1. Word Count: 7653
PLAN COLOMBIA:
AIMED TO ELIMINATE COCAINE OR COMMUNISM
International Studies Capstone Thesis
by
NOLAN CREWS
Submitted to the International Studies Program of
North Carolina State University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
BACHELOR OF ARTS
December 14, 2014
!

2. ! ii
ABSTRACT
Throughout the analysis of Plan Colombia, I intend to bring forth the idea that the United States
geared this policy in order to fight the communist guerrilla group known as the FARC. The
FARC, otherwise known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, has countered
the Colombian government for the past five decades in an attempt to establish a more extreme-
left, communist-like government similar to Cuba. This analysis will put into question the aid
distribution, the status of the coca plant eradication, and the strategies that the United States is
taking in order to complete this so called coca plant eradication. While doing so, I hope to bring
to light this far-reaching idea that Plan Colombia is an attack on communism rather than cocaine.
Then, I propose that the United States progress towards direct involvement in Colombia to
counter the FARC. In the meantime, however, 11 Colombians on average are killed daily due to
this ongoing internal conflict (“Colombian conflict has killed 220,000 in 55 years, commission
finds,” 2013). This conflict has continuously claimed innocent civilian lives since 1964, and Plan
Colombia has not neutralized this. This lack of progress after the implementation of Plan
Colombia shows that a more direct approach should be taken by the United States if they want to
truly defeat this communist uprising in Colombia.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. HISTORY OF COLOMBIA 3
III. HISTORY OF PLAN COLOMBIA 7
IV. AID DISTRIBUTION 9
V. STATUS OF THE COCA PLANT ERADICATION 13
VI. UNITED STATES’ MILITARY STRATEGIES 17
VII. CONCLUSION 23
BIBLIOGRAPHY 27

4. 1
INTRODUCTION
Plan Colombia was originally proposed in 1999 by Colombia’s former President Andrés
Pastrana in order to further develop economically beyond their dependence on the coca trade and
strengthen the country against the extremist groups. The Plan was supposed to be funded by
several different countries, however there ended up to be only two main donors: the United
States, $1.3 billion, and Spain, $100 million (Stokes 60). Since the United States was the major
donor and showed much support, the Plan was altered in order for it to get approval from
Congress. The United States expressed the three main objectives for this Plan: economic
development, coca eradication, and the bettering of human rights (Stokes 93). Despite these
objectives, it is clear that the United States geared this policy towards fighting the communist
guerrilla group known as the FARC. The FARC, otherwise known as the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia, has countered the Colombian government and the right-wing paramilitaries
for the past five decades in an attempt to establish a more extreme-left, communist-like
government similar to Cuba (Stokes 578). The right-wing paramilitaries do not have the same
views as the Colombian government or the United States; however, they share the commonality
of disliking the FARC. This research evaluates the methods of the United States, including: aid
distribution, the status of the coca plant eradication, and the United States’ strategies to complete
this coca plant eradication.
While doing so, I argue that Plan Colombia is an attack by the United States on the
FARC and communism and not an attack on cocaine. Due to the Plan’s claimed focus of
eradicating the coca plant, large amounts of money are being wasted since the presence of the
coca plant and cocaine have only increased, and lives are continuously lost. Based on this
research, the United States should adapt Plan Colombia to entail a more developmental approach

5. 2
by improving Colombia’s infrastructure while offering alternative crops to reduce the desire to
cultivate the coca plant while pointing the Colombian economy in the right direction instead of
countering the FARC’s insurgency. In the meantime, however, 11 Colombians on average are
killed daily due to this ongoing internal conflict (The Guardian 2013). This conflict has
continuously claimed innocent civilian lives since 1964, and Plan Colombia has not neutralized
this. This lack of development and strengthening of Colombia after the implementation of the
Plan shows that a more developmental approach should be taken by the United States if they
truly desire to defeat this communist uprising in Colombia.

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HISTORY OF COLOMBIA
In terms of the history of Colombia, there is a vast amount of background information
that is necessary to understand the country and the current happenings. Firstly, one should
understand that Colombia is a characteristically violent country as they have had interminable
civil unrest since their independence from Spain in 1810 except for a brief cessation between
1902 to the 1940s (Rochlin 715). Secondly, one has to have a firm grasp on the notion that the
violence within Colombia occurs due to a shared political discontent. Thirdly, one must put all of
this into an economical context where the coca plant is the most cultivated crop in the Andean
region and the alkaloid within the leaves can then be turned into cocaine and sold for extremely
high prices.
Much of the root of the Colombian conflict can be traced back to the independence from
the Spanish control in 1810. Since they were a newly free country, Colombians had to figure out
their political affiliation in order to create a functioning government. LeGrand declares that some
Colombians claim that they are born Liberal or Conservative and that these affiliations are
hereditary to them (172). With that being said, one can associate the main left wing guerrilla
groups, the FARC and the ELN (National Liberation Army), on the liberal side. The right wing
paramilitaries fall under the conservative side, with the main one being the AUC (United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia). The AUC was considered to be inactive as of 2008, but there are
many other smaller-scale paramilitaries that are still present. The FARC is still active today,
although their force has been put into question due to a slowing down of operations. Needless to
say, both sides are forces in which should not be reckoned with and they are both responsible to
kidnappings, assassinations, and mass killings of civilians (Stokes 67-68). As Stokes claims,
there is no such thing as a “secure environment” (67).

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Now if we examine the civil wars within Colombia, we will find that they began due to
the Colombians strong belief in their views pertaining to politics. Not only did their views cause
controversy, but the corruption that comes along with politics also caused a lot of internal
conflict. The two most significant civil wars within Colombia are known as the Guerra de los
Mil Días or the Thousand Days’ War and La Violencia or The Violence. The cause of the Guerra
de los Mil Días lies in the idea that the Conservatives achieved their power through rigging the
election and over 100,000 lives were lost from 1899 to 1902 due to this conflict (LeGrand 172).
Colombia then experience approximately forty years of peace and tranquility before La
Violencia began. The outcome of the 1946 election can be noted as an underlying factor in La
Violencia, but the true reason as to why La Violencia occurred is the assassination of the re-
elected Liberal Colombian President at the time, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala (LeGrand 172). In
1957, peace talks between leaders of the two parties and they came to an agreement known as the
National Front of 1958 that the next four presidencies would rotate between the two parties
(*LeGrand PG #). In other words, a Liberal held the office in 1958 and then a Conservative came
next in 1962 and so on. However, this arrangement did not lead to peace by any means. On the
contrary, this led to the formation of many guerrilla groups in the 1960s that had been inspired
by the notorious Fidel Castro in Cuba (LeGrand 174). As a reaction to the left-wing guerrilla
groups, right-wing paramilitary groups began to form in the 1980s. The paramilitaries function in
a similar manner to the guerrilla groups, but also have many differences. The guerrilla groups
rely heavily on kidnappings to fund their tasks, while the paramilitaries rely heavily on the drug
trade to fund theirs (Stokes 66)
The coca plant should also be looked at in a historical context due to the reason that the
cultivation of the coca plant serves a larger purpose for the Andean culture beyond

8. 5
manufacturing cocaine. Howard Mofenson and Thomas Caraccio explain that inhabitants of the
Andes region have chewed the coca leaves due to its sweet property (864). Laura Pereira, whom
visited Colombia to form her argument that the coca plant is a commodity, goes on to explain
how there are an infinite amount of local recipes that include the coca plant, such as: salsa de
coca, arroz mixto con coca, and crema de dodo de coca (392). Pereira also states that the coca
leaves are nutritional and contain a high amount of calcium (392). Due to the strong cultural
characteristic that the coca leaves have, its legality is debated.
However, this small-scale amount of coca that a person is allowed to grow allows for the
Colombians to abuse this right. Colombians have grown aware of the economic benefits that the
coca plants reap, and therefore make the decision to grow more than necessary for their own
personal use. The other well-known crops of Colombia, coffee and cacao, do not provide the
same economic profits that are needed in the areas where poverty is highly present (Hellin 141).
Hellin goes on to declare that “Coca does not require fertilizer, it suffers from few pest problems,
it grows well in impoverished soils, it can be harvested three or four times a year, it is easy to
transport and despite price fluctuations it can bring in a good reliable income” (141). Due to this
high rate of poverty, many Colombians rely on the coca plant since it can grow in the most
extreme of conditions and since it is an economically lucrative crop. Needless to say, the crop is
a staple in the Andean region that led to the trafficking of cocaine that the paramilitaries and
guerrilla groups are mostly responsible for.
This is not to say that all Colombians that grow coca are associated with cocaine and the
drug trade. Many farmers grow the coca plant for recreational uses, as stated previously. On the
other hand, there are also many farmers that have ties to either the paramilitaries or the guerrilla
groups. These farmers are less likely to be targeted by the Colombian government for growing

9. 6
the coca plant on a small to medium scale, so it is a safer method for the groups. Then, the
farmers are paid for their coca leaves by these groups in order to fund their operations and
activity within the drug trade.

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HISTORY OF PLAN COLOMBIA
The former Colombian President, Andrés Pastrana, prepared the first proposal of Plan
Colombia in 1999 as a “$7.5 billion aid package designed to address the country’s interwoven
problems of extensive narco-trafficking, civil war and economic underdevelopment” (Stokes 92).
Pastrana called for 55% of the aid to go towards military and the remaining 45% to be dedicated
to alternate developmental methods (Stokes 96). The Clinton Administration in the United States
was the first to show a large amount of support for Plan Colombia, and promised to allocate $1.3
billion for this initiative. However, the United States’ final proposal required that over 80% of
the money to aid Colombia be spent on the Colombian military (Stokes 96). Due to this heavy
militarization of the Plan, other international countries decided to restrain from providing aid.
Needless to say, this militarization strays from the original intentions that Pastrana had. In a a
conversation between Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright, and Andrés Pastra in 2000,
Pastrana stated that,
Plan Colombia wants to… implement policies on health, on structural reforms,
strengthening our institutions, human rights and alternative development and
social investment. We want to invest most of this money that we're asking for the
international community in social development, because we cannot solve only the
problem looking at this as a military problem or a policing aspect or the
repression problem. We want to get into the real essence of the problem: that is,
bringing back to Colombia prosperity and health and richness to our people, and
that's the way of eradicating drugs from our soil and from our territory (Stokes
93-94).
The original goals of Plan Colombia were to develop the country economically, eradicate
50% of the crops over a six-year period, and to improve human rights (Stokes 61). Yet, the Plan
was destined to fail from the beginning due to the aid being mainly directed to the military and
not putting enough towards alternative development. Going back to the quote by Pastrana, he
even stated that taking a military perspective would not solve the conflict within Colombia and

11. 8
that development is necessary to bring prosperity. However, he accepted the United States’
proposal and militarized the conflict within Colombia leading to thousands of civilian deaths and
misery to those alive. Meanwhile, the rest of the international community decided to hold back
knowing that the Plan was now militarized and not focusing on the original developmental
strategy.
The Plan intended on sanctioning crop alternatives to those who willingly eradicated their
coca plants that exceeded the legal amount, fumigating the coca plants that were not willingly
eradicated, and developing the country socially and economically to where Colombians may
have a legacy beyond the cocaine trade. This research will show the contrary and upholds that
Plan Colombia was disguised by the United States as such in order to remain behind the scenes
while taking out the communist-like guerrilla group in Colombia known as the FARC.

12. 9
AID DISTRIBUTION
The Plan that Andrés Pastrana drafted called for $7.5 billion in aid between 2000 and
2006 in order to achieve all of the goals that have been previously listed. The United States
appropriated $1.3 billion, Colombia accounted themselves for raising $4 billion from the
privatization of public utilities, and the remaining $2.2 billion was supposed to come from other
countries (Stokes 60). However, many of the European countries that Colombia was looking at
for the money held back due to revised United States’ version of the Plan that gave a more
militarized approach. As stated previously, the Plan increased the amount of military aid from
55% to 80%, and Colombia was heavily militarized by the United States (Schack 146). Due to
this militarization of Colombia, the European countries took it such that the goals of Plan
Colombia were altered and no longer focused on development. Therefore, the European
countries did not believe that their monetary aid would alleviate Colombia’s current state of civil
unrest or their lack of development. Because of the lack of aid from other countries and the
majority of the United States’ aid going to military spending, little money was actually spent on
the original developmental strategies, such as the alternative crops that were essential to the
possible success that the Plan could have had.
Schack refers to a journalist named Misha Glenny who then refers to the Government
Accountability Office which states that approximately 70% of the money that is supposedly
going towards Plan Colombia does not leave the boundaries of the United States (Schack 146).
Instead, the United States looks towards large corporations within its borders, such as Military
Professional Resources Incorporation or MPRI. MPRI is a global provider of private military
contractor services that just so happened to receive a $6 million contract in 2000 in order to

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advise and train the Colombian military as part of Plan Colombia (Rochlin 726). Not only that,
but the United States has also used a massive amount of money that was dedicated to the Plan in
order to provide Colombia with several aircrafts, such as the C-26, AC-47, OV-10, T-65, AT-
802, Huey II, and UH-60 Blackhawks (Rochlin 729). These range from fighter aircrafts to coca
crop spraying aircrafts to specialized helicopters, and all of them come with a hefty price tag
(Rochlin 729). The list of equipment, however, does not end there. The Colombian military
received a great deal of other gear, such as land radar systems, night-vision equipment, and even
satellite surveillance (Rochlin 731). By examining this militarization of the aid package, people
such as Justin Delacour argue that Plan Colombia goes by a counterinsurgency strategy instead
of the publicized counternarcotic strategy (63). The United States is attempting to counter and
defeat the FARC in order to maintain the democratic control within Colombia. In other words,
the United States does not consider cocaine to be the central problem in Colombia, but rather this
communist group that poses a threat to United States’ interests. The United States has one main
interest when dealing with Colombia, and that is petroleum. Colombia is the fifth largest
importer of petroleum into the United States, and therefore a huge part of the United States-
Colombia relationship (Rapier). With that being said, it can easily be acknowledged that this
supply could potentially be cut off or be subject to skyrocketing prices if the communist-like
FARC had their way.
By doing so, the Plan should be evaluated as ineffective as it did not take into account
the necessity of a larger amount of aid that should have been allocated towards alternate
developmental programs. According to Stokes, the United States has only allocated an
insignificant amount of money towards alternative development programs, totaling to $68.5
million (Stokes 61). One example of an alternative development program that the United States

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tried to implement was voluntary eradication, where the coca farmers would willingly destroy
their coca crops in exchange for monetary compensation and help with the crop replacement
(Stokes 62). However, Stokes points out that “the Colombian government only has enough
money to cover 13,250” of those who decide to voluntarily destroy their crops, while there are
more than 300,000 that rely on coca plants for their income (62).
Not only that, but the coca farmers have also strongly criticized these alternative crops
that are provided as they do not provide an income parallel to the one that they previously
incurred from the coca plants (Hellin 144). Hellin references the attempts in Bolivia where the
farmers were provided with access to many different crops. For example, pineapple plants were
one of the alternative crops that were grown by many Bolivians. Consequently, the economic
model of supply and demand kicked in when the pineapple was overproduced and caused the
market price to drastically fall and provide very little profit (Hellin 145). On the other hand, the
banana tree crops are one of the few that did hold to be successful in Bolivia. However, there is
another obstacle that much of Latin and South America experience, the lack of a sufficient
infrastructure (Hellin 145). With that being said, local farmers have been able to sell their
bananas on a local level providing an honest living, but the few who have actually benefited
from the banana trees are the farmers who have been able to successfully gain access to the
exportation of their goods (Hellin 146). Consequently, few benefit from these alternative crops
and the typical Colombian is stuck in a perpetual cycle of poverty that results in the cultivation
of the most profitable crop known to them, the coca plant.
Nevertheless, much more than alternative crops will be needed in order to truly raise the
economic dependence on the coca plants and even the economy of Colombia as a whole. Some
of the institutions that need attention, but not inclusively, according to Hylton are: schools,

15. ! 12
health clinics, roads, sewage, and housing (110). By allocating more than 20% of the aid to
programs and institutions like these that actually need help, much of the discontent within
Colombia could dissolve. However, the government will need to implement these and
continuously oversee them in order to make sure that they are being properly run to their utmost
potential. In order for that to happen, however, Colombia and the United States alike will have to
realize and address that the true problem does not lie in the coca plant and the cocaine trade. As
Pastrana said, “bringing back to Colombia prosperity and health and richness to our people…
that's the way of eradicating drugs from our soil and from our territory” (Stokes 93-94).
By the lack of funds being put towards development strategies like the alternative crops
and infrastructure, the perpetual cycle of poverty and the coca plant are both remaining distinct.
Therefore, one can easily assume that the main underlying objective of Plan Colombia is to
militarize the Colombian government in order to abolish the guerrilla groups; not to eradicate the
coca plant and to develop the country’s infrastructure, such as a functioning government and
more extensive roadways. Instead of allocating such an immense amount of money towards the
privatization of military aid, a more fifty-fifty approach should be taken. The alternative crop
programs could possibly show some success, but will not nearly show as much success for
Colombians unless the amount of aid allocated for development increases substantially and goes
towards developing the infrastructure within the country alongside the alternative crops as well.

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STATUS OF THE COCA PLANT ERADICATION
When talking about the success of coca plant eradication, there are mixed responses due
to the subjective nature of the word ‘success.’ Success, however, should be measured by Plan
Colombia’s goals and the ability for it to reach the goal of lessening the coca plant cultivation by
50%. Forrest Hylton suggests that the Plan was successful at the eradication level due to the 5.5
million hectares of land that was seized from 1999 to 2007 (108). However, Michelle Dion and
Catherine Russler bring forth this balloon-effect concept that compares the coca plant to a
balloon (400). Meaning that, if you squeeze the air or eradicate the coca plant from one place, it
will just move to another. One of the statistics that Dion and Russler use is that in a 2005 survey
of the land in Colombia, 44% of the land in which coca was being grown had not been
recognized previously as a coca-producing area (401). With that being said, the crop will simply
relocate elsewhere if it is truly eradicated from one place.
The success of Plan Colombia should, however, be measured by whether or not it
achieved it’s proposed objectives. The objective was to reduce the cultivation and production of
illegal drugs, mainly cocaine, by 50% over a six-year period and was not achieved according to
the 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office (Schack 145). Schack also points out
that cocaine production actually increased within the Colombian borders by approximately 27%
(146). Dion and Russler also point out that attempted coca production has risen by 36% since
2000, which entails both the coca that was eradicated and that which was not eradicated (400).
Therefore, coca plant cultivation is actually increasing despite the United States’ efforts and their
large amount of money dedicated to eradicate the crop. Not only that, but the coca plant can
actually renew itself after eradication once roughly six to eight months pass (Reyes 72). So the

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crops may grow back in the same location half a year later and therefore may require several
fumigation efforts to truly eradicate the plant. Due to this reason and the extraneous conditions
that it can grow in, it is a very desirable crop unless the land that it is grown on is actually
apprehended by the government. If the government seizes a portion of land that the coca plants
are grown on, the only method to recover them is by force. What this means is that the
Colombian military would have to result to force in order to gain control of the coca plant
cultivation and the land given the way that the United States aid is heavily distributed towards
the military.
Coca eradication also corresponds with the inflow of Plan Colombia funds. The coca
plant is cultivated progressively more and more with the cost of United States dollars and
Colombians lives. Reyes states that a 1% increase in eradication consequently results in a 1%
increase in cultivation (82). Despite the efforts by the United States and Colombian governments
to eradicate the coca plant crops, they have not been able to effectively eradicate them due to the
characteristics of the plant. Therefore, it can be said that the increased cultivation provides
enough information to conclude that cocaine, among other drugs, are more readily available for
roughly the same price as before Plan Colombia.
One must also keep in mind that these fumigation attempts do not go unnoticed by the
more commonly attacked guerrillas. In reality, the phrase ‘war on drugs’ is quite accurate. By
that, I mean that the fumigation process is not completed without a fight. As described by Reyes,
the fumigation process includes an OV-10 unarmed aircraft equipped with fumigation materials
such as glyphosate and is accompanied by armed aircrafts such as the Huey II or the UH-60
Black Hawk (73). In doing this, there is a large risk involved. In the past decade, ten pilots have
been killed and the fumigation aircrafts are often shot at by FARC members without discretion

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(Reyes 73). However, there is one loophole to this fumigation process that the FARC are well
aware of. The armed aircrafts that accompany the unarmed fumigation aircraft can only reach a
distance of 80 miles before running out of gas and having to return to the airport in which they
departed from (Reyes 73). Because of the lesser amount of airports in the south of Colombia, a
majority of the FARC operations take place in the southernmost points in Colombia where these
armed aircrafts cannot travel in. The unarmed fumigation aircraft can reach these points, but the
possibility of it being shot down is exponentially higher when it is not accompanied by the armed
aircrafts. Carrying out the fumigation process comes with a high risk in terms of the pilot’s life
and that should be accounted for in the Plan. If the goal of Plan Colombia was to eradicate 50%
of the coca plant, they should also focus on the northern areas of Colombia that pose less of a
threat to the pilot.
Not to mention, the fumigation process also poses many negative consequences.
Glyphosate is a harmful substance to most other crops and will kill them on contact. Hellin
points out that the glyphosate has destroyed their other food crops, such as: plantains, yucca, and
fruit trees (151). In addition to the negative impact that it is on the food crops, it has also come to
attention that glyphosate poses some health risks as well. Many people in Colombia have been
coming forth with medical symptoms such as: diarrhea, vomiting, rashes, irritated eyes, and
headaches (Hellin 151). It should be questioned as to why the eradication process is even carried
out when looking at these negative consequences alongside the increase in cultivation of the coca
plant. These negative consequences should be analyzed further because glyphosate is a toxic
chemical that is even illegal in some countries. If it is continuously used in excess, it could have
a long-term negative effect on the indigenous people’s health as well as the crops that are grown
in Colombia.

19. ! 16
In order to reduce coca plant cultivation, alternative crops such as exotic fruit trees are
going to be needed. However, it would not be bright to rely on a single crop to avoid the
possibility of increasing the supply while the demand will more than likely remain unchanged
such as the example of pineapples in Bolivia. Not only that though, because one must also keep
in mind that the glyphosate chemical used in the fumigation is highly toxic and will kill nearly
any crop on contact. Another factor that must be kept in mind is that these alternative crops are
going to have to be highly profitable in order to truly diminish the Colombian’s desire to grow
the coca plant. Be that as it may, the most important factor is a developed infrastructure that is
accessible for exportation and trade. Trade will be able to flourish with more advanced,
available, and functional roadways. The country will also be more pleased with the knowledge
that their government is operating in the interests of Colombians as a whole instead of the
President’s affiliation. With trade and authority readily accessible and successful, the conflict
and discontent in Colombia will be bettered.

20. ! 17
UNITED STATES’ MILITARY STRATEGIES
There are three main military strategies that will be drawn on, which are: the privatization
of equipment and weaponry, the targeted areas, and the relationship of the paramilitaries with the
United States and Colombian governments. These strategies should be heavily criticized due to
their lack of following through with any of the objectives of Plan Colombia. They do not develop
the economy as they decrease the amount of aid that could be appropriated towards bettering the
infrastructure and offering effective alternative crops. Nor do they better human rights as
militarizing Colombia has only led to more civilian deaths. Nor do they truly eradicate the coca
plant as it was noted in the previous section that coca plant cultivation has actually increased.
Due to the domestic nature of the Colombian conflict, the United States does not seem to
desire to become involved. Colombians have constantly been in disagreement due to their
political affiliations and history. Therefore, the United States did not hesitate when making the
decision and modifying the Plan to create a more militarized approach due to the nature of
privatizing the war. The majority of Americans have not heard about Plan Colombia due to the
distant, behind-the-scenes approach that the United States has taken. “[T]he use of [private]
contractors is meant to attract less public attention to US policy than if US military forces were
used instead” (Rochlin 726). Since there is a small amount of public attention on such a large
foreign policy, the United States government can easily get away with allocating $1.3 billion
from 2000 to 2006. Approximately 75% of this aid was allotted to the Colombian military and
police (Rochlin 726). By doing so, it puts into question the purpose of Plan Colombia on behalf
of the United States. The militarized approach takes the focus away from the coca plant, and puts
the focus on the FARC. The focus was placed on the FARC due to their communist-like views,
and that is why the Colombian government is only targeting the southernmost regions of

21. ! 18
Colombia where the FARC operations take place. In the meantime, the right-wing paramilitaries
go untouched amongst their coca plant estates.
One of the large problems with Plan Colombia is that the majority of the money goes to
private corporations instead of directly to Colombia. These funds never leave the soil of the
United States because the private corporations that provide Colombia with the weaponry,
equipment, and intelligence are based out of the United States. One of the main recipients of this
aid money is a corporation named DynCorp that focuses on security, flight, and intelligence
training. For some reason the United States decided that it would be a good idea to provide
Colombia with 30 Black Hawk helicopters and 33 UH-1N helicopters. (Stokes 64). However, it
does not make sense as to why Colombia would ever need these 63 helicopters in addition to the
others that they received at the same time. No country that is attempting to develop would need
such a vast assortment of helicopters, and therefore suggests that the helicopters were not meant
for developing Colombia. They were to be used in fumigating the FARCS’s coca crops and to
battle them by air if needed. However, the coca eradication attempts were not successful and the
immense sum of money spent on these helicopters is now put into question. Would it not have
served a better purpose if dedicated towards alternative crops or roadways?
Therefore, the United States is not providing Colombia with billions of dollars, but
instead the United States is providing US corporations that specialize in military equipment,
security, and intelligence with billions of dollars. Given that 70% of the $1.3 billion dollars goes
to these US corporations, that only leaves approximately $400 million left for the Colombian
government to spend accordingly. This privatization allows the United States to control the
conflict within Colombia while not actually directly getting involved. By doing this, the United
States is indirectly making the decisions for the Colombian government to continue attacking the

22. ! 19
FARC and the Colombian government does just that without questioning the authority of the
United States since Colombia is using the aid money in which the United States provided them
with.
On a similar note, one of the most criticized points of Plan Colombia is that the United
States is focusing all of the newly trained military personnel that have everything that they need
in any potential combat and only targeting the southern regions of Colombia where the FARC
and other guerrilla groups operate. Generally speaking, the majority of the areas targeted by
aerial fumigation are in the south of Colombia, which is controlled by the FARC. However,
Stokes brings forth a valid point that, “[i]n northern Colombia coca cultivation is largely
industrialized on large well-organized ‘coca-estates’ run by powerful landowners and
paramilitary gangs” (Stokes 64-65). If I stand correct, one of the main objectives of Plan
Colombia was to eradicate drug production by 50% in a six-year period in hopes to reduce the
amount that is then imported into the United States. There is not an official statistic since it is
something that is difficult to measure, but most say that the cultivation of the coca plant actually
increased during the period of Plan Colombia. If one of the main goals of Plan Colombia is to
eradicate the coca plant, why is the United States targeting FARC territory when the right-wing
paramilitaries are in control of the large coca-estates that are responsible for the majority of
cocaine that comes into the United States?
FARC territory is not the main area in which these coca plants are being cultivated. Not
only is it not the main area where the coca plant is being cultivated, but is also not the main area
in which the result of the coca plant, cocaine, is being exported from Colombia into the United
States. The purpose of the Plan is to reduce the in flow of drugs into the United States; however,
they are not targeting the coca plant crops in the north where the majority of drugs are flowing

23. ! 20
into the United States from the paramilitary groups (Stokes 65). These paramilitary groups in the
north mainly fund all of their operations from their profit in the drug trade, which is not the case
with the FARC and other guerrilla groups. The guerrilla groups tend to use more guerrilla-like
tactics to fund their operations, such as kidnappings for ransom. Meanwhile, the paramilitaries
rely more heavily on the drug trade and therefore rely on coca plant cultivation and cocaine
exportation. Why does the United States decide to not target the north where the paramilitaries
mainly reside if Plan Colombia is intended to impede the drug importation into the United
States?
The reason that the United States does not want to target the north is simple; the north of
Colombia is where the AUC and other paramilitaries are located. The paramilitaries fund their
operations from the profits from the drug trade, and the coca plants are more commercialized on
large coca-estates similar to what we know as plantations (Stokes 64-65). These paramilitaries
could be considered a cooperative force to the Colombian and United States government due to
their difference of political views from the FARC. However, by the United States targeting
FARC territory, it can be implied that this is not a war on drugs. In fact, this is a war against the
FARC and their political views that seem parallel to communism.
Conveniently enough, the paramilitaries and the United States have one goal in common;
defeating the FARC and other guerrilla groups. For that reason and that reason alone, the United
States seems to be ignoring the fact that these paramilitaries are heavily invested in the drug
trade. Instead, the United States turns to the paramilitaries and uses them as a proxy to achieve
their goal of an anti-communist counter-insurgency (Stokes 66). Victoria Sanford adds in that the
paramilitaries and the Colombian government share a mutually beneficial relationship (64). What
this entails is that the paramilitaries are allowed to move freely within the country without any

24. ! 21
threat, besides in territories that are controlled by the FARC. In exchange, the paramilitaries
carry out the dirty work, such as assassinations, so that the Colombian government is not directly
held responsible (Sanford 64). Although they are not held accountable for the political
assassinations that take place, they still get the same results that they desire without dirtying their
name in the media.
Due to this relationship between the paramilitaries and the Colombian government
among the militarization of Colombia, one can easily say that the situation has worsened in terms
of human rights. As a result of providing the military with weaponry, these same weapons have
trickled down to the paramilitaries due to their relationship with the government. By consciously
allowing the weaponry to reach the paramilitaries, the United States and Colombian governments
should be held accountable for the crimes that the paramilitaries commit. Sanford provides us
with the statistic that there have been 25,000 to 30,000 homicides in the recent years (77).
Another 2012 article assists this idea by placing Colombia as having the 10th
highest murder rate
out of all of the countries in the entire world (Alfred). The main difference between Colombia
and other countries, however, is that justice is a rare commodity in Colombia. Stokes goes as far
as to say that the Colombian military has in fact brought ‘lawlessness’ and ‘murder’ to
Colombians (68). Sanford even goes on to declare that those in power often rationalize these
killings by stating that they are done to prevent international communism (77-78). The killings
have changed in fashion, however, according to a former member of the AUC that goes by
‘Julian.’ Julian declares that ever since human rights have become a large topic, they have to kill
each person ‘one by one’ in order to prevent the term ‘massacre’ to become associated with them
and their operations (Sanford 66). However, a majority of the Colombians that are murdered

25. ! 22
each year do not have any affiliation with the FARC. On the contrary, they are often peasant
inhabitants (Stokes 68).
With this being said, it puts into question the claimed objective of bettering human rights.
Not only have human rights not bettered, but they have worsened. This can be accredited to
many things that are occurring within the country. First and foremost, the ridiculous amount of
weapons that the Colombian government received from the United States should be questioned.
Colombia’s army already had plenty of arms as most armies do, so they were not a necessary
element for Plan Colombia to achieve its claimed objectives. Secondly, the United States
intervening has only caused more tension within the country. According to the Human Rights
Watch, the killings within Colombia peaked from 2006-2008, just as Plan Colombia came to and
end (Vivanco; par. 6). It also does not help when President Uribe is attempting to pass bills that
would not hold those in the Colombian army accountable by simply trying them in military
courts and granting them impunity (Vivanco; par. 6).

26. ! 23
CONCLUSION
First and foremost, it should be understood that Plan Colombia was not successful in
completing its claimed objectives. As a reminder, the claimed objectives for Plan Colombia
were: economic development, coca plant eradication, and the bettering of human rights.
Economic development was not achieved due to the lack of funds appropriated to do so. Some
farmers did receive a decent compensation for willfully eradicating their crops, but they did not
receive an alternative crop in order to progress them past the coca cultivation. Then, the aid
appropriated for development ran out and some farmers that willfully eradicated their crops did
not even receive compensation. An agro-industrial engineer in the region also made a sarcastic
remark that “maybe the money got lost on the way, or maybe [the government] contracted a lot
of experts in order to supply the cow” (Brittain 125). As far as coca plant eradication goes,
progress was not achieved due to the 27% increase in coca production over the course of Plan
Colombia according to Schack (146). The last objective of bettering human rights was not
achieved either as subjective as it may be. Stokes argues that the Colombian military has one of
the worst records in terms of human rights, and that they have maintained their connections to
the right-wing paramilitaries (97). Now if you add in the mass amount of money that is funneled
through the Colombian military, it can be assumed that some weapons reach the paramilitaries
whom carry out a majority of the civilian killings. One of the examples that Delacour uses is that
the “paramilitaries danced and drank as they tortured and beheaded at least 28 villagers on a
table set up on a basketball court” (66). That statement speaks for itself if wondering how the
human rights have bettered. In light of this, we must now assume that there was another motive
behind Plan Colombia since it failed horribly at doing so: defeating the guerrilla groups such as

27. ! 24
the FARC, and communism. I then suggest a refocused ‘Plan Colombia’ that could complete the
original objectives and bring the country to a more prosperous state.
Colombia is a prime example of US foreign policy post-Cold War due to the communist-
like organization, the FARC, that looks towards Cuba for direction. Stokes, however, provides a
good point that Plan Colombia was originally claimed to be a ‘war on drugs’ and then a ‘war on
terror’ after the attacks of the twin towers on September 11, 2001 (570). However, the specifics
of Plan Colombia did not change after the attacks on 9/11. Therefore, it can easily be stated that
this has always been a war on ‘terror,’ although the FARC does not operate as a terrorist
organization. Instead, this is a war on the FARC and what they stand for, which happens to be
communism. Placing the focus on the cocaine masks the focus of defeating the guerrillas, and
therefore allows the United States to influence a war within the country without being directly
involved. The money that is being spent on Plan Colombia is the only toll that the United States
has taken, or else there might have been more discontent and disapproval within the United
States of this policy. We can look to Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, and assess that the
United States acted more carefully in those situations due to the American lives that were at
stake. Needless to say, Colombia is still a country that needs an immeasurable amount of
economic development in order to get past the drug trade. In doing so, both the guerrillas and the
paramilitaries should generally slow down their operations once a state of social and political
content is evident throughout Colombia. That is where all the violence is perpetuating from:
discontent.
Above all, the primary problem of political discontent must be fixed before any progress
is made. Although the guerrillas and paramilitaries are extremist, organizations from both sides
have agreed to peace talks. Since both sides have previously agreed to peace talks, which means

28. ! 25
that they are open to negotiation. Negotiations and compromises will have to be made from both
sides in order to restore peace to Colombia, however it is not out of the question. For example,
the FARC have previously suggested a bilateral ceasefire many times, but the Colombian
government has yet to agree due to the fear of them rearming and attacking whenever they are
strongest.
Once this is complete, the next phase would be to put alternative crops into effect that
will yield a respectable income for Colombians. Many Colombians have been in poverty their
whole life, and a modest and honest income is the only thing that they desire. However, the
alternative crops are going to have to be tapped in on at the exportation level. As a minimum,
these exportations should reach their neighboring countries in South and Latin America. In the
book, Neglected Crops: 1492 From a Different Perspective, they suggest that there is a growing
niche for quinoa and exotic fruit trees (129). Both of which, Colombia has more than enough
access to. However, Colombians face earning a lower income by following this method due to
the massive profit that the coca plant brings. Therefore, the Colombian government is going to
have to assist these farmers is some way or another. Whether is be providing them with more
land to cultivate, more farm animals, or some amount of monetary compensation.
Another change that would drastically help Colombia is to further develop their
infrastructure. By this, I mean that all of the important institutions such as education, health, and
government should be focused on more heavily. According to Hylton, “rural areas still lack
schools, health clinics, decent roads, sewage systems, or housing,” which are all necessities in
order to live a more prosperous life (110). Neither the United States nor Colombia can truly
believe that the Colombians and others living within the country will be able to live a decent life
without developing their institutions and infrastructure. It should be understood that this

29. ! 26
reimagined Plan Colombia will not lift every Colombian out of poverty nor will it make anybody
rich overnight. It will take many years, if not decades, of a continuous effort on part of the
Colombian government in which should receive international aid that is purely devoted to socio-
economic development. Without roadways, trade is limited. Without schools for everyone,
developing past agriculture is extremely difficult. Without more accessible hospitals, lives are
not saved that could potentially be. Most importantly, however, this is all just an aspiration
because it will not be accomplished unless there is a functioning government that desires the
same outcome.
Needless to say, the process of assisting Colombia to develop beyond their past violence
and coca plant dependence is not an easy task. However, I believe that it can be done if the
foreign aid that Colombia receives is placed in the right direction. The bottom line is that
Colombia does not need all of this privatization and contracting out. Colombia needs more
physical results. In the slightly lighthearted account by Ruiz, he is claiming that the money is
being wasted on ‘experts,’ when all Colombia really needs is concrete agricultural resources and
they will figure out the rest. Their culture and economy is built around agriculture (aside from
the drug trade), and the money spent on any advice or experts is not needed. Colombia does not
need any more helicopters, arms, or contractors advising the farmers. They need schools,
hospitals, housing, successful crops, and a means to distribute them wherever the market is
available. On top of all of this, a functioning government that is willing to abolish their party’s
platform in order to reach across the aisle and conquer this internal conflict and discontent
together. Until all of this is completed, Colombia will remain in this effervescent stalemate of
violence and economic dependence on the coca plant and drug trade.

30. ! 27
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