Making and Keeping  the Peace:  An Analysis of  African Union Efficacy Nicholas Temple June 26, 2009 Committee: Earl Conte...
Introduction <ul><li>Decolonization of Africa  </li></ul><ul><ul><li>led to civil unrest and power struggle  </li></ul></u...
Introduction <ul><li>The European Union has been used as the model to exemplify regionalism’s role in sustaining peace thr...
The Creation of the OAU/AU <ul><li>The OAU mission </li></ul><ul><ul><li>To oversee the African liberation from the hold o...
Peacekeeping in Africa <ul><li>The cost of peacekeeping in Africa continues to proliferate </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1980 – $1...
Thesis Objective <ul><li>This thesis seeks to evaluate the efficacy of African regionalism, in particular the African Unio...
Methodology <ul><li>Efficacy will be measured through three areas of peacemaking and peacekeeping: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>F...
Methodology <ul><li>AU Efficacy in peacemaking and peacekeeping will be evaluated within two case studies: </li></ul><ul><...
Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Peacemaking: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The use of bot...
Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Peacekeeping: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The act of ma...
Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Financial Impediments to peace: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul...
Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Political Impediments to peace: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul...
Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Socio-Cultural Impediments to peace: </li></ul></ul><u...
Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>AU Efficacy: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The AU’s abili...
Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>AU Efficacy (cont.) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Pea...
Darfur
Darfur Background <ul><li>40 percent of the Darfur region is of Fur ethnicity (non-Arab) </li></ul><ul><li>Disproportional...
Darfur Background <ul><li>Conflict redefined: Arabs vs. Non-Arabs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Rebel groups form </li></ul></ul><...
Darfur Background <ul><li>The Janjaweed </li></ul><ul><ul><li>An Arab militia with whom the SLM/A and JEM have been in con...
Darfur Background <ul><li>Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Not all rebel groups listed as signatories </...
Darfur: Financial Impediments <ul><li>Over-stretched combat forces </li></ul><ul><ul><li>7,700 man force to cover entire r...
Darfur: Financial Impediments <ul><li>UN/AU Hybrid Force </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Replace current force with 23,000 personnel...
Darfur: Political Impediments <ul><li>State sponsored violence </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Proven Khartoum support for Janjaweed...
Darfur: Socio-Cultural Impediments <ul><li>Arab – non-Arab cleavages </li></ul><ul><li>Rebel factions split </li></ul><ul>...
Darfur: Conclusions <ul><li>AU enforcement of DPA falls short </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Logistical shortcomings </li></ul></ul...
Western Sahara
Western Sahara Background <ul><li>Spanish decolonization </li></ul><ul><li>Land grab </li></ul><ul><ul><li>AU charter – La...
Western Sahara Background <ul><li>Chronology of conflict </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Morocco and Mauritania lay claim to the reg...
Western Sahara Background <ul><li>Agenda for peace </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ad Hoc committee (“Committee of Wise Men”) </li><...
Western Sahara: Financial Woes <ul><li>AU fundraising plagued by recent history </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Poor peacekeeping re...
Western Sahara: Financial Woes <ul><li>Natural resources: An ulterior motive? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>10 billion tons of pho...
Western Sahara: Political Impediments <ul><li>Loophole in international law </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Recognizing Morocco’s so...
Western Sahara: Socio-Cultural Issues <ul><li>Ruling of ICJ </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Western Sahara not found to be  terra nu...
Western Sahara: Socio-Cultural Issues <ul><li>Elusive referendum </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ceasefire achieved </li></ul></ul><...
Western Sahara: Conclusions <ul><li>Strong US-Moroccan relationship </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Formidable Moroccan military fro...
Western Sahara: Conclusions <ul><li>Moroccan openness to UN-led peacekeeping operations as a result of: </li></ul><ul><ul>...
Thesis Conclusions <ul><li>The AU’s consistent need for UN involvement </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Inability to support peacemak...
Thesis Conclusions <ul><li>Case studies demonstrate the AU membership is hindered </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Diversity </li></u...
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Thesis Presentation

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Thesis Presentation

  1. 1. Making and Keeping the Peace: An Analysis of African Union Efficacy Nicholas Temple June 26, 2009 Committee: Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D., Major Professor M. Scott Solomon, Ph.D. Abdelwahab Hechiche, Ph.D.
  2. 2. Introduction <ul><li>Decolonization of Africa </li></ul><ul><ul><li>led to civil unrest and power struggle </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Struggle resulted in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations by Western powers, the UN, and neighboring African states </li></ul></ul>
  3. 3. Introduction <ul><li>The European Union has been used as the model to exemplify regionalism’s role in sustaining peace through economic and political interdependence </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Other examples: UN, NATO </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Is regionalism Africa’s answer to the conflict question? </li></ul>
  4. 4. The Creation of the OAU/AU <ul><li>The OAU mission </li></ul><ul><ul><li>To oversee the African liberation from the hold of colonialism </li></ul></ul><ul><li>The AU mission </li></ul><ul><ul><li>To bring peace and stability to the African continent through economic, political, and social solidarity </li></ul></ul>
  5. 5. Peacekeeping in Africa <ul><li>The cost of peacekeeping in Africa continues to proliferate </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1980 – $180 million budget </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1994 – $ 3.5 billion budget </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>2008 – $ 7 billion budget </li></ul></ul><ul><li>AU Peace Fund is $48 million in arrears </li></ul>
  6. 6. Thesis Objective <ul><li>This thesis seeks to evaluate the efficacy of African regionalism, in particular the African Union (AU), and its peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur and Western Sahara. </li></ul>
  7. 7. Methodology <ul><li>Efficacy will be measured through three areas of peacemaking and peacekeeping: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Financial/Economical </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Political </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Socio-Cultural </li></ul></ul>
  8. 8. Methodology <ul><li>AU Efficacy in peacemaking and peacekeeping will be evaluated within two case studies: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Darfur </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Western Sahara </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Data will be analyzed on a qualitative basis using primary and secondary sources </li></ul>
  9. 9. Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Peacemaking: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The use of both non-military and military interventions as a means to achieve cessation of open hostilities. </li></ul></ul>
  10. 10. Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Peacekeeping: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The act of maintaining and sustaining peace through the use of military intervention forces. </li></ul></ul>
  11. 11. Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Financial Impediments to peace: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Obstacles, financial by nature, which obstruct the proliferation of peacekeeping endeavors. </li></ul></ul>
  12. 12. Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Political Impediments to peace: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Hurdles peacekeepers face which stem from the use of rules, alliances, and other political devices to obstruct the progression of peacekeeping endeavors. </li></ul></ul>
  13. 13. Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Socio-Cultural Impediments to peace: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Obstacles born through circumstances that involve conflicting groups whereby the source of conflict is ethnic, cultural, or societal by nature. </li></ul></ul>
  14. 14. Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>AU Efficacy: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The AU’s ability to meet peacemaking and peacekeeping goals wherein peace is attained and sustained. </li></ul></ul>
  15. 15. Methodology <ul><li>Conceptual clarifications </li></ul><ul><ul><li>AU Efficacy (cont.) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Peacemaking Goals </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>To halt hostilities through the attainment and continuance of ceasefire. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Peacekeeping Goals </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>To bring warring parties to the negotiations table </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Facilitate negotiation whereby both parties are likely to maintain peaceful relations over time </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>To maintain peace longevity amongst the populace </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>
  16. 16. Darfur
  17. 17. Darfur Background <ul><li>40 percent of the Darfur region is of Fur ethnicity (non-Arab) </li></ul><ul><li>Disproportional treatment of non-Arab groups in midst of drought and famine </li></ul><ul><li>Disgruntled groups take up arms against government officials in February 2003 </li></ul>
  18. 18. Darfur Background <ul><li>Conflict redefined: Arabs vs. Non-Arabs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Rebel groups form </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Justice Equality Movement (JEM) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Government funding and support of Arab tribes continues to flare non-Arab distaste for an Arab-dominated Khartoum </li></ul></ul>
  19. 19. Darfur Background <ul><li>The Janjaweed </li></ul><ul><ul><li>An Arab militia with whom the SLM/A and JEM have been in conflict. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Government funded </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Act as a proxy fighting force against the rebel groups in the region on behalf of the Sudanese Government </li></ul></ul>
  20. 20. Darfur Background <ul><li>Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Not all rebel groups listed as signatories </li></ul></ul><ul><li>AU sanctions against DPA violators </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Chronic cease-fire violations </li></ul></ul><ul><li>2009 – AMIS becomes </li></ul><ul><li>United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (AMID) </li></ul>
  21. 21. Darfur: Financial Impediments <ul><li>Over-stretched combat forces </li></ul><ul><ul><li>7,700 man force to cover entire region </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Underpaid military – pay is months in arrears </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Struggling AU Peace Fund </li></ul><ul><ul><li>International dependence </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>E.g. EU to pledge €40 million, Britain increases aid from £6.6 million to £19 million </li></ul></ul></ul>
  22. 22. Darfur: Financial Impediments <ul><li>UN/AU Hybrid Force </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Replace current force with 23,000 personnel in the region </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Khartoum’s resistance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>“ [UN resolution 1706 is] part of a comprehensive conspiracy for confiscating [Sudan’s] sovereignty” </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>-President al-Bashir </li></ul></ul></ul>
  23. 23. Darfur: Political Impediments <ul><li>State sponsored violence </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Proven Khartoum support for Janjaweed </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Sudanese President al-Bashir </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Refusal of UN logistical support in the region </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Indictment by ICC for Crimes Against Humanity </li></ul></ul><ul><li>The Chinese variable </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Sudan is China’s largest supplier of oil while China is Sudan’s largest supplier of arms. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>80 percent of $500 million in revenue went for military expense in 1999 </li></ul></ul></ul>
  24. 24. Darfur: Socio-Cultural Impediments <ul><li>Arab – non-Arab cleavages </li></ul><ul><li>Rebel factions split </li></ul><ul><ul><li>SLM/A JEM split into multiple fighting groups </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Power struggle between ethnicities </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Infighting proliferates </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Hampers peace talks </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Charter of reunification </li></ul>
  25. 25. Darfur: Conclusions <ul><li>AU enforcement of DPA falls short </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Logistical shortcomings </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Political impediments </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Socio-cultural cleavages </li></ul></ul>
  26. 26. Western Sahara
  27. 27. Western Sahara Background <ul><li>Spanish decolonization </li></ul><ul><li>Land grab </li></ul><ul><ul><li>AU charter – Land to be returned to previous sovereignty </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>International Court of Justice Ruling (ICJ) </li></ul></ul>
  28. 28. Western Sahara Background <ul><li>Chronology of conflict </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Morocco and Mauritania lay claim to the region </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Western Sahara natives (Saharawis) form a rebellion force and government </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Prolisario Front) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (1976) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Prolisario overtakes Mauritania but not Morocco </li></ul></ul>
  29. 29. Western Sahara Background <ul><li>Agenda for peace </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ad Hoc committee (“Committee of Wise Men”) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Implementation Committee </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Recommendations of Committees </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Cease-fire between warring factions </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Withdrawal of Moroccan troops </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Free and Fair referendum for self-determination </li></ul></ul></ul>
  30. 30. Western Sahara: Financial Woes <ul><li>AU fundraising plagued by recent history </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Poor peacekeeping reputation (Chad) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>UN support helps justify limitation of contribution </li></ul></ul><ul><li>US – Moroccan special relationship </li></ul><ul><ul><li>20 percent of US support towards Africa given to Morocco </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>US allowed access to Moroccan ports, airspace </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Morocco helps support pro-western regimes in Africa </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>American support turns the tide of Prolisario-Moroccan conflict </li></ul></ul>
  31. 31. Western Sahara: Financial Woes <ul><li>Natural resources: An ulterior motive? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>10 billion tons of phosphate </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.7 billion tons of high-grade ore </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Amongst the largest fisheries in the world </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Western Sahara would be the second largest producer of phosphate in the world </li></ul><ul><ul><li>#1: Morocco </li></ul></ul>
  32. 32. Western Sahara: Political Impediments <ul><li>Loophole in international law </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty in the Western Saharan region </li></ul></ul><ul><li>SADR admission to AU </li></ul><ul><ul><li>AU membership split on SADR self-determination </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>SADR admission led to Moroccan withdrawal </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Politicized Western Saharan conflict </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Forfeited AU objectivity </li></ul></ul>
  33. 33. Western Sahara: Socio-Cultural Issues <ul><li>Ruling of ICJ </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Western Sahara not found to be terra nullis </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Neither Morocco nor Mauritania held legal claim to the region </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ruling upheld Saharawis’ right to self-determination </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Little materialized pursuant to the 15-1 ruling </li></ul></ul>
  34. 34. Western Sahara: Socio-Cultural Issues <ul><li>Elusive referendum </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ceasefire achieved </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Referendum promised </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Objections to voter registration </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Provisional Voters List (PVL) </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Revised PVL qualified 86,425 voters out of a population of 250,000 </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Referendum Deadline is continuously postponed </li></ul></ul></ul>
  35. 35. Western Sahara: Conclusions <ul><li>Strong US-Moroccan relationship </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Formidable Moroccan military front stymies negotiations </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Political missteps undermine peacekeeping and peacemaking processes </li></ul><ul><ul><li>UN support and leadership increased after SADR’s admission to the AU </li></ul></ul>
  36. 36. Western Sahara: Conclusions <ul><li>Moroccan openness to UN-led peacekeeping operations as a result of: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Moroccan mistrust of AU peacekeeping </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Close US-Morocco relations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>US influence in the UN </li></ul></ul>
  37. 37. Thesis Conclusions <ul><li>The AU’s consistent need for UN involvement </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Inability to support peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavors </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Competing with well funded governments </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Governments are well connected </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>AU fragility prevents a unified peacekeeping force and voice </li></ul></ul>
  38. 38. Thesis Conclusions <ul><li>Case studies demonstrate the AU membership is hindered </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Diversity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Size of Goals </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Scope of Goals </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Voluntary funding solicited from members </li></ul><ul><li>Membership’s cavalier attitude undermine AU validity on the whole </li></ul>
  39. 39. Thank You

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