Brian Ghilliotti: Catatumbo Conflict. US Army Reserve project.

1. Catatumbo Conflict
• Origins of conflict stem from the Colombian civil peace
accord attempt in 2016.

2. • During the previous civil war, three rebel factions operated
in the area: FARC, the ELN, and an organized crime
faction known as “Los Rastrojos”.
•
• The FARC, Colombia’s main rebel group, had a small
presence in the region during the conflict.
• In August 2016, the group disarmed in the region, on the
conditions of decocafication, supported by Colombian
government funding for alternate crop farming programs.
• The Colombian government also pledged economic
development in Catatumbo for the region’s rural peasants.

3. • The safety of former rebels and social activists was also
guaranteed by the Colombian government.
1
• The disarmament deal happened at the end of President
Juan Manuel Santos’ rule.
• By 2018, a more right wing leader was voted in, Ivan
Duque Marquez, who had less sympathy for the peace
process.
• Farmers in former areas controlled by FARC rebels initially
agreed to grow substitution crops, which they complained
sold for much less than cocoa, while obtaining a monthly
stipend of 300 euros.
https://www.france24.com/en/20180921-video-reporters-catatumbo-colombia-cursed-coca-catatumbo
1

4. • As soon as Duque came into office, he cut these stipends
for substitution crops and has not pushed for economic
development in the region, as called for in the 2016
accord.
2
• In response some farmers or landless ex rebels have
chosen to return to cocoa production or rejoin the
insurgency by joining the other armed groups still
operating in the region.
• These armed groups included the ELN, Los Rostrojos, and
the EPL.
2 https://www.france24.com/en/20180921-video-reporters-catatumbo-colombia-cursed-coca-catatumbo

5. • The result is a conflict between the ELN, EPL, and Los
Rastrojos for the control over the cocoa fields.

6. • Though a small number of former FARC rebels have
remobilized in the region, the vacuum left behind by the
FARC was mostly filled by the three other groups.
• FARC has chosen to remobilize in the less populated
southern regions, showing sympathy for the peasants
desire to no longer remain in a state of conflict.
3
The population density of Colombia.
Red showing concentration of population .4
https://www.france24.com/en/20180921-video-reporters-catatumbo-colombia-cursed-coca-catatumbo3
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Colombia
4

7. Los Rastrojos
• Los Rastrojos originated from the break of the Colombian
Norte del Valle drug cartel.
• The group started fracturing by 2012 when its top
leadership was captured, killed, or surrendered.
• In 2017, last major leadership of Los Rastrojos was
captured, leaving the organization without unity of
command.
• Localized remnants of Los Rastrojos in Catatumbo
continued their operations smuggling cocoa paste across

8. the border into Venezuela and over maritime routes to
North America and Europe.
5
• Though Los Rastrojos have a presence on the Colombian
side of the border, they primarily remain on the Venezuelan
side, buying cocoa paste from the various competing
rebel factions inside Colombia, where they refine it into
cocaine.
6
• Their relationship with the EPL faction has complicated
the tactical situation in Catatumbo, causing a split in the
organization.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Rastrojos
5
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5afadb104.html6

9. • While the EPL was in conflict with the ELN, the EPL
leaders controlling cells in the center of Norte de
Santander province, encompassing the Catatumbo region,
sent a group of fighters to the south of the province to a
border town (Puerto Santander) to gain control of drug
trafficking routes in the area.
• The commander of EPL cells in central Norte del
Santander later asked these cells that were deployed
south the move back north to reinforce his cells against
the ELN.
• The EPL cells deployed in Puerto Santander refused, and
the commander of EPL cells in central Norte Del
Santander learned that these commanders had switched
their loyalties.

10. • They formed an alliance with Los Rastrojos on the
Venezuelan side of the border, effectively converting these
cells into a drug trafficking group.
•
• This split the EPL, weakened them, and yielded the
province to the ELN.
7
https://thedailyusnews.com/eln-gains-upper-hand-over-epl-in-norte-de-santander-colombia/
7

11. • Los Rastrojos complicated their own tactical situation by
choosing to work with Venezuelan opposition leaders
Juan Guaido.
• In September 2019, photos emerged of Juan Guaido next
to local leaders of the Los Rastrojos gang.
• Guaido later claimed he was only seeking their help in
February 2019 to sneak across the Colombian border to
attend a concert raising “humanitarian” aid for Venezuela.
8
• Real goal was to have the convoy attacked by Guaido
supporters posing as Maduro supporters, hoping to
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/juan-guaido-take-photos-with-rastrojos-at-colombia-border/
8

12. instigate anger amongst anti-Maduro activists within
Venezuela and beyond (the plot failed).
• Guaido claimed that he did not realize whom he was
working with.
• Later on a high ranking Los Rastrojos member confessed
that his group did help Guaido sneak across the border to
attend the concert.
• He also stated that Guaido promised Los Rastrojos would
have complete control over black market activities along
the Colombian-Venezuelan border if he got in power.
9
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/juan-guaido-take-photos-with-rastrojos-at-colombia-border/9

13. Los Rastrojos Areas (Green)
10
https://naritoons.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/los-nuevos-paramilitares-de-colombia/
10

14. • Venezuelan military responded to these revelation by
conducting a raid against their hideouts along the
Venezuelan border, dismantling a communications and
smuggling base while making several arrests.
11
• Additionally, the Venezuelan military has used the help
of ELN cells on both sides of the border to neutralize
Los Rastrojos cells affecting Venezuela.
12
• In July 2019, a group of Los Rastrojos were found
massacred along the Venezuelan Colombian border,
presumably by a faction of Los Rastrojos that was led
http://cubasi.cu/en/world/item/19692-venezuelan-army-dismantles-los-rastrojos-base-in-tachira
11
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/rastrojos-siege-colombia-venezuela-border/
12

15. by a Rastrojos leader who was released from
Venezuelan prison.
• The leader was released on condition that he would
help the Venezuelan security forces bring the border
regions under their control.
13
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/massacre-colombia-venezuela-border-rastrojos-war/
13

16. The ELN
• The ELN originated in 1964 as a leftist guerrilla
organization based on Marxism and liberation theology,
fighting for the interests of Colombia’s peasant classes.
• It did more to reach out to university students and
urban youth than the FARC, which distinguished it from
the FARC.
• By 1973 the ELN was almost pacified by the Colombian
military, but the President of Colombia at the time,
López Michelsen decided to let the group survive so
they could participate in a negotiated end of the civil
war.

17. • These negotiations broke down, and the ELN resumed
fighting.
• During this time it resorted to taxing the cocaine
smuggling trade and extortion of foreign oil companies.
• The ELN refused to participate in another round of
peace negotiations between the rebels and the
Colombian government under the Presidency of Andrés
Pastrana Arango (1998 to 2002).
• Another effort to offer the ELN a demilitarized zone in
Colombia’s southern regions was successfully blocked
by right wing paramilitaries in the region.

18. • Under the Presidency of Álvaro Uribe Juan Manuel
Santos Calderón (2010 to 2018) saw another concerted
effort to generate a peace with Colombia’s rebels.
• The ELN’s reaction was to be skeptical of them, but
continue to let them proceed without participating.
• The ELN’s reaction to the January 2018 demilitarization
agreement between the FARC and the Colombian
government was to wait and see if the next president
who would be elected in Colombia’s 2018 Presidential
election would honor Calderon’s settlement.
14
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Liberation_Army_(Colombia)
14

19. • President Iván Duque Márquez won the election, who
did not support the peace efforts of the previous
administration.
• He failed to financially support cocoa crop substitution
agreements , resumed cocoa crop eradication efforts,15
and did not commit to developing the Catatumbo
region.
• Duque’s administration also saw a stepped up killing of
former guerrillas, leftists, and human rights advocates
throughout Colombia.
16
https://www.france24.com/en/20180921-video-reporters-catatumbo-colombia-cursed-coca-catatumbo
15
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/colombia-human-rights-advocate-killed-days-190105131404348.html
16

20. • The ELN gave their final answer concerning the January
2018 peace accord by carrying out a car bombing of
Bogota's Gen. Santander National Police Academy in
January 2019.
• The ELN claimed responsibility, stating it was done in
retaliation for the Colombian military’s bombing of their
camps, though they had said they would tentatively
support the ceasefire.
17
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/21/americas/colombia-car-bomb-eln/index.html
17

21. Venezuelan ELN Ties
• Venezuela’s Maduro tolerates the presence of the ELN
and other Colombian rebels in his country.
• The ELN has allegedly helped Maduro repress anti
government demonstrators
18
• We must have some skepticism with these claims, as
these press allegations could have been put forth to
discredit the Colombian rebels, who may have not
been involved.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/01/feared-colombian-guerrillas-join-forces-maduro-regime-quash/18

22. • The ELN has also helped the Venezuelan military
secure its border with Colombia and act as a strategic
buffer against potential land based attacks from
Colombia.
• The ELN has also pledged to provide military support
for Maduro’s regime should it face an attack from the
United States
19
• The ELN also provides security in the mining
communities of southern Venezuela, where they carry
out gold mining activities, with Maduro’s tacit support,
as an alternative source of funding besides the cocoa
trade.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/02/02/eln-interview-colombian-marxist-guerrillas-will-fight-us-troops/
19

23. • The ELN’s security services involve helping the
Venezuelan government wrestle control of these legally
unsanctioned gold mining operations from criminal
organizations, and bringing them under joint control
between themselves and the Venezuela.
20
• The ELN’s primary means of funding remains taxing
drug smuggling operations through Venezuela.
• The ELN also use Venezuela as a military sanctuary, a
source of recruitment, training, and propaganda.
https://ctc.usma.edu/maduros-revolutionary-guards-rise-paramilitarism-venezuela/
20

24. • Open sources have reported the ELN presence in half
of Venezuela’s states.
21
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/eln-present-half-venezuela/
21

25. • There have bene times when the Venezuelan security
forces have clashed with ELN cells inside Venezuela,
but these have been isolated incidents.
• In one case, the Venezuelan National Guard made an
arrest of an ELN commander, resulting in a retaliatory
attack in November 2018 by the ELN that left three
dead and ten wounded.
22
• Given the outside pressures the Maduro regime is
facing, Maduro has decided that he is better off having
the ELN as an ally rather than an adversary, as they are
more of a benefit to him than a problem.
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/eln-present-half-venezuela/22

26. • Open sources indicate that the ELN leader who was
arrested, leading to the November 2018 clash between
ELN and Maduro’s security forces, remains in
custody.
23
• It seems as if the ELN has restrained its reaction to this
situation, realizing that it cannot jeopardize its strategic
advantages it has in using Venezuela as a sanctuary.
http://www.2001online.com/en-la-agenda/196235/el-guerrillero-del-eln-alias-garganta-sera-recluido-en-ramo-verde.html
23

27. Relevance
• In March 2020, Trump announced that his administration
was labeling Maduro and several of his close aides as
“narco-terrorists”, and offered a $15 million dollar reward
for information leading to his capture.
• He specifically claimed that Maduro was conspiring with
Colombian rebels to “flood the United States with
cocaine.”
24
• There was some speculation that he was trying to
politically posture with the Venezuelan American voting
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/indicts-venezuela-maduro-narcoterrorism-charges-200326145359824.html24

28. community, made up anti-Maduro exiles, for the up
coming election.
• This looked less like political posturing when Trump
ordered the deployment of US Naval assets off of
Venezuela’s Caribbean coast to intercept drug
traffickers .
25
• He claimed they were trying to take advantage of the
Covid-19 pandemic to facilitate their drug smuggling
operations
26
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/us-navy-warships-drug-smugglers/
25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wxDaIXbEBE0
26

29. • Some open sources questioned Trump’s true motives, as
most of the drugs smuggled into the United States come
from Colombia’s Pacific Coast .
27
• Some press sources and world leaders were beginning to
wonder if Trump’s true motivation was to initiate military
action against Venezuela in order to deflect negative
Covid-19 related attention away from him.
• Diplomatic sources in both Cuba and Venezuela openly
characterized Trump’s saber rattling as an effort to distract
attention away from his Covid-19 issues.
28
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/us-navy-warships-drug-smugglers/27
https://www.newsweek.com/venezuela-cuba-argue-us-military-operation-caribbean-attempt-intimidate-distract-1500535
28

30. • In another step indicating potential confrontation, Trump
ordered Chevron to shut down operations in Venezuela in
April 2020.
29
• By May 2020, Trump announced the authority to mobilize
up to 200 Soldiers from the Selected Reserves to “fight
drug trafficking”.
30
• The analyst sees a slow build up to war on the part of
Trump, trying to portray Maduro in many ways like Manual
Noriega was portrayed prior to the 1989 invasion of
Panama.
https://apnews.com/ec3510ac38818e219a7268668da9920e
29
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/05/01/trump-authorizes-activation-more-troops-fight-drug-trafficking.html
30

31. • He is trying to link this effort toward the familiar sources of
fear that Americans are currently dealing with, terrorism
and Covid-19, to “sell” this potential invasion.
• His motivations could range from ideological, a desire for
resources, a desire to remove foreign actors from
America’s “back yard”, to a need for a political distraction.
• If one of Trump’s motives for his saber rattling against
Venezuela is to intimidate foreign powers from building
their presence in Venezuela, it has seemingly backfired.
• In that same month, April 2020, the Russian military
leaked information to open sources that they were

32. drawing plans to try to break the blockade if needed,
primarily by using submarines.
31
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russia-may-break-venezuela-blockade-with-subs-warships-media/
31