Dissertation Study Temporary Accommodation

MSc Public Policy & Management 7SSMM408 Dissertation 2016
Candidate Number: W00106
Supervisor: Prof. Ken Young
Department of Management, KING'S COLLEGE LONDON
Date of Submission: Thursday 1st
September 2016
Word Count: 14,899
The Impact of Local Authorities on the use of Long
Term Temporary Accommodation in London
A Case Study of Three London Boroughs

i
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
Abstract
ii
iii
iv
v
1. Introduction 1
2. Evaluating Housing Policy in England
- The Development of Homelessness and Allocations Policy in England
- How Effective Has Homelessness Policy Been?
- A ‘Dualist’ Structure of Low Cost Housing?
- Allocating Social Housing and the Power of Local Authorities
- Why is London Special?
- Conducting the Literature Review
5
5
7
8
10
12
13
3. Research Method
- Choice of Case Studies
- Interview Methodology
- Limitations and Problems
14
14
18
20
4. Case Study Results
- By Borough
- By Research Theme
21
21
25
5. Discussion
- Should Households in Temporary Accommodation by prioritised for Social Housing?
- Where should Homeless Households be Housed?
- The Borough Structure and ‘Out of Borough’ Placements
32
32
35
37
6. Conclusion
- Main Findings
- Recommendations
- Research Strengths and Limitations
40
40
42
42
References 44
Appendices 51

ii
List of Tables and Figures
Tables Page Number
Table 2.1: Households in Temporary Accommodation on 31st March 2015 by Placement Type,
England, London and the rest of England
10
Table 3.1: Total number of households in temporary accommodation and length of stay 2004 -
2015
17
Table 4.1: Criteria for Acceptance on to Housing Allocations Schemes 27
Table 4.2: Households in Temporary Accommodation on 31st March 2015 by Placement Type:
Case Study Boroughs
30
Figures Page Number
Figure 1.1: Proportion of households that spent two years or more in temporary arrangements before the
main duty was ended, London and the rest of England, January to March 2013 and 2014
1
Figure 2.1: Households accommodated in England by Local Authorities under the Housing Act
1996 by type of accommodation
6
Figure 3.1: Average Length of Time in TA Indicator* between 2012 - 2015 by Pressure on
Housing Stock, All London Boroughs
15
Figure 3.2: Number of households leaving temporary accommodation after 5 years or more
between April 2014 - March 2015, by London Borough
16

iii
Abbreviations
CBL - Choice Based Lettings
DCLG - Department for Communities and Local Government
DETR - Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
DHP – Discretionary Housing Payments
DWP - Department for Work & Pensions
PRS - Private Rented Sector (acronym used in quotations only)
PRSO - Private Rented Sector Offer (acronym used in quotations only)
TA - Temporary Accommodation (acronym used in quotations and tables only)

iv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ken Young for his continuing guidance and insight, and my
employers, Mr John Delahunty and Ms Tricia Goan at Innisfree Housing Association for their understanding
and support throughout my two years of study, and for enabling this research to take place.
Crucially, I would like to thank all the professionals who kindly agreed to take time away from the hectic
and demanding world of London housing to participate in this study.

v
Abstract
The number of households who spend over two years in temporary accommodation due to statutory
homelessness is five times higher in London than the rest of England. This study examines three London
Boroughs with high pressure on low cost housing. It asks how the implementation of housing policy is
contributing to long stays in temporary accommodation, and what this implies about the appropriateness
of the legislative framework.
Matland’s ambiguity, conflict matrix is used to analyse the implementation of two co-dependent policies:
homelessness policy which is clear and prescriptive, and social housing allocations policy, which gives Local
Authorities significant discretion. Findings identify two areas of ambiguity contributing to the use of long
term temporary accommodation: the priority of such households for social housing, and what kind of
accommodation should be used for temporary placements. It further shows that the borough system
contributes to efficiency losses and the displacement of households.

1
Chapter 1: Introduction
According to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), between 2013 and 2014 the
number of households who spent over two years in temporary accommodation was approximately five
times higher in London than in the rest of England. At the end of March 2014 London accounted for 74 per
cent of the total 58,440 households in temporary accommodation in England (Great Britain, DCLG, 2015).
One London borough who participated in this study reported an average wait time in temporary
accommodation for a three bedroom property of 19 years.
Fig 1.1 Proportion of households that spent two years or more in temporary arrangements before the
main duty was ended, London and the rest of England, January to March 2013 and 2014
Source: Great Britain, DCLG, 2014, p.16, chart.11a
Temporary accommodation is an output of homelessness policy in England. Under the Housing Act 1996,
Local Authorities have a duty to provide emergency accommodation to the most vulnerable homeless
households (generally families and vulnerable adults) from within their jurisdictions, by placing them in
temporary accommodation for a period of up to two years. During this time households are expected to
find secure accommodation either in the private market or by applying for a place in low cost social housing
through their Local Authority’s waiting list. Where households are unable to find accommodation and their
situation remains the same, the duty can recur. The length of time households spend in temporary

2
accommodation is therefore related to the implementation of their statutory duty, the availability of low
cost private renting or social housing stock, and the efficient allocation of it by the Local Authority.
The law and guidance on Local Authorities’ duties to homeless people in England is clear and prescriptive.
It defines exactly what groups of people should be given what kind of assistance with only those meeting
strict criteria of eligibility and vulnerability being owed a right to temporary accommodation. By contrast,
the law and guidance on who Local Authorities should allocate their social housing stock to is very flexible.
It lists categories of people who must be given ‘reasonable preference’ for social housing but Local
Authorities have, and are encouraged to use their own autonomy to add to this list and prioritise groups
within it as they see fit. In the three case studies in this research, the London boroughs had between five
and eight thousand people all meeting the reasonable preference criteria who had a right to be prioritised
for social housing, and an average of approximately five or six hundred properties becoming available every
year. This gives Local Authorities considerable power to determine who receives what kind of housing
assistance.
The supply shortage of affordable housing in London and the South East has been widely acknowledged
and quantitative studies have evidenced its effect on increasing levels of homelessness (Bramley, 1993;
Barker Review, 2004). Peer reviewed, and government studies have also questioned the sustainability of
the Local Authorities’ duties under the current legislative framework (Cloke et al, 2000; Great Britain, DETR,
2001; The Barker Review, 2004; Fitzpatrick and Pleace, 2012). This study showed Local Authorities were
incurring annual deficits of up to £5 million beyond central government individual housing subsidies for
households in temporary housing. Additionally, the policy stance of Local Authorities has been recognised
as a contributing factor to housing outcomes (Bramley 1993), and the use of temporary accommodation
differs significantly between London boroughs. A report by the charity Shelter in 2014 found that the
percentage of those temporarily housed for over five years in Lambeth, and Kensington and Chelsea, was
four and nine per cent of total households respectively, whereas in Camden it was 48 per cent (Shelter,
2014). The severe shortage of affordable housing in London poses unique challenges to Local Authorities’
ability to meet their residents housing needs and justifies specific research into policy implementation in
London, rather than nationwide.
In this study I examine three Local Authorities in London: Brent, Haringey and Camden (also referred to as
boroughs and councils). Each borough had a high demand on their social housing properties but varying
numbers of households who have been in long term temporary accommodation (over two and five years).

3
I evaluate the three boroughs approaches to managing their statutory homelessness duty, their allocation
of social housing and their efforts to facilitate alternative placements in the private sector. I hypothesise
that, the implementation of housing policy by Local Authorities is contributing to the use of long term
temporary accommodation in London. I further reflect on what this means for the national legislative
framework and recommend ways in which national policy and local implementation could be improved. In
this paper, ‘housing policy’ refers to two policy areas: homelessness policy and the allocation of social
housing stock.
The Study was led by the following research questions derived from a review of relevant literature:
● How is performance of homelessness and allocations policy measured?
● How is national policy and guidance on homelessness interpreted differently by different London
Boroughs?
● What are the mechanisms that lead to long term temporary accommodation?
● What are the barriers to ending stays in temporary accommodation?
● Does the varying use of long term temporary accommodation indicate policy shortcomings or
simply reflect the local environment?
A minimum of two managers in each borough’s Housing Needs team were interviewed, and documentation
was reviewed covering their relevant strategy papers, homelessness policy and allocations scheme. The
case study results were identified by borough and under the above research questions. Findings were then
interpreted in conjunction with relevant literature and statutory guidance.
The Analytical Framework
Matland’s model of implementation was used to consider the interaction between the legislative
framework and its implementation. Matland aimed to consolidate the conflicting ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-
up’ camps of implementation theory. His model states that the level of ambiguity in centrally determined
policy planning, and political conflict surrounding the policy, were key criteria for determining what factors
would be most relevant to its implementation. His model would suggest that the two policies examined in
this study would fall under different categories. Under homelessness legislation, the provision of
temporary accommodation to what groups of individuals is heavily prescribed. There is little ambiguity
over the policy goal and little conflict between policy planners and implementers in how it will be carried
out. Under legislation relating to the allocation of social housing, much more discretion is allowed to Local
Authorities. There is a high level of ambiguity over both policy aims and tools, but a low level of political
conflict. Applying these groupings to the framework is useful in two ways:

4
1) Regarding the statutory duty towards homelessness, it suggests that policy failure will only occur
because of technical problems like poor coordination or lack of resources.
2) Regarding stock allocation, it suggests that “contextual conditions dominate the process”. He
claims that in this case a bottom-up research approach will be most enlightening and that, as
housing literature has suggested, we can expect to see large differences between different
‘implementation sites’, i.e. between each borough.
In the context of this study we are examining the implementation of two policies that are co-dependent.
With a different allocation of stock, a better arrangement of resources could be available to meet the
statutory duty on homelessness. With a high incidence of statutory duty, resources for the allocation of
stock is decreased. The framework supports the hypothesis that, despite the obvious limitation on
resources in the three case studies of high housing demand, housing outcomes are heavily dependent on
the implementing actors: the London boroughs.

5
Chapter 2: Evaluating Housing Policy in England
This study hypothesises that Local Authority policies on homelessness and allocations increase the length of
time households spend in temporary accommodation in London. I began research by reviewing literature
on the performance and implementation of housing policy, and the causes and impact of temporary
accommodation on Local Authorities and households.
The Development of Homelessness and Allocations Policy in England
Social housing in England developed over the last century as a way of government ensuring satisfactory
housing to those who could not afford private market rents. During the post-war period Local Councils
largely took over provision from independent Housing Associations and charities, providing large-scale
housing provision and developments, which offered secure, permanent tenancies at a low rent. Funding
came predominantly from substantial government grants. The 1977 Housing Act introduced the first
statutory duty on Local Authorities to house homeless people deemed to have a ‘priority need’.
A Consultation Paper in 1994 proposed reforms to the 1977 Act on the basis that people who applied for
housing in a priority need group gained an unfair priority to social housing over others on the waiting list.
The subsequent legislation, the Housing Act 1996 revised and expanded the priority need group to the
following categories that are applied in current practice: families with children, pregnant women and adults
who were vulnerable due to age, mental or physical illness or a special need. It also detailed eligibility
criteria on the basis of immigration status and placed an onus on the applicant to prove that they became
homeless unintentionally, to minimise fraudulent claims to social housing.
Most importantly in relation to this study, the 1996 Act states that Local Authorities only had a duty to
provide temporary tenancies to the homeless for a maximum of two years. During that time they would be
placed on the authority's waiting list and assessed along with other groups of people in housing need for a
secure social housing tenancy, through the borough’s allocations scheme, on the basis of their “underlying
need” (Cloke et al, 2000). If the household had not found secure accommodation at the end of the two
years, the duty could recur as long as they still met the eligibility criteria, therefore forming the legislative
framework in which households remain in temporary accommodation for over two years.

6
The process of assessing and prioritising households for a secure tenancy in social housing is dealt with
under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996. Local Authorities have the right to devise and operate their own
allocations schemes to determine who gains social housing. Under Part VI they must give ‘reasonable
preference’ to the following groups but are free to add additional groups and prioritise within these groups
as they wish:
- People who are homeless within the meaning of Part VII
- People occupying insanitary or overcrowded housing conditions
- People who need to move on medical grounds
- People who need to move to the Local Authority where failure to do so would cause hardship
While modifications have been made to provisions for homeless households, the legislative framework on
allocations schemes has remained largely unchanged since 1996.
Following media and political attention on the increasing number of families living in bed and breakfasts,
The Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) Order 2003 was introduced (Great Britain, DCLG, 2003).
Under the Order families or pregnant women should only be housed in Bed and Breakfasts in an emergency
and for a maximum of six weeks. Figure 2.1 shows the subsequent decrease in the use of bed and
breakfasts.
Figure 2.1: Households accommodated in England by Local Authorities under the Housing Act 1996 by
type of accommodation
Source: Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, 2016, p.6 fig.2

7
In a major reform of housing policy, the coalition government introduced the Localism Act in 2011, with the
intention of decentralisation, “to give Local Authorities more freedoms and flexibility” (Great Britain, DCLG,
2011, p.4). Under the 1996 legislation an authority could make an offer of private rented accommodation
but households had the right to refuse it and wait for a social housing tenancy through the register. The
Localism Act gave authorities the power to make this offer mandatory. If a household in temporary
accommodation refused a Private Rented Sector Offer, the authority can end their homelessness duty and
therefore the household risks losing their temporary accommodation, and potentially their right to
reasonable preference on the allocations list for social housing. This means that for the first time since the
statutory homelessness duty was introduced, private sector renting and social housing are viewed as
equally viable options for homeless households. It should be noted that this is an optional power for Local
Authorities and not an obligation. Some commentators predicted a surge in private rented sector
involvement in homelessness practice and the potential for Local Authorities to discharge all homelessness
cases in the private renting sector (Bevan, 2014), while the results of the three case studies in this research
show a varied but increasing take up.
As demonstrated in Figure 2.1, the number of households in temporary accommodation (i.e. homeless
households who are eligible and in a priority need group who are owed a main homelessness duty) rose
significantly after 1996 and peaked at over 100,000 in England in 2004. The Labour governments between
2001 to 2010 made efforts to reduce homelessness and the use of temporary accommodation (Great
Britain, DCLG, 2016, p.6-7) and figures improved significantly but have showed a steady increase again
since 2008, mirrored by an increase in households remaining in temporary housing for over two years.
How Effective Has Homelessness Policy Been?
The statutory duty in UK homelessness policy has received international praise. A comparative study of
approaches in Europe, the USA and Australia by Minnery and Greenhalgh (2007) found that the UK was the
only European country with a statutory responsibility and a specific task force for homelessness. However
concerns were raised about the “overall policy environment in the UK”. It was suggested that applying
thresholds of ‘unintentionality’ and ‘priority need’ groups promoted discrimination. The policy system has
also been blamed for deterring single homeless people from approaching authorities for help, and it is
often claimed that figures for this group are therefore under-reported in official statistics (Cloke et al.,
2000; Minnery and Greenhalgh, 2007).

8
The Housing Act 1996 has been criticised for promoting the progression of other groups with lesser housing
needs over homeless households in priority need, i.e. homeless families and vulnerable adults. A
nationwide survey was conducted of professionals into the impact of the 1996 legislation. It found that
authorities with lower demand for social housing updated their allocations scheme to enable the priority
need group who would be eligible for temporary accommodation to be placed immediately into secure
social housing, while others saw a considerable increase in the use of temporary accommodation:
“20 officers responding to the survey commented on a greater use of temporary accommodation
and 13 referred to a developing shortage of such accommodation with the possible ‘silting’ or
‘clogging up’ of temporary accommodation by homeless households waiting to be rehoused from
the housing register a particular cause for concern” (Cloke et al, 2000, p.746).
The study commented that the move to allocate secure housing to homeless families under Local
Authorities’ allocations schemes resulted in a ‘reframing’ of homelessness into one of several ‘housing
need’ groups. The authors predicted that this would result in a “loss of imperative” and therefore
resources for tackling homelessness. A subsequent survey by Fitzpatrick and Pleace (2012) responded to
these criticisms by taking evidence from families themselves rather than professionals. Their responses
suggested that the system on the whole was fair and effective. It found that families reported a higher
standard of living in the housing obtained through the statutory system or even those in temporary
accommodation (most of which was self-contained), than in their last settled home, leading to an overall
maximising of collective welfare. However, they noted that outcomes were significantly dependent on
geographical area:
“Supply constraints mean that there were serious problems with the physical conditions in some
temporary accommodation in London and the South, as well as with the lengthy periods
households spend in such accommodation in London in particular (at very considerable cost to the
public purse). These observations led the authors to question whether the current ‘offer’ under the
homelessness system was sustainable in London” (Fitzpatrick and Pleace, 2012, p.248).
A ‘Dualist’ Structure of Low Cost Housing?
Kemeny’s (1995) book introduces a new analytical framework for comparative studies of rental systems. In
his conception, the UK is grouped with other English speaking countries who adopt a “dualist” system

9
consisting of a separate private renting sector and government run, means-tested social housing sector. In
this model governments intervene in the market by providing low cost housing at a subsidised rate for
households that the authorities assess as unable to afford market rents. Traditionally, the social housing
sector in England provided extra protections to tenants by limiting rent increases and giving tenancies with
additional protection from eviction, and indefinite life-spans.
One of the disadvantages of a means-tested social housing sector reflected on by Andersson (2002) is that
it can stigmatise tenants when compared, for example, to ‘unitary’ models which either require high
taxation and spending, or rent-ceilings to secure housing for people on low incomes (Andersson 2002;
Sheridan et al, 2002). The UK social housing sector has been further criticised for having inherent
disadvantages (Pawson and Kintrea, 2002; Bramley 2015). A longitudinal study in 2015 by Bramley found
little difference between the level of need in social and private renting and further critiqued:
“Social renting as currently operating is less the solution to the problem of housing need and more
a locus for its continuing presence”.
Access to social housing tenancies in England is still very much controlled by Local Authorities housing
registers on a means-tested basis, as illustrated by the persistence of long wait times, however there have
been attempts by recent governments towards greater convergence with the private sector (Murie, 2012).
Social housing providers for example can now charge up to eighty per cent of market rents and use fixed
term tenancies. Two additional areas of overlap deserve particular mention: the power to make private
renting sector offers, and the use of privately sourced properties for temporary accommodation.
Firstly, Since the Localism Act Local Authorities can discharge their duty by making mandatory offers in
private renting. It appears likely that the private sector will play a larger role in future responses to
homelessness, given successive government’s reluctance to fund large scale building of social housing
(Bramley 1993; Barker, 2004) and the introduction of the private sector as a valid solution to homelessness.
Secondly, Local Authorities have used privately-owned property to provide temporary accommodation for
many years (Great Britain, DCLG, 2015a) as is demonstrated by figure 2.1. The study by Cloke et al. (2000)
into the 1996 Housing Act suggested that simply by placing homeless households into two year fixed term,
temporary accommodation there is little distinction between temporary accommodation and the private

10
sector, regardless of how the property is sourced. They suggested that “in light of the stigmatisation of
council housing, some homeless households may prefer to be rehoused in private renting accommodation”
(Cloke et al., 2000, p.749). In terms of what type of accommodation is used for those families in temporary
placements, Table 2.1 shows that Local Authorities especially in London use accommodation derived from
private sector.
Table 2.1: Households in Temporary Accommodation on 31st March 2015 by Placement Type, England,
London and the rest of England
Bed and
breakfast
(including
shared
annexe)
Hostels LA/HA*
stock
Private
sector
leased
(by LA or
HA*)
Other
types
(including
private
landlord)
Total in
temporary
accommodation
England 5,270 5,040 10,920 23,990 19,480 64,710
London 2,950 2,620 5,430 20,180 17,050 48,240
Rest of
England
2,320 2,420 5,490 3,810 2,430 16,470
*Refers to Local Authority and Housing Association properties, jointly referred to as ‘social housing’.
Source: Great Britain, DCLG, 2015a
The above data shows that on 31st March 2015 there were 20,180 households in London placed in
properties that had been leased from the private sector (usually on two or five year leases), and 17,050
placed in ‘other types’ of properties including directly with private landlords. In these cases the Local
Authority would typically manage the tenancy on the landlord’s behalf, and would be liable for rent not
covered by individual housing benefit subsidies. Given that over 25 per cent of households who left
temporary accommodation during 2014 - 15 in London had remained there for more than two years (Great
Britain, DCLG, 2014, p.16, chart.11a) it is questionable whether sourcing temporary accommodation from
the private sector, vulnerable to market fluctuations, is a sustainable or effective use of Local Authority
resources.
Allocating Social Housing and the Power of Local Authorities
Several authors have recognised the impact of Local Authorities on outcomes for households (Bramley,
1993; Cloke et al, 2000; Great Britain, DETR, 2001). A government commissioned study on allocations

11
processes in 2001 found that “within England, there is a strong tendency towards a stricter understanding
of vulnerability in areas under greater demand pressure” (Great Britain, DETR, 2001, pp.8-9). For Bramley,
the impact of varying policies is not necessarily a problem. He found much greater variation over
allocations policies than the interpretation of homelessness, and suggests that “it is questionable whether
you can ever enforce total uniformity in an area like this or whether it would be desirable” (Bramley, 1993,
pp.145-146).
It has been mentioned above that Part VI of the Housing Act governing the allocation of social housing
tenancies gives Local Authorities considerable discretion in the allocation of social housing stock. The
advantage of decentralisation on housing issues is that it increases public participation on local agendas
and creates policy that reflects local communal interests. However, it can also produce policy that
preferences income-generating middle and upper class citizens. Hananel discusses this debate in relation
to affordable housing in the USA and found that centralisation is needed to promote redistribution and
provide housing solutions for lower income residents (Hananel, 2014). Murie, writing specifically on the
analysis of housing policy in the UK, emphasised the importance of focusing on how national policy
interacts with other implementing agencies:
“There will be a continued need for detailed local studies that set out the alternatives and
responses available to various actors, identify new opportunities and constraints, and examine
emerging patterns of segregation and stratification” (Murie, 2012, p.1046)
Matland’s approach to implementation suggests that ambiguity in centralised policy making is not
necessarily negative: “Especially when prescribing means, policy designers rightly may believe they lack the
technical knowledge to produce a programmed implementation package” and that in such circumstances
demanding uniformity “robs us of vital information and limits the street-level bureacrats’ use of their
knowledge as a resource” (Matland, 1995, p.167). In the context of housing, policy implementation
depends heavily on local factors which are too varied and complex for central policy makers to account for.
However, he also warns that inherent ambiguity will lead to sharp variations across different areas, will
affect the ability of superiors to monitor activities and will decrease the likelihood that policy is uniformly
understood.

12
Why is London Special?
As discussed above, London accounted for 74 per cent of all households in temporary accommodation in
England at the end of March 2015, and five times the number of households who have remained there for
over two years. My literature search did not identify any studies that directly investigated these
differences, however the shortage of supply in London and the South East has been commented on by
various government and academic studies and can manifest itself in increased levels of temporary
accommodation and widespread street homelessness (Hall, 1996; Cloke et al., 2001; Barker, 2004;
Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 2007). The Rough Sleepers Initiative, a government task force set up in the early
1990s and currently led by the Greater London Authority addressed the issue of street homelessness with
notable success by securing accommodation from social housing providers and operating a pan-London
programme of allocation to homeless individuals. The Rough Sleepers Unit for example, in 1999 achieved
its target of reducing street homeless by two thirds by 2002 (Shelter, 2006). The model was subsequently
developed in other Metropolitan areas across the UK. While this tackled the issue of single homeless
people who are usually left out of the ‘priority need’ statutory duty, Local Authorities remain the main
route by which homeless families and vulnerable adults are housed.
Multiple studies have identified difficulties in applying national policies and initiatives to London and the
South East. As mentioned above, Fitzpatrick and Pleace (2012) noted the poorer outcomes from the
Housing Act 1996 on temporary accommodation in terms of length of stay and condition of
accommodation. A study by Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2007) examined tensions between successive
governments’ policy objectives to promote social housing as a ‘safety net’ and as a ‘tenure of choice’. They
found that:
“In higher demand regions such as London and the South, it remains very difficult to see how a
social sector continuing to contract can widen its role from that of safety net for the most
disadvantaged” (Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 2007, p.163)
The government-commissioned study (Great Britain, DETR, 2001) into Local Authorities practice and policy
on homelessness and allocations reported that the main reason for households remaining in temporary
accommodation in London after two years was the lack of suitable housing. The authors however also
noted that London was distinct from other metropolitan areas in that housing registers are still managed
internally by boroughs, and that they commonly use a different system of allocating housing to the rest of
the country. London boroughs often organise people together into priority groups (usually split into either

13
A, B or C) and then make offers according to the date that the application was made. Therefore a social
housing property would be offered to the Band A applicant who had remained on the waiting list the
longest. Whereas 89 per cent of Local Authorities in England use a points system, where each household is
given particular points for particular factors of need. They also found that London Local Authorities
frequently apply a local connection threshold for applicants as a way of rationing provision, meaning that
an individual must have lived in or have a connection with a borough for a minimum length of time before
they can be considered for the waiting list.
Conducting the Literature Review
Relevant literature was identified through online searches of the database Ovid for peer reviewed
literature, and Planex for housing specific sources including grey literature and government studies.
Additional searches were also conducted in Taylor and Francis, Cambridge and Sage journals, and the
British Library Main Catalogue. Boolean logic was applied to the following search terms for databases:
temporary housing, bed and breakfast, social, council and affordable housing, allocations policies and
family housing (as the majority of households in temporary accommodation are families). The majority of
relevant peer reviewed articles identified came from the journal Housing Studies.
Charities, advocacy groups and government-commissioned research have produced multiple studies on the
use of temporary accommodation in England. Academic studies were also conducted into the high number
of households in temporary accommodation during the eighties and nineties but in the last two decades
the focus has moved towards concepts of affordability and market supply. No academic literature was
found directly relating to temporary accommodation or allocations policies in the London context,
therefore grey literature was relied upon to give a background on Local Authority practices in London.

14
Chapter 3: Research Method
A range of qualitative and quantitative methods have been used to evaluate housing policy. Questions
relating to homelessness and policy implementation have frequently used interviews with housing staff and
homeless families (Holme as referenced in Murie, 1987; Cloke et al., 2000) and case studies (Great Britain,
Department of the Environment, 1989). While the impact of national legislation has been tackled using
postal questionnaires to housing staff (Hall, 1996; Cloke et al, 2000; Fitzpatrick and Pleace, 2012). Analysis
of housing and homelessness policy on a national level has been conducted quantitatively, most notably by
Kate Barker’s Government Review (2004) which used economic analysis, and by Bramley (1993) who
conducted regression analysis into the causes of statutory homelessness. Bramley (2015) has conducted
several macro-level quantitative studies including a longitudinal study into trends in housing needs. The
literature review showed no previous attempts to compare policies among all 33 London Boroughs,
perhaps because of the scale and complexity required.
I took an interpretative approach throughout this study. My literature review and data analysis (addressed
below) suggested that variations in outputs on homelessness and allocations are not a direct result of
external factors, but are distinctive to each borough. Definitive reasons for differing performance
outcomes of Local Authorities were not evident from statistical analysis. I therefore hypothesised that
Local Authorities policies and practices contribute to the use of, and length of stay in temporary
accommodation in London. It follows then that the study should take a qualitative and interpretative
approach to investigating Local Authorities’ policies and practices.
To evaluate the implications of Local Authorities policies I could have conducted a postal survey of all 33
London Boroughs or affected families. However, given the large amount of discretion that Local Authorities
have to shape their allocation policy and use of stock, it was felt that a case study approach would enable a
more thorough and accurate assessment of individual stakeholder interests and complex mechanisms that
led to long term temporary accommodation (Biggam, 2015; Yin, 2003). The disadvantage is that findings
were difficult to generalise and the evidence for my hypothesis is restricted only to the boroughs examined.
Choice of Case Studies
The case studies were selected after examining data published by the DCLG between April 2012 and March
2015 (see Appendix A for a full table of all data collected). The case studies were chosen on the basis of
their total number of households leaving temporary accommodation, the length of stay in temporary

15
accommodation for those leaving between the years Apr 2012 to Mar 2015, and the pressure on housing
stock (calculated by social housing stock divided by total number in temporary accommodation).
The literature review highlighted potential problems with the sustainability of the current legislative
framework in London, and the different applications and policies adopted in London boroughs to
elsewhere. An examination of performance data from individual boroughs presented significant
differences within London, as shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2 below.
Figure 3.1: Average Length of Time in TA Indicator* between 2012 - 2015 by Pressure on Housing Stock**,
All London Boroughs
*Average Time Indicator is calculated by: Total number of years spent in TA by households leaving, divided by number
of households leaving during financial year where total number of years spent was calculated by giving periodic
figures the following values: Households leaving within 1 yr given value 0.5, between 1 and 2yrs given value of 1,
between 2 and 3yrs given value 2, between 3 and 4yrs given value of 3, between 4 and 5 yrs given value of 4, over 5yrs
given value of 5. NB: As the number of years spent in temporary accommodation above 5yrs are not reported in DCLG

16
data this indicator is likely to significantly underestimate the average length of stay. Data source: Great Britain, DCLG,
2015c.
**Pressure on housing stock calculated by total social housing stock divided by total in TA. Lower figures therefore
indicate higher demand and greater pressure on stock.
Data Collected from Great Britain, DCLG, 2015a; Great Britain, DCLG, 2015c. See Appendix A.
Figure 3.2: Number of households leaving temporary accommodation after 5 years or more between
April 2014 - March 2015, by London Borough
Data Collected from Great Britain, DCLG, 2015a; Great Britain, DCLG, 2015c. See Appendix A.
Two of the boroughs, Brent and Haringey were chosen because their use of temporary accommodation is
different but they have similarly high levels of demand for affordable housing and an average amount of
social housing stock available for them to allocate. Haringey has one of the highest numbers of households
in temporary accommodation of all London boroughs, and the greatest average length of stay in temporary
accommodation. Brent also has a high number of households in temporary accommodation but this
number is decreasing, and the average length of stay is half that of Haringey’s. Camden was chosen
because it is statistically an outlier. It has more social housing stock than the other two boroughs and a
much lower number of households in temporary accommodation, but the average length of stay for a
household in temporary accommodation is as high as Haringey’s. Camden also had a significantly lower

17
number of cases they recognised as needing temporary accommodation than the other two boroughs
despite in theory there being little room for interpretation on this factor as the criteria is set in law.
Figure 3.1 shows the three case study boroughs have different trends on the use and length of stay in
temporary accommodation, with Haringey showing increases in both counts, and Camden showing a
significant drop in the number of households in temporary accommodation from 1,148 in 2004 - 05 to 490
in 2014 - 15. Brent’s figures have decreased since 2004 - 05 but remained fairly consistent at just above
3,000 between 2012 - 15.
Table 3.1: Total number of households in temporary accommodation and length of stay 2004 - 2015
Case Study
Borough
April 2004 - March 05 April 2012 - March 13 April 2013 - March 14 April 2014 - March 15
Total
Household
s in TA
Average
Length of
Time in TA
Indicator*
Total
Household
s in TA
Average
Length of
Time in TA
Indicator*
Total
Household
s in TA
Average
Length of
Time in TA
Indicator*
Total
Household
s in TA
Average
Length of
Time in TA
Indicator*
Brent 4,453 ** 3,249 1.23 3,341 0.63 3,161 1.14
Camden 1,148 ** 654 3.20 539 2.59 490 2.33
Haringey 1,175 ** 2,832 3.50 2,869 2.53 2,997 1.49
London
Average
1,878 ** 1,182 1.51 1,312 1.51 1,462 1.63
Rest of
England
Average
133 ** 56 0.61 52 0.67 56 0.71
* Average Length of Time Indicator calculation as described above
**Data not available
Source: Great Britain, DCLG, 2015a; Great Britain, DCLG, 2015c.
It was hoped that a fourth borough, with similar characteristics to Brent and Haringey but an even lower
average length of stay in temporary accommodation could also be included but they unfortunately refused

18
to participate. While the research would have benefitted from a fourth case study, the three participating
boroughs were sufficient to produce findings and demonstrated how markedly different each borough’s
approach to housing is and how it impacts on the use of temporary accommodation.
Interview Methodology
Case study boroughs were approached initially by email to a manager in the Housing Needs team who then
contacted other colleagues to be interviewed. Interviews were conducted at council offices and lasted
between twenty minutes and half an hour. I used semi-structured interviews in order to explore
unanticipated findings and “make use of open-ended questions and encourage meaningful responses”
(Biggam, 2015, p.176). This also allowed for the interview questions to evolve slightly from one interview
to another. For example in an early interview with Brent Council it emerged that Brent use a strategy of
ring-fencing a proportion of their housing stock allocated through the housing register specifically to
households in temporary accommodation. There was no indication of this practise in literature or primary
documentation and it has a significant impact on the allocations process, therefore it was something that
was raised as a question to other boroughs. In the case of Haringey and Brent, more factual questions that
could be validated by documentation were removed after the first staff interview, to free up time for more
in-depth discussion into other themes. Questions were also adapted slightly to the position of the
interviewee so questions for officer-level staff were slightly more practice focused whereas questions for
managers focused on strategic policy and performance. For core questions relating to research themes this
was planned in advance but for the remainder it followed the flow of the interviewee’s answers.
The diagram below captures this study’s approach to data analysis. The four research questions, based in
the preliminary literature review informed the initial list of interview questions and the case study themes
for analysis. Additional themes were identified during the interview process and incorporated into the
subsequent interviews to allow for unexpected findings and thorough comparison between participants.
Six out of seven of the interviews were recorded and then transcribed and for the one interview where the
participant declined recording, notes were taken and subsequently written up. While this was a lengthy
process it allowed for textual analysis and coding of responses which fed a more detailed data description
and in-depth interpretation. The interview data was coded under the the case study themes. Relevant
sections of the documentation was also coded using NVivo. The documentation provided both first hand
data in relation to allocation details and strategies, as well as validation of the interview data.

19
Qualitative Analysis Process:
1) Collect data under case study themes (interviews and documentation)
2) Transcribe all recorded interviews
3) Code data by borough and by case study themes using NVivo
4) Interpretation of data
5) Gather further necessary data and compare qualitative findings with literature review, and national
legislation & guidance under wider themes.
Case Study Themes Wider Themes
Interview themes:
Policy aims and performance
Interpretation of legislation
Mechanisms leading to long term temporary
accommodation
Barriers to ending temporary accommodation
Post interview theme:
Costs and Strategic management of housing stock
Cooperation Between Boroughs
Policy aims and performance
Ambiguity and Successful implementation
Causes of long term temporary accommodation
The contribution of Local Authority policies beyond
external environmental factors
Policy tools and recommendations
Interview data was coded first according to pre-established categories and then by themes that had
presented themselves during the interview process. Preconceived themes led the formulation of my
research questions and interview questions and are applied in each interview relatively evenly. The role of
strategic management in how housing stock was used and its impact on policy performance was
underestimated in my initial case study method and became apparent in the first interview. Triangulation
was conducted between the interview answers and documentation provided by each borough, their
publicly available policy documents and performance data published by the DCLG.
During the interviews it became apparent that each borough employed distinctly different strategies to
their allocations process, sourcing secure placements and managing their housing stock. Therefore findings

20
are organised by first giving an overview of the policies and performance of each case study, then under
relevant themes.
Limitations and Problems
A minority of London Boroughs had not submitted data for the length of time households remained in
temporary accommodation which limited the number of potential case study boroughs.
All interviewees with the exception of one Borough Councillor, were staff and managers delivering frontline
services in a high pressured environment with many time constraints. On advice from housing
professionals who assisted in gaining access to the case study boroughs, it was felt interviews needed to be
restricted to approximately twenty minutes in order for staff to agree to participate. Although many of the
interviews continued for slightly longer, more thorough and detailed insight would have been gained had
they been able to continue for up to one hour. Access to interviewees was also dependent on the initial
contact volunteering their colleagues for participation which meant in the case of Brent and Camden
interviewees consisted only of service managers and in Haringey, one manager and one Senior
Homelessness Officer. Camden also insisted on a joint interview which limited the amount of data available
for comparison and triangulation, so for their case documentation was more heavily relied upon.

21
Chapter 4: Case Study Results
This section describes the case study findings. In Part 4.1 I address each borough in turn, summarising their
overall strategy and key policy decisions. In Part 4.2 I categorise the findings under the case study themes
outlined in the methodology to aid discussion of the research questions in the following section.
4.1 Case Study Results by Borough: Key Strategies and Outcomes
Haringey
Haringey have one of the highest number of temporary accommodation cases in London and the overall
number continued to increase over the three years prior to this study. The rate of households being placed
in temporary accommodation had decreased however the rate of households leaving temporary
accommodation also fell meaning that the total figure increased. The borough had a £5 million annual
deficit due to the costs of temporary accommodation which is met directly from their general fund. There
is now a focus among the cabinet and managers on reducing that figure by shifting resources towards
prevention work and moving people on to secure tenancies. Four operational factors were identified in
interviews as contributing to these high figures:
1) Property used for temporary accommodation consisted of very little hostel accommodation and a
high number of self-contained properties from private landlords
2) The decision making process on acceptances was slow and staff resources focused on managing
households in temporary accommodation rather than moving them on.
3) Fewer households in temporary accommodation were given private sector offers as a means of
ending the homelessness duty than in Brent and Camden.
4) Haringey’s allocations scheme is more inclusive than in Brent and Camden.
Haringey traditionally avoided using hostels and bed and breakfasts for temporary accommodation, on the
basis that self-contained properties provided a better standard of accommodation. The property used to
provide temporary accommodation was predominantly split between leasing from the private renting
sector (in which case council staff carried out the management functions of rent collection, repairs and
tenancy issues) and leasing from Housing Associations (who manage the households on Haringey’s behalf).
Due to rising rent costs most of these placements are outside of the borough and can be as far as Croydon.
Managers also planned to begin looking outside of the M25 area. In order to keep more households inside

22
the borough and reduce costs the council had begun to convert some of their own property into four
hostels which would be used for temporary accommodation.
Regarding the use of internal resources, Haringey’s housing team included a large number of housing
managers responsible for tenancies in temporary accommodation. It had begun a restructure to reduce
this number and take on more ‘Move On’ officers focused on ending placements in temporary
accommodation. Two of the three participants from Haringey made reference to lengthy decision making
processes to place people into temporary accommodation. The borough had one team who would offer
emergency accommodation, usually at a higher, nightly rated cost, on the day a homeless application was
made, until a second team assessed whether the applicant was eligible and owed a duty at which point
they would be moved to more settled, temporary accommodation.
Haringey had approximately 8,500 applicants on their housing register at the time interviews were
conducted, and placed between five and six hundred into social housing stock in the preceding year. They
gave households in temporary accommodation a band B priority on their waiting list for social housing (out
of a banding system of A to C) and allocations are made predominantly through the register, according to
banding. There were no incentives for households to find their own alternatives, for example Camden
offer additional priority on their allocations list to families who find their own private rented sector.
Haringey also showed a limited take up of the power from the Localism Act to discharge their homelessness
duty by placing households in the private rented sector, although they planned to increase the number to
400 in the subsequent year. Haringey therefore largely relied on the negotiating ability of their frontline
staff to prevent evictions and limit the number of new acceptances in temporary accommodation.
Camden
Camden reduced the number of households in temporary accommodation from over 2,000 in 2004 to 430
in December 2015 (London Borough of Camden, 2016b, para 2.4). One of their key strategic objectives is
“Reducing the use of temporary accommodation still further to a level consistent with an emergency core
provision for emergency use only” (London Borough of Camden, 2016b, para 2.4). They have structured
their allocations scheme to discourage households from making homelessness applications, focused
resources on prevention and predominantly used hostels and annexes for those who are placed in
temporary accommodation.
Figures from July 2016 showed that out of the 419 households in temporary accommodation, 188 were
placed in nightly rated annexes, 122 in hostels with exclusive use to kitchen and bathrooms, and 66 were in
self-contained properties managed by Housing Associations. They used out of borough placements with

23
the furthest being in Ealing, Suffolk and Hertford, but most commonly in Haringey and Enfield. Participants
cited high rental costs as the main reason they are using temporary accommodation outside of the
borough. They also spoke of being constrained by the Pan London Agreement, a consortium arrangement
which sets agreed limits for boroughs negotiating rent levels in the private sector. They said that private
landlords no longer see them as a way to make money and that breaches to the agreement by other
boroughs puts them at a disadvantage.
At the beginning of 2016 Camden introduced a new allocations scheme and reduced the number of
applicants from approximately 30,000 to 5,000 partly because the list of applicants had not been regularly
reviewed (6,000 letters were returned as applicants were no longer living at the address they registered
with). Under the new scheme applicants must have lived in the borough for five out of seven years prior to
their application and meet set criteria in line with the ‘reasonable preference’ groups determined by Part VI
of the Housing Act 2016.
Camden predominantly allocated their social housing stock in line with their allocations scheme and gave
additional points to households who had moved into the private rented sector as an alternative to making a
homeless application (therefore, a family who has avoided making a homeless application is given a higher
priority than an equivalent family who made an application and who the borough have placed in temporary
accommodation). The impact of this is that they have proportionally very high numbers of long term
temporary accommodation, 19% were placed for 5 to 10yrs and 17% for over 10 years. Participants stated
that these households had often refused private rented sector offers. The issue is described in their
Homelessness Accommodation Strategy, paragraph 2.4:
“Access to social housing is limited for this group, as the Council promotes homelessness
prevention through its allocations scheme, and avoids incentivising people to seek temporary
accommodation as a way of securing a Council home”
Brent:
Brent had 3,161 households in temporary accommodation in March 2015, a fall of 180 from the previous
year. One participant described the trend in their figures as follows:
“Every year about 700 to 1000 are added into it so 3,000 plus 1,000 is what goes in, but then what
goes out is about 300 go into the private sector and about 500 or so, 600 get rehoused into social
housing stock under part VI. So the temporary accommodation population if you like is reducing at

24
a slow pace, but it’s reducing because more people are coming out of temporary accommodation
than going in.”
Brent had adopted two major strategies to reduce the number of households in temporary accommodation
in recent years: Firstly, they made extensive use of the new power under the Localism Act 2011 to
discharge their duty to homeless households through offers of private rented accommodation. One
participant described the borough as “the champion in the UK” for this. The power applies to all cases
accepted as homeless after 9th November 2012 when the Act came into force. The extensive use of the
private sector means that the majority of households in temporary accommodation in Brent are those that
were accepted prior to Localism Act 2011 who retained the right to refuse an offer of private sector
accommodation and wait for an offer of social housing through Brent’s housing waiting list. These cases
made up approximately 2,500 of the 3,000 households in temporary accommodation. To address these
outstanding cases, they employed a second strategy of ring fencing 80 per cent of their social housing stock
for households coming out of temporary accommodation, effectively allocating housing outside of their
allocations scheme. According to their Housing Strategy (2016) this is a “short term measure” intended to
clear the backlog of temporary accommodation cases. It means that eight of every ten social housing
properties that become available will be given to people in temporary housing and only the remaining two
will be given to other groups with housing needs who applied through the register.
Brent were the only case study who ring fenced social housing stock for households in temporary
accommodation, and who used ring fencing at all for such a high proportion of properties. In their previous
strategy, stock was allocated predominantly under their allocations policy which placed households in
temporary housing as a band C. It was suggested that households were given a low banding, as a way of
discouraging people from seeing homelessness as a route into social housing.
An internal review into the council’s use of temporary accommodation found that sourcing affordable
tenancies in the private rented sector was a major challenge due to freezes on government subsidy levels
and increasing rents. In response, staff pursued new initiatives including starting a Council-owned Lettings
Agency to develop more secure ties between landlords and service users. They also planned to set up a
private company to acquire new property in and near the borough. The company would behave as a
private landlord, but charge rents in line with government subsidies, ensuring a source of private rented
accommodation that can sustain itself, free from market competition. Brent also had a high number of
households in temporary accommodation in bed and breakfasts and planned to reduce this by establishing
its own permanent hostel for short-term accommodation and use self-contained annexes for families “as
near to Brent as can be achieved” (London Borough of Brent, 2014, p.26).

25
Out of all the three case studies Brent participants acknowledged using placements in areas furthest away
from London. They made connections with Luton and Birmingham for both temporary and secure
placements. Secure placements to these areas could be made as a private rented sector offer under the
Localism Act meaning that if the offer meets suitability guidelines Brent can discharge its duty regardless of
the household’s wishes. Allocations staff have also communicated with Newcastle about using their hard-
to-let social housing properties where demand is low but participants stated that these placements would
only be pursued with the agreement of the household.
4.2 Case Study Results by Theme
Policy aims & performance
How is the performance of homelessness and allocations policy measured?
There was little consensus between or within each borough on the objectives of the housing needs team.
One participant from Brent referred purely to a duty to “meet our legal obligations” while another said
their aims went beyond legal duties and included prevention work:
“We have things like the Welsh model where you have a duty to prevent homelessness before you
even assess it. We have been doing things similar to that which is, try to assist before we get to the
point where the statutory duty arises so, everything we do before the statutory duty arises is based
on guidance and our own policies.”
In Haringey, where the numbers in temporary accommodation are highest, their Cabinet Member
discussed increasing prevention work but also a political objective to keep people within the borough and
maintain mixed communities in line with Labour values. Staff at Haringey also acknowledged this as a
political objective:
“Broadly speaking yes we are answerable to legislation but there are specific decisions that
Haringey has taken in terms of their Allocations Policy that means, as with any borough, we have
specific desires for this area in terms of groups that we want to help out or particular ways that the
Council feels that they want to enforce that legislation. So we’re probably a bit more open to taking
people onto our Housing Register than a number of other London Borough’s might be. We have a
Council that believes in trying to help people into accommodation therefore they approach their
policy from that perspective.”

26
The consequences of this stance were problematic:
“It’s definitely more beneficial to the user. It’s probably not very beneficial to us at all. It can create
us problems in terms of actually having to supply the correct size of accommodation and it maybe
something we have to come away from in the future, we may have to be a little bit more pragmatic
about what we’ve got but that’s where we are right now.”
The most commonly mentioned performance measures were the proportion of cases prevented from
becoming homeless and the six week limit placed on Bed and Breakfast accommodation for families, set
out in national guidelines. These were both referred to in three out of seven interviews. Participants also
cited the following: the number of acceptances into temporary accommodation, the number of out of
borough placements and wait times on the housing register. The length of time households are in
temporary accommodation was not referred to in answers about performance. It was instead discussed in
relation to the cost of temporary accommodation and long wait times for social housing.
Is legislation interpreted differently by different boroughs?
As predicted in the literature review, there were small differences in the interpretation of Part VII of the
Housing Act 1996 in terms of how homeless applicants are assessed as ‘vulnerable’ and therefore whether
they are given temporary accommodation. In Brent the decision is made by housing staff using a
‘Vulnerability Matrix’ which takes into account social factors whereas in Camden it is decided by a Medical
Assessor so is based on mental and physical health. This is not estimated to have had a significant
difference on numbers of acceptances.
In regards to the Housing Act Part VI on allocations schemes, all three case studies follow the statutory
reasonable preference criteria closely. How those ‘reasonable preference’ groups are prioritised among
each other (an area not prescribed by law or government guidance) was found to differ substantially and is
discussed further under the next theme on mechanisms leading to long term temporary accommodation.
All three boroughs have applied additional powers given to them by the Localism Act to exclude certain
groups such as those in rent arrears and perpetrators of anti-social behaviour, which is in line with findings
by a study commissioned by the DETR (2001) that London Boroughs apply more restrictive interpretations
to their allocations policies.
However Haringey is slightly more lenient on who it will accept on the housing register than Brent and
Camden as demonstrated in Table 4.1. It has the lowest qualifying period for which applicants must have

27
lived in the borough and allows grandparents or grandchildren to be included on applications without
discretion. In addition, Haringey is the only one of the three case studies that allows one additional or one
fewer bedroom than the number required by the household members. One participant described Haringey
as having a “more generous” stance on allocations than most boroughs. Although those specific areas of
policy had not been reviewed by the cabinet in recent years, the Cabinet Member interviewed described
their more inclusive stance as “a proactive thing about our labour values, wanting to build strong mixed
communities”.
Table 4.1: Criteria for Acceptance on to Housing Allocations Schemes
Case Study
Borough
Qualifying
residency period
in the borough
Who can apply (beyond statutory
reasonable preference criteria)
Notable Exclusions
Haringey 3 continuous
years
Main applicant’s spouse or partner, child,
sibling, grandparent or grandchild.
Others may be included under discretion of
manager
Council operates
discretion over applicant’s
income & assets
Camden 5 out of the last
7 years (many
exceptions
apply)
Main applicant’s spouse or partner, siblings,
children of any age, other adults who are
dependent on main applicant.
Applicants with financial
assets above £32,000,
Brent 5 continuous
years
Main applicant’s spouse or partner, children
or legal dependent under age of 21.
Applicants over 21 must have extenuating
circumstances, people giving or receiving
care
Households with specific
income beyond set
thresholds (starting at
£35,000 for a 1 bed)
Mechanisms Leading to Long Term Temporary Accommodation
In Haringey and Camden, households in temporary accommodation are not given the highest priority on
the waiting lists for social housing through the boroughs’ allocations schemes. As one Haringey participant
noted:
“Most homeless households will fall into a band B category unless they’ve got additional needs. So
they are obviously in the next tier down - band A being the top band.”
Band A groups include urgent medical needs and specific quotas such as care leavers, people being moved
out for regeneration projects or “London or countrywide quotas”. In Haringey households on the waiting
list are regularly “verified” and if they fall out of eligibility for the allocations scheme for example if they

28
have rent arrears, their place on the housing register will be deferred. This means “basically suspending
their possibility of them moving into long term secure accommodation”, and therefore prolonging their
stay in temporary accommodation which is costly to the borough.
Camden operate a points system which gives households a series of points based on factors relating to
their need. For example, a household who is owed a main homelessness duty (which includes those in
temporary accommodation) would be given 100 points. Other factors that are awarded the same amount
of points include households living in overcrowded or unsanitary conditions in their current home. This
does not give any particular priority to households in temporary accommodation. By comparison, an
applicant who is privately renting and has an urgent medical need to move is awarded 300 points.
The choice based lettings system was identified by Camden and Haringey as a cause of holding up the
efficient allocation of social housing properties to people on the waiting list. The systems are designed to
give the applicant an element of choice. Any property that becomes available is advertised to all applicants
through an online system and applicants can ‘bid’ for the property if they like it. The council then produces
a shortlist from all bids of those with the highest priority need according to their banding or points system.
Participants however described some applicants “scatter-gunning”, i.e. bidding on any property including
ones they are not interested in which “clogs up” the system. Camden said that they have now had to make
up lists of as many as twenty people because so few applicants who bid on a property would follow up, i.e.
attend a viewing or accept the property when offered. Staff also believed some applicants did not
understand the system and therefore did not bid at all.
In Haringey’s case long wait times on the allocations list were described as preventing people from
engaging and therefore making it harder to keep accurate data and manage cases effectively:
“if you’re saying to a customer on the one hand you’re going to wait five, six, seven, whatever years
for that permanent accommodation but you need to come in and see us every six months to keep
that information up to date customers quickly work out ‘well what am I coming to see you for?’”
Haringey staff also referred to having slow decision making speeds when accepting someone into
temporary accommodation: “so what’s been happening in Haringey, it’s got better now, but I suppose the
homelessness decision making process has been very long.”
One research participant also highlighted that for properties the local authority owns or leases, the
structure of government subsidy in more expensive areas in London provided an incentive to councils to
assign it for temporary accommodation rather than for secure tenancies for families on their waiting lists.

29
This is rooted in the government limit to the ‘Local Housing Allowance’, given to households in temporary
or private renting accommodation who are eligible for benefits. The limit is a function of the local market
rent but the function is different for temporary accommodation and permanent. For council-owned
accommodation the Local Authority receive this subsidy. One participant explained the impact:
“you still get a better rental income in some areas anyway, certainly in the inner part of the
borough, for temporary accommodation, because the TA rate of housing benefit was set before the
welfare reforms, the caps on individual property sizes and the move to the 30th percentile”
It was not possible with the data collected to determine how this impacted on each case study as it
depends on local market rents and how much property is owned. However, the participant quoted above
said that their borough chose to pursue alternatives to temporary accommodation despite the higher levels
of subsidy, because it could provide a more secure stream of income.
Barriers to Ending Temporary Accommodation
When asked what the barriers are to ending temporary accommodation, three out of seven participants
mentioned the limited supply of social housing and two participants mentioned the high costs of market
rents:
“Before you would get people, just exiting temporary accommodation themselves because they’d
say actually, I’ve saved up some money and I’m working and I could actually afford a flat round the
corner, I’d prefer that. Or I’ve saved up and I can get a shared ownership home. Increasingly that
simply is not financially viable to people so the people who are in temporary accommodation, we
can’t move them out but equally, people are sort of clinging to temporary accommodation for
longer, because it’s their best alternative in the market.”
Other factors described as barriers included having limited land left to build on and the expectations of
applicants on the waiting list. Those households who applied before November 2012 and not affected by
the Localism Act, were choosing to wait in temporary accommodation until they could obtain a social
housing tenancy, because of ideas about greater security in the social housing sector. All three case study
boroughs recognised this as an issue. Further, when households were made an offer of social housing they
sometimes refused. This problem was identified by Camden and Haringey. In the case of Camden, a “huge
mismatch” was described between what service users expected and what was on offer because 80 per cent
of social housing stock in Camden is on estates and therefore undesirable.

30
The Financial Costs and Use of Housing Stock
Each borough used types of stock for temporary accommodation in different proportions as shown in figure
4.2 below. One element of this is a normative judgement about what type of accommodation is most
suitable. As discussed under the case study headings above, Haringey showed a preference for self-
contained properties while Camden used more hostels and annexes.
The other element is financial and is dependent on the private sector. All three boroughs used a high
proportion of private sector leased properties. In procuring these properties Housing Associations will take
out leases with the private sector, and use it as temporary accommodation for homeless households on
behalf of the Local Authority. These properties, along with properties rented directly from private
landlords (column 6 in Table 4.2) are therefore vulnerable to market changes. Brent described that they
had had to use their own funds where rents exceeded government subsidies: “We have used huge amounts
of DHP to really pay the difference but it is something that cannot be maintained or sustained forever”.
Another problem described by Haringey in the private sector market was competition created by other
boroughs:
“We’ve created that problem because we’ve been so desperate to get hold of properties we’ve
actually created the issue of, we’ve not persuaded but we’ve encouraged landlords to charge us an
extortionate amount. I mean, nightly rated accommodation is the most popular among landlords
because with nightly rated accommodation they can get a month’s worth of rent in one week, on a
property”.
Table 4.2: Households in Temporary Accommodation on 31st March 2015 by Placement Type: Case Study
Boroughs
Case Study
Borough
Bed and
breakfast
(including
shared
annexe)
Hostels LA/HA*
stock
Private
sector
leased (by
LA or
HA*)
Other types
(including
private
landlord)
Total in
temporary
accommodati
on
Camden - 23 51 168 230 490
Haringey - 137 64 1,475 1,283 2,997
Brent 218 74 - 2,707 162 3,161
*Refers to Local Authority and Housing Association properties, jointly referred to as social housing.
Source: DCLG Live Table 784: Local Authority Summary, Local authorities’ action under the homelessness provisions of
the 1985 and 1996 Housing Acts

31
The difficulty of procuring placements in private renting was referred to by all boroughs and applied both
when the boroughs were looking to lease from the private sector to provide temporary accommodation,
and when boroughs were assisting temporary accommodation cases to move on into the private sector,
under their new Localism Act power. Difficulties were found not only from high market rents and
availability, but from competition from other boroughs. One Haringey participant explained that private
landlords would previously have let to councils even though the amount they were paid was lower, because
the income was coming from a public body where payment was guaranteed and demand was consistent:
“What landlords have said because of all the benefit changes [is] they now see the temporary
accommodation market as risky, it’s unpredictable”.
The number of private sector leased properties available for temporary housing was therefore described as
decreasing. Market rent levels continued to increase while government subsidies remained frozen,
meaning the council incurred the cost of the difference.

32
Chapter 5: Discussion
Should households in Temporary Accommodation be prioritised for Social Housing?
Legislation and guidance does not dictate how households in temporary accommodation should be
assessed in allocations schemes. There are two ways of viewing households in temporary accommodation
when they are placed on the housing register, they can be judged on the circumstances that led them to
approach the council in the first place, or on the circumstances of their newly acquired temporary
placement. The first option takes the view that ‘temporary’ housing should indeed be a temporary solution
and in essence provide emergency relief for homeless families and vulnerable households. It would follow
that their claim to a social housing tenancy should be based on their status as homeless and vulnerable,
and therefore these households should be given highest priority. Theoretically this approach should lead to
lower numbers in temporary accommodation and a cost saving to the borough.
However, the risk of ‘incentivizing homelessness’ by providing a fast track to social housing came up
frequently in interviews as an argument against prioritising households on the allocations scheme. For
both Camden and Haringey, households are given mid-level priority or points on the list along with all other
applicants with different housing needs. One Haringey participant commented:
“the priority given to homeless households, is actually quite a high priority, because, essentially
when you think about it, when you’ve given someone a full housing duty you place them into
temporary accommodation, that temporary accommodation is actually suitable for their needs, so
why should they get a high priority on the waiting list?”
In guidance and case law, Local Authorities are required to meet suitability requirements similar for both
temporary accommodation and permanent placements. Haringey’s use of predominantly self-contained
properties for temporary accommodation, is seen as a justification for households not to be moved on. In
the eyes of this participant there is an acceptance of those placements as satisfactory in their own right.
The impetus to move the household on reduces, and the group which are initially given accommodation
because by law they are viewed as the most vulnerable and in need of assistance, then fall below multiple
other groups on the allocations list for a secure placement in social housing.

33
Cloke et al’s study into the impact of the 1996 Housing Act highlighted this as a potential failing in the
legislation. They argued that by assessing homeless families equally among other groups in the allocations
process the definition of homelessness is reframed to one of “housing need”, resulting in a “blurring of the
boundaries between housing need and homelessness”. While this helps to reduce stigma, they predicted
the following:
“the disadvantage is that by altering the route to rehousing and talking about households in
homeless situations as being in ‘housing need’ rather than expressly as being ‘homeless’, the
imperative and sense of urgency to tackle homelessness will be lost” (Cloke et al, 2000).
Regardless of debates around who is most deserving of social housing, this study shows that in these high
demand London boroughs, there are high financial and efficiency costs to not prioritising homeless families
for secure placements and therefore prolonging their stay in temporary accommodation. Haringey’s
practices have incurred significant financial resources and require a high number of staff to maintain the
placements.
Fitzpatrick and Pleace’s (2012) nationwide study into outcomes under the 1996 Housing Act found
“homeless households having a higher level of long-term housing need than non-homeless households
allocated social housing. This means that giving priority in allocations to statutorily homeless households
should maximise collective welfare in line with utilitarian priorities” (Fitzpatrick and Pleace, 2012, p.248).
The importance of how homelessness is defined is highlighted by Minnery and Greenhalgh’s comparative
study which concludes that narrow definitions of homelessness cause multiple problems and can exclude
groups from services and measurement: “Definitions are also the connecting link between the problem of
homelessness and agency responsibility”. It could be argued that the lack of centralised guidance on
prioritising these households in the past allowed authorities to avoid encouraging homelessness. However
the new power of Local Authorities to discharge homeless households from temporary accommodation
into the private sector neutralises the problem of ‘incentivizing’ homelessness because there is no longer
guaranteed access to social housing.
By contrast, in ring fencing 80 per cent of social housing stock for temporary accommodation cases, Brent
have prioritised these households without increasing their priority on their allocations scheme, meaning no
assessment of need is conducted. While legislation allows a great deal of discretion, it could be argued
that Brent’s approach is in breach of DCLG guidance. The law allows and encourages Local Authorities to

34
decide how properties are allocated to people within the reasonable preference categories in line with
local needs and factors, however, the DCLG guidance for local housing authorities on the allocation of
accommodation also states:
“An allocation scheme may provide for other factors than those set out in s.166A(3) to be taken
into account in determining which applicants are to be given preference under a scheme, provided
that they do not dominate the scheme” (DCLG, Allocation of Accommodation, para 4.19)
In their strategy documentation Brent states quite clearly that homelessness should not be used as a route
to social housing, and uses private sector placements for post-Localism Act cases as a way of removing the
incentive to become homeless:
“The housing waiting list, rather than homelessness, is seen as the primary route into affordable
housing and in this context the council has already taken the decision to use the power to discharge
homelessness duties through the private sector” (London Borough of Brent, 2014, p.23).
Their policy of ring fencing 80 per cent of their social housing allocations for pre-Localism cases in
temporary accommodation contradicts this but is described as a “short term measure with the clear intent
to provide that in the longer-term the Housing Register is the primary route into permanent social housing”
(London Borough of Brent, 2014, p.27). Approximate figures around the length of time it would take to
clear the backlog were discussed in an interview with Brent staff. Of the 2,500 households eligible for
priority access to social housing stock, around 600 properties actually become available on a yearly basis.
“So we have 2,500 but 600 properties a year so it will take us six or seven years to house everyone
that is already on the list pre 9/11/12. But there’s no guarantee that we’ll be doing it by then
because it depends on the size of accommodation households need. For example if you need a one
bedroom property, you will only be in temporary accommodation for one or two years…. If you
need a two bed it’s six years or seven years, if you need a five bed, now it’s down to about 13-14
years. If you need a four bed, it’s about 15 or 16 years. If you need an eight or nine bed, and we do
have households who need such huge family sized properties, they may be waiting for a very, very
long time. The last time the council let a seven bedroom property was in 1990.”
One participant from Haringey viewed this strategy as a way of ensuring the people with the most acute
need are given priority to housing. Whereas another participant criticised it for excluding other people

35
with different housing needs, and because it creates an incentive for people to become homeless in order
to obtain a place in social housing. The purpose of this study is not to determine what groups of people are
most deserving of suitable, affordable housing. Brent’s practise however shows that in order to reduce
their use of temporary accommodation they have had to undermine the current legislative framework by
side-stepping the use of the allocations system.
Where should Homeless Households be Housed?
Cloke et al.’s assessment of the Housing Act 1996 warned against the potential for a ‘Clogging up’ of the
system through the increased use of housing for temporary accommodation. Camden and Haringey
showed opposite approaches to what type of accommodation should be reserved for temporary housing
and indeed two different understandings of the purpose of temporary housing. Brent unlike Haringey
refused to use Local Authority housing stock but still used private sector leases. Again, legislation and
guidance is purposefully vague on how stock should be used, to allow for local expertise and different
contexts. This comes down to how successful implementation is measured or how the local authorities
choose to determine it. The 6 week limit on the use of bed and breakfast accommodation for families is an
area where central guidelines are unusually specific and this was not questioned and largely adhered to in
all three case studies. It was one of the few commonly referred to performance measures. Placing families
in self-contained accommodation rather than annexed or hostel accommodation is not an explicitly stated
goal.
If we measure performance according to efficiency, hostel & annexe accommodation would probably win
out (depending on local costs and availability), and self-contained accommodation would be reserved for
secure placements. However, if we measure performance on the basis of meeting housing needs, self-
contained properties are likely to be preferable. Bramley 2015 refers to needs measures as overcrowding,
concealed housing, shared amenities, lack of amenities, housing condition, affordability, suitability around
health, family, neighbourhood problems. Government suitability criteria reflects these needs. The three
case studies demonstrate that the use of self-contained properties for temporary accommodation impacts
on the efficient allocation of resources and on household’s expectations.
In all three case studies, self-contained properties are being sourced from the private sector often at rents
higher than government subsidies. Cloke et al. commented on the subjectivity of affordability in the private
rented sector and the need for households to make up the difference in costs above housing benefit limits

36
(2000, p.750). This study has shown that in many cases Local Authorities are making up this difference
from their own budgets, both when using the private sector for temporary accommodation, and when
preventing homelessness.
In Haringey the use of self-contained properties had the unintended consequence of discouraging
households to bid through the allocations system. A participant described the problem of how the
households themselves perceive their situation. They explained that family sized temporary
accommodation in Haringey is partly made up of desirable, Victorian, family sized homes with a garden,
“and of course they love it”. Whereas much of the social housing stock available for secure placements
through the allocations system consists of flats on estates:
“There’s an issue there about expectations, where people wait in temporary accommodation and
some residents complain and complain that they’re in TA and it’s taking forever. But actually they
don’t want what’s at the end of the tunnel, they don’t want a flat on Broadwater Farm, so most of
our vacant flats do come up in Tottenham and often on estates, but people don’t want that. So I
don’t think that residents necessarily understand that temporary accommodation, this very exciting
queue for a permanent home is not necessarily going to give them what they want.”
The participant commented further:
“When you get a lot of people in the borough in temporary accommodation for five years plus,
sometimes eight or nine, it sort of says to me that we need to rethink what we mean by temporary
accommodation.”
Further research would be needed to determine whether limiting temporary accommodation to hostel or
annexed accommodation would reduce the average length of stay, and if so what impact that may have on
outcomes for individual households.

37
The Borough Structure and ‘Out of Borough’ Placements
I have so far discussed areas in which Local Authorities policy implementation affects the use of temporary
accommodation, with varying costs to resources. The findings of the three case studies however pointed to
a third issue largely beyond their individual control: the structure of the borough system itself.
The lack of cooperation between boroughs both on allocations policies, temporary accommodation and
placements in the private sector was identified as a source of inefficiency and poor outcomes both for Local
Authorities and households in the following two ways:
a) It encourages competition over private rented sector properties for temporary and secure
placements to the benefit of the private market
b) The legislative framework of local connection prevents redistribution of resources across
boroughs and results in arbitrary placements of households.
As market rents increase in inner London areas, fixed borough boundaries are becoming an increasing
barrier to procuring suitable placements and using temporary accommodation efficiently.
Multiple participants referred to breaches of the Pan London Agreement resulting in difficulties procuring
private renting accommodation and the effect that competition between boroughs has on driving up
prices:
“I think it would be better if there was a single London-wide system, and then you wouldn’t have
this competition driving prices up, two if there was just a London temporary accommodation or a
London housing placement agency, then you would know as the landlord, if that agency said to you,
no I’m paying you £600 a week and not a penny more, you can take it or leave it. Because what you
can’t do is knock on next door and say to Camden ‘oh Haringey won’t pay but you’ve got more
money’ so I think having one agency would I think calm the market down because that would be
your only choice really.”
The competition also leads to a poor allocation in terms of location of the available accommodation to
homeless households. Under legislation boroughs have the option of restricting homeless applicants to
those who can prove they have been resident in that borough. Each of the case studies applies this

38
restriction as a way of rationing the number of people they assist. However, each case study acknowledged
having to place an increasing number of households outside of their borough because of a lack of
affordable options within it. This creates a race to procure accommodation in lower cost areas which has
resulted in boroughs having to place households in more distant locations:
“You do have these silly situations where on the same day you’ve got someone in Haringey putting
someone in Croydon, someone from Croydon’s putting someone in Haringey. So you’ve got people
being disjointed from their circumstances.”
The three case studies demonstrate that as a result of the Localism Act 2011 there has been an increase in
households being placed in private rented accommodation either in temporary or permanent placements,
outside of their resident borough, in a minority of cases in areas as far as Luton, Birmingham and even
Newcastle. Interviews suggested that out of borough placements are also likely to increase in the future as
the cost of private renting continues to rise and social housing stock in London decreases. Data showed
that at the end of September 2015, 18,600 households in temporary accommodation were placed in
another local authority’s area, an increase of 20 per cent on the previous year (Great Britain, Parliament,
2016, p.8). DCLG guidance on the Localism Act advises the following:
“Where it is not possible to secure accommodation within district and an authority has secured
accommodation outside their district, the authority is required to take into account the distance of
that accommodation from the district of the authority. Where accommodation which is otherwise
suitable and affordable is available nearer to the authority’s district than the accommodation which
it has secured, the accommodation which it has secured is not likely to be suitable unless the
authority has a justifiable reason or the applicant has specified a preference.” (Great Britain, DCLG,
2012b, para. 48)
When asked about forms of cooperation between boroughs, participants discussed the Pan London
Agreement and some collaborative programmes where inter-borough placements were facilitated for
example for people fleeing domestic violence or gang exit. Cooperation on out of borough placements of
temporary accommodation however is limited to a statutory duty to notify the relevant Local Authority in
which the placement has occurred. When discussing opportunities for cooperation, there was a perception
among two participants that all boroughs “have the same pressures that we have” so any cooperation or
sharing of stock does not work well except in some specific cases. However both the data and interview

39
findings show significant differences in ‘pressures’ for example in demographics and in the number and
type of housing stock available. Increased placements in out of borough temporary accommodation and of
private rented sector offers far beyond London signals a question over the appropriateness of the borough
set-up. It is possible that better communication and resource sharing between boroughs could increase
the number of affordable private sector offers obtained, and reduce the likelihood of households having to
be displaced as far from their resident borough.

40
Chapter 6: Conclusion & Recommendations
In my introduction I hypothesised that the implementation of housing policy by Local Authorities has
contributed to the use of long term temporary accommodation in London. I planned to use a case study
method to prove my hypothesis by evaluating the three boroughs approaches to managing their statutory
homelessness duty, their allocation of social housing and their efforts to facilitate alternative placements in
the private sector.
Main Findings
My findings support the hypothesis in the following ways:
 Ambiguity around how to assess households in temporary accommodation for social housing mean
they are not being prioritised through allocations schemes. The impact is a longer stay in
temporary accommodation at additional cost and use of housing stock. This policy stance resulted
from a perceived need among allocations managers to lower the priority of homeless households
on allocations schemes as a way of discouraging homelessness as a route into social housing. With
the introduction of the Localism Act however, the threat of incentivizing homelessness should be
weakened.
 There is some evidence suggesting a ‘clogging up’ of affordable housing provision because property
is being used for temporary accommodation. Tight suitability criteria, similar for temporary
accommodation and permanent housing encourages the use of self-contained property which
could otherwise be used for permanent housing either in the social housing sector or as a private
renting sector offer.
 Competition between boroughs to source both temporary and permanent placements in the
private sector causes efficiency losses and poorer outcomes for households. This comes down to
both the implementation framework (the borough system in London) and Local Authority
behaviour. There is a misconception among some staff that all boroughs face the same problems.
This could be improved by encouraging Local Authorities to share information about the demands
for particular stock in their area, to promote the spread of resources across London.
In the case of Haringey, factors contributing to long term temporary accommodation consisted both of
areas of inefficiency (slow decision making and lack of resources focused on move on and slow take up of
private renting sector offers), as well as a conscious policy stance of inclusion and a preference to provide

41
self-contained accommodation over annexe, hostel and bed and breakfasts. The total impact of Haringey’s
practices does not appear sustainable given their deficit of £5 million but this study cannot determine
whether or not a restructuring of resources and processes will be sufficient to reduce their temporary
accommodation figures and costs, while maintaining their current policy choices.
Camden have taken the position that temporary accommodation should facilitate only a core emergency
provision and accordingly use predominantly hostel and annexed accommodation. They focus on
prevention and incentivize individuals against making homeless applications. However, those in temporary
accommodation are not prioritised for social housing and therefore consist of a high proportion of cases
accepted before the Localism Act. This also contributes to the unusual circumstance that, despite having a
relatively low number of people in temporary accommodation, their average length of stay is high (as
demonstrated in figure 3.1).
Brent have been quick to take up private renting sector offers therefore reducing the proportion of
temporary accommodation cases that were accepted after the Localism Act. However their policy to ring-
fence the majority of their housing stock for households in temporary accommodation makes the
performance of their allocations scheme, and their duties under Part VI redundant for 80 per cent of their
properties. Although this means households in temporary accommodation are housed more quickly and
reduces costs to the borough, it also, as one participant commented, disregards the needs of other groups
on the housing register who under the Housing Act 1996 should be given ‘reasonable preference’.
My findings and recommendations were shaped by Matland’s implementation framework, and previous
literature which indicated that the high level of discretion allowed to Local Authorities in housing policy
should not be discouraged. Matland suggests that allowing for discretion in situations where central policy
makers lack necessary local knowledge for policy implementation “should be seen as an opportunity to
learn both new means and new goals” (Matland, 1995, p.167). Indeed, the case studies showed that
boroughs had used innovative solutions to meet contextual challenges. Brent for example pursued the
acquisition of new properties through a private company to ensure a provision of private renting in line
with government subsidy rates, and Haringey planned to create their own lettings agency to improve
relations with private landlords. Additionally, each borough showed an increased focus on prevention
work. However, the interaction of discretion over allocations schemes and use of housing stock, with the
very prescriptive duties to accommodate homeless households had also contributed to a backlog of
temporary accommodation cases.

Dissertation Study Temporary Accommodation

Dissertation Study Temporary Accommodation

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (14)

Similar to Dissertation Study Temporary Accommodation

Similar to Dissertation Study Temporary Accommodation (20)

Dissertation Study Temporary Accommodation