Civil-military working paper by Adam C Smith.

1. C i v i l - M i l i ta r y
w o r k i n g pa p e r s
2 0 11
Understanding What We’re saying:
dilemmas of the Un’s PeacebUilding Paradigm
adam C. smith
w w w.c i v m i l co e . gov. au

2. Disclaimer:
the views expressed in this Civil-Military Commentary/Civil Military Working Paper/
Civil-Military Occasional Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the position of aPCMCOE or of any government agency. authors enjoy the academic
freedom to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of
furthering debate on key issues.
the content is published under a Creative Commons by attribution 3.0 australia
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/) licence. all parts of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems, and transmitted by any means without
the written permission of the publisher.
iSBN: 978-1-921933-11-0
Published 2011.
Civil-Millitary working papers ii

3. abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has steadily increased the ambition and scope of its peace
and security activities in conflict-affected countries. Over that time, peacekeeping evolved in
concept and practice from what was called traditional peacekeeping to what is now described as
multi-dimensional peace operations. One could argue that the UN was engaged in non-traditional
peacekeeping in the Congo back in 1960 (ONUC). However, ONUC was an aberration for the
UN during the cold war period, and neither its aspirations nor operational requirements were
comparable to, say, the UN’s current multi-dimensional operation in the DrC. During that same
period, the concept of peacebuilding emerged and eventually came to provide a conceptual
framework for this ambitious work. Peacekeeping, and particularly peacebuilding, however, still
suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity among observers, scholars, and even practitioners. the
common assumption that post-conflict interventions proceed sequentially from mediation to
peacekeeping and then to peacebuilding are indicative of this confusion.
key words: UN, multi-dimensional operations, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conceptual confusion
adam smith
adam Smith is a research Fellow heading the peace operations program the international Peace
institute (iPi). His work focuses on multidimensional peacekeeping, the management of UN
field operations, peacekeeping partnerships, and the role of the Special representative of the
Secretary-General (SrSG). Before joining iPi, adam consulted for the Macarthur Foundation’s
Program on Global Security and Sustainability, the Foreign Policy leadership Council and
Security Council report. He holds a BS in Foreign Service from the School of Foreign Service at
Georgetown University and an Mia with a concentration in international Security Policy from
Columbia University. His recent publications include: adam Smith and vanessa Wyeth, “Security
Council istanbul retreat: at the Crossroads of Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding,”
(New york: international Peace institute, October 2010); Cathy Clement and adam C. Smith,
“Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in UN Peace Operations,” (New
york: international Peace institute, June 2009); and international Peace institute, “Peace
Operations,” iPi Blue Paper No. 9, task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity,
New york, 2009.
Understanding What We’re Saying: Dilemmas of the UN’s Peacebuilding Paradigm 1

4. introdUction
the most recent output by the UN Secretariat on the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding
describes peacekeeping, in its contemporary, multi-dimensional form, as an instrument applied in support
of a larger peacebuilding process. through the paradigm envisioned by the Secretariat, peacebuilding can
arguably be understood as the organising principle that guides UN intervention – at all stages of the conflict
cycle – in countries in crisis. the UN’s shift towards this peacebuilding paradigm, however, has operational and
institutional implications for how the UN mandates, organizes and implements its peace and security efforts
in the field. Some of these implications remain unacknowledged by the international community. as a result,
the architecture supporting the UN’s peace and security activities stays wedded to an outdated Cold War-era
peacekeeping logic.
the first section of this paper underlines the importance of conceptual and linguistic clarity to forge resilient
agreements and develop effective strategy. Section two describes the evolution of the concept of peacebuilding
in the UN and how peacebuilding relates to peacekeeping. the final section outlines some important but under-
acknowledged implications of (and contradictions in) the UN’s present understanding of peacebuilding.
concePtUal clarity is imPortant
Certain definitions can be notoriously difficult to agree on; peacebuilding is one of them. a concept that is
relatively new or one that changes over time and place as the understanding of it evolves can pose an even
greater challenge. So we should not be surprised that peacebuilding, a relatively young concept, and one that
is evolving, still creates confusion. is peacebuilding a tool at the disposal of the UN Security Council or the
Peacebuilding Commission – something the UN does? Or do others, such as local institutions, do it? is it a stage
in the conflict cycle during which a certain type of intervention is warranted? if so, is that stage before a conflict,
during a conflict or after a conflict? How does peacebuilding differ from state-building or nation-building?
Peacekeeping, of course, can be similarly confounding. When we say ‘peacekeeping,’ do we mean traditional
peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, peace support operations, peace enforcement, counter-
insurgency, or all of the above? Despite their obvious differences in mandate, resources, scope, methods, and
goals, iSaF in afghanistan, UNPrOFOr in the former yugoslavia, UNFiCyP in Cyprus, and MONUC in the
Democratic republic of Congo were all called peacekeeping operations.
Civil-Millitary working papers 2

5. Clarity, however, is crucial. Confusion over language and meaning continue to complicate discussions
over important subjects inside the UN (e.g. terrorism, the responsibility to Protect (r2P), and robust
peacekeeping). Often, disagreements in the General assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping or
the Security Council are papered over with imprecise language, rather than faced head on. lack of clarity or
agreement on language can set off a chain of events that makes the enormous challenge of helping to build a
just and sustainable peace even more difficult.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has often managed to come to agreement on a resolution
by one of two methods: a) using ambiguous or vague language, or b) including everyone’s wishes into one
lengthy mandate – the so-called ‘Christmas tree’ resolution. the latter method has been most common of
late; from 2002 to 2009 the average word count in Security Council resolutions rose from 586 to 1,675.1
Similarly, it is often pointed out that resolutions renewing the mandate for MONUC and now MONUSCO
include more than 40 mandated tasks for the resourced-stretched and politically-compromised UN mission.
Overly descriptive mandates and their flip side, ambiguous mandates (seen throughout the 1990s), reduce the
likelihood of clear and strategic direction given to the Secretariat. Poorly-crafted mandates of course create
their own challenges for the SrSG, the Force Commander, and the rank-and-file in the field. this says nothing
about outside observers, the media, and host populations, who rarely understand what the United Nations is
doing, wants to do, or is able to do in post-conflict settings.2
the UN Secretariat has made repeated efforts to explain peacebuilding. However, each document it has
produced on the subject since its first mention in Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s “agenda for Peace” of
1992 paints a slightly different picture of an evolving concept.3 the latest effort, and perhaps the most explicit
in its goal of clarity, was a four-page non-paper circulated to all UN Member States in October 2010, entitled
“Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus.”4 in it, the Secretariat rightly notes that “different
constituencies continue to use the term ‘peacebuilding’ in ways that may diverge from each other and from the
concept as articulated in reports of the Secretary-General.” this divergence results partly from the concept
having evolved over the last two decades, but also from unresolved differences among actors and institutions
regarding the exact nature of peacebuilding and the roles of peacebuilders. 5
Understanding What We’re Saying: Dilemmas of the UN’s Peacebuilding Paradigm 3

6. What is the difference?
When coined in 1992, ‘post-conflict peace-building’ was defined by the UN as “action to identify and support
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”6 Since
then, three significant modifications have been made to that definition: a) the temporal scope of peacebuilding
has broadened to encompass all stages of the conflict cycle (thus peacebuilding can also be conflict
prevention); b) an emphasis has been put on national ownership of and responsibility for the peacebuilding
process; and c) the goal has become a peace that is described as self-sustaining.
One can deduce the UN’s conception of self-sustaining peace from the description of peacebuilding priorities
in the September 2010 DPKO non-paper.7 the document explains that peacebuilding priorities typically
include supporting “(i) basic safety and security including protection of civilians and rule of law, (ii) inclusive
political processes, (iii) delivery of basic services, (iv) restoring (sic) core government functions, and (v)
economic revitalisation.” although the UN’s actual priorities are said to differ from place to place, in reality,
the UN often tries to address all of these areas when it has an integrated peacekeeping mission on the ground.
as such, this paradigm becomes rather comprehensive and ambitious in its scope. this may be unsurprising,
given the inherent tendency of a bureaucracy to expand its mission over time; the UN is certainly no stranger
to this phenomenon. However, and importantly, it is also an acknowledgement of the intrinsic complexity and
enormous difficulty of preventing conflict (or its resurgence): because we don’t know what exact combination
of factors prevents a return to violence in a given context, we tend to work on all of them. the broader the
scope of potential action is, however, the more difficult it becomes to set priorities, adjust methods to local
context, and determine achievable objectives. 8
if peacebuilding is a process, led by national actors and supported by the United Nations, with the goal
of creating the conditions for a self-sustaining peace, what then is peacekeeping? in the new peacebuilding
paradigm at least, peacekeeping is an instrument that aids in this process of peacebuilding. Given the broad
definition of peacebuilding adopted by the UN Secretariat, literally no task of today’s peacekeepers falls
outside of peacebuilding’s scope. Unlike the days of traditional peacekeeping, peacekeepers are now ‘early
peacebuilders’ that ‘enable,’ ‘articulate,’ or ‘implement’ peacebuilding activities. the 2010 ‘Nexus’ non-paper
describes in detail the role peacekeepers play to support each peacebuilding priority.
Civil-Millitary working papers 4

7. imPlications and dilemmas of the
PeacebUilding Paradigm
the landmark shift away from traditional peacekeeping and toward multidimensional peacekeeping operations
with a focus on peacebuilding began in the early 1990s. the shift reflected both a growing appreciation of the
complex, underlying causes of conflict, as well as an acknowledgement of the high rate of recidivism among
conflict-affected states. However, the embrace of the peacebuilding paradigm continues to expose a number
of conceptual and operational dilemmas for the international community as it struggles to build lasting peace
under difficult circumstances around the globe. Despite many years of evolving peacebuilding practice in
peacekeeping operations, many of these dilemmas still go unacknowledged.
the first dilemma related to the use of peacekeepers as peacebuilders is whether the goals and methods of
peacebuilding and the goals and methods of peacekeeping are even compatible. Peacekeeping was invented
as a tool for ensuring a so-called ‘negative peace’ (absence of war) among parties to a conflict, which requires
stabilisation and ensuring the status quo. (Presumably, although they are now called ‘early peacebuilders,’
a goal of peacekeepers is still to provide safety and stability.) Peacebuilding seeks to create the conditions
for a ‘positive peace’ in a society at large by addressing and transforming underlying circumstances that led
(or may again lead) to conflict. Unfortunately, progress toward stabilization (peacekeeping) can jeopardise
transformative (peacebuilding) goals. at the same time, any transformation of underlying structures or
circumstances also runs the risk of helping de-stabilize. this is partly why peacekeepers in lebanon, for
example, are not given peacebuilding tasks.9
tension can occur between the various objectives of a UN peace operation for a number of reasons, often
because the UN is mandated to do more than it can actually do. as discussed above, the UN Security Council
has had the tendency in recent years to create long, overly-descriptive mandates. Such mandates can include
goals that are seemingly contradictory, and can lead to incoherent strategies implemented in the field. this is
perhaps best-known in the case of the DrC, where a UN mandate to protect civilians is contradicted by its
other mandate to work closely with and support the DrC government (and its armed forces, who are often
the perpetrators of violence against civilians). it is not difficult to see how each of these two goals of the UN in
the DrC could compromise the other. it also begs the question of whether there needs to be a ‘peacebuilding
space,’ similar to the concept of ‘humanitarian space.’
Second, the increasing use of such a broad peacebuilding paradigm must have implications for how the UN
understands its role in the world, and consequently, how it organizes its peace and security related intervention
efforts. although many UN member states would never admit to it as such, peacebuilding is now the organising
principle of UN peace and security intervention. the purpose of the UN as framed by its Charter has not
changed (to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war), but the post-WWii mindset that penned
those words has, of course, been altered. traditional peacekeeping was, during the Cold War, in part justified as
a tool to stabilise conflict among proxy armies of the two major world powers. today, however, few observers
could claim that the goal of the UN Security Council’s interventions in post-conflict countries is the prevention of
World War iii. rather, as can be concluded from the most recent Secretariat non-paper, much of the agenda of
the Security Council now revolves around, and is guided by, this concept of peacebuilding.
Understanding What We’re Saying: Dilemmas of the UN’s Peacebuilding Paradigm 5

8. Furthermore, given the broad definition of peacebuilding that has emerged, the UN Secretariat’s various
departments now do peacebuilding. if peacebuilding is indeed prevention and is indeed political, the work
of the Department of Political affairs is peacebuilding; likewise for DPKO and DFS, whose peacekeepers
are described as early peacebuilders. Given both the UN Security Council and the Secretariat’s orientation
toward peacebuilding, peacebuilding is therefore not only a process of building peace in conflict-affected
countries, but can also be seen as a de facto organising principle of UN peace and security intervention efforts.
the dilemma here, of course, is that in practice, the UN’s mechanisms, procedures and organisation are not
consistent with the UN’s definition of peacebuilding, but rather are relics of the peacekeeping logic of the
past. a small, but obvious example is that its new peacebuilding logic does not extend to how it labels its
peace operations. During ongoing conflict (e.g. UNaMiD) or immediately after the cessation of a conflict
(e.g. UNMiS), the UN names its missions ‘peacekeeping.’ Directly following the end of a peacekeeping
mandate, the UN will typically call an operation a ‘peacebuilding mission’ (e.g. UNiOSil).10 Such terminology
hints at – and likely fuels confusion over – the nature and relation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. it
would perhaps be more appropriate to use terms like ‘preventive peacebuilding missions,’ ‘early post-conflict
peacebuilding missions’ and ’long-horizon peacebuilding missions.’
a much more critical example of this organisational confusion and the dilemma it creates relates to the fact
that to be effective, peacebuilding support requires integrated action. Out in the field, much progress has
been made toward the goal of integration, primarily through the adoption of the integrated mission structure,
including the multi-hatting of the Deputy Special representative of the Secretary General. yet while the UN
is integrating its field presence, it is seemingly uninterested in a similarly integrated headquarters structure.
although processes for coordination have been initiated in New york (e.g. the integrated Mission Planning
Process and the integrated Operational teams, etc.), an incoherent and outdated headquarters structure
continues to preserve stovepipes in all departments, funds, agencies, and programmes of the United Nations.11
this lack of integration is felt acutely out in the field as different funding mechanisms, personnel policies,
and lines of accountability prevent swift and integrated action where and when it is needed. the persistent
challenge of implementing effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDr) programs – in
which different parts of the UN have to work together in a synchronized and highly coordinated manner – is
evidence of this phenomenon. reliable and flexible funding of peacebuilding activities is consistently cited as
another victim of UN bureaucratic dysfunction. it is the hope; at least, that the creation and increasing use of
the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund might help fill gaps in coordination and flexible
funding, respectively.
Finally, in addition to the dilemmas regarding the Secretariat’s organisation and its implementation of
peacebuilding mandates, a further dilemma regards who defines what is to be implemented and how those
mandates are decided. We are told that the peacebuilding process should be locally-led, that it varies greatly
depending on the local context, and that success is highly dependent upon local actors. Given that the UN
Security Council is composed of member state governments (a third of which come and go each year, some of
which are non-democratic, and all of which may have self-interest in a specific peacebuilding process), both the
Council’s legitimacy and its ability to develop effective peacebuilding support mandates has been questioned.
indicative of this problem is the tendency of the Council to draft long and complicated mandates with scores
of un-prioritised tasks for the UN mission to carry out. Critics also point out that effective peacebuilding
requires a long-term commitment and a strategy of decades, not years. Due to procedural and funding issues,
the Council is forced to do its strategizing in six-month to one-year intervals. Some have thus suggested
an increased role for the Peacebuilding Commission, in partnership with mission leadership and the host
government, in developing peacebuilding support strategies.
Civil-Millitary working papers 6

9. conclUsion
Moving forward, the UN Secretariat continues to work toward better coordination, integration and more
thoughtful peacebuilding strategies. For its part, the Security Council has committed to drafting smarter
mandates through better consultation with relevant stakeholders, troop- and police-contributing countries,
and the Peacebuilding Commission. along with this important work, however, UN Member States should
not forget about the broader conceptual and institutional questions raised by the UN’s stated peacebuilding
paradigm. Honest discussions should continue inside and outside the UN regarding: the structure and
mechanisms of the UN Secretariat, the engagement and role of the Peacebuilding Commission vis-à-vis the
Security Council, the proper use of military as participants in and alongside peacebuilding activities, as well as
the innate contradictions between the goals of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
endnotes
1 Numbers generated from iPi research included in the background paper for the 2009 “Hitting the Ground running” workshop
held for the members of the UN Security Council.
2 this lack of understanding is particularly harmful in the context of peacekeeping operations with protection of civilians (PoC)
mandates. Host populations seeking protection are often tragically unaware of the low or inconsistent level of protection the
deployment of a peacekeeping force with a PoC mandate actually offers.
3 Call and Cousens note that the word ‘peacebuilding’ actually dates back to Johan Galtung’s 1975 essay, “three approaches to
Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding.” See, Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace,”
iPa Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, March 2007,
4 “Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Department of
Field Support non-paper, September 2010.
5 For a discussion of different interpretations of peacebuilding by different actors and institutions see “Peacebuilding: what is in a
name?,” Michael, Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell, and laura Sitea, Global Governance, vol. 13, No. 1, January, 2007.
6 report of the Secretary-General, Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping, a/47/277, June 17, 1992,
para 21, p. 6.
7 this was earlier stated in the report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of Conflict,
(a/63/881–S/2009/304), June 2009.
8 See Mats Berdal, Building Peace after War, routledge, Ny, 2009.
9 One alternative critique of the peacebuilding paradigm is that peacebuilding, as conceived by the UN, the iFis, and Western
aid agencies, is not, in fact, transformative, but rather it tends to stabilize and reinforce the pre-existing socio-economic power
structures that led to conflict. if this is the case, one might assume that using peacekeepers as peacebuilders will make the
transformation of social, economic and power structures even less likely. For more on this critique, see “Peacebuilding does not
build peace,” tobias Denskus, Development in Practice, volume 17, Numbers 4-5, august 2007.
10 there are, of course, exceptions to this pattern (e.g. the preventive deployment of peacekeepers in Macedonia, the preventive
peacebuilding office in Guinea-Bissau, and the open-ended duration of a peacekeeping mission in Cyprus), which only create
further confusion.
11 Former head of the UN mission in Nepal, ian Martin, recommends the merger of DPKO, DPa, and the Peacebuilding Support
Office in his article, “all Peace Operations are Political: a Case for Designer Missions and the Next UN reform,” Review of Political
Missions, NyU Center on international Cooperation, 2010.
Understanding What We’re Saying: Dilemmas of the UN’s Peacebuilding Paradigm 7