2. Events Leading to War
• In the very beginning of
this year relations started
to deteriorate.
• Tensions climaxed when
Egyptian President closed
the strait of Tiran,
preventing Israeli ships to
reach Red Sea from the
Gulf of Aqaba.
3. Events Leading to War
“Interference with Israeli shipping would be considered as
an act of war.”
6. Israel Objectives
• To prevent the use of Arab air power against
Israel by destroying it on ground.
• To achieve air superiority for successful force
application
• To occupy territory for ensuring safeguard of
SLOC
8. Arab Objectives
• To absorb the first Israeli onslaught
• To respond with full force from three fronts
to cut Israel into half
9. Force Comparison : Overall
Israel
Arabs
Ratio
Egypt Jordan Syria Iraq Total
Ground
Forces
265,000 240,000 50,000 50,000 70,000 410,000 1:1.5
Tanks 800 1200 200 400 400 2200 1:1.5
Combat
A/C
295 450 28 134 110 722 1 : 2.5
10. The Israeli Attack : 5th June
o By aerial recce flts and intel they had accurate
information about Egyptian Air Defence Network, Radar
cover ages and positions of decoy ac.
o Israelis launched a surprise air attack on Egyptian
Radar stations and airfields.
o Routes were selected to take adv of radar blind spots.
12. 40 x
TOT : 0825
40 x
TOT : 0835
40 x
TOT : 0845
40 x
TOT : 0855
40 x
TOT : 0905
40 x
TOT : 0915
40 x
TOT : 0925
40 x
TOT : 0935
40 x
TOT : 0945
Air Operations : 5th June
40 x
TOT : 1005
Sequential attacks
13. Israeli Deception Tactics
o Surprise was achieved by selecting the time of lowest
readiness of the Egyptian Air defence forces.
o 1st wave took off on sunrise for routine trg flts, deception
done to mislead the Egyptians that it was just another
normal day.
o 2nd wave of ac carried out the first attacks.
o Initially flew LL over the sea to the west of Cairo, to attack
in Easterly direction, from where Egyptians never expected
any threat.
14. Israeli Jamming Tactics
o They could maintain their EW plan secret on which they
were working since last two years.
o It is difficult to believe in all of the Egyptian Air Defence
Network comprising of 23Radar stations no body was
alert at the time of attack.
o No EW action was taken on any Egyptian radar till 0745
hrs on 5th June to keep element of surprise.
15. Israeli Jamming Tactics
o First blow was on long range radars and subsequently
on others electronic jamming or ECM were applied.
o Subsequently spoofing was also done while carrying out
Comm jamming to cause confusion in the entire Egyptian
Air Defence Network.
o This war is an ideal example of Command and Control
warfare.
16. Air Operations : 5th June (Day 1)
• At the End of First Day
– RJAF Completely
Destroyed
– EAF and SAF Suffered
Heavy Losses
• IAF Claimed 300 A/C
Destroyed
• 19 A/C Lost
• Approx 1000 Sorties
Flown
Air Operations : 5th June (Day 1)Air Operations : 5th June (Day 1)Air Operations : 5th June (Day 1)
17.
18. EW : CASE STUDY
The War of Attrition (1967)
ANTI-SHIP STYX RADAR
GUIDED MISSILE
ISRAELI DESTROYER EILAT
19. EW : CASE STUDY
The War of Attrition (End of 1968)
IAF KFIR JETS
WITH RWR FACILTY
SA-2 Guideline
20. EW : CASE STUDY
The War of Attrition (Dec 1969)
‘Spoon Rest’ Tgt Acquisition Radar
21. EW : CASE STUDY
The War of Attrition (1970)
F-4E Phantom
EA-4 Skyhawk
22. EW : CASE STUDY
The War of Attrition (1970)
EB-47 StratoCruiser
23. EW : CASE STUDY
The War of Attrition (1970)
SA-3 GOA
MiG-21J
24. EW IN YOM KIPPUR WAR-
1973
Introduction
Capabilities
Tactics
Conclusion
28. Egyptian Tactics
Arranged AD with SA series Missiles and ZSU-
23-4 RCG – With wideband Jamming system.
Israel planned to fly low
Significant attrition due to ZSU-23-4 RCG
Israel Upgraded EW measures by Jamming Pod
and Chaff Dispenser. UAV to destroy SAM
29. Egyptian Sagger wire-guided missile against
Israeli Tanks- Centurion.
Israel Had to Wait for Control of Air – thus,
CAS msn to Destroy Tanks