3. SEQUENCE
• Genesis of the term “Air Power”
• How to define air power
• Why learning about History of Air Power
• Evolution of air power over the years
• Q&A
3
4. GENESIS OF THE EXPRESSION : AIR
POWER
• 1893-Maj Fullerton (British
Army) prophesized that future
war would commence with air
battle (official birthday of air
power)
• 1908- HG Wells first used the
term air power in his novel
named ‘The war in the air”
H.G. WELLS
4
5. WHAT IS AIR POWER
• AP is the ability to project military power by using air or space or platform operating above
surface of earth platforms including AC,Hel, Missiles, UAV, Satelight etc.
• Billy Mitchel: The ability to do something in the air
• RAF: Air power is the ability to use platforms operating in or passing through the
air for military purposes (2nd
edn)
• USAF: Aerospace power grows out of the ability to use a platform operating in or
passing through the aerospace medium for military purposes (AFM-1-1 1992)
• RAAF: Air power represents the ability to project military force in the third
dimension - which includes space - by or from a platform above the surface of the
earth (AAP-1000 1994)
• IAF: “Air Power is the ability of a nation to assert its will through the medium of
air”-IAP-2007
5
• RAF: “The ability to project power from the air and space to influence the
behaviour of people or the course of events”-4TH
edn
• USAF: The ability to project military power or influence through the control and
exploitation of air, space and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational or
tactical objectives- AFDD-1 Sep 1997
6. WHY LEARNING ABOUT AIR POWER
HISTORY?
• Air Power “Employment” (i.e Strategy & Tactics)
philosophies
• Evolution of Roles of Air Power
• Targeting philosophies
• C2 of air power
• Air-Land Integration
• Postulations of Air Power Advocates
• How capability went infavour/went against the
postulations
• What is the takeaway for us (i.e BAF)
6
7. HISTORY:PRE WW-I
• In 200BC, Chinese Gen Huan
Theng used man lifting kites for
obsn
• Btl of Fleurus (1794)- use of
recce balloon was decisive for
French victory
• Heavier than air machine flight
in 17 Dec 1903
• On 1 Nov 1911, vis recce by
Italian airplane in Italio-Turkish
war
• Same year, Actual cbt by Italian
Capt Moizo and Capt De Rada
against Turkish grd forces
• AAA debut in 1912 when Capt
Moizo was shot by AAA-AD
concept took shape
7
AN EXAMPLE OF MAN LIFTING KITES
CAPT CARLO PIAZZA
8. HISTORY:WW-I
• Recce role using hand held cameras
• Aerial guns to fight for the control of war
• Scouting (Sweep) duties
• Battle of Verdun- Feb 1916- First realization of air
power as strategic tool. Fort Doumont was captured by
gaining con of the air
• 1915- airfd attk started. Btl of Somme (Sep 1916)
German airfds were systematically targeted
• ASuW role evolved with aerial torpedos
• All traditional role, CAS, recce, ASuW, ASW,
interdiction, airfd attk, tpt, comm and SAR evolved
• C2 remained with army, navy
• Gotha attk (July 1917) forced the British air ministry to
dev an indep air force to carr out SAO
8
9. HISTORY:WW-I
• 1918- Maj Gorell (USA) evolved strat plan- drop bombs on
commercial and industrial centers and LOCs to cut en from
his vital supplies
• Two important doctrinal lessons emerged- Use of ac in op
and need for gaining and maint con of the air is pre-
requisite for subsequent op.
• Gen Foch said “air superiority was a prerequisite to
ground superiority, which ensured it”.
9
10. HISTORY:INTERWAR
• RAF estb as indep air force in 1918
• RAF CD-22 – the first air power doctrine published
• AP theorists emerged (Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell)- Douhet’s famous
book “Command of the air” published in 1921. Trenchard’s famous
postulation “Bombers would always get through”. Mitchell court
• Luftwaffe estb in 1935 as indep air force in 1925.
• Increment in ac rng, speed, man, tech and improvement in metallurgy,
weapons and sensors and at the same time AD sys developed
• Air policing role emerged for controlling colonies (Middle East and
NWFP) as a substitute for army and navy (advocated by Trenchard)
• Army coop sqn estb
• RAF evolved army coord through depl FAC with army units behind the
“bomb line” (later termed as FSCL)
• Targeting philosophies estb by Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchel, Weaver
– Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchel advocated strat use of air power
– Weaver’s death overshadowed Germany’s focus on the use of strat use of
air power
• Amph doctrine in 1934 by US Marines integrating air power
10
11. HISTORY:WW-II
• Btl of Heligoland Bight- First successful Def CAO by Germany
against RAF. Trenchard’s famous postulation “Bombers would
always get through” turned “FALSE”- RAF reshaped their
doctrine
• Blitzkrieg 1939-started with offensive counter air followed by
CAS and AI
• Poland tried to save the ac for future use-wrong strategy
• Op Weserubung- World’s first tri-service jt op by Germany
• France allotted 40% of total air assets to army command in
response to op Fall Gelb -wrong strategy
• Op Sealion failed- Luftwaffe failed to gain con of the air over
English channel
• First cruise missile (V1 and V2) attack by Germany against
London
• Dev of IADS by RAF
• Dev of ECM and ECCM by the RAF and Luftwaffe
• Dev of night fighters with AI radars 11
12. HISTORY:WW-II
• Op Barbarosa failed- Luftwaffe never concentrated on targets
behind enemy lines, thus could not stop the reinforcement
• Logistic doctrine took a new shape- sustain op by air lift
• Luftwaffe enjoyed unity of command under a single air
commander from the beginning. USA learned it through hard
way during North African Campaign
• North African Campaign saw air power role as SCAR, FAC (A),
SEAD
• Allied bomber offensive against strategic targets inside
Germany made sure that Normandy landing faces almost no
air threat-which came true
• Pacific campaign saw the success of USMC’s amph op doctrine
under Nimitz’s AOR.
• McArther’s AOR saw the integration of USMC and USA and
USAAF’s integration
• First op jet (Me-262) for the def of the Reich in 1944
12
13. HISTORY:POST WW-II
• USAF became indep force in 1947
• Air tpt op maint allied troops in Berlin for almost a
year- USSR gave up the cease of Berlin against the
allied persistence (1948-49)
• AP theories influenced by nuclear power and strat
deterrence
• Dev of high alt interceptors and heavy bombers
• French intro air mobile op against occupied
Vietnam
• Use of air power against insurgents by the French
13
14. HISTORY:KOREAN WAR
• USAF’s nuclear strategy proved invalid against agrarian
Korea
• Offensive counter air remained the major and primary air
power role
• Platforms never limited to its primary role. Proved once
again that Air Power is highly flexible
• C2 of air power was geographic controlled between USN,
USAF and USMC- poor emp of air power
• No unity of command within USAF
• USAF not permitted to take part in the inchon landing-
Service perochialism. USAF only shaped the ldg beyond 50
miles
• First jet vs jet air combat
• First use of helicopters
14
15. HISTORY:VIETNAM WAR
• Mismatch between strategic and tac level
• Unable to realise the nature of warfare
• Poor targeting philosophies
• Use of RPVs for recce
• Flexibility of air power – B-52 in CAS role
• Poor use of air power- divided Vietnam in several geographic
locations for targeting by USN and USAF
• No unity of command between and within services for air
power employment
• BVR philosophies proved wrong-conc later on WVR
• First depl of MRSAM and SHORAD systems by NV forces in
layered air defence concept – An excellent example of Def CAO
by the NV Forces
• Use of force Package against highly defended targets inside
North Vietnam
• 48 hours planning cycle for air op
15
18. HISTORY:6 DAY WAR
• IDAF focused on offensive counter air ops –
struck 11 Egyptian airfds cont while destroying
ac on the grd
• Having gained con of the air from the
successful OCA ops, they shifted focus to sp
their army
• Flown more than 1000 sorties on the first day
making the Arab believe that IDAF has more
no of ac than they expected
18
19. HISTORY:INDO-PAK WAR 1965
• War commenced with airfd attk
• Unsuccessful OCA Ops by both the sides in a
contested airspace
• IAF lost a significant no of ac on the ground– HAS
was a must
• PAF changed strat from OCA ops to DCA ops so as
to reduce attrition
• Both the forces focused on sp the army
19
20. HISTORY:LIBERATION WAR OF BD
1971
• War commenced with airfd attack
• HAS paid dividend for the IAF
• PAF 14 sqn neutralised by 48 hours-complete air
dominance paved the way for
– Tangail drop
– Army adv with lesser casualty
– Vertical envelopment by IAF helicopters in the face of
natural barriers and to hold high tempo ops
– Air op by Kilo flight
– Strat attack on 14th
– Night bombing put pressure on the pak commanders
20
21. HISTORY: ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
1973
• Surprise by the Arabs on the jews holy day
• IDAF started to sp the army without gaining
con of the air and suffered heavy losses to
Egyptian SA-6s
• IDAF soon realised the doctrinal mistake and
conc on gaining con of the air and then sp
their grd forces
• Air lift proved more responsive and timely
than sea lift
21
26. OP BABYLON/OPERA
• Israeli F-16s attk Iraqi Nuclear fac near Bagdad
• Photo Recce of the reactor played huge dividend for
plg of the attk
• Surv also played a vital role to ident radar gaps in the
Iraqi AD sys
• TOT set based on meal time for SA-6 crew
• Low Lvl app and high angle dive attk to attain
accuracy with dump bomb
• Achieved surprise, deceived Saudis and Jordanians
on radio during ingress
• Strat Attk
26
27. HISTORY:FALKLAND WAR
• Air Lift played a major role to sustain ops at greater distances
• Importance of staging bases to deter adversary with air power
at greater distances that the su force can never think of
• Black Buck raid made strat impact on the air ops planning
• Shepherded stand off strike by the Argentine Navy put
pressure on the RN
• RN felt the need for AEW for the protection of the fleet
• ULL attk by the Argentine ac proved deadly to ship’s CIWS
system and arming problems of the bombs
• Technology (All aspect AAM) overcame the ac performance in
close in air combats
• Civ ac used as decoy by the Argentines
• British International politcs paved the way for British Victory-
EBO
27
28. HISTORY:MOLE CRICKET
• Focused at gaining air superiority over the
bekka so as to push the army beyond Litani
river
• Excellent tactics based on int collected over
years regarding SAM disposn, op freq,
reaction to RPVs, real time ISR and data
transfer
• Non-kinetic attk followed by kinetic strike in
10 min against 19 SAM sites
• Syrians dug in with mobile SA-6-big mistake;
emitted more than reqr 28
29. HISTORY:OP ELDORADO KANYON
• First jt op by USN and USAF
• Employment of air power especially packaging
• Reach of AP
• Use of PGMs (missed tgt)
• Libyan SAM effective against LL intruders
• Strategic attk
29
30. EL-DORADO CANYON PACKAGE
• TRIPOLI AREA
– 24 FB-111 Strike aircraft (six of these were airborne spares, and returned to base after the initial refueling)
– 5 EF-111 Raven ECM (Electronic Countermeasure) aircraft
– 6 F-14 Tomcats (Detached Escort)
• BENGHAZI AREA
– 14 A-6E strike aircraft
– 6 A-7E and 6 F/A-18 Electronic warfare and jamming aircraft which undertook air defense suppression for the mission
– 10 F-14 Tomcats (detached Escort)
• BDA by SR-71
30
31. HISTORY:PERSIAN GULF WAR 91
• Targeting philosophy by Warden
• Air battle preceded grd offensive
• Counter air by Cruise missiles fol by manned ac
• Stealth nullified package concept; conventional strike needed sp ac (30 sp ac (4XF-
4G, 5XEA-6B, 20XFA-18 with ARM ) for 8 strike ac;(4XA-6E, 4XTornados)
• LL attk took a toll on allied air effort; Allied resorted to ML attk
• SEAD by Hel to punch a hole into Iraqi AD system for the subsequent wave to go
through
• Iraqi KARI system proved effective (mobile SAMs)
• IrAF dispersed to Iran-Bad example of PAD
• Despite cap, number game played a major role against Iraqi forces
• Major reform under JFAAC (Single commander for air ops plg)
• Mission type command in the North
• 72 hours proved ineffective against pop up and mobile targets. (of the days ATO,
60% were planned and the rest 40%impromptu)
• One sided war
• Saddam did not visualise the effect of air power
• Gave rise to a concept of parallel operation
• Modified FSCM
31
32. HISTORY:DELIBERATE FORCE
• AOC reformed with six div for conduct of air op
• Single commander for all air assets
• Attk commenced with airfd attk by cruise missile and
then by manned ac to gain and maint con of the air
• Revisits to the airfd kept Serbian air power on the ground
• Fast FAC
• Difficulties with LGB at bad wx
• Mobile SAMs (serbian AD) pushed the NATO above
12000ft-difficulties for targeting
• Increment of BVR kills in a controlled environment
• PGM use increased to avoid collateral damage
32
33. HISTORY:KOSOVO WAR 1999
• Single commander for all air assets
• Attk commenced with airfd attk by cruise missile and
then by manned ac to gain and maint con of the air
• Revisits to the airfd kept Serbian air power on the
ground
• Difficulties with LGB at bad wx
• Mobile SAMs (Serbian AD) pushed the NATO above
12000ft-difficulties for targeting
• Increment of BVR kills in a controlled environment
• PGM use increased to avoid collateral damage
• AP integrated with the other instrument of ntl pwr to
bring Milesovich under control-EBAO
33
34. HISTORY: INDO-PAK KARGIL 1999
• PAF did not participate over the conflict area
• Attk hel empl was flawed
• Mi-17s took over
• Pak SAMs effective at high altitude
• Package concept for empl of strike ac
• Dive delivery and re-attacks proved fatal against
AD
• PGM once again proved effective – Tiger Hill attk
34
35. HISTORY: OIF 2001
• Counter air campaign against Iraqi GBAD to gain air
superiority followed by grd offensive
• Doctrine of rapid Dominance was applied (Shock & Awe)
• Non-linear btlfd: Coalition failed to realise the use of air
power against insurgents
• Asymmetric tactics: AP not very effective; AP at times
counter productive due to CD and CC
• CAS to supplement the presence of grd forces
• Focused logistic system by reachback and massive air lift
• TST and an addition of TST cell in the AOC
• ISR
• ATO cycle reduced to 44 hours
35
36. HISTORY: OEF 2003
• Counter air campaign against Iraqi GBAD to gain air
superiority followed by grd offensive
• Non-linear and non-contiguous btlfd : Coalition failed to
realise the use of air power against insurgents
• Assymetric tactics: AP not very effective; AP at times
counter productive due to CD and CC
• CAS to supplement the presence of grd forces
• Focused logistic system by reachback and massive air lift
• Humanitarian asst
• TST and dynamic targeting procedure
• ISR by UAVs and tgt netralisation by armed UAVs flown
from mainland USA
• ATO cycle reduced to 44 hours
36
37. CHANGE OF CONCEPTS iro STRAT
ATTK & AP IN CIO
• No platform is inherently
strategic/operational/tactical- depends on
effects desired
• Strategic attacks does not depend on weapon
used or platform used
• Moral can not be broken by aerial
bombardment especially in CIO situation
37
38. SUMMARY
• Counter air campaign is the primary campaign of any air forces in
the world
• Air power can not hold territory but can influence the outcome of
the war
• Air power can not be used in penny packets
• C2 of air power is to be centrally controlled
• Geography plays a major role for employment of air power
• Air power employment depends on the nature of the war-AP is very
eff against fixed tgt and in a linear btlfd
• US op examples are of less importance in contested airspace
• Airpower is the part of instrument of national power that needs to
be synchoronised with the action of other instrument of national
power-EBAO
• Force package depends on en AD. Conventional strike needs huge
number of sp ac while stealth bombers does not need them
• GBAD pushes the intruders at high alt complicating aiming, reqr
targeting pods and PGMs
38
40. • British doctrine defines airpower as "the ability to
project power from the air and space to influence
the behaviour of people or the course of events.“
• more expansively defined by Billy Mitchell as ‘the
ability to do something in the air’.
“the ability to project military power or influence
through the control and exploitation of air, space
and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational
or tactical objectives.”-AFDD
40
“Air Power includes a national’s ability to deliver cargo, people, destructive missiles, and
war-making potential through the air to a desired destination to accomplish a desired
purpose. Air power is not composed alone of the war-making components of aviation
but is the total aviation activity, civilian and military, commercial and private, potential
as well as existing”.--General Hap Arnold
The first time a
fixed wing aircraft was used in the strike role was in 1911 by an Italian Officer, Lt.
Cavotti. Leading a formation of six aircraft, he dropped a few kgs of bombs on
Turkish troops in Libya
On 1 Nov 1911, vis recce by Italian airplane in Italio-Turkish war
These included close
air support, reconnaissance, maritime attack, antisubmarine warfare,
interdiction, airfield attacks, transportation, communication and search and
rescue.
Two important doctrinal lessons that emerged during World War I were the
use of aircraft for offensive operations and the need for gaining and
maintaining control of the air
These included close
air support, reconnaissance, maritime attack, antisubmarine warfare,
interdiction, airfield attacks, transportation, communication and search and
rescue. Gorell of the US Army who in
1918 evolved the first Strategic Plan
Two important doctrinal lessons that emerged during World War I were the
use of aircraft for offensive operations and the need for gaining and
maintaining control of the air
bombs on commercial and industrial centres and lines of communications, to
cut the enemy from his vital supplies
Other Air Forces developed on somewhat different lines. The Luftwaffe was
built in keeping with the Clausewitzian concept that the primary objective in war was
the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces. Hence, it was equipped to contribute to
the German philosophy of ‘blitzkrieg’. The Japanese Air Force did not develop as an
independent entity. It was subjugated to Army and Naval control. In Italy, General
Giulio Douhet strongly advocated the strategic use of air power. Though he was
court martialled during the First World War for being over critical of the use of military
aviation, his book ‘Command of the Air’ published in 1921, did much to focus
attention on the future role of Air Power.
Industrial Web Theory [edit]
Muir S. Fairchild researched industrial interconnections.
Prior theories of bombing were developed by Italian General Giulio Douhet, British Sir Hugh Trenchard and American Colonel Billy Mitchell, each of whom advocated bombing an enemy's population centers as a method of shortening wars and thus saving more lives than were taken.[1] This theory of area bombardment was taught at ACTS until 1934 but was unpopular in the press and in government. In 1922, a treaty to limit aerial bombardment of civilians was written and promoted by the United States, called The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, but it was not adopted.[3] A similar international proposal was drafted in Tokyo in 1934 regarding the "Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War," but this, too, was not ratified by treaty.[1]
In 1935, ACTS instructors studied the probable results of area bombardment and concluded that not enough economic damage resulted from attacks on civilian population centers.[1] Mitchell and the ACTS adjusted their bombing strategy to avoid direct attacks on civilians to be "more in keeping with our humanitarian ideals," though the possibility of attacks on general population centers was retained as a "last resort."[1]
The industrial web theory was based on the idea that the economic strength of an industrial nation is composed of interdependent sectors such as manufacturing, mining, utilities and transportation. Any one of the sectors could be targeted with bombs to make the whole system suffer breakdowns and shortages. From 1935, instructors such as Robert M. Webster and Muir S. Fairchild at ACTS studied the industrial interdependence of the United States as a model for targeting an aggressor enemy state.[4] They drew up lists of optimal targets that would produce the greatest disruption for the least expenditure of bombs. Transportation and electric power industries were seen as vital targets, as well as iron ore mining and steel manufacturing.[4]
Robert M. Webster listed iron ore, steel, electricity and transportation as appropriate targets.
With the loss of an enemy's economic strength through crippling attack on a vital sector, the theory held that the enemy's will to fight would collapse and that they would surrender or be forced to the bargaining table.[4]
In 1934, six ACTS leaders appeared before the Howell Commission to advocate for an independent military air arm for the United States. Webster was joined by Donald Wilson, Robert Olds, Kenneth Walker, Claire Chennault, and Harold L. George—all six spoke about the critical opportunity that could be taken in attacking the cohesiveness of an enemy's industrial web.[5] George submitted his opinion that a bomber with a 3,000-mile (4,800 km) range would be available within two years.[4] The Howell Commission (which would develop into the Federal Aviation Commission and then into the Federal Aviation Administration) was interested in the industrial web theory and in the possibility that an independent air arm might stop an enemy from making war. They authorized the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQ Air Force) as a semi-independent arm within the United States Army.[5]
Industrial targets[edit]
Traditional military targets had primarily been fielded enemy forces[1] and concentrations of supplies held in rear areas.[4] After aerial bombardment became a possibility, tactical targets such as communications (supply and signal lines) and troop concentrations became the focus of bombing efforts.[4] The industrial web theory instead targeted choke points and bottlenecks in an enemy's economic and industrial base, deep inside the interior of an enemy nation.[6] If precision bombing could be used to destroy an industrial node with resulting paralysis of enemy industry, the particular node was given serious consideration as a target.[6]
Suitable targets included railroad lines, junctions and marshaling areas, oil drilling and fuel refining industries, iron ore mining and transportation, steel refining and manufacturing industries, electric power generation and distribution, and, in general, all forms of transportation.[4]
Enemy morale[edit]
A hold-over element of area bombardment strategies that was incorporated into the industrial web theory was that enemy morale would deteriorate in the face of bombing attacks that vitally reduced an enemy's economy. The enemy's will to resist would fail, and the enemy would surrender or would at least be forced to end the war by diplomatic means. In 1939, Fairchild said of a theoretical enemy that the "nation-wide reaction to the stunning discovery that the sources of the country's power to resist and to sustain itself are being relentlessly destroyed, can hardly fail to be decisive."[4]
Walter Weaver
Walther Wever (general)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the Luftwaffe general. For his son, the World War II Luftwaffe flying ace, see Walther Wever (pilot).
Walther WeverBorn11 November 1887Wilhelmsort, Bromberg districtDied3 June 1936 (aged 48)Dresden-KlotzscheAllegiance German Empire (to 1918) Weimar Republic (to 1933) Nazi GermanyService/branch LuftwaffeRankGeneralleutnantCommands heldChief of the Luftwaffe General StaffBattles/warsWorld War IRelationsWalther Wever (son)Walther Wever (11 November 1887 – 3 June 1936) was a pre-World War II Luftwaffe Commander. He was an early proponent of the theory of strategic bombing as a means to wage war, opposing the theories of Giulio Douhet. He died in an air crash in 1936, and German efforts to build a strategic bomber force died with him.
Contents
[hide]
1Early life
2Luftwaffe
3Notes and citations
4References
5External links
Early life[edit]
Walther Wever was born on 11 November 1887 in Wilhelmsort in the county of Bromberg (now in north-central Poland). He was the son of Arnold Wever, the one-time director of a Berlin bank and the grandson of the Prussian Prosecutor-General Dr. Carl George Wever. After his final secondary examinations, he settled in Schweidnitz where he trained as an officer.
Wever saw action in World War I and served as a staff officer for the OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung, Army High Command).
Luftwaffe[edit]
Wever became the Commander of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium on 1 September 1933. On 1 March 1935, he became Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe shortly after its creation on 26 February 1935, a post he held until his death. Wever was a supporter of the Strategic bomber and recognised its importance as early as 1934. He supported the aviation companies such as Junkers and Dornier, in their respective projects to produce the Ju 89 and Dornier Do 19 competitors for the Ural Bomber production contract competition. Wever outlined five key points to air strategy:
1. To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets.2. To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces3.To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armored forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations.4. To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles5. To paralyze the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories.[1]
However, after his death, other strategists, like Ernst Udet and Hans Jeschonnek favored smaller aircraft as they did not expend as much material and manpower. They were proponents of the dive-bomber (Junkers Ju 87) and the doctrine of close support and destruction of the opposing air forces on the 'battle-ground' rather than through attacking enemy industry. As a result, high-speed medium-bombers such as the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, and Junkers Ju 88 were developed, with much initial success.
Walther Wever funeral
On 3 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden, to give a lecture at the Luftkriegsschule Klotzsche to a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets. When he received the news of the death of a World War I German hero, he immediately set off for Berlin. On his return journey, the Heinkel He 70 Blitz that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks, and the aileron gust locks were not removed. The aircraft was airborne when the wing dipped, and the Heinkel stalled and went into a horizontal cartwheel (akin to a ground loop, but at low altitude). It crashed and exploded in flames, killing Wever and his flight engineer. That same day, the RLM issued the Bomber A heavy bomber specification and design competition for what would become the Luftwaffe's only wartime heavy bomber in production and frontline service, the Heinkel He 177.[2]
After Wever's death, a Luftwaffe bomber wing, Kampfgeschwader 4 General Wever was named after him, which fittingly enough in the later war years, would be equipped with and using in combat the one aircraft created for the design competition that started on the day of General Wever's death, the Heinkel He 177A. His son, also named Walther Wever, was a fighter pilot who was killed in action in April 1945.
Coral Sea and Midway: the turning point[edit]
Main articles: Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway
Lexington on fire at the Coral Sea
By mid-1942, the Japanese found themselves holding a vast area from the Indian Ocean to the Central Pacific, but lacking the resources to defend or sustain it. Moreover, Combined Fleet doctrine was inadequate to execute the proposed "barrier" defense.[75][81] Instead, Japan decided on additional attacks in both the south and central Pacific. However, the element of surprise, present at Pearl Harbor, was now lost due to the success of Allied codebreakers who had discovered the next attack would be against Port Moresby. If it fell, Japan would control the seas to the north and west of Australia and could isolate the country. The carrier USS Lexington under Admiral Fletcher joined USS Yorktown and an American-Australian task force to stop the Japanese advance. The resulting Battle of the Coral Sea, fought in May 1942, was the first naval battle in which ships involved never sighted each other and only aircraft were used to attack opposing forces. Although Lexington was sunk and Yorktown seriously damaged, the Japanese lost the carrier Shōhō, and suffered extensive damage to Shōkaku and heavy losses to the air wing of Zuikaku, both of which missed the operation against Midway the following month. Although Allied losses were heavier than the Japanese, the attack on Port Moresby was thwarted and the Japanese invasion force turned back in a strategic victory for the Allies. The Japanese were subsequently forced to abandon their attempts to isolate Australia.[107] Moreover, Japan lacked the capacity to replace losses in ships, planes and trained pilots.
Japanese advance until mid-1942
After Coral Sea, Yamamoto had four fleet carriers operational—Sōryū, Kaga, Akagi and Hiryū—and believed Nimitz had a maximum of two—Enterprise and Hornet. Saratoga was out of action, undergoing repair after a torpedo attack, while Yorktown had been damaged at Coral Sea, and was believed by Japanese navy intelligence to have been sunk. She would, in fact, sortie for Midway after just three days' of repairs involving her flight deck, with civilian work crews still aboard to be present for the next decisive engagement.
In May, Allied codebreakers again discovered Yamamoto's next move: an attack on Midway Atoll. It was hoped the attack would lure the American carriers into a trap,[108] leading to the destruction of United States strategic power in the Pacific.[109] He also intended to occupy Midway as part of an overall plan to extend Japan's defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle Raid. It would then be turned into a major airbase, giving Japan control of the central Pacific.
Initially, a Japanese force was sent north to attack the Aleutian Islands as a diversion. The next stage of the plan called for the capture of Midway, which would give him an opportunity to destroy Nimitz's remaining carriers. Admiral Nagumo was again in tactical command but was focused on the invasion of Midway; Yamamoto's complex plan had no provision for intervention by Nimitz before the Japanese expected him. Planned surveillance of the U.S. fleet by long range seaplane did not happen (as a result of an abortive identical operation in March), so Fletcher's carriers were able to proceed to a flanking position without being detected. Nagumo had 272 planes operating from his four carriers, the U.S. 348 (115 land-based).
As anticipated by Nimitz, the Japanese fleet arrived off Midway on 4 June and was spotted by PBY patrol aircraft.[110] Nagumo executed a first strike against Midway, while Fletcher launched his aircraft, bound for Nagumo's carriers. At 09:20 the first U.S. carrier aircraft arrived, TBD Devastator torpedo bombers from Hornet, but their attacks were poorly coordinated and ineffectual; thanks in part to faulty aerial torpedoes, they failed to score a single hit and all 15 were wiped out by defending Zero fighters. At 09:35, 15 additional TBDs from Enterprise attacked in which 14 were lost, again with no hits. Thus far, Fletcher's attacks had been disorganized and seemingly ineffectual, but they succeeded in drawing Nagumo's defensive fighters down to sea level where they expended much of their fuel and ammunition repulsing the two waves of torpedo bombers. As a result, when U.S. dive bombers arrived at high altitude, the Zeros were poorly positioned to defend. To make matters worse, Nagumo's four carriers had drifted out of formation in their efforts to avoid torpedoes, reducing the concentration of their anti-aircraft fire. Nagumo's indecision had also created confusion aboard his carriers. Alerted to the need of a second strike on Midway, but also wary of the need to deal with the American carriers that he now knew were in the vicinity, Nagumo twice changed the arming orders for his aircraft. As a result, the American dive bombers found the Japanese carriers with their decks cluttered with munitions as the crews worked hastily to properly re-arm their air groups.[76]
Hiryū under attack by B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers
With the Japanese CAP out of position and the carriers at their most vulnerable, SBD Dauntlesses from Enterprise and Yorktown appeared at an altitude of 10,000 feet (3,000 m) and commenced their attack, quickly dealing fatal blows to three fleet carriers: Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi. Within minutes, all three were ablaze and had to be abandoned with great loss of life. Hiryū managed to survive the wave of dive bombers and launched a counter-attack against the American carriers which caused severe damage to Yorktown (which was later finished off by a Japanese submarine). However, a second attack from the U.S. carriers a few hours later found and destroyed Hiryū, the last remaining fleet carrier available to Nagumo. With his carriers lost and the Americans withdrawn out of range of his powerful battleships, Yamamoto was forced to call off the operation, leaving Midway in American hands. The battle proved to be a decisive victory for the Allies. For the second time, Japanese expansion had been checked and its formidable Combined Fleet was significantly weakened by the loss of four fleet carriers and many highly trained, virtually irreplaceable, personnel. Japan would be largely on the defensive for the rest of the war.
The attack against targets in Benghazi area was initiated around 23;45, when first Corsairs - after closing at very low level - popped up to a level of 300ft/100m, in order to show on Libyan radars and provoke them into action. As soon as the first emissions from Libyan air defences were registered, Corsairs fired several Shrike ARMs against active Libyan radars and SAM-sites, closely followed by a number of HARMs, fired by F/A-18s. Reportedly, up to 30 missiles were fired in less than three minutes, and around 23:49, the RC-135E intercepted the communication between one of LARAF bases and their superiors. A commander of a SAM-site defending Benina AB first complained „my radar does not work“, and when repeatedly ordered to open fire, he replied, „It’s out. I can’t do it“. Not that the Libyan commanders had it easier with their pilots: the commander of the MiG-23 interceptors at Benina refused to take off when ordered to do so, claiming in a long and heated radio conversation that his field had been put out of commission. Still, as subsequently reported by Commander of the 6th Fleet, Vice Adm. Frank Kelso, the Libyans put up intense air-defence over Benghazi: „They came at us with a wide spectrum of surface-to-air missiles, and there were anti-aircraft (guns) of all kinds“. One of his pilots later recalled dodging a SAM that looked like a „Roman candle coming up at me“. He added, „One was enough for me“. Exactly at 00:01, Intruders of the VA-55 crossed the Libyan coast. Guided by their Norden AN/APQ-148 radars and TRAMs, and closely escorted by EA-6Bs, they found the Benina AB, and plastered it with Mk.82s and Mk.83s. Four MiG-23s were confirmed destroyed and 12 were either badly damaged (probably w/os) or disabled, two Fokker F.27s and two Mi-8s were also destroyed. Simultaneously, A-6Es from USS America obliterated the al-Jamahuriyah barracks with Mk.82s and Mk.83s, destroying most of larger buildings. At least 80 Libyans were said to have been killed in these two strikes, and the inflicted damage was heavy. The USN suffered no losses, but two Intruders aborted the attack because of technical problems; by 00:13 all aircraft were outside the Libyan airspace, and by 01:58 all were back on their carriers. At the moment the break down of the Libyan air defence near Benghazi was reported, the 18 F-111Fs were short of entering the Libyan airspace, escorted closely by four EF-111As and - from a distance - by several F-14As, flying at a level of 60 meters. Shortly after entering the Libyan airspace, first problems appeared, foremost caused by strict RoEs, which permitted nobody to continue the mission if not all three targeting and navigational systems would be fully functional. This decision was to assure that no civilians were to be hit. Because of this, two F-111Fs aborted when already inside the Libyan airspace. Anyway, remaining F-111Fs crossed the beach around 00:01hrs, west of Tripolis, accelerated and then the formation parted in three sections in order to attack three different targets: - Azziziyah barracks (with the Ghaddafi's HQ), - military side of Tripolis International, - terrorist training camp at Sidi Billal. After activating their APQ-130 radars, three other F-111Fs had to abort, due to additional problems. Despite this, the strike caused a surprise, and the Libyan air defences haven't reacted so far: actually, the whole Tripolis was still in full light. The first to attack was the Remit-section, dropping AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack-guided 907kg heavy GBU-10 LGBs against Azziziyah barracks, and level of some 150 meters. - the first plane dropped all four bombs and these landed some 50 meters in front of Ghaddafi's HQ, - the second aborted at the last moment due to a technical problem, - the third scored direct hits by all four GBU-10s, and its Pave Tack video showed also the first two SAMs fired at US planes over Tripolis on that night. These were to cause immense problems to the following Kamra-section.
In Gulf war one attk on airfd:- 38 ac constituted one package. Four A-6Es and four Tornados striking the airfield were protected by four F-4G Wild Weasels, five EA-6B radar jammers and twenty one F/A-18C Hornets carrying radar homing missiles. In this package of 38 ac, 30 support ac were needed to ensure that eight strike ac could hit one tgt with a reasonable chance of survival.
Doctrine of rapid dominance[edit]
Rapid dominance is defined by its authors, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, as attempting
to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe.[3]
Further, rapid dominance will, according to Ullman and Wade,
impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on ... [to] seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels.[4]
Introducing the doctrine in a report to the United States' National Defense University in 1996, Ullman and Wade describe it as an attempt to develop a post-Cold War military doctrine for the United States. Rapid dominance and shock and awe, they write, may become a "revolutionary change" as the United States military is reduced in size and information technology is increasingly integrated into warfare.[5] Subsequent U.S. military authors have written that rapid dominance exploits the "superior technology, precision engagement, and information dominance" of the United States.[6]
Ullman and Wade identify four vital characteristics of rapid dominance:[7]
-near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment;
-rapidity and timeliness in application;
-operational brilliance in execution; and
-(near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment.
The term "shock and awe" is most consistently used by Ullman and Wade as the effect that rapid dominance seeks to impose upon an adversary. It is the desired state of helplessness and lack of will. It can be induced, they write, by direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of disinformation, overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action.
The doctrine of rapid dominance has evolved from the concept of "decisive force". Ulman and Wade contrast the two concepts in terms of objective, use of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties, and technique.
Civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure[edit]
Although Ullman and Wade claim that the need to "[m]inimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage" is a "political sensitivity [which needs] to be understood up front", their doctrine of rapid dominance requires the capability to disrupt "means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure",[8] and, in practice, "the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause ... the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction."[9]
Using as an example a theoretical invasion of Iraq 20 years after Operation Desert Storm, the authors claimed, "Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese."[10]
Reiterating the example in an interview with CBS News several months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Ullman stated, "You're sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you're the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2, 3, 4, 5 days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted."[11]
What is Air Power?
One of the challenges for air power doctrine is finding a definition as to what
constitutes air power. At one extreme, one could consider all activities that exploit the third dimension above the surface of the earth to be air power. However, with such a
definition, there would be little in the military sphere that would be excluded from the
definition of air power, since artillery, small arms and even stone throwing exploit the
air for transit. A more limited definition might consider only systems operated by air
forces, but this would somewhat arbitrarily include, for example, helicopters operated
by air forces, but not those operate by armies and navies, even though they may be
fulfilling the same roles. To be of analytical value, air power doctrine needs to
describe elements that are sufficiently similar that they have common attributes, and
at the same time, they should be sufficiently distinct from other elements of military
power that they are worth considering separately. This enables a set of guiding
principles for the employment of air power to be derived from their shared
characteristics. Without such a focus, air power doctrine risks becoming intangible, or
worse, banal, in attempting to encompass too wide a sphere.
The definitions of air power currently accepted by the RAF, USAF and RAAF
are as follows:
RAF: air power is the ability to use platforms operating in or passing through
the air for military purposes.1
USAF: aerospace power grows out of the ability to use a platform operating
in or passing through the aerospace medium for military purposes.2
RAAF: air power represents the ability to project military force in the third
dimension - which includes space - by or from a platform above the surface of
the earth.3
The common feature of these definitions is that air power is defined by the use
of platform; thus these definitions encompass not just fixed-winged aircraft but also
helicopters, uninhabited aerial vehicles, balloons, guided missiles, and satellites.
Clearly, air power doctrine is not intended to be limited to systems operated by air
forces, but also takes in platforms operated by naval and army air arms. While there is
a neat doctrinal purity in these definitions, can the principles of air power remain
applicable and useful across such a broad spectrum of capabilities? In particular, what
is the nexus between helicopters and air power doctrine?---http://www.fourays.org/pdf/Command%20and%20Control%20of%20Battelfield%20Helicopters%20-%20Airpower%20Studies%20Centre.pdf
---Air power is the integrated employment of all air and space forces to control and exploit the air and space environments to achieve national security objectives. Air power exploits the properties of its operating medium to realize unique operational characteristics and thus employ unique capabilities to provide the nation a broad range of military options.
Most of the intellectual leaders who cast the longest personal shadows over the air
power landscape even today – including Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard, Seversky, and
Slessor (MacIsaac 1986; Meilinger 1997; 2003; Mets 1998) – emerged during the
interwar years, when air power was still in its formative stages.
In general they were both
theorists and advocates of military aviation (and often of civilian aviation as well),
engaged not only in seeking to understand air power but also in trying to generate interest
and investment in it in spite of resource shortages and organizational resistance from
powerful army and naval traditionalists.
