3. INTRODUCTION
IAF carried out SEAD op against Syria
on 09 June 1982
Destroyed a Soviet-built SAM
network
A decisive Israeli victory
Leading to the informal name the
‘BEKAA VALLEY TURKEY SHOOT’
3cont…
4. INTRODUCTION
SAM suppression op at the end of the YOM
KIPPUR war
Development of conflict between Israel and
Syria
Israel decided to launch the op in BEKAA
Valley
4
…cont
cont…
5. INTRODUCTION
IAF were able to develop own ECM
Used airborne jammers and emitter locating
systems
Fired AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 missiles
5
…cont
cont…
AGM- 78
AGM- 45
6. INTRODUCTION
IAF was success to jam communication
system of SAF
Syrians were flying unplanned manner
Israeli fighters shot down with the support
of missiles
6
…cont
cont…
11. OPERATION PLANNING TO EXECUTION
11cont…
PLANNING
Country of
Origin
USSR
Range 22 Miles
12. Syrian dense belt along the
GOLAN HEIGHTS
IAF changed plans on 09 June
1982
Five newly spotted SAM
batteries
12cont…
…cont
…cont OPERATION PLANNING TO EXECUTION…cont
PLANNING
13. 13cont…
Israeli RPVs tested out RADAR and communication frequencies of the
SAM batteries
IAF Electronic Warfare in BEKAA Valley
…cont OPERATION PLANNING TO EXECUTION…cont
PLANNING
15. 15cont…
…cont
“ You have find a way went to jam and when not to jam, you can
jam it when you need it to assist your fighter planes and you
cannot jam it when you want to get information, when you
want to listen ”
- Aluf David Ivry
OPERATION PLANNING TO EXECUTION…cont
PLANNING
24. 24
Selective Airborne communication jamming disrupted the airwave
for the MiG 21s and MiG 23s
Cut them off from ground control, making them vulnerable to
AWACS
The IAF positioned RPVs over three major airfields in Syria
OPERATION PLANNING TO EXECUTION…cont
EXECUTION
cont…
29. 29
ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE…cont
cont…
AIR STRATEGY
SEAD
Air Field
Attack
Fighter
Sweep
Escort
Offensive
Counter Air Ops
Defensive
Counter Air Ops
CAP
SAM
AAA
Wpn Sys
Control and
Reporting
Counter Air
Campaign
Counter Surface
Force Campaign
Strategic Air
Campaign
Combat Support
Operations
30. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE…cont
33cont…
Military Effectiveness
Decision Action Cycle
Success in Operation
• Approaches to Attacking the Enemy’s
Will to Fight
Principles of War
31. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
31cont…
THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
…cont
The Fighting Power must be Adaptable
Force must be Balanced
Ability to Continue for as long as is Necessary
32. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
32cont…
…cont
The Model of Fighting Power
Source: UK ADP Volume I
THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
33. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
33cont…
…cont
THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
CONCEPTUAL
COMPONENT
Flexibility To Adopt How to Operate
34. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
34cont…
…cont
THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
MORAL
COMPONENT
Leadership
Moral
Ethical Foundation
35. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
35cont…
…cont
THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
PHYSICAL
COMPONENT
Equipment
Sustainability
Resources
Manpower
Training and
Collective
Performance
36. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
36
…cont
cont…
The Model of Fighting Power
Source: UK ADP Volume I
37. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
37cont…
THE DECISION ACTION CYCLE
…cont
The Decision Action Cycle
Source: The Doctrine Hand Book
OODA
Loop
38. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
38cont…
…cont
The observations of the own
weaknesses and taking corrective
measures
IAF significantly invest in
developing electronic measures
to counter future SAM threats
Observe
Orient
Decide
Act
THE DECISION ACTION CYCLE
39. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
39cont…
…cont
Not engaged with their
neighbours for nearly a decade
IAF utilized UAVs and other
reconnaissance aircraft to gain
the complete intelligence picture
Observe
Orient
Decide
Act
THE DECISION ACTION CYCLE
40. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
40cont…
…cont
IAF was able to provide accurate
and real time intelligence picture
to the Security Council
Initiate the ground operations
against Lebanon
Observe
Orient
Decide
Act
THE DECISION ACTION CYCLE
41. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
41cont…
…cont
Two way communication
Virtually be in the picture and to
make timely decisions
To provide accurate directions by the
AEW aircraft
Observe
Orient
Decide
Act
THE DECISION ACTION CYCLE
42. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
42cont…
APPROACHES TO ATTACKING THE ENEMY’S WILL
TO FIGHT
…cont
Pre-Emption
Dislocation
Disruption
43. 43
Seize the opportunity enemy to deny him taking advantageous COA
Initiate a military response against the Syrian AD coverage
Prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position
PRE-EMPTION
ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE…cont
44. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
44cont…
DISLOCATION
…cont
To deny the ability of the enemy
Dislocation of the enemy AD
network
45. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
45cont…
DISLOCATION
…cont
IAF Strike Aircraft IAF UAV
46. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
46cont…
…cont
Tracked by the AWACS Aircraft
DISLOCATION
47. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
47cont…
…cont
ECM Aircraft
DISLOCATION
48. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
48cont…
…cont
AGM - 78 AGM-45
DISLOCATION
49. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
49cont…
…cont
By correctly locating and
destroying the AD batteries
DISLOCATION
50. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
50cont…
…cont
Attacking to the enemy in order to break apart and throw them in to
confusion state
DISRUPTION
Syrians SAM Batteries
51. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
51cont…
DISRUPTION
…cont
GCI RADAR SAF MiGs
52. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
52cont…
…cont
SPARROW AAM System
DISRUPTION
53. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
53cont…
…cont
Isolating Syrian Fighters in the AirAirborne Communication Jamming
System
DISRUPTION
54. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
54cont…
…cont
Destroying SAM Batteries 82-86 Syrian Fighters
DISRUPTION
55. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
55cont…
APPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR
…cont
Selection and Maintenance of the Aim
Maintenance of Morale
Offensive Action
Security
Surprise
Cooperation
56. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
56
…cont
Concentration of Force
Economy of Effort
Sustainability
APPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR
58. LESSONS LEARNT
Success based on lessons learnt in YOM
KIPPUR War, 1973
Initially, IAF failed and lost their jets
An Op planned with fullest synchronization
with EW Division
Beginning of revolution in IAF air ops
Success due to hard works/alterations
done between wars
58cont…
59. LESSONS LEARNT
Syrians regularly changed loc of SAM
batteries
Real time int gathering and
dissemination
Command Centre enabled directing
pilots to exact and latest loc of the targets
59
…cont
cont…
…cont
REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE IS VITAL
60. LESSONS LEARNT
Efficient com network nicknamed as
‘PERISCOPE’ and ‘GROUP SING-ALONG’
Acquired new tech and equip
RPVs
Aircraft for ‘E’ int and jam
Anti-radiation munitions
Chaff/flare
60
…c
cont…
…cont
UNINTERRUPTED AND SECURE COMMUNICATION
61. LESSONS LEARNT
Accurate and proper IPOE
Synchronized int from various
sources
61cont…
…cont
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT (IPOE)
62. LESSONS LEARNT
Enabled higher commanders to
exercise centralized command
Freedom of initiative for subordinate
commanders with decentralized
execution
62
…cont
cont…
CENTRALIZED COMMAND THROUGH LATEST TECHNOLOGY
63. LESSONS LEARNT
Example for the impact of EW in
modern battles
Offensive EW disabled the
command structure of Syrians
63
…cont
IMPORTANCE OF EW
67. CONCLUSION
67cont…
The success of the IAF can be
contrasted with the failure of Syrian
defences
Lack of doctrinal or cognitive
flexibility for Syrian Defence Forces
…cont
68. 68cont…
The IAF demonstrate Doctrinal and
cognitive flexibility in the form
combined arms operation
CONCLUSION…cont
IAF learned a number of lessons during the Yom Kippur War. The main lesson learnt was that the absolute superiority enjoyed in aerial combat was not sufficient for achieving air superiority where an existence of solid AD system.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.
Pre-Emption. Pre-emption is to seize the opportunity, often fleeting, before the enemy does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. The pre-emption was well executed by the Israelis by deciding to initiate a military response against the strengthening of Syrian AD coverage in the BEQQA valley by initiating ‘operation Mole Cricket 19’. It prevents Syrians taking an advantageous position by relocating their ground based AD system which could limit the freedom of the Israeli to utilize their own airspace.