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CIGREAUB5SEAPAC2015PPT68_AU_Haines-revised
- 1. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Paper Reference
New Generation Secondary Systems Design for
Ausgrid North Sydney Zone Substation Including
IEC61850 With Multivendor RTU and IEDs
68_AU_Haines
1
Author Company Email Presenter
Ben Haines Ausgrid bhaines@ausgrid.com.au
- 2. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Why is Ausgrid using
IEC61850?
• Reduce dependence on a single SCADA
supplier
• Make future expansion easier
• Reduce hard wiring
• Improve electrical isolation between panels
• Collect additional information to help inform
operational decisions e.g. trip targets
• Open standard to define customer interfaces
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- 3. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
North Sydney Zone
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• 2 x 132kV feeders, 45 x 11kv feeders,
3 x 132kV/11kV 50MVA transformers
- 4. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Key Design Requirements
• Isolation between A and B.
• Provable with reasonable outages.
• Avoid vendor-specific features.
• Support the different work groups which must
live with the result (PE, Tele, Op)
• Do not introduce common points of
vulnerability.
• Logical design rules applied consistently.
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- 5. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Separation of ‘A’ and ‘B’
• Do not wire ‘A’ relays into ‘B’ relays!
o Prefer two independent protection schemes, rather
than one highly redundant system
• Separate ‘A’ and ‘B’ ethernet networks.
• Future development to implement Sub
Transmission feeder reclosing on bay
controllers with GOOSE subscription from
protection relays
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- 6. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Network structure
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Control Switch 1A
‘A’ Protection Switch 1 ‘B’ Protection Switch 1
Control Switch 1B
Control Switch 2B
‘A’ Protection Switch 2
‘A’ Protection Switch 3
‘B’ Protection Switch 2
‘B’ Protection Switch 3
‘A’ Protection
Router and firewall
‘B’ Protection
Router and firewall
HMI A
SMU A
(RTU)
HMI B
SMU B
(RTU)
‘A’ Protn
Relay 1
‘A’ Protn
Relay 2
‘A’ Protn
Relay 3
‘A’ Protn
Relay 4
‘B’ Protn
Relay 1
‘B’ Protn
Relay 2
‘B’ Protn
Relay 3
‘B’ Protn
Relay 4
SDR-MA SDR-MBSDR-MC
SDR 2
SDR 3
SDR 1
SDR-A SDR-B
A Protection (10.1.x.x) B Protection (10.2.x.x)
Control (10.3.x.x)
Miscellaneous signals
Master controls
- 7. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Sub Transmission Bays
• Relays which talk IEC61850 report signals and
targets directly.
• “Main” relay on each panel collects all sub
signals for that panel.
• Dedicated Bay Control IEDs
o Sub Trans switchgear has many alarms & controls
o Protection is on freestanding panels away from the
switchgear
o Several different relay combinations to deal with
o Can justify more per bay than 11 kV feeders
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- 8. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
11 kV Feeder Relays Provide
SCADA functionality
• Simple fixed pattern switchgear.
• Sufficient I/O on relays.
• Very little panel space.
• Cost sensitive due to number of panels.
• Many identical panels.
• Relays physically close to switchgear.
• Optical arc flash detection implemented for safety
• Backup OC provided on all feeders to meet NERs –
S5.1.9(C) “a Network Service Provider must provide sufficient
primary protection systems and back-up protection systems to
ensure that a fault of any fault type anywhere on its
transmission system or distribution system is automatically
disconnected”
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- 9. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
How would you replace the
SMU in a live substation?
• Separate ‘0c’ positive for all controls which act
via output contacts.
• Status of ‘0c’ broadcast to all relays via GOOSE
message.
• If the broadcast GOOSE indicates that ‘0c’ is
de-energised, relays will report or flag but not
act on software controls.
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- 10. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Under Frequency Load Shedding &
Scheme Testing
• No single IED should be able to trip the whole
substation
• Each transformer has separate ‘check’ and ‘trip’ IED
• 11 kV feeder relays only respond when both ‘check’
and ‘trip’ GOOSE messages are present
• Test mode is not used because it alters the IED logic
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- 11. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
61850 Specific Tree Logical
Nodes vs GGIO
• Desired relay behaviour:
o Standard list of targets and signals for each protection type.
o All IEDs programmed to behave the same way regardless of supplier.
o Relay LED alarms match site HMI and control room screens.
• Presently not possible in supplier defined LNs
• Presently only possible with internal relay logic and GGIOs
• Highly desirable that end user can configure the behaviour of LNs.
11
Relay 1 Relay 2 Relay 3
Zone 1&1B has 2 PDIS
LNs, 6 operation flags, one
per fault loop
6 PDIS LNs in total,
3xP-P, 3xP-N
Zones 1,2,3,4,P
modelled as 5 PDIS LNs
Zones 2,3,4,5,6 as single
PDIS LNs only has a single
operation flag for the zone.
One fault operation
flag per zone.
Each PDIS has
operation flags for 3
phases and neutral.
- 12. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Analogue Reports and
Deadbands12
• Philosophy:
o Small deadbands lead to higher network traffic.
o To minimise network traffic dead bands set to trigger on
solid switching events.
o Integrity polling shows small measurement changes.
• Different IED suppliers had different implementations.
o % deadband change of present value,
o % deadband of user defined maximum and minimum.
o Deadband change in primary value.
• Benefit of dead band setting complexity Vs
straight integrity polling?
- 13. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
IED Undocumented Features
• Relay denied repeat TCP/IP connections. Ethernet card firmware.
• LNs distance to fault in kms not implemented, used % and scale km in
SMU.
• XCBR tangled up with reclosing logic didn’t allow separate use.
• SBO control sequences had to be redefined in SMU.
• IRIG-B time sync failure not available in relay logic but was in LNs.
• buffered reports missed events. Ethernet card firmware.
• Protection quality variables and or drop out timers had to be used to
capture events in IEC61850 reports.
• Phase flagging in relay logic only available through front panel LEDs.
• Phase flagging reset too quickly for relays own internal logic.
• MODBUS switch port alarms didn’t work with specific settings.
• MMS fault record retrieval was not supported by every IED, so had to
implement telnet file transfer for some. Improved in later firmware.
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- 14. © CIGRÉ Australia
AP B5
SEAPAC 2015
Slide
Hold that thought for question time at the end of this session ….
Thank You
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