. 16. Collection of volatile data Tool/s Utilities OSHardware Results
  17. 17. Collection of volatile data Tool/s Utilities OSHardware Results Kernel Space UserSpace
  18. 18. External tools • cmd ?? *are you bringing your own command console?* • Sysinternals: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/default • Nirsoft: http://www.nirsoft.net/ • Foundstone: http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/index.aspx • WFT: http://www.foolmoon.net/security/wft/ • Tons of others out there
  19. 19. Collection of volatile data Tool/s Utilities OSHardware Results Kernel Space UserSpace API
  20. 20. Collection of volatile data Tool/s Utilities OSHardware Results Kernel Space UserSpace
  21. 21. RAM / Image Analysis tool OS utilities OSHardware Results ? Kernel Space UserSpace Tool
  22. 22. Imaging and Analysis Tools • Win32/64 dd • Dumpit • Man dd • FTK Imager • Belkasoft • Volatility • Memoryze • Redline • HBGary Responder • Encase • Etc….
  23. 23. Imaging and Analysis Tools • Challenges – Varied Implementations – Anti-Forensics programs and techniques
  24. 24. Direct Memory Access tool OS utilities OSHardware Results ? Kernel Space UserSpace Tool
  25. 25. http://www.breaknenter.org/projects/inception/ “Inception is a FireWire physical memory manipulation and hacking tool exploiting IEEE 1394 SBP-2 DMA. The tool can unlock (any password accepted) and escalate privileges to Administrator/root on almost* any powered on machine you have physical access to. The tool can attack over FireWire, Thunderbolt, ExpressCard, PC Card and any other PCI/PCIe interfaces.”
  26. 26. “Goldfish was a project by Afrah Almansoori, Pavel Gladyshev, and Joshua James aimed at the extraction of user password and fragments of AIM instant messenger conversations directly from RAM of Apple Mac computers. Goldfish software can be used against 32 bit versions of Mac OS X up to and including Mac OS X (10.5) Leopard.” http://digitalfire.ucd.ie/?page_id=430
  27. 27. Direct Memory Access • Advantages – Bypass passwords to gain access – Recover passwords (keyboard buffers) – Evade current anti-forensics techniques
  28. 28. Direct Memory Access • Challenges – Hardware dependent! – Physical access! – Disabled drivers? – 4GB of accessible space! 0>ffffffff
  29. 29. Direct Memory Access • Mitigation – Windows • Block SBP-2 drivers: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2516445 • Remove FireWire and thunderbolt drivers
  30. 30. Direct Memory Access • Mitigation – Macs • Filevault2 (OS X Lion) and screen locked • Firmware password
  31. 31. Direct Memory Access • Mitigation – Linux • Disable DMA • Remove FireWire drivers
  32. 32. Questions ??

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