Working paper 1 2013 police-military interaction


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Working paper 1 2013 police-military interaction

  1. 1. 1 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsPolice–military interaction ininternational peace and stabilityoperationsWorking towards guidelines for actionwhen on operations.4The research deliberately focusesonly on the relationship between civilian police and militarypersonnel, although mention is made of the specific role ofmilitary police. It does not deal with the role formed policeunits or constabulary-type forces might play or the role ofprivate security companies; both of these subjects remainimportant areas for future research.5In this document, therefore, the focus is on the interactionbetween the civilian police forces and the militaries ofcountries with Anglo–Peelian traditions of civilian policing,with a strong consent-based tradition and a traditionof professional volunteer military forces; examples areAustralia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom.6The document identifies the appropriate divisions ofresponsibility for the various forces, taking into accountthe hostility of the environment, in order to show areaswhere coordination, cooperation or collaboration mightbe beneficial and to point to ways in which such interactionmight be profitably pursued.> Paper 01/2013BK Greener and WJ Fish – Massey University, New ZealandIntroductionPolicing is an increasingly important part of peace andstability missions.1The word ‘policing’ suggests that it iscivilian police who carry out the task, but recent practicehas seen a marked rise in the use of more militarisedformed police units, as well as indications that there issome acceptance of the use of military police or othermilitary personnel in policing or policing-type tasks.Although some new academic work has been done on themilitarisation of law enforcement, broader theoreticallyinformed research into what has been termed ‘third-generation civil–military affairs’ remains fledgling.2Inaddition, there is a dearth of doctrine and guidelines relatingto police–military interaction in the field. In 2009 the UnitedNations developed pre-deployment training guidelines thatdescribe generic roles for police and military personnel inpeace operations, but the guidelines are fairly general andmore detailed documentation dealing with the relationshipbetween the police and the military in operations does notappear to exist.3The aim of this project was to help fill the gap betweenoperationally specific reference documents and abstractacademic arguments in order to provide some generalguidelines for formulating how police and military personnelshould interact and decide on the division of responsibilities
  2. 2. 2 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsMethodologyThe project involved three main activities:>> more than 60 semi-informal interviews with servingand retired police and military personnel in Australia,New Zealand, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste>> analysis of policy documents and academic commentary>> the bringing together of selected Australian DefenceForce, Australian Federal Police, New ZealandDefence Force and New Zealand Police personnel fora day-long workshop in June 2011 to discuss variousthemes in greater detail so as to elucidate the mainprinciples and develop recommendations for action.The people with whom discussions were held came froma wide range of backgrounds; for example, those from theDefence Forces were from the Navy, the Air Force, the Armyand the military police and were non-commissioned officersas well as high-ranking officers. The people chosen alsorepresented a wide range of operational experience; forexample, policing participants had been involved in policetraining and reform in Afghanistan, executive policing inSolomon Islands, election monitoring in Mozambique, post-tsunami victim identification in Indonesia, disaster responsein New Zealand, and close protection in Timor-Leste. Allwere asked to describe their experience of working with thepolice or military in these contexts and were encouragedto speak about things that worked well and where tensionsarose. The discussions were conducted in an open-endedmanner, and points of commonality and divergence werenoted.The primary policy documents relating to activities in peaceand stability operations—such as those obtained from theUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the EuropeanUnion, Australia and New Zealand—were collated in orderto establish what guidelines for practice exist and whatrecommendations have previously been made. The amountof secondary source material on the subject of police andmilitary roles and interaction in peace operations is growingand is to be found in academic journals such as ArmedForces and Society, International Peacekeeping and Policingand Society, as well as in reports from institutions such asthe Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces,the US Strategic Studies Institute, the Lowy Institute, theNorwegian Institute of International Affairs, the US NavalPost Graduate School’s Center for Civil–Military Relations,and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.Finally, the project leaders, Dr Greener and Dr Fish, areindebted to those who participated in the discussionsand, in particular, those who attended and contributedto the June 2011 workshop—Senior Sergeant Peter Davis,Inspector Mal Schwartfeger, Major Tim Hind, Colonel BrianCox, Wing Commander Wendy Horder, Major Josh Wineera,Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Lieutenant Colonel AndrewCombes, Dr Jim Rolfe and Dr Tony Murney. The workshopfocused on roles, agents and situations and when andhow various tasks should or can be performed by differentagents. It is predominantly the work of this group, as well asthe interviews and research, additional commentary fromLieutenant Ken Coombes and Superintendent Jason Byrnes,and much appreciated support from Inspector Roly Williams,Inspector Paul Sindlin and Lieutenant Colonel Vern Bennettthat resulted in what follows and the recommendationsmade. Any mistakes are, however, the authors’ alone.BackgroundDuring the Cold War policing efforts in peacekeepingoperations typically concentrated on the support,monitoring, advising and training of local police forces.This range of roles reflected the peacekeeping norms of theday, norms that emphasised neutrality and consent-basedoperations. The post–Cold War era, however, has seenpolicing in peace operations become increasingly complex.At the beginning of the 1990s UN civilian police monitoredand verified the demobilisation of ex-combatants in Angola,while in Croatia they were expected to ensure that basichuman rights in UN-protected areas were upheld and inMozambique they oversaw the retraining of local police.From this their policing role broadened and deepenedfurther. In El Salvador in 1992 the UN became involved inpolice reform efforts to an unprecedented degree, andduring the Cambodia mission UN civilian police began toadopt executive policing roles (that is, having the ability toarrest and detain) as the mission evolved. By the turn ofthe century the situation in Kosovo and East Timor initiallywarranted full UN administration of those territories,meaning the full suite of policing roles was needed to helprestore security, uphold law and order, and help providejustice for the local people.The policing role in contemporary peace operations caninvolve both stability-related tasks and capacity-buildingtasks. In the case of the first category, police personneldeployed to peace missions can potentially take a more‘active’ role in the earlier phases of an operation, when anexecutive policing mandate grants external police the powerof arrest if there has been a breakdown of law and order.In the case of the second category, police can be used for
  3. 3. 3 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsmonitoring, training, mentoring and capacity building orin programs designed to ‘reform, rebuild and restructure’existing police capabilities.The ideal scenario of using police to perform these functionsin peace and stability operations is, however, complicated bya number of factors. Important among these is the difficultyof deploying police abroad both in sufficient number andsufficiently quickly. The result is that there might well besituations, particularly during the early phases of a mission,in which police officers are simply unavailable to perform thenecessary tasks. This leads to a so-called capability gap, andin the United States some commentators have described theuse of military units for policing as ‘the least-worst option’for filling the gap.7Military personnel have thus been used inroles such as close protection, detention, traffic control, siteinvestigation and—particularly controversially—the trainingand mentoring of civilian police, as in Iraq and Afghanistan;for example, the US 2nd Stryker cavalry unit has mentoredthe Afghan National Police in Kabul for years. Althoughlatterly there has been an increase in the number of policedeployed abroad, the problem of insufficient numbers atpresent means that military personnel might still be requiredto perform some police tasks.There are a number of reasons for thinking that the potentialblurring of police and military roles in such operationscould be problematic. Upholding the distinction betweenthe police and the military in democracies is consideredvital to retaining civilian control over the use of force withinstate boundaries and in this way is a touchstone of liberaldemocratic politics.8Separation and demilitarisation ofpolice  are recommended in order to keep military forces outof internal security and to ensure the successful functioningof democratic practices.9Police are a vital part of a state’scapacity to provide for both security and justice, and inliberal democratic states they play a fundamental role inthe protection of citizens’ rights. Police services and militaryforces in liberal democratic countries—particularly thosewith Anglo–Peelian traditions of policing—are thereforedeliberately distinct entities, with a different ethos, training,skill set, outlook and attitude.10The use of military personnelto perform policing functions in peace and stabilityoperations is thus not ideal in terms of concerns aboutpossible military involvement in internal security, distractionfrom core competencies, and a mismatch of ‘troops totasking’—something both the police and the militaryappear to agree on. Nor is it ideal in that any regular use ofthe military to carry out frontline policing in post-conflictenvironments runs the risk of making the population feelas though they are under occupation.In particular, the question of legitimacy is crucial when itcomes to the likelihood of a local police force persistingin situ, since policing relies on legitimacy and consentin transforming power into authority.11The questionof legitimacy is therefore also central to the ability ofinterveners to leave peace operations. The chances for alasting and sustainable peace are considerably diminishedif this legitimacy is threatened by a confusion of military andpolicing roles and functions in a post-conflict society—onthe part of the interveners and the host government, orboth.12In post-conflict situations it is also important thatmilitaries are not tasked to help redress societal problems,whereas police can potentially do so. Militaries are designedto be instruments of the political executive; police aredesigned to be instruments of law and order. Thesefundamentally different starting points have flow-on effectsfor determining how such institutions might or might not beused in different situations. What is key here, then, is not justwhat the military can do in peace and stability operations:it is what they cannot be seen to be doing, or simply shouldnot do, in such operations.But even if the problem of the capability gap could be solvedby increasing police numbers, a second important factorto consider is the hostility of the environments in whichpolicing work might be required. It might simply be too riskyfor police to perform the necessary tasks. What is more, thefluid nature of the security environment for most peace andstability missions—which can switch from relatively safe todangerous quite quickly—means that, even when police areavailable, they may very well still need the support of themilitary in order to safely perform the required tasks. Thisquestion of permissibility will greatly affect policy makers,planners and practitioners seeking to understand how bestto create an ideal division of responsibility between thepolice and the military on operations.Findings and recommendationsPolice and military personnel engage in operations inresponse to government directives and, these days, aretypically part of much broader peace- or state-buildingefforts. In such operations multiple sites of coordination,cooperation and even collaboration can be required at anumber of levels. One such site concerns a combination ofagencies of a contributing state, as reflected in the currentmantra of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches. Anothermight concern cooperation between government andnational or international non-government agencies, assometimes suggested by the expression ‘a comprehensiveapproach’. Yet another concerns the case of the need for
  4. 4. 4 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsinterstate cooperation in multinational operations, andanother still between agencies of the contributing andhost states.The primary focus of this project is the first of these sitesof interaction—cooperation and coordination of the policeand the military of a contributing state that is deployingthese personnel to help provide security in a peace orstability operation. We note a number of recommendationsthroughout this document to try to help consolidate bestpractice for police-military interaction. In doing so, werecognise that the Australasian entities examined in thisstudy might already pursue some or potentially all ofthese practices or are working towards them. The findingsof this study will help underline the importance of thesepractices in our neighbourhood, but we also consider theserecommendations to be of broader relevance to otherglobal, regional or national institutions.Pre-deploymentProject participants’ descriptions of their experiences in thefield revealed some general pre-deployment considerationsthat are required to set the scene for functional police–military interaction in the field. Solid preparatory workshould be done before deployment to help facilitate betterrelations in operations. In particular, at the more ‘macro’level of government, where institutional design and strategicframeworks are formulated, there needs to be an initiationof suitable policies and well-directed resourcing to supportand encourage multi-agency liaison. This could range frombroader memorandums of understanding between agenciesto policies that allow for and support the creation of specifictraining schedules that outline the police and military rolesand procedures in different projected situations.RecommendationIt is recommended that governments direct agenciesinvolved or likely to be involved in peace and stabilityoperations to develop generic strategic frameworks andbroad policies on inter-agency interaction, independentlyof any specific deployments.Mission-specific policies should be implemented when aparticular deployment is embarked upon. In particular, theoperational pattern of interaction between commandingofficers and political leaders for a particular missionshould be set out clearly and agreed to by all concerned inadvance—especially in relation to command and controlin different phases of the operation and in relation to thedetermination of risk. To this end, a regular schedule ofmeetings or a system of updating should be arranged earlyin the piece. Escalation procedures in particular should bedeveloped and understood by commanding officers fromboth police and military units.Military forces often have the resourcing and institutionalarrangements to allow them to take the lead in outliningmission-specific policies. But this does not necessarily meanthey should be the lead agencies in developing such policies.Military-heavy policies will of their nature be somewhatskewed by the institutional culture. It would therefore bepreferable that knowledgeable or specialist personnel froma civilian agency—such as the Department of Foreign Affairsand Trade in Australia or the Ministry of Foreign Affairsand Trade in New Zealand—who have sound knowledgeof police and military capabilities act as the coordinatingpivot between police and military advice on these matters.This is in large part to ensure that policies are made with aneye to the long-term requirements of peace and stabilityoperations, rather than being captive to shorter term orpartial needs, although the personnel working in this areamust also understand the capabilities and limitations ofboth the police and the military.RecommendationIt is recommended that before a deployment knowledgeableor specialist staff based in a civilian agency, and advisedby the military and police, be responsible for coordinatingthe development of mission-specific policies to enrich thebroader policies that apply more generally.Finally, all subject matter expert sources consistentlyrecommended that there be a considerable degree ofinter-agency interaction during pre-deployment trainingand preparation. Desk-based exercises working with allarms of government need to be established to ensure thesmooth running of whole-of-government approaches beforedeployment. Knowledge of what different agencies can andcannot do in such operations is important so that players inthe relevant sectors of government are able to respond wellto questions or problems that arise.RecommendationIt is recommended that pre-deployment training andpreparation be conducted with as much cross-over as ispossible or desirable given the different operational needsof each agency.
  5. 5. 5 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsAssessing risk and the roles that need to beplayed to provide security in operationsOne of the primary requirements at the initial planning stageof an operation is an assessment of risk for the contributingcountry. Workshop participants in particular were of theview that the use of agents less suited to particular rolespotentially increases that risk. An understanding of the rolesof the police and the military in the provision of security istherefore fundamentally important. In assessing the rolesthat need to be played in order to contribute to securityin a peace or stability operation, most participants in thediscussions also asserted that engagement with the localcontext is vitally important—particularly in undertakingan initial needs assessment. Workshop participants wereespecially concerned that before deployment contributingagencies should know what is broken, why, and what canbe done in what time and with what resources. In the lightof this concern and in order to try to establish what an idealdivision of responsibility might be between such agencieson operations, the various roles that need to be played inproviding security are outlined here and then who might playthese roles is considered.The following types of roles need to be played in order toprovide security in peace and stability and other operations:>> strategic planning and decision makingin relation to security priorities>> governance and the rule of law>> intelligence>> special operations>> targeting>> protection of civilians>> securing assets>> force protection>> maintenance of public order>> patrolling>> responding>> investigative capability>> education, PR and liaison>> training of local police>> training of local military>> mentoring of local police>> mentoring of local military.A number of discussion participants stressed that manyof these matters are broader than ‘just’ police or ‘just’military. The centrality of good governance and the rule oflaw repeatedly came up in discussions and in the workshop.Many personnel had been disappointed by experiencesthat had seen successful investigations or raids undone by,among other things, the lack of a functioning justice andcorrections system.RecommendationIt is recommended that in planning for the policing elementsof peace and stability operations, in particular, civilian leadagencies give consideration to ensuring the functioning ofthe general justice sector of which that policing is a part.Who plays the roles?As noted, there can be situations in which police are simplyunable to play the roles asked of them because of eitherdeployment difficulties or the relative impermissibility ofthe environment. This has the consequence that matchingplayers to roles is not as simple as deciding which agencyshould ideally play each role. To try and respect thisconsideration, while providing a classification that is simpleenough to be functional, we found it useful to break the tasksdown into the following four categories, which emergedfrom discussions with personnel about how they perceivedthe desirability of specific roles being played by specificpersonnel:Police only. These are tasks that it is appropriate only forpolice to perform. If police are unavailable or incapable ofperforming these tasks for any reason, it is better that thetasks go unperformed. This said, it is assumed that in theperformance of police-only tasks the police might need tocall on the support of the military. An example of this typeof limited supporting role for the military would be use ofmilitary personnel as a general deterrent to resisting arrestin the case of high-risk arrests.Police first. These are tasks that police should do, if this isappropriate, but that could be performed by other agenciesunder police guidance and supervision. Again, it is assumedthat the police might need to call on the support of themilitary in the performance of these tasks.Collaborative. These tasks could be performed by either thepolice or the military—or possibly even by both agenciestogether. The lead agency would need to be determinedcase by case.Military only. These are tasks that are suitable only formilitary forces. Reciprocally, however, there could be
  6. 6. 6 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationssituations in which the military might call for supportfrom the police in performing the tasks. An example ofsuch limited support would be for police to be ready totake custody of those suspected of crimes after instancesof military contact.We found no requirement for a distinct ‘military-first’category on the grounds that if the military is unable toperform a certain military task no alternative agency willbe in a position to perform this task in the military’s stead.As noted, however, this is not to say that the military wouldnot benefit from the support of other agencies in theperformance of these tasks.Police-only tasksA recurrent theme in both the discussions and the workshopconcerned ways in which the police and the militarydiffer. Such differences influence the ways they tackle thevarious tasks assigned to them. (See Appendix A for furtherinformation about the differences between the police andmilitary roles.)Although some discussion participants from the militaryasserted that they ‘could’ perform policing tasks if asked todo so, many other military and all police personnel we talkedwith felt that the various cultural, educational, material,legal, organisational and operational differences betweenthe services meant that there were certain core policingtasks that simply should not be performed by militarypersonnel. It was stressed numerous times that skill setsand mind-sets differ and that military personnel have the‘wrong optics’ for carrying out a significant proportion ofgeneral police duties. One example was that military trainingfreely encompasses the use of lethal force and the controlof elements within a given mission space, whereas policingrelies much more on consent and prevention and these areunderpinned by a legitimacy held only by police.For these reasons the power of arrest is most definitelyconsidered a police officer’s domain only (although thepower to detain was seen as a more common phenomenon).Criminal investigations were also thought to be bestperformed by civilian police. Nevertheless, some aspects ofthis function—such as site preservation for later specialistinvestigation or site investigation by military police duringperiods of conflict—were seen as tasks that could involvemilitary input; these are explained in more detail shortly.It was also evident that most discussion participantsbelieved that only police should train the local police,since training is the initial point at which ethos and valuesas well as skills are transmitted. Use of the military totrain police has the potential to reinforce trends towardsthe militarisation of law enforcement and involvement ofthe military in civil affairs at precisely the point where thisshould be discouraged.13RecommendationIt is recommended that the power of arrest, primacy incriminal investigations and the training of local policecome solely within the purview of ‘police-only’ tasks.Police-first tasksAlthough members of the military often suggested theywere capable of performing a number of policing tasks,our research made it clear that there was among militaryas well as police personnel a level of discomfort about thispossibility. Military personnel were concerned that thereis plenty to train for already and that policing was not andwould not be a core task: personnel commented on thebroader political and social ramifications of any involvementin such a task. Despite this unease, however, all militarypersonnel said they were comfortable working with policeand that the experience of RAMSI (the Regional AssistanceMission in Solomon Islands), in particular, has led toincreased willingness to work in support of police objectives.With this in mind, a number of areas were identified astasks where the military could support police or, if it wasunsafe for police to perform those tasks, perform themin their stead. The maintenance of public order is alreadywell established as a police-first task, yet most militarypersonnel we spoke with had taken part in exercises oroperations where the need to ramp up or ramp downresponses had been central, and since 1999 militarytraining in maintaining public order has also become morecommonplace, particularly for South Pacific deployments.Other tasks that were deemed to be ideally performedby police yet potentially performable by the military werecommunity liaison and the mentoring of local police forces.In relation to the first of these, discussions highlighted howthe community engagement work done by military personnelreturning to Timor-Leste in 2006 helped set the scene forcivilian police to follow up with closer liaison efforts. In thelatter case—mentoring—although it was deemed essentialthat the police do the initial training of police personnel,discussion participants generally suggested that if the policewere unable to mentor local police forces for some reasonthe military could potentially perform this task under policeguidance. In Afghanistan, for example, police have typicallynot been allowed out from ‘behind the wire’ to mentortheir Afghan National Police colleagues in the field. In suchinstances military personnel have provided that support.
  7. 7. 7 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsThere are problems with using such a model for mentoring,however, because of the possibility of sending the ‘wrongmessage’ to host states.We would therefore stress that, for the present, using themilitary for police mentoring is to be a last resort and, ifsuch mentoring must occur, it is a task for military police.An alternative solution might, however, be to identifypolice with military reservist or strong tactical experienceto be classified in such a way as to allow them into thefield. Current operational decision-making procedures donot expressly allow for direct police input into the choiceof military personnel for such tasks. We would suggest,however, that it is worth military commanders seeking suchinput, both to maximise resources and to minimise risk.RecommendationIt is recommended that the maintenance of public orderand community liaison be designated ‘police-first’ tasks.Similarly, for now, the mentoring of local police forces shouldbe designated ‘police-first’, such mentoring being carriedout by military police if civilian police indicate they areunable to perform this role. It is further recommended thatalternative options for facilitating police mentoring of localpolice in non-permissive environments be investigated bypolice agencies.In this regard we note that military police appear to haveincreasingly oriented themselves towards the potentialfor policing in less permissive environments. Consider,for example, the Australian First Military Police Battalion’sassertion:The foundations of 1 MP Bn proficiency are the technicalaspects of policing, and the combat survivabilityrequired to execute policing tasks where the operationaluncertainty precludes or restricts operations by civilianpolice.14[emphasis added]In considering the ramifications of this, discussionparticipants acknowledged that military police have fairlycompetent levels of police training and that they mighthave specialist capabilities—for example, in functioning ina non-permissive environment, close protection and doghandling—that civilian police lack, which could make thempotential agents in the performance of police tasks. It wasalso noted, however, that military police are not swornofficers of the law, owe allegiance to the political executiverather than the law, are bound by hierarchy more thancivilian police, work within a military law framework, havedifferent methods for interrogating suspects, and have lessexperience in dealing with general public matters day to day.Despite this, most participants considered that, althoughnot ideal, they would prefer to have (Australian and NewZealand) military police rather than infantry or other militarypersonnel performing policing-type tasks were this thechoice presented to them, although they were still cautiousabout treating military police as if they were civilian police.RecommendationIt is recommended that, when civilian police indicate thatthey are unable to perform ‘police-first’ tasks, missionplanners consider the use of military police in the firstinstance and ensure that provision is made for civilianpolice guidance and supervision of those tasks.For this to work successfully, however, who is ‘supporting’,who is ‘supported’ and in what phases of an operation needto be clearly outlined and understood, as do the political andoperational consequences of those decisions.RecommendationIt is recommended that, once a non–civilian police agencyis deployed, all strategic planning be clearly laid out bythe lead agency and clearly relayed to military and policeleaders. Command and decision-making structures should,as much as is feasible, be known by all involved in themission—civilian, police and military.Significantly, too, although civilian police were of thestrong view that policing skills and know-how accrueover time—and most agreed that these are things thatneed to be exercised regularly so as to be reinforced—there were situations where they thought some skillsmight usefully be transferred to military personnel. Inparticular, site preservation and basic investigative skillsrequired for evidence collection were seen to be relativelystraightforward, fairly fundamental skills that militarypersonnel could train for. These were thought to be ofparticular use in cases where it was likely that war crimes orother major criminal activity had occurred and demanded aresponse but civilian police were not yet in situ to carry thisout. In fact, the military already has some useful capabilitiesin this area. Military police, force protection and explosiveordnance device personnel have particularly relevant skillsets. For example, force protection could provide securitythrough cordons, access control and checkpoints; militarypolice have some forensic capability; and explosive ordnancedevice personnel can provide explosives analysis.Broader dissemination of a more general awareness ofsuch matters would, however, be helpful for operationaleffectiveness and improved police–military relations.
  8. 8. 8 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsRecommendationIt is recommended that military personnel receive basictraining in site preservation and evidence collection,especially when deploying on missions that are likely torequire such skills.Collaborative tasksDiscussion participants noted that some activities, suchas patrolling, were regularly engaged in by both police andmilitary—although often motivated by different factors.For example, both organisations use patrolling to gatherintelligence but do so for different reasons: the police mightseek to interpret the criminal environment and to allocateresources to resolving problems; the military might seekto gather intelligence in order to accomplish the missionat hand. Establishing the utility and desirability of variouspatrolling options (for example, joint patrols or police patrolssupported by the military) is an important task given theimpact of such decisions on local perceptions and optionsfor action. It is also important to note that there are differenttypes of patrolling. For example, military personnel canbe deployed on security, clearance, listening, fighting,community engagement, presence, reconnaissance, convoyescort, and many other types of patrol. Many of these aresolely military in function or purpose and would not besuitable for police involvement. Similarly, traffic controlthrough road blocks and cordons and border controlactivities are tasks that can at times be performed by eitherthe police or the military, but it should be noted that the useof different agents might signal a difference of approach orattitude towards the purpose of such activitiesOther operational activities that have been explicitly jointin nature are the repatriation of internally displaced peopleand preparation for elections, where military personnelwere responsible for securing the perimeter and police wereresponsible for searching and maintaining order within theperimeter.Most discussion participants agreed that these effortsgenerally worked well as long as a fairly clear division ofresponsibility had been decided on beforehand. They wereconcerned that there must be a clear policy- and decision-making lead in the mission and that, before being assigneda particular role on operations, representatives of agenciesshould be at the table in the early phases of a mission toensure clarity about available capacity and the requirementsof their respective institutions. This recommendation hasalready been noted.Military-only tasksThe remaining tasks—such as force protection, the securingof assets, and the training and mentoring of local militaryforces—were seen as appropriate and desirable for themilitary to perform. In the case of training and mentoring,the reasoning is not so much to do with operational capacitybut more about a general principle that like should trainlike—military to train military and police to train police.Other mattersCultural differencesAs noted, there are major differences between the cultureof the police and that of the military. Misunderstandingsbased on these differences emerged time after time indiscussions. For example, members of the police forcesoften expressed frustration at the highly systematic planningof the military, while military members were taken aback bythe tendency of police personnel to ‘plan’ on the way to anincident, making decisions quickly and with a high degreeof individual responsibility and discretion. This differencein planning, at the strategic level and particularly theoperational level, causes friction, especially if the rationalefor such a planning style is not known. As with many of theother concerns raised, familiarity tended to be seen as thebest solution to working through problems connected withdiffering planning methods or priorities. It is important forpolice to understand, for example, that the detailed planningrequired in a military context is not just a result of the risksinvolved: it is also a result of the sheer logistics of dealingwith such an organisation. Organisational inertia is inherentin agencies dealing with large numbers of people, equipmentand machines and is something police might not be familiarwith. The embedding of Australian Federal Police personnelas liaison officers in AusAID and the Australian DefenceForce appears to have been highly successful in terms of‘firefighting’ before problems begin and is something otheragencies should consider.RecommendationIt is recommended that more permanent interactionbetween the police and the military be facilitated bysecondments or exchanges of personnel, as well as sharedtraining, education, liaison and exercises to increaseinteroperability and mutual understanding.
  9. 9. 9 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsRankingAnother problem that has arisen at times is caused by thefact that police ranks are not easily translated into militaryranks. Police personnel on early deployments to RAMSIcommented on the difficulty of conveying their seniority tomilitary personnel because of the relative ‘flatness’ of policeranking structures. Pleas were made for a constable with12 years’ experience to be seen as equivalent in ‘worth’ toa platoon, rather than being seen as an individual private.This problem of ranking recognition and equivalencehas been mitigated to some extent by experiments withbrevet ranking (moving inspectors up to superintendent,for example, for the duration of an overseas operation) orby the actual removal of ranking altogether in some cases(with AFP officers at times simply having ‘agent’ status).Such mechanisms have allowed for flexibility, but each hasattendant problems. Brevet ranking causes difficulties when‘real’ rankings become known, while the lack of rankingcan add to confusion about who is in charge during a crisis.Most discussion participants seemed to suggest, however,that such problems were fairly minor in that leadership andrespect provide for seniority.RecommendationIt is recommended that consideration be given to thequestion of ranking on a case-by-case basis.Mission complementarityAdditional difficulties have arisen in relation toincommensurability of levels of pay, benefits such asaccommodation arrangements, rotation length, workinghours when in the field and, in particular, leave when onan international deployment. Military personnel oftencommented that police seemed to have a much better‘package deal’—although they also recognised that theyhad signed up for international deployments under knownconditions while police might not have come into the jobwith such a task in mind. Some particular concerns, suchas the military being ‘dry’ when police could drink alcohol,were significant despite their specificity and were handledwith variable levels of success. Many of these matters havebeen dealt with more directly in recent years or a greaterunderstanding has developed, helping to alleviate some ofthe tensions that can arise, as they did after RAMSI in 2003.One important factor that seems to help shape how suchdifferences are ridden out in the field is the personalitiesof the commanding officers and how well they can worktogether to establish a strong working relationship betweenthe police and the military.RecommendationIt is recommended that authorities reconsider thecomplementarity of operational matters relating to leave,pay and other aspects of deployment where possible. It willbe necessary for differences to remain between police andmilitary personnel in some areas, but in other areas greatercomplementarity will help to ease tensions and improveoperational effectiveness. Where differences do need toremain, personnel should be told why.We also note that this awareness goes hand in hand with adeeper understanding between personnel of all agenciesthat remuneration and conditions will vary not just betweenagencies within a country, but also between personnel fromother countries.15Deployment length and handoversDeployment length was a consistent concern among policepersonnel: deployments of six months were seen as far tooshort to gain any ground in an operation; nine months wasgenerally viewed as the minimum time frame needed. Mostpolice called for 12-month deployments—or two years forspecialist roles. Handover periods were also identified ascrucial to mission success. Staggering the rolling of majorappointments for both police and military personnel allowsfor additional continuity in the provision of security, as doesthe allocation of time for senior personnel to provide adviceto incoming officers.RecommendationIt is recommended that authorities reconsider the length ofdeployments, the pattern of handovers, and the effects ofhigh tempo and rotation on overall mission goals in both thepolice and the military sectors.ConclusionFinally, it is important to note that police–militaryinteraction in places such as Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan has been very much dependent onpersonalities—that is, the willingness and ability of keypersonnel to engage productively with one another. Althoughit might be difficult to do much about the compatibility ofsenior personnel in a mission, increased organisationalawareness of the complementarity of roles available, aswell as of the differing priorities that will apply to the policeand the military in the field, is vital for helping to pin downgeneral operating principles. The best policy and guidelinescan describe options, but mutually beneficial and symbioticfunctioning can occur only if the people concerned respondwillingly to directives designed to improve cooperation. This
  10. 10. 10 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsin turn requires that all agencies understand the value aneffective combination of police and military personnel canbring to peace operations.Summary of recommendationsThe recommendations noted in this document are generalguidelines intended to help consolidate best practice.We note that a number of institutions—including thoseAustralasian entities examined in this study—mightalready pursue some or potentially all of these practicesor are working towards them. We would also suggest,however, that these recommendations are of broaderrelevance to institutions outside the trans-Tasman context.1. It is recommended that governments direct agenciesinvolved or likely to be involved in peace and stabilityoperations to develop generic strategic frameworksand broad policies on inter-agency interaction,independently of any specific deployments.2. It is recommended that before a deploymentknowledgeable or specialist staff based in acivilian agency, and advised by the militaryand police, be responsible for coordinating thedevelopment of mission-specific policies to enrichthe broader policies that apply more generally.3. It is recommended that pre-deployment trainingand preparation be conducted with as muchcross-over as is possible or desirable given thedifferent operational needs of each agency.4. It is recommended that in planning for the policingelements of peace and stability operations, inparticular, civilian lead agencies give considerationto ensuring the functioning of the general justicesector of which that policing is a part.5. It is recommended that the power of arrest, primacy incriminal investigations and the training of local policecome solely within the purview of ‘police-only’ tasks.6. It is recommended that the maintenance of public orderand community liaison be designated ‘police-first’ tasks.Similarly, for now, the mentoring of local police forcesshould be designated ‘police-first’, such mentoring beingcarried out by military police if civilian police indicatethey are unable to undertake that role. It is furtherrecommended that alternative options for facilitatingpolice mentoring of local police in non-permissiveenvironments be investigated by police agencies.7. It is recommended that, when civilian police indicatethat they are unable to perform ‘police-first’ tasks,mission planners consider the use of military police inthe first instance and ensure that provision is made forcivilian police guidance and supervision of those tasks.8. It is recommended that, once a non–civilian policeagency is deployed, all strategic planning be clearly laidout by the lead agency and clearly relayed to militaryand police leaders. Command and decision-makingstructures should, as much as is feasible, be known byall involved in the mission—civilian, police and military.9. It is recommended that military personnelreceive basic training in site preservation andevidence collection, especially when deploying onmissions that are likely to require such skills.10. It is recommended that more permanent interactionbetween the police and the military be facilitated bysecondments or exchanges of personnel, as well asshared training, education, liaison and exercises toincrease interoperability and mutual understanding.11. It is recommended that consideration be given tothe question of ranking on a case-by-case basis.12. It is recommended that authorities reconsider thecomplementarity of operational matters relating toleave, pay and other aspects of deployment wherepossible. It will be necessary for differences to remainbetween police and military personnel in someareas, but in other areas greater complementaritywill help to ease tensions and improve operationaleffectiveness. Where differences do need toremain, personnel should be told why.13. It is recommended that authorities reconsider the lengthof deployments, the pattern of handovers, and theeffects of high tempo and rotation on overall missiongoals in both the police and the military sectors.Notes1. See Pfaff (2007) and Sedra (2006).2. Rosen (2009) claims that we are in a third generation ofcivil–military relations: the first was a domestic debateabout the military and the soldier’s role in relation tothe state; the second was the literature on the militarycontribution to humanitarian interventions or complexhumanitarian emergencies; and the third is a deeperlook at the multi-agency roles played in internationaloperations. One of the few considerations of this isprovided by Rasmussen (1999), who considered theresponse to the Los Angeles riots as well as Britishinvolvement in Ulster in suggesting some more general
  11. 11. 11 ACMC Paper 1/2013 > Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operationsguidelines for the possible use of armed forces ininternal security roles. The main recommendationsdealt with the following: planning for public orderemergencies in advance; police to train to deal withpublic order in a way that does not exacerbate thesituation; police to always be accountable; police todevelop procedures and techniques that make themlegitimate; and if use of reinforcement (includingmilitary) is needed there must be ‘well establishedprocedures and societally approved criteria’.3. UN Department of PeacekeepingOperations (2009a, 2009b, 2008).4. We owe the use of the term ‘division of responsibility’to Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, AustralianDefence Force, who suggested it in the stead of‘division of labour’ to highlight the significanceof work done in planning and preparation, notjust in operational ‘boots on the ground’.5. For more on the role of formed police units as part ofthe spectrum dealing with capability gaps in particular,see Dziedzic (2003); De Weger (2009); Wiatrowski,Pino & Pritchard (2008); and Zimmerman (2005).6. The focus here is on policing models used inGreat Britain rather than Northern Ireland.7. Keller (2011).8. Dunlap Jr (1991) and Gray (2008).9. Watts (2001).10. For an overview of literature debatingthe contemporary relationship betweenpolice and military, see Weiss (2011).11. Turk (1982, p. 115).12. As noted by Last, coercive capacity in particular ‘raisesquestions about consent, legitimacy and the publicinterest in international missions’ (2010, p. 34).13. Friesendorf & Penska (2008).14. 1st Military Police Tactical Policing ConopsBrief 2010, Powerpoint for ADF.15. Thanks to Superintendent Jason Byrnes for this point.Appendix A Police and military rolesPolice principles—1829 Soldiers’ rules—1947, 19931. Prevent crime rather than repressing it. 1. Fight only enemy combatants.2. Depend on public approval. 2. Harm none who surrender.3. Secure willing observance of laws. 3. Do not torture or kill POWs.4. Cooperation reduces the need for physical force. 4. Collect and care for all wounded—friend or enemy.5. Offer impartial service to law, rather than pandering to publicopinion, friendly good humour and courtesy.5. Do not attack medical personnel, facilities or equipment.6. Use force only as a last resort, and use only the minimum amountof force necessary.6. Destroy no more than the mission requires.7. All citizens have police responsibilities. 7. Treat all civilians humanely.8. Do not judge guilt or innocence. 8. Respect private property and possessions.9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder. 9. Prevent and report violations of the law of war.Source: Reith (1956), Friedland (1996), as cited in Last (2010).Military component Traditional peacekeeping operations.Multi-dimensional operationsMonitor or supervise military arrangements thatparties to a conflict have agreed on.Create a secure and stable environment for otherelements of the peace process to be implemented.Police component Can be deployed either as individual UNPOL or asformed police units to either traditional or multi-dimensional peace operations.Play a role in establishing public safety andpreventing crime as well as facilitating rule of law.Collaborate closely with civilian componentssuch as human rights, judicial and civil affairs andcorrections.Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2009a).
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