1. NATIONAL DEFENSEUNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
POLICY DEVELOPMENTUNDER FIRE
ExplainingHow U.S. Forces May ServeUnder Foreign Command
Course 5603
Course5603Essay Requirement
LTC NOLEN V. BIVENS
Dr. John Reichart
COLWilliamAngerman

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Policy Development Under Fire. Explaining How U.S. Forces May Serve
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3. POLICY DEVELOPMENTUNDER FIRE--
ExplainingHow U.S. Forces May Serve Under Foreign Command
uSontalia'sagony underscores a more basic need[thanfood relien: an effective,mobile UN
peace-keeuina force, strong enough to quell the warlords.'"- he New ark T---& H ~ I ICalledSomaltan
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the Cold War, Preadent Bush proclaimed a "New world order "'
Consldemg this new order, many nations, too includethe United States,thought the Untted
Nation's (UN) could play a largerrole in solvingworld calamitiesand anarchc conditions Ths
was especially true forUN peace-keepmg operations
Whde on the campagntrad, candidateBill Climtonjoined the choruscallingfor a greater
UN role in the post cold war era He suggested establishinga UN "rapid deployment force"2that
would stand guard "at the border of countriesthreatened by aggression preventing masswolence
against civdian populations and combating terr~rism."~His words produced images of a force
similarto that mthe aboveNew York Times quote As one of the first acts of his adrmnistration,
President Clinton set out to draft a United States (U S )peace-keeping policy in that view
However, after fourteenmonthsof arduous, interagencyremting and leakingto the
press, the Clinton administrationhad failed to produce a U S peace-keeping pohcy consistent
with this view. 1t had also developed a greater skepticismabout the UNYsabiity to
effectivelyaddress peace-keeping missions alltogether TheClmton adrninistrabon's change of
view was dnvenby popular disagreementwith one of the policy's key features --the placement of
U S forcesunder foreigncommand dumg UN peacekeeping operations The Clinton
administration's policy reform became a victim of partisan and bureaucraticpolitics Policy
makers failed to foreseehow domestxopiniontowards their policy to place U S. forcesunder

4. foreign command would decreaseamidst growingAmerican casualties mcurrent peacekeeping
operations
How did the ahnistration's effort to craR a peace-keeping policy become
overshadowed by the issueof putting U S forcesunder foreigncommand? What precipitated the
changein the administrationviews and caused it to replace the foreign command issuewith a
concept called "operational control?'" This paper describesthe process and bureaucraticcontext
mwhich ths policy was developed
PRELUDETO CHANGE
Severalfactorsset the conditionsfor President Clintonto changethe U S peace-keeping
policy Growingworld sentiment for a greater UN role was first amongthese A Spring 1991
Foreign Affms' articlecapturedthat preddect~on
"The use of rmlitary force by the UN for enforcement and peacekeepmg purposes is
essential to the new world order envisioned by preadents Bush and Gorbachev
Both leaders foresee a world order founded on collective secunty The Persian
Gulf War provided a model of how the UN could be involved in mamtaining
international security Alternative procedures rmght allow national forces to be
brought together under a unified UN command, or they might have each member
countrymaintainunits in its armed forcesthat are earmarkedfor UN services Such
procedures are not without their problems, but the opportunity to achieve a new
level of collective security should not be missed "'
Secondly, condhons were set by the fact that the UN's participation in peace-keeping
operationshad risen sigdicantly dumg the periods prior to the end of the Cold War andjust

5. after Desert Storm TheUN averaged fivepeace-keeping operationsannuallydumg the period
referred to as the Reagan buddup However, between 1988 and 1992,the percentageof new UN
peace-keeping operation increased fiom a low of 28%in 1988 to a 55% high In 1991 At the end
of 1992,six ofthe thirteen peace-keeping operationsthe UN had underway lnvolved U S. forces
Thirdly, it was conditionedby prior deasions and actionsof President GeorgeBush He
gave strongsupport for a more assertivemultilateralU S policy duringhis lidaddressto the
UN in September 1992 In it he stated, "As much as the United Nations has done [in peace-
keeping] it can do much more Effectivemultinationalactlonwill requirecoordinated
command and control Let me assureyou the United Statesis ready to do ~ t spart to strengthen
world peace by strengtheningintematlonalpeace-keeping I have directed the United States
Secretary of Defenseto place a new emphasison peace-keepmg "'Yet, it was his selection of the
l ledge hammer"^ plus optionfor intervening in Somahathat most influencedthe C h o n
administration's attempt at peace-keeping reform In an instance ofuncommonbureaucratic
unity, the WhiteHouse, Department of Stateand Departmentof Defense agreed that U S
intervenbon m Somaliawould be an "easy litmustest for a pohcy of assertwemultilateralism in
addressingdestabiliig wars and statecollapse in the post-Cold War era "'Ironically though,
thls decisionbecame the progenitorofthe seriesof events that would eventuallyeclipsethe entire
policy reform effort
When President Clinton, on inauguralday, "spoke pos~tivelyabout multilateralactionto
addressinternational prob~ems,"'~allthe bureaucratic starsfor policy reform became aligned
ChangingU S peace-keeping policy based on multilateralism, a greater UN role, underwhose
command U S forcesmight serve, was imminent Yet, despite all the optimism surroundmg
policy reform and the inauguration,oneU S Marinewaskilled in Somaliaon January 12th Tom

6. Post, in a Newsweek articleentitled"Somalia First ~lood,"'~wrote, "Operation RestoreHope is
gettingmessier by the day, asU S. troops comeunder fireby Somaliagunmen" l2 Unknowingly,
his words recorded the first of the 26 American deathsto occur in the UN led Somaliapeace-
keeping operation It was the lost ofthese American livesthat would cause Congressand
Americansto attackthe policy reform featurethat would put U S forcesunderforeign command
THEBUREAUCRATIC STRUGGLE (April 1992-May 3,1994)
Building The First Draft -Presidential DecisionDirective 13
In February 1993,the Clinton admnistrationestablished a NaQonalSecurity StaE(NSC)
draftinggroup to reviewthe Umted States' role in peace-keeping operationsand ways of
improvmgUN operationsin this area As this group set out to writePresidentialDeciaon
Directive (PDD) 13, Secretaryof StateWarren Chstopher, and MadelemeAlbnght, Amencan
Ambassadorto the Umted Nations, spokewidely for "greater U S multilateral engagement'y13
and "the need of U S leadership among collectiveb~dies,"'~in particular the UN Even as they
were advancing the multilateral policy, in June 1993,the press brought to American hving rooms -
m a styleremiuscent of Vietnam -news of twenty threePakistani peace-keeperswho were lulled
in Somaliaunder UN command
A month later, in July 1493,the first draft of the policy was completed and mternally
distributed. It mostly expanded on previouspolicy and looked at ways to "strengthen the U S 's
contribution"I5 It stated a ''wdlinnness to have U S forcesto serveunder UN control in veace-
keeping operations."16 It also allowedU S commandersoperatingunder UN control not to
complywith ordersthey believe to be outside the "mandate of the mission or rmlitary imprudent
or unsound "I7 But most importantly, it reflected no political acuityfor the possible

7. congressionaland public dissent to the command issue given the UN's deteriorating
performance in Somaliaand Bosnia.
Bureaucratic Response (Who they were and what they thought)
The initial draft of PPD 13was attacked fiom multiplebureaucraticdirectionsfor its
commandfeature The real world U S and Pakistani casualtiesin Somaliawere leadimgmany to
questionthe assumptions about the UN's role in the new world order U S citizenswere
witnessing by the UN's continualinabilityto deal wth the situationmBosma and the growing
death count in Somalia Someunpleasant realities of the new world order had begun to take
better shape Quick, no cost solutionwas one of them
Congress --that "collegial body of s h i h g mqorities, carryingout constitutional
responsibdities, challengmgthe executivebranch, passing legdation and making pohcyy'18--
attacked the draft policy in terms of its "purpose, motive and interests "19 By this tune, the
Republicandominated Congresshad become more politically sensitizedby the "messier"
conhtions of Somalia Thetwenty-three Pakistani peace-keepers lulled under UN command m
Somahaonly accentuatedit Generalreaction was summed up by SenatorRobert Byrd in an
August 1993New York Timesarticle entitled, "The Perils of peacekeeping"" He said,
"Before the C h o n administrationadopt any directive embracmg an expanded role
in UN peacekeeping operations, Congressshould be allowed to debate thzspolzcy
thoroughly Such a plan would mean that the U S would face the prospect of both
sendmgtroops into battle una'erforezgn command and becoming milltardy involved
in operationsthat Americans do not properlyunderstand or support "21

8. The policy's foreign command provision was seued by the Repubhcan led Congressand
became a politicaltool for attackingthe President's policy as unsound in Somahaand Bosnia
UN SecretaryGeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghaliexpressed very strong concern about the
part in the policy that sad U S commanderscould not complyto UN orders He stated allowing
such a pohcy "would set a precedent whereby other nations would do the samethus undermirung
the concept of a UN command "22
Public reaction and discontent overU S troops servingunder UN control drew comments
fkom the policy elite and averagecitlzen In a Forbesfeaturearticle, former Secretaryof Defense
Casper Weinberger said,
"As long as there are well -defined goals, U S forces engaged mUN peacekeepmg
efforts have shown commendable success Without such goals, however, U S
forces involved in these efforts have been dangerously vulnerable Unfortunately,
the current crisis in Bosnia and Somalia are loolung more and more like the latter
case UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali is no military leader, and h s
command of the UN's multinational force in Somalia Is a disaster wating to
happen As long as the Clinton administration remains chained to a policy of
multdateralism, its foreign policy will continueto be inadequate
In the editorialsection of the SanDiego Union-Tribune, Mr Paul L Evans fiom La Jolla,
Ca s u m m d what averageAmencans said "US troops shouldnot be place under UN
command Like million of citizens, I oppose putting our military under UN command, and I am
neither an isolatiorustnor a unilateralkt I am an Americanfirst and foremost and proud of it
The next volley of real world eventsto impactPDD 13's command featurecamein
August 1993when four more U S soldierswere killed in Somaliaby remote mines By

9. September 1993, support for continuedexpansionofUN peace-keepingand for U S supportfor
this activltyhad greatly diminished It was in this monththat SecretaryWarren Christopher
redrafted PDD 13 In the rewnting, he created a list of criteriato determineU S support for
peace-keepmg operations, and limited the situationsin which U S troopswould serveunder UN
operationalcontrol He also remove the "imprudent and unsound"25basisby which U S
commanderscould non-comply wth UN orders "Orders were now to be appealedup the UN
chain of command and then to the appropriateU S commanders""
As a result of a leak to TheNew York Timesin September, Secretaryof State
Christopher's rewrite did not go unnoticed Unnamed officials, accordmgto theNew York
Times, "reported that top national secunty advlsersto President Clintonhave not been ableto
agree on what role the United Statesshould play m peace enforcementoperabonsaround the
world Accordrng to the officials,the Clinton administrationsis moving away fi-oma proposal
whch would alIow Arnencan troopsto be put under United Nations command mpeace-keeping
operations""
Retrospectively one can see how the substanceof SecretaryChstopher's remte was
beginntng to reflect in the way the Clinton admuristrationdealt with the growmgproblem in
Bosnia as well as public dislikefor the foreigncommandissue On 12September, TheNew York
Tunesreported PresidentClinton's statementthat "he would send Americanpeacekeepingtroops
to Bosnia and Herzegovina only lf the operationis underNATO's not the UN's control "*' The
president's commentscaused a drsputewith Bntain and France on one side of the Bosnianissue
and the U S on the other However, not even thesefaint glimpsesof change in the
administration's policy swayed Congressionaldiscontent with the policy Senator Bob Dole,
soonto be presidentialcandidate, introduced the Peace Powers act of 1994in Congress. Under

10. the bill, "No U S troops could be placed under UN command or operational control unless
approved by Congress U S forcescould continueto report independentlyto U S
commanders, and the U S could be withdrawn at anytime" It also called for "Reducmg the U S
share of peacekeeping operationsfiom 30%to 25%
On 23 September, dumg a speech at theNatlonal War College, U S Ambassador
MadeleineAlbright gavethe first semi-official hint of a changein policy view. She announced
that perhaps a more "lunited view'" of peace-keepingoperationswas needed Shewent on to
"cnticize UN management cdmg for the UN decisionmaking process [to] be overhauled"31
Even as AmbassadorAlbright gave her speechto theNational War College, threeU S
helicopterswere shot down m Somalia Three more American servicemen died gvmg Amencans
more reasonsto dislikea policy that puts U S forcesunder foreign command
President Clmton, m a 27 Septemberspeechto the UN General Assembly, made official
what the National Review called a "damping"32of its initialenthusiasmfor multilaterahsm In his
speechPresident Clinton said the "UN must know when to say no ,933 He also outlined "criteria
for the participationofU S forces inUN peacekeeping missions He soughtto quiet concerns
over the "policy involvingthe placement ofU S forcesunder UN command [that]was emerging
within the administrationuntd a leak prompted sharpcongressionalreaction "34 HISmessage
clearly marked the adrmnistration's break with its policy that supported an aggressiverole by the
UN in peace-keeping operations Three days later, on October 3,1993, the policy provision that
would allow U S. forcesto serveunder foreigncommand was destroyedby the samefirethat
killed 1S and wounded 75 U S Rangers in Somalia The total number of Americanslulled mthe
UN led Somaliaoperationw a s now 26. President Clinton, on 7 October, announceda
"short term increase in U S.forceswith pull out by 31March 94 "35

11. The Final Policy -Presidential Decision Directive 25
In March 1994,theNSC stsbegan briefingthe final contentsof PDD 13to Congress.
About the sametime, Anthony Lake, SpecialAssistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, published an artlclemTheNew York Times Its t~tle,"The Limits of
aptly characterized the final policy s~gnedby PresidentClmton on May 5, 1994 PDD 25,
Elements of the ClintonAdministration's Policyfor ReformingMultilateral Peace
Operations, provided a disciplinedlist of six crrtenathat would guideU S entry into
peacekeeping operations, and various objectives for reengineeringUN peacekeepingactivities,
and reducing UN costs It provided an unequivocal statement that the president "wdl never
relimiuish command authority overU S forces"" Instead, "on a case by case baas, the president
will consider placing appropriateU S forcesunder the operational control of a competent UN
commanderfor a specificUN operationsauthorizedby the SecurityCouncd "'*
The Joint StafXwas"never really c~mfortable"~~with the term operationalcontrol LTG
Wesley K Clarke, U S Army Director for StrategicPlans and Policy (J5) sad "by command
what we're speakingof is the constitutional authorityto establishand deploy forces
Operational control is a subset of command Given for a specifictime fiame, mission and
location This clearlywas a semanticdistinction based upon the president's constitutional
powers as CommanderIn Chief
CONCLUSIONS
, The process out ofwhich PDD 25 emerged on May 5,1995 afhnsthat policy making is a
result of compromise, organizational dynamics, individualpersonahtiesand political consequences

12. caused by real world events Benjamin Wittesbest describedthe process results in TheNew
Leader's articletitled "The Politicsof peace-keeping "41 In it, he states,
"President Clinton's recent policy document on international peacekeeping has
more to do with domestlc politics than with foreign affairs Clinton hst six
conditionsthat must be satisfied before the U S wdl support the deployment of UN
peacekeepers Some of these conditions make sense, but others are irrelevant
His directive is intended primarily to reassure the Amencan people and Congress,
who have expressed concern over the deaths of Amencan soldiers under UN
command in Somalia, tentative plans to send a large force into the former
Yugoslavia, and the high percentage of peacekeepmgbudgets paid by the U S "42
TheNCS staffdrafting group developed and published a peacekeepmg pohcy that did not
consider current peacekeeping events and the domestic responseto them TheUN's ternble
perfanwince m Somaliaurldely influenced pubhc and Congressionalopinion and actions
Faced by bureaucratic criticism to putting U S troopsunder foreign command, President
Clinton subscribedto a pohcy that makes a tenuous semanticdistinctionbetween "command" and
"operational control " Thistype of distinctionconfoundsthe more technical and appropriate
defirutionsinjoint, operationaland tacticalmanuals Its potential for addmg"fkiction" to future
peace-keeping operationsis very high
Bottom-line, the Clintonadministrationattemptedto reform U S peacekeepingpolicy so
that it would be consistent wtth the post Cold War reahties at home and abroad However, as the
UN's efforts at peacekeeping cameunder fire, both hterally and figuratively,so did the
administration's policy for puttingU S forcesunder foreign command

13. cauyl by real world events BenjaminWittesbest describedthe process results in TheNew
Leader's articletitled "The Politics of peace-keeping."4i In it, he states,
"President Clmnton's recent policy document on international peacekeeping has
more to do with domestic politics than with foreign affairs Clinton list six
conditionsthat must be satisfied before the U S will support the deployment of UN
peacekeepers Some of these conditions make sense, but others are melevant
His directive is intended primarily to reassure the American people and Congress,
who have expressed concern over the deaths of Amencan soldiers under UN
command in Somalia, tentative plans to send a large force into the former
Yugoslavia, and the hgh percentage of peacekeepingbudgets paid by the U S 'y42
TheNCS staffdrafbnggroup developed and published a peacekeepmg policy that did not
conslder current peacekeeping eventsand the domesticresponse to them TheUNysterrible
performance m Somaliawidely iduenced public and Congressionalopinion and actions
Faced by bureaucratic criticismto putting U S troops under foreign command, President
Clinton subscribedto a policy that makes a tenuous semantic distinctionbetween "command" and
"operational control " Thistype of distinction confoundsthe more technical and appropriate
definitionsinjoint, operational and tactical manuals Its potential for adding "friction"to h r e
peacpkeepingoperationsis very high
Bottom-he, the Clinton administrationattemptedto reform U S peacekeepmg policy so
that it would be consistent with the post Cold War realities at home and abroad However, as the
UN's efforts at peacekeeping cameunder fire, both literallyand figuratively,so did the
administration's policy for putting U S forcesunder foreign command

14. ENDNOTES:
Russett, Bruce M "The UN m a New World Order," Fore~gnMars,Spnng 1991,p69
Elame Saolmo, "New U S PeacekeepmgPollcy De-emphasizesRoleof the UN," New York T~mes,6 May 1996,
pp AkA7
Ibld
Mark M Lowenthal, "Peacekeepmgm FutureU S Foreign Policy," Washngton Congress~onalResearch
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994,p A37
Russett,Bruce M "The UN m a New World Order," Fore~gnAlEurs, Spnng 1991,p69
Mark M Lowenthal, "Peacekeepmgm FutureU S Fore~gnPohcy," Washtngton Congress~onalResearch
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994,p 24
Mark M Lowenthal, "Peacekeepmg m FutureU S Fore~gnPol~cy,"Washtngton Congress~onalResearch
Semces. CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994, p 2.
~ e dMenkhausw/ Louls Ortmayer, "KeyDec~s~onsm the SomalraInterventlon," Washngton Pew Case Studres
m InternattonalAfEm Case464,1995, p 7
Ibld, p 7-8
lo Mark M Lowenthal,"Peacekeepmg m FutureU S Fore~gnPohcy," Washngton Congress~onalResearch
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994,p 1.
l1 ~ o i nPost, "Somal~aFirst Blood,"Newsweek, 25 Jan 1993,p 47
l2 Ibld
l3 Mqrk M Lowenthal,"Peacekeeping m FutureU S Fore~gnPol~cy,"Washngton CongresslonalResearch
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994,p 5
l4 Ib~d,p 6
l5 Mark M Lowenthal, "Peacekeepmg ~nFutureU S Foreign Pollcy," Washngton CongressonalResearch
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994,p 7-5
l6 Ibld
l7 lbld ,p S
l8 John T T~emey,Congress~onalActIvlsm m ForeignPollcy Its VanedFormsand Stmull," in Dawd A Deese,
TheNew Polmcsof Amencan Fore~gnPol~qNew York St Martm's Press, pp 103
l9 JohpT Tremey, CongresslonalAmmsm m ForeignPol~cyItsVmedForms and Stmuh," mDamd A. Deese,
TheNew Polmcsof Amencan Foreign Pohq New York St Marttn's Press, pp 104
20 Robert C Byrd, "The Perils of Peacekeep~ng," New York Tunes, 19August 1993,pp A23
21Ibtd
Mark M Lawenthal, "Peacekeepmg mFuture U S Fore~gnPohcy,"Waslungton CongresslonalResearch
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994,p 8
23 Casper Wemberger, "Somaha -Chton's Lebanon, and Bosma," Forbes, 13September 1993,p 35
24 Paul L Evans,"U S. Troops Shouldnot be PlacedUnderUN Command,"The SanD~egoUmon-Tnbune, 31
August 1996,p B-9 6,7.
Mark M Lowenthal,"Peacekeep~ngm Future U S Fore~gnPohcy," Washngton CongresslonalResearch
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994, p S
26 lbfd
27 h n Molotsky, "Adrmmstrahon rsDtvided on role for the U S ln PeacekeepmgEfforts," New York Tlmes, 22
Septepber 1993,pp AS
''M a m Walker, "U S Inslst onNATO Commandof PeaceForce," Guardian, 3 October 1995, p 11.
29 Mark M. Lowenthal, "Peacekeeplng mFuture U S Fore~gnPohcv" Washmgton Congressional Research
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994, p 10.
30 lb~d,p S
31 Ib~d,p 9
32 "NIT Chnton at the UN,," NatIonal M e w , 1sOctober 1993,pp 18-19
33 Ibld

15. 33 Ibld
34 Ibld
35 Ken Menkhausw/LowsOrtmayer,"KeyDecmonsin the SomaliaIntervenbon," Waslungton Pew Case Stuhes
in ~nternahonalMars Case4647 1995,p 20-21
36 MarkM Lowenthal, "Peacekeepmg mFuture U S ForeignPolicy," Waslungton CongresstonalResearch
Services CRS Report94-260 S May 10,1994,p 11
371b14i,pA37
38 Ibi ,p A37,A3S
39 COone1J Tracey, mtenlewby LTCNolen Bivens, NahonalDefense Umversity, 2December 1996
40 4k M Lowenthal, "Peacekeeping in FutureU S Foragn Policy," Washington Congressional Research
Semces CRSReport 94-260 S May 10,1994,p 12
EenjanuneWittes, "The Pohhcs of Peacekeepmg," TheNew Leader, 9-23 May 1994,pp 10,ll
42 Ibld