1Kantian Ethics1724-1804Spent virtually all of his life in

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Kantian Ethics
1724-1804
Spent virtually all of his life in Konigsberg, East Prussia.
From a Lutheran family.
Never married.
Immanuel Kant

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Distinguish
Utilitarianism—Teleological Theory
Goal directed
Kantian Ethics—Deontological Theory
Duty based

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Kant’s Moral Theory
Kant wanted to “seek out and establish the supreme principle of
morality.”

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Morality and Rationality
For Kant, all of morality has its ultimate source in rationality.
The categorical imperative, in any formulation, is an expression
of rationality, and it is the principle that would be followed in
practice by any purely rational being.

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Morality and Rationality
Moral rules are not mere arbitrary conventions or subjective
standards. They are objective truths that have their source in
the rational nature of human beings.

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Autonomy
For Kant, morality presupposes autonomy.
Autonomous = not controlled by others or by outside forces;

independent. Independent in mind or judgment; self-directed.

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Consequences are Morally Irrelevant
For Kant, the consequences of an action are morally irrelevant.
Rather, an action is right when it is in accordance with a rule
that satisfies a principle he calls the “categorical imperative.”

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Categorical Imperative
And to act out of respect for the law means to follow the
“categorical imperative.”
Cf. Hypothetical Imperative

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Kant’s moral theory centers around the categorical imperative.

“Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to
be a universal law.”

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Universality
You must be willing to see your maxim universalized (by
similarly situated persons) even though it may turn out on some
other occasion to work to your disadvantage.

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Psychological Agreement Not Required
For a maxim to satisfy the categorical imperative, it is not
necessary that we be agreeable in some psychological sense to
seeing it made into a universal law. Rather, the test is one that
requires us to avoid inconsistency or conflict in what we will as
a universal rule.

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Similar Cases = Similar Treatment
All things being equal, justice dictates that similarly situated
people ought to be treated similarly.

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Other Formulations
“I am never to act unless I am acting on a maxim that I can will
to become a universal law.”
“Act as if the maxims you choose to follow always become
universal laws of nature.”
“Act so as to treat people as ends unto themselves and never
merely as a means.”

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What’s a Maxim?
A maxim is a succinct formulation of a fundamental principle,
general truth, or rule of conduct.

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Maxims
More specifically, they are the general rules or principles on
which rational agents act and they reflect the end that an agent
has in view in choosing actions of a certain type in given
circumstances.

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Maxims Are Principles Of The Form:
When in an S-type situation, act in an A-type manner in order
to attain end-E.

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Maxim Example
“When I incur a debt, I should pay off the debt as soon as
possible so as to avoid incurring unnecessary obligations.”
(You should promptly pay off your debts.)

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Maxim
The categorical imperative tests maxims by prescribing a
thought experiment in which you ask yourself whether everyone
should do what the maxim states.

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If the maxim passes this test, then it’s morally permissible. If
it fails the test, then it’s morally impermissible.

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Objective Rules of Morality
In passing the test, the maxims cease to be merely personal and
subjective. They gain the status of objective rules of morality
that hold for everyone.

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So can you live in a world in which everyone promptly repaid
his or her debt?

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Another Maxim
Can you will this maxim to be a universal law?
“You should borrow money by falsely promising to repay.”

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Promising
Probably not, because the institution of promising would break
down. No one would take you seriously when you made a
promise.

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Ends versus Means
We should always treat persons as ends in themselves, never as
a means to an end.

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Example
So with the lying example, the maxim is morally impermissible
because it treats the person being lied to as a means to an end.

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Kant’s Views on Lying
By being deceived, I am being denied the dignity inherent in my
status as a rational being. Lying is wrong in general, and it
deprives me of my autonomy, of my power to make decisions
and form my own opinions. As a result, such deception
dehumanizes me.

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Motive
The moral worth of an action is determined by one’s motive.
Motive = An emotion, desire, physiological need or similar
impulse that acts as an incitement to action.

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Good Will
“Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out
of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a
good will.”
Happiness is a qualified good.

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Duty
The proper motive is to do one’s duty simply because it is
one’s duty. To act out of duty means to act out of respect for
the law.

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Example
Nurse provides special care to severely ill patient. Why?
Hopes the patient or family will reward him with a generous
gift.
Fear of getting sued.
Is he doing the right thing for the wrong reason?

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Distinction
Perfect Duty: One we must always observe. Examples?
Imperfect Duty: One that we must observe only on some
occasions.

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Group Discussion
Do you agree with Immanuel Kant that lying is wrong in all

circumstances? What are some situations in which you believe
lying might be ethically justified? Why? How do you think Kant
would respond to these "exceptions" to telling the truth?
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Difficulties with Kant’s Ethics
Kant’s ethical theory is not realistic. Don’t moral principles
have exceptions?
Examples: Prohibitions against killing, lying, stealing, etc.

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Kant’s Ethics in the Medical Context
No matter what the consequences may be, it is always wrong to
lie.
We must always treat people (including ourselves) as ends and
not as means only.
An action is right when it satisfies the categorical imperative.
Perfect and imperfect duties give a basis for claims that certain
rights should be recognized.

Is it morally permissible to lie for (supposedly) benevolent
purposes?
Is it morally permissible to lie to a patient who has Stage 4
cancer?
How about the surgeon who promised the patient that only he
would operate on her?
Cadaver example?
Body Worlds?

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What do we do when duties conflict?
Example:
Doctor promises a colleague that he’ll attend a staff conference.
On the way, he sees a patient lapse into an insulin coma.
Duty to keep our promises vs. Duty to assist others.
What does your moral intuition tell you?
Hierarchy of duties?

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It seems that we can act virtually in any way we choose if we
are willing to describe the situation in sufficient detail.

(1) “Lie when it is convenient for you.”
(2) “Lie when telling the truth is likely to cause
harm to another.”
(3) “Whenever a physician has good reason to
believe that a patient’s life will be seriously threatened i f
she is told the truth about the condition, then the physician
should lie.”

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The concept of autonomy might be problematic. Under what
conditions can we assume that an individual possesses such a
will? Does a child, a mentally-challenged person, or someone
in prison? Without such a will, in Kant’s view, such an
individual cannot legitimately consent to be the subject of an
experiment.

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Utilitarianism
Ethical Theories, Moral Principles, and Medical Decisions
Classical Utilitarians:
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Ethical Theories
Ethical Theories
Ethical theories attempt to articulate and justify principles that
can be employed as guides for making moral decisions and as
standards for the evaluation of actions and policies.
Defines duties and obligations
Explanations and justifications of actions

Ethical Theories
Some Moral Questions
Is it right for a woman to have an abortion for any reason?
Do people have a right to die?
Does everyone have a right to medical care?
Should physicians ever lie to their patients?
Should people suffering from a genetic disease be allowed to
have children?
Can parents agree to allow their children to be used as
experimental subjects?

Ethical Theories
When Would These Questions Matter?

When we are the decision makers.
When we must advise those who make the decisions.
When we are on the receiving end of the decisions.

Ethical Theories
Philosophers in the Spotlight
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
They did not produce identical theory but, both their versions
have come to be spoken of as “classical utilitarianism.”

Ethical Theories
Utilitarian Principles
Principle of Utility: “Actions are right in proportion as they
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness.”
Greatest Happiness Principle: “Those actions are right that
produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of
people.”

But How To Define Happiness?
Bentham
Pleasure of any kind
Mill
Certain pleasures are higher than others
Intellectual versus physical

Ethical Theories
Pluralistic Conception
Some more recent formulations of utilitarianism have rejected
the notion that happiness, no matter how defined, is the sole
intrinsic good that actions or polices must promote.
Knowledge, beauty, love, friendship, liberty, and health.

Ethical Theories
Teleology
Since utilitarianism determines the rightness of actions in terms
of their tendency to promote the greatest happiness for the
greatest number, it is considered to be a teleological (goal -
directed) ethical theory.

Consequentialism
The principle focuses attention on the consequences of actions,
rather than upon some feature of the actions themselves. The
“utility” or “usefulness” of an action is determined by the
extent to which it produces happiness. Thus, no action is in
itself right or wrong. Nor is an action right or wrong by virtue
of the actor’s hopes, intentions, or past actions.

Ethical Theories
Consequentialism
The position that the morality of an action is determined by its
nonmoral consequences.
If the consequences are good, the act is right. If they’re bad,
the act is wrong.

Ethical Theories
Consequentialism
Consequentialists consider the ratio of good to evil that an
action produces. The right action is the one that produces or
will probably produce as great a ratio of good to evil as any
other action.
How much good can come out of this action (compared to
alternative courses of actions) for how many people?

Act Utilitarianism
Judges the rightness or wrongness of an action on a case-by-
case basis (according to the utilitarian principle, of course).
What will be the consequences of my action not only for myself
but also for everyone else affected by my action?

Act Utilitarianism
Does the theory imply that any sexual activity is morally
permissible if it produces a greater balance of pleasure over
pain than any other alternative?

Thought Experiment
Richard Taylor
Do the pleasures of adultery justify lying to one’s spouse to
maintain the affair?
That is, if revealing the affair to one’s spouse will injure the
spouse and the marriage relationship, then it seems that one
should conceal the affair.
Cf. Ignorance is bliss?

Criticisms
Strict application of the view would countenance actions we
intuitively reject as wrong.
Hypothetical: Judge in small town sentencing an innocent
person to death.
Utilitarianism would seem to require the judge to sentence the
accused man to death, although she know he’s innocent.

Rule Utilitarianism
Uses the utilitarian principle to judge moral rules and not
individual actions.
Examples:
“We should never punish people for something they didn’t do.”
“We should always tell the truth.”
“Stealing is never morally justified.”

Paul Ramsey Institute
Center for Bioethics and Culture
Adopting a rule-utilitarian ethic, they argue that permissive
moral doctrines that allow adultery, divorce, and homosexuality
are harmful to society and so such activities are wrong.

Criticisms
It is far from clear how to apply the principle to rules.
Rules that allow for exceptions seem better than those that
don’t, but making exceptions threatens to reduce rule
utilitarianism to act utilitarianism.
How can we be sure that the predicted consequences will
actually occur?

Ethical Theories
Case Study
Suppose a child is born with severe impairments. The child has
an open spine, severe brain damage, and dysfunctional kidneys.
What should be done? (Ignore the question of who should
decide.)

Ethical Theories
Consider the Consequences of Possible Courses of Actions
Give the child only the ordinary treatment that would be given
to a normal child.
Give the child special treatment for its problems.
Give the child no treatment—allow it to die, in effect.
Put the child to death in a painless way.

Ethical Theories
Each Case is Considered Individually
How impaired is the child?
How good are its chances of living an acceptable life?
What is the character and financial status of the family?
What is the quality of life, in the eyes of the child?

Ethical Theories
Criticisms
There is no way to be sure that we’ve made the right decision.
We are sure to be ignorant of much relevant information.
The consequences might be different from what we originally
anticipated.
Response: Acting morally doesn’t mean being omniscient. We
need to make a reasonable effort to get relevant information,
and we can usually predict the probable consequences of our
actions.

Ethical Theories
Criticisms
Utilitarianism is unable to account for obligations engendered
by such actions as promising and pledging, for such actions
involve something other than consequences.
E.g., Surgeon promises a patient that only she will perform the
operation.

Ethical Theories
Criticisms
The pleasures of adultery justify lying to one’s spouse to
maintain the affair.
That is, if revealing the affair to one’s spouse will injure the
spouse and the marriage relationships, then one should conceal
the affair.
Richard Taylor

Ethical Theories
Case Study
Cadavers in Car Crash Testings

Ethical Theories
Cadavers
Heidelberg University (in Germany) used more than two
hundred corpses, including those of eight children, in
automobile crash tests. The university claimed it received
relatives’ permission.

Ethical Theories
Cadavers
There was an immediate outcry when the tests were made
public.
“Even the dead possess human dignity. This research should be
done with mannequins.”
(Rudolph Hammerschmitd, spokesman for the Roman
Catholic German Bishops’ Conference)

Ethical Theories
Cadavers
German law permits the use of cadavers for research if relatives
grant permission. In the crash tests, the bodies are strapped
into cars that are smashed into other cars, walls, and barriers.
The impact on humans is measured with cameras and electronic
sensors.

Ethical Theories
Cadavers
The head of Heidelberg’s forensic pathology department
claimed that the tests are justified because they save lives,
including those of children.

Ethical Theories
Center for Auto Safety
(Washington D.C.)
(1) Prior consent by the deceased person,
(2) Informed consent of the family, and
(3) Assurance that the data sought by the tests cannot be
gained from using dummies.

Ethical Theories
Wayne State University
Bodies donated for medical research and education—dressed in
leotards and hoods to protect their identities—have sensors
implanted and are then hit or thrown over cars at mock
intersections.

Ethical Theories
Or they’re cracked in the head, chest and other parts with a 50-
pound, six-inch pendulum the approximate size of a steering-
wheel hub.

Ethical Theories
Albert King, the director of Wayne State’s Bioengineering
Center, says they go through about twenty bodies a year.
Unfortunately, corpses are becoming increasingly scarce.
Researchers need cadavers younger than sixty-five because they
represent the typical driving public.

Ethical Theories
Cadavers
These tests have resulted in better-designed seat belts, air bags,
windshields, and doors. All of these safety features, in turn,
help save more lives. So the end justifies the means.
Cf. Body Worlds / Body Farm

Ethical Theories
Harm Principle
It is morally permissible for me to do anything that doesn’t
harm you.
Live and let live—so long as you don’t harm others.
But what kind of harm? Physical, economic, emotional, etc.?

Harm Principle
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”
Ethical Theories

Ethical Theories
Implications of the Harm Principle
No Paternalistic Laws
Seat belts
Helmets
Alcohol, smoking, drugs, tobacco
Snack foods

Ethical Theories
Moral Restrictions
No Unnecessary Moral Restrictions
Pornography (e.g., magazines, Internet)
Prostitution
Premarital sex
Extramarital sex (e.g., swinging)
Suicide, euthanasia
Homosexuality

Nature of Ethics
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What is Ethics?
The philosophical study of morality. Ethics deals with morality,

but it is not the same as morality. Morality is the subject matter
that ethics studies.
Good and bad; right and wrong.
Distinction between “ethics” and “morality.”
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What is Ethics?
What is the basis of morality?
Which ethical theory best justifies and explains moral life?
What is morality’s relationship with
Religion?
Law?
Social etiquette?
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Questions to Ponder
What is it to be a moral person?
What is the nature of morality?
Why do we need morality?
What function does morality play?
How do I know what is the good?
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These are the questions posed by the author in the introductory
Chapter One.
Questions to Ponder

Are moral principles absolute?
Use examples of killing, lying, and stealing.
Are moral principles relative to social groups or individual
decisions?
Is morality only in the view of the person being moral?
Is there a time for me to act immorally?
How can I justify my moral beliefs?
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What is Morality?
Morality consists of the standards that an individual or a group
has about what is right and wrong or good and bad.
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Moral:
The term comes from BOTH
the Latin (meaning “mores”)
and
the Greek (meaning “ethos”)
Each derives their meaning from
the idea of custom.
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Morality Refers to
Certain Customs
Certain Precepts
Certain Practices of Peoples and Cultures
Positive or Descriptive Morality
used to describe actual beliefs and customs of a culture
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Moral Philosophy
Refers to philosophical or theoretical reflection on morality
Ethical theories come from moral
philosophical reflections.
Moral philosophers
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Ethics
Refers to the whole domain of morality and moral philosophy

Both areas are connected by common concerns in different ways
through:
Values, Virtues, Principles
And Practices
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Moral Philosophy
The systematic endeavor to
understand moral concepts and
justify moral principles and theories.
Moral Philosophy analyzes concepts
and terms like: right/wrong, ought, and good/evil.
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Moral Philosophy
Seeks to establish principles of right behavior to serve as a
guide for individuals and groups.
Investigates which values and virtues are important for a
worthwhile life in society.
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Moral Precepts Concern Social Norms
Morality has a normative aspect in that it has a distinct guiding
function which is also shared by religion, law and social
etiquette.
Morality functions differently in religion, law and social
etiquette.
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Morality In Religion
Morality is usually essential to the religion’s practice.
The moral principles are grounded in revelation and divine
authority of that religious belief system.
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Religious and Secular ethics have two different orientations
which often generate different moral principles and evaluation
standings. However, they need not do this. Both religious and
secular ethics can and do agree.
Morality and Law
Laws are instituted to promote social and individual well being.

Laws resolve conflicts of interest.
Laws promote social harmony.
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Morality and Law
Morality also does all of these three.
Ethics may judge that some laws are immoral without denying
that those same laws are valid laws.
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Some aspects of morality are not covered by law. For example:
There is no general law against lying except in certain
situations like perjury when one is under oath in a court of law.
Law and Morality Differ
According to the concept of ‘Intent’
Bad intentions (mens rea) is factored into the legality of a
criminal act.
But, no one can be punished for only thinking bad thoughts
according to the law.
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English law of 1351 against treason made it a crime to think
about killing the king, but there was no way the law could
enforce or fathom a person’s thoughts or intent. Morality can
hold an individual responsible for their intent and a person can
suffer punishment for their intent even if they never commit the
action.

Law and Morality Differ
The enforcement of Law has physical (imprisonment) and
financial (fines) sanctions.
Sanctions of conscience, guilt, reputation, etc. enforce morality.
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Morality and Etiquette
Etiquette determines what is polite social behavior.
Morality determines what is correct or right social behavior.
Can not obeying social custom in some cases be considered
immoral?
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Social etiquette deals with the customs people in each culture
habitually use and term acceptable. These behaviors help our
society to flow smoothly. None of the social rituals claim any
moral superiority over another. However, once a social custom
is adopted, the practice of that custom appears as a moral rule
that defers respect to all people in that society. Not obeying the
social customs could be termed in some cases immoral by
society.
Religion, Law, & Etiquette have limitations in society
Religion –Rests on Authority that some people question.
Law – Every social ill does not have a law and all rules cannot
be enforced.
Etiquette – Does not go to the depth of what is existentially
important.
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Normative Statements
Distinction between normative and factual statements (a.k.a.
fact/value distinction). Ethical disagreements are usually not
resolved (if they are resolved at all) by appealing to facts.
A normative statement expresses a value judgment of some
kind, and its correctness is determined by reference to a norm or
standard.
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Examples of Normative Statements
Stealing is wrong.
It is never permissible to lie.
You should not cheat on your spouse.
Capital punishment is cruel and unusual punishment.
Affluent nations have a moral duty to assist impoverished
nations.
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Reasonable Disagreements
Ethics is enormously important but difficult to think about
clearly and responsibly.
Seems like reasonable people can have reasonable
disagreements on ethical issues.
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Sources of Morality

We can get our sources from
Virtually anywhere.
Parents Friends
Teachers Movies
Music Video games
Church Synagogue
Mosque Temple
Reason Internet
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Why is Ethics Important?
Much of what we are and do is determined by our moral values,
because our values shape our thoughts, feelings, actions, and
PETA vs. PETA
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So Why Study Ethics?
On an intellectual level, studying ethics can help you participate
intelligently in society’s ethical debates (e.g., abortion,
euthanasia, capital punishment).
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So Why Study Ethics?
On a professional level, many professions (e.g., law, medicine,

engineering, nursing) have rules of professional conduct to
which you’re expected to adhere.
Disciplinary/ethics boards
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Consider The Consequences Of NOT Caring
Demotion, termination, monetary fines, loss of company
reputation, bankruptcy, imprisonment.
The government may investigate companies suspected of ethical
and legal improprieties.
Enron Halliburton
WorldCom Qwest
Arthur Andersen Adelphia
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On a Professional Level…
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Need for Morality
Why do we need morality? There are many responses to this
question.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) stated:
Humans create a ‘social contract or
covenant’ to create a standard of
social morals to counteract our
‘state of nature’ as he saw humanity.
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“State of Nature” according to Hobbes means that people in
society are insecure because they have reason to fear one
another due to the fact of human equality and ability to harm
one another and our human desire to fulfill our personal goals.
Hobbes emphasized that humans create a ‘social contract or
covenant’ and agree to give up personal liberty in order to set
up rules over us that we know we must obey. These rules we
agree are to be enforced by the might of the ruler or the state.
Where there is no enforceable law, there is neither right or
wrong, justice or injustice.
But Don’t We Need Morality?
Morality is the force in humanity that can keep us within a
human behavior that advocates decency and respect.
Morals are a set of rules that if everyone follows them, nearly

everyone will flourish.
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Rules formed over time become internalized and hopefully hold
us back from violent animal impulse and responses.
Purposes of Morality
These rules restrain our freedom in order to promote greater
freedom and well being for us and for all in society.
There are generally five purposes of morals that are related but
not all identical.
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Five Moral Purposes
To keep society from falling apart
To ameliorate human suffering
To promote human flourishing
To resolve conflict of interest justly and in a orderly manner
To assign praise, blame, reward, punishment and guilt in society
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The Goal of Morality
To create happy virtuous people
To create and support flourishing communities based on order
and justice
To provide guidelines for people to achieve the above
To promote the good of morality
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The good of morality is constituted in the five purposes: To
keep society from falling apart; to ameliorate human suffering;
to promote human flourishing; to resolve conflict of interest
justly and orderly; to assign praise, blame, reward, punishment
and guilt.
Morality
Extreme view: Morality is the most important subject on earth.
Without it, we can not promote the good of humanity.
Moral rules are not relative.
They are not totally absolute; they can override one another.
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Moral rules are not justified by cultural acceptance. They are
not relative. They do not change. However, at times moral

rules can be overridden by one another. Therefore, they are not
absolute in and of themselves when there are several rules
involved in any given situation. One moral rule will always be
the most applicable and absolute for any given situation and
will be the one to which all defer.
Traits of Moral Principles
Central to morality are moral principles which have these five
traits:
Prescriptivity
Universalizability
Overridingness
Publicity
Practicability
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Prescriptivity
This refers to the practice or action guiding nature of morality.
This trait of moral principles advises people and influences
action.
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Universalizability
Moral principles must apply to all who are in relatively the
same situation.
They must apply to all evaluative judgments.
They must be used consistently.
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Overridingness
An authority that takes precedence over other considerations
including aesthetic, prudential and legal concerns.

When principles conflict, one must override the other(s) for an
action to be morally justified.
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Moral principles must have authority to take precedence over
other considerations and have the hegemonic authority to do so
at any time.
Publicity
Moral Principles must be known by all and must be made
public.
Keeping a moral principle secret would defeat the purpose of
having a moral principle.
But cf. “cultural defense”
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It is necessary for moral principles to be made public so that
they are known by all, used and known to prescribe behavior in
society, can be used to give advice, and can be used to assign
praise or blame.
Practicability
Moral Principles must be workable to all in the general society.
Rules must not be too much for any one person.
Rules must take human limitation into consideration.
Difference in ethical standards occur over time and place.
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Philosopher Spotlight:
Peter Singer
Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, Center for Human
Values, Princeton University

http://www.princeton.edu/~psinger/
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Protest Letter: Not everyone was pleased with Singer’s hiring
by Princeton.
We the undersigned protest the hiring of
Dr. Peter Singer as the Ira DeCamp
Professor of Bioethics at Princeton
University’s Center for Human Values.
We protest his hiring because Dr. Singer
denies the intrinsic moral worth of an
entire class of human beings – newborn
children – and promotes policies that
would deprive many infants
with disabilities of their basic human
right to legal protection against
homicide.
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Is There Any Such Thing As Moral Expertise?
Is the layman just as likely to be an expert in moral matters as
the moral philosopher?
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Hard Experts versus Soft Experts

Hard Experts
Mathematics
Physics
Chemistry
Soft Experts
Art
Religion
Politics
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C.D. Broad’s Opinion
“It is not part of the professional business of moral philosophers
to tell people what they ought or ought not to do. . . .
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C.D. Broad’s Opinion
Moral philosophers, as such, have no special information not
available to the general public, about what is right and what is
wrong; nor have they any call to undertake those hortatory
functions which are so adequately performed by clergymen,
politicians, leader-writers . . .”
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Peter Singer’s Response
First, his general training as a philosopher should make him
more than ordinarily competent in argument and in the detection
of invalid inferences [logical fallacies].
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Next, his specific experience in moral philosophy gives him an
understanding of moral concepts [ethical theories] and of the
logic of moral argument.
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Finally, there is the simple fact that the moral philosopher can,

if he wants, think full-time about moral issues, while most other
people have some occupation to pursue which interferes with
such reflection.
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50
Moral philosophers have, then, certain advantages which could
make them, relative to those who lack these advantages, experts
in matters of morals.
51

51
Generally speaking, though, philosophers do not accept a
statement solely on the basis of an individual’s authority, no
matter how eminent.
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Knowing Your Facts
Of course, to be moral experts, it would be necessary for moral
philosophers to do some fact-finding on whatever issue they
were considering. But knowing the facts does not necessarily
resolve the ethical quandary.
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What Ethics is Not
(Peter Singer)
Ethics is not about a set of prohibitions particularly concerned
with sex. There are other ethical issues to discuss.
Ethics is not an ideal system that is noble in theory but no good
in practice.
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What Ethics is Not
Ethics is not something intelligible only in the context of
religion. It is possible to think critically and responsibly about
ethical issues independently of religious consideration.
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What Ethics is Not
4. Ethics is not relative or subjective.
Is it still possible . . . to give reasons for choosing one way
of life in preference to another? Is it all a matter of what will
make us happier, or live a more meaningful and fulfilling life?
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56
One objective in this course is to reexamine our ethical
intuitions, especially those that have not been subjected to
rational scrutiny.
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Rational Scrutiny
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Some Ways Not to Answer Moral Questions
Personal preferences and opinions.
Why thinking it so does not make it so.
The irrelevance of statistics.
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The Ideal Moral Judgment
Conceptual clarity
Information
Rationality
Impartiality
Coolness
Valid Moral Principles
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No Double Standards Allowed
Have important concepts been analyzed, and if so, have they
been analyzed correctly?
Does the author argue from a basis of knowledge of the real -life
setting(s) in which a moral question arises?
Is the author rational? (Do the arguments presented observe the
rules of logic?)
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No Double Standards Allowed
4. Is there a lack of appropriate impartiality? (Is someone, or
some group, arbitrarily favored over others?)
5. Are things argued for in a state of strong emotion? (Are deep
feelings rhetorically vented in the place of hard thinking?)
6. Are the moral principles used valid ones? (Is any effort
expended to show that they meet the appropriate criteria?)
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Ethical Assessment
Generally there are four domains which evaluate rules of right
conduct
Action
Consequences
Character
Motive
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The rules of right conduct are evaluated and from this decisions
are made.
1. Action
Actions are usually termed
right or wrong.
‘Right’ can be an ambiguous term.
Right can mean
Obligatory or
Permissible
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Right Action – 2 Types
Optional Act – An act not obligatory or wrong to do; not your
duty to do or not to do
Obligatory Act – An act you must do; you are required to do;
you may not refrain from doing it.
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In the optional act, if you did it or did not do it, neither would
be wrong.
Wrong Acts
One has an obligation or duty to refrain from doing the action.
One ought not to do the action at all.
It is not an act that is permissible for one to do.
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Supererogatory Acts

These actions are within the range of permissible acts.
These are highly altruistic acts.
These are not required or obligatory acts.
They exceed what morality requires.
They go beyond ‘the call of duty.’
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Deontological Actions
‘Deon’ is from the Greek word ‘Duty’
These theories emphasize the nature of an action.
They hold that there is something inherently good or right about
certain actions and wrong or bad about other actions.
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2. Consequences
Actions based on the foreseeable outcome of a course of
decision
Theories that focus on consequences in determining what is
moral/right or immoral/wrong are termed:
Teleological Ethical Theories
‘Telos’ is Greek and means goal directed.
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3. Character
Character reflects actions that emphasize virtue.
Virtue empowers character to do good.
Most moral theories consider virtue important.
But, virtue is not always central to all moral theories.
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4. Motive
Moral actions take into account the intention or motivation of
the actor prior to the act itself.
The full assessment of an act considers intention or motive.
Motive and intent are relevant factors in any given action.
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Definition and Meaning
Genuine and Verbal Disputes
We’ve seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language
can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate
correct reasoning. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three
centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often
hampered by the use of words without fixed signification.
Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by
an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms.

We can distinguish disputes of three sorts:
· Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not
some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a
genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of
which they convey their respective positions, each of them can
propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead
to a resolution of their differences.
· Merely verbal disputes, on the other hand, arise entirely from
ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the
disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people
involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms,
since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief.
Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of
course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity
only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that’s been
discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate
methods of reasoning.
We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and
communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for
disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve
them whenever we can.
Kinds of Definition
The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences
in the use of languages is by agreeing on the definition of our
terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or
phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the
service of different goals, it’s useful to distinguish defini tions
of several kinds:
A lexical definition simply reports the way in which a term is
already used within a language community. The goal here is to
inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the
definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy
with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions
of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended
to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually
employed within the discipline of logic.

At the other extreme, a stipulative definition freely assigns
meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had
never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to
propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no
existing standards against which to compare it, and the
definition is always correct (though it might fail to win
acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree
that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered
in French as “glorsherfs,” I have made a (probably pointless)
stipulative definition.
Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to
reduce the vagueness of a word or phrase. These precising
definitions begin with the lexical definition of a term but then
propose to sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits on its
use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative
portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness.
If the USPS announces that “proper notification of a change of
address” means that an official form containing the relevant
information must be received by the local post office no later
than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has
offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.
Theoretical definitions are special cases of stipulative or
precising definition, distinguished by their attempt to establish
the use of this term within the context of a broader intellectual
framework. Since the adoption of any theoretical definition
commits us to the acceptance of the theory of which it is an
integral part, we are rightly
cautious in agreeing to it. Newton’s definition of the terms
“mass” and “inertia” carried with them a commitment to (at
least part of) his theories about the conditions in which physical
objects move.
Finally, what some logicians call a persuasive definition is an
attempt to attach emotive meaning to the use of a term. Since
this can only serve to confuse the literal meaning of the term,
persuasive definitions have no legitimate use.
Extension and Intension

A rather large and especially useful portion of our active
vocabularies is taken up by general terms, words or phrases that
stand for whole groups of individual things sharing a common
attribute. But there are two distinct ways of thinking about the
meaning of any such term.
The extension of a general term is just the collection of
individual things to which it is correctly applied. Thus, the
extension of the word “chair” includes every chair that is (or
ever has been or ever will be) in the world. The intension of a
general term, on the other hand, is the set of features which are
shared by everything to which it applies. Thus, the intension of
the word “chair” is (something like) “a piece of furniture
designed to be sat upon by one person at a time.”
Clearly, these two kinds of meaning are closely interrelated. We
usually suppose that the intension of a concept or term
determines its extension, that we decide whether or not each
newly-encountered piece of furniture belongs among the chairs
by seeing whether or not it has the relevant features. Thus, as
the intension of a general term increases, by specifying with
greater detail those features that a thing must have in order for
it to apply, the term’s extension tends to decrease, since fewer
items now qualify for its application.
Denotative and Connotative Definitions
With the distinction between extension and intension in mind, it
is possible to approach the definition of a general term (on any
of the five kinds of definition we discussed last time) in either
of two ways:
A denotative definition tries to identify the extension of the
term in question. Thus, we could provide a denotative definition
of the phrase “this logic class” simply by listing all of our
names. Since a complete enumeration of the things to which a
general term applies would be cumbersome or inconvenient in
many cases, though, we commonly pursue the same goal by
listing smaller groups of individuals or by offering a few
examples instead. In fact, some philosophers have held that the
most primitive denotative definitions in any language involve

no more than pointing at a single example to which the term
properly applies.
But there seem to be some important terms for which denotative
definition is entirely impossible. The phrase “my
grandchildren” makes perfect sense, for example, but since it
presently has no extension, there is no way to indicate its
membership by enumeration, example, or ostension. In order to
define terms of this sort at all, and in order more conveniently
to define general terms of every variety, we naturally rely upon
the second mode of definition.
A connotative definition tries to identify the intension of a term
by providing a synonymous linguistic expression or an
operational procedure for determining the applicability of the
term. Of course, it isn’t always easy to come up with an
alternative word or phrase that has exactly the same meaning or
to specify a concrete test for applicability. But when it does
work, connotative definition provides an adequate means for
securing the meaning of a term.
Definition by Genus and Differentia
Classical logicians developed an especially effective method of
constructing connotative definitions for general terms, by
stating their genus and differentia. The basic notion is si mple:
we begin by identifying a familiar, broad category or kind (the
genus) to which everything our term signifies (along with things
of other sorts) belongs; then we specify the distinctive features
(the differentiae) that set them apart from all the other things of
this kind. My definition of the word “chair” in the second
paragraph of this lesson, for example, identifies “piece of
furniture” as the genus to which all chairs belong and then
specifies “designed to be sat upon by one person at a time” as
the differentia that distinguishes them from couches, desks, etc.
Copi and Cohen list five rules by means of which to evaluate
the success of connotative definitions by genus and differentia:
1. Focus on essential features. Although the things to which a
term applies may share many distinctive properties, not all of
them equally indicate its true nature. Thus, for example, a

definition of “human beings” as “featherless bipeds” isn’t very
illuminating, even if does pick out the right individuals. A good
definition tries to point out the features that are essential to the
designation of things as members of the relevant group.
2. Avoid circularity. Since a circular definition uses the term
being defined as part of its own definition, it can’t provide any
useful information; either the audience already understands the
meaning of the term, or it cannot understand the explanation
that includes that term. Thus, for example, there isn’t much
point in defining “cordless ‘phone” as “a telephone that has no
cord.”
3. Capture the correct extension. A good definition will apply to
exactly the same things as the term being defined, no more and
no less. There are several ways to go wrong. Consider
alternative definitions of
“bird”:
· “warm-blooded animal” is too broad, since that would include
horses, dogs, and aardvarks
along with birds.
· “feathered egg-laying animal” is too narrow, since it excludes
those birds who happen to be male and “small flying animal” is
both too broad and too narrow, since it includes bats (which
aren’t birds) and excludes ostriches (which are).
Successful intensional definitions must be satisfied by all and
only those things that are included in the extension of the term
they define.
4. Avoid figurative or obscure language. Since the point of a
definition is to explain the meaning of a term to
someone who is unfamiliar with its proper application, the use
of language that doesn’t help such a person learn how to apply
the term is pointless. Thus, “happiness is a warm puppy” may
be a lovely thought, but it is a lousy definition.
5. Be affirmative rather than negative. It is always possible in
principle to explain the application of a term by identifying
literally everything to which it does not apply. In a few
instances, this may be the only way to go: a proper definition of

the mathematical term “infinite” might well be negative, for
example. But in ordinary circumstances, a good definition uses
positive designations whenever it is possible to do so. Defining
“honest person” as “someone who rarely lies” is a poor
definition.
Language and Logic
Functions of Language
The formal patterns of correct reasoning can all be conveyed
through ordinary language, but then so can a lot of other things.
In fact, we use language in many different ways, some of which
are irrelevant to any attempt to provide reasons for what we
believe. It is helpful to identify at least three distinct uses of
language:
1. The informative use of language involves an effort to
communicate some content. When I tell a child, “The fifth of
May is a Mexican holiday,” or write to you that “Logic is the
study of correct reasoning,” or jot a note to myself, “Jennifer —
555-3769,” I am using language informatively. This kind of use
presumes that the content of what is being communicated is
actually true, so it will be our central focus in the study of
logic.
2. An expressive use of language, on the other hand, intends
only to vent some feeling, or perhaps to evoke some feeling
from other people. When I say, “Friday afternoons are dreary,”
or yell “Ouch!” I am using language expressively. Although
such uses don’t convey any information, they do serve an
important function in everyday life, since how we feel
sometimes matters as much as—or more than—what we hold to
be true.
3. Finally, directive uses of language aim to cause or to prevent
some overt action by a human agent. When I say “Shut the
door,” or write “Read the textbook,” or memo myself, “Don’t
rely so heavily on the passive voice,” I am using language
directively. The point in each of these cases is to make someone

perform (or forswear) a particular action. This is a significant
linguistic function, too, but like the expressive use, it doesn’t
always relate logically to the truth of our beliefs.
Notice that the intended use in a particular instance often
depends more on the specific context and tone of voice than it
does on the grammatical form or vocabulary of what is said. The
simple declarative sentence, “I’m hungry,” for example, could
be used to report on a physiological condition, or to express a
feeling, or implicitly to request that someone feed me. In fact,
uses of two or more varieties may be mixed together in a single
utterance; “Stop that,” for example, usually involves both
expressive and directive functions jointly. In many cases,
however, it is possible to identify a single use of language that
is probably intended to be the primary function of a particular
linguistic unit.
British philosopher J. L. Austin developed a similar, though
much more detailed and sophisticated, nomenclature for the
variety of actions we commonly perform in employing ordinary
language. You’re welcome to examine his theory of speech acts
in association with the discussion in your textbook. While the
specifics may vary, some portion of the point remains the same:
since we do in fact employ language for many distinct purposes,
we can minimize confusion by keeping in mind what we’re up
to on any particular occasion.
Literal and Emotive Meaning
Even single words or short phrases can exhibit the distinction
between purely informative and partially expressive uses of
language. Many of the most common words and phrases of any
language have both a literal or descriptive meaning that refers
to the way things are and an emotive meaning that expresses
some (positive or negative) feeling about them. Thus, the choice
of which word to use in making a statement can be used in
hopes of evoking a particular emotional response.
This is a natural function of ordinary language, of course. We
often do wish to convey some portion of our feelings along with

information. There is a good deal of poetry in everyday
communication, and poetry without emotive meaning is pretty
dull. But when we are primarily interested in establishing the
truth—as we are when assessing the logical merits of an
argument—the use of words laden with emotive meaning can
easily distract us from our purpose.
Kinds of Agreement and Disagreement
In fact, an excessive reliance on emotively charged language
can create the appearance of disagreement between parties who
do not differ on the facts at all, and it can just as easily disguise
substantive disputes under a veneer of emotive agreement. Since
the degrees of agreement in belief and attitude are independent
of each other, there are four possible combinations at w ork
here:
1. Agreement in belief and agreement in attitude: There aren’t
any problems in this instance, since both parties hold the same
positions and have the same feelings about them.
2. Agreement in belief but disagreement in attitude: This case,
if unnoticed, may become the cause of endless (but pointless)
shouting between people whose feelings differ sharply about
some fact upon which they are in total agreement.
3. Disagreement in belief but agreement in attitude: In this
situation, parties may never recognize, much less resolve, their
fundamental difference of opinion, since they are lulled by their
shared feelings into supposing themselves allied.
4. Disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude: Here the
parties have so little in common that communication between
them often breaks down entirely.
It is often valuable, then, to recognize the levels of agreement
or disagreement at work in any exchange of views. That won’t
always resolve the dispute between two parties, of course, but it
will ensure that they don’t waste their time on an inappropriate
method of argument or persuasion.
Emotively Neutral Language
For our purposes in assessing the validity of deductive
arguments and the reliability of inductive reasoning, it will be

most directly helpful to eliminate emotive meaning entirely
whenever we can. Although it isn’t always easy to achieve
emotively neutral language in every instance, and the result
often lacks the colorful character of our usual public discourse,
it is worth the trouble and insipidity because it makes it much
easier to arrive at a settled understanding of what is true.
In many instances, the informal fallacies we will consider next
result from an improper use of emotionally charged language in
the effort to persuade someone to accept a proposition at an
emotional level, without becoming convinced that there are
legitimate grounds for believing it to be true.
Logic as a Discipline
Human life is full of decisions, including significant choices
about what to believe. Although everyone prefers to believe
what is true, we often disagree with each other about what that
is in particular instances. It may be that some of our most
fundamental convictions in life are acquired by haphazard
means rather than by the use of reason, but we all recognize that
our beliefs about ourselves and the world often hang together in
important ways.
If I believe that whales are mammals and that all mammals are
fish, then it would also make sense for me to believe that
whales are fish. Even someone who (rightly!) disagreed with my
understanding of biological taxonomy could appreciate the
consistent, reasonable way in which I used my mistaken beliefs
as the foundation upon which to establish a new one. On the
other hand, if I decide to believe that Hamlet was Danish
because I believe that Hamlet was a character in a play by Shaw
and that some Danes are Shavian characters, then even someone
who shares my belief in the result could point out that I haven’t
actually provided good reasons for accepting its truth.
In general, we can respect the directness of a path even when
we don’t accept the points at which it begins and ends. Thus, it
is possible to distinguish correct reasoning from incorrect

reasoning independently of our agreement on substantive
matters. Logic is the discipline that studies this distinction—
both by determining the conditions under which the truth of
certain beliefs leads naturally to the truth of some other belief,
and by drawing attention to the ways in which we may be led to
believe something without respect for its truth. This provides no
guarantee that we will always arrive at the truth, since the
beliefs with which we begin are sometimes in error. But
following the principles of correct reasoning does ensure that no
additional mistakes creep in during the course of our progress.
In this review of elementary logic, we’ll undertake a broad
survey of the major varieties of reasoning that have been
examined by logicians of the Western philosophical tradition.
We’ll see how certain patterns of thinking do invariably lead
from truth to truth while other patterns do not, and we’ll
develop the skills of using the former while avoiding the latter.
It will be helpful to begin by defining some of the technical
terms that describe human reasoning in general.
Structure of Argument
Our fundamental unit of what may be asserted or denied is the
proposition (or statement) that is typically expressed by a
declarative sentence. Logicians of earlier centuries often
identified propositions with the mental acts of affirming them,
often called judgments, but we can evade some interesting but
thorny philosophical issues by avoiding this locution.
Propositions are distinct from the sentences that convey them.
“Smith loves Jones” expresses exactly the same proposition as
“Jones is loved by Smith,” while the sentence “Today is my
birthday” can be used to convey many different propositions,
depending upon who happens to utter it, and on what day. But
each proposition is either true or false. Sometimes, of course,
we don’t know which of these truth-values a particular
proposition has (“There is life on the third moon of Jupiter” is
presently an example), but we can be sure that it has one or the
other.
The chief concern of logic is how the truth of some propositions

is connected with the truth of another. Thus, we will usually
consider a group of related propositions. An argument is a set of
two or more propositions related to each other in such a way
that all but one of them (the premises) are supposed to provide
support for the remaining one (the conclusion). The transition
or movement from premises to conclusion, the logical
connection between them, is the inference upon which the
argument relies.
Notice that “premise” and “conclusion” are here defined only as
they occur in relation to each other within a particular
argument. One and the same proposition can (and often does)
appear as the conclusion of one line of reasoning but also as one
of the premises of another. A number of words and phrases are
commonly used in ordinary language to indicate the premises
and conclusion of an argument, although their use is never
strictly required, since the context can make clear the direction
of movement. What distinguishes an argument from a mere
collection of propositions is the inference that is supposed to
hold between them.
Thus, for example, “The moon is made of green cheese, and
strawberries are red. My dog has fleas.” is just a collection of
unrelated propositions; the truth or falsity of each has no
bearing on that of the others. But “Helen is a physician. So
Helen went to medical school, since all physicians have gone to
medical school.” is an argument; the truth of its conclusion,
“Helen went to medical school,” is inferentially derived from its
premises, “Helen is a physician.” and “All physicians have gone
to medical school.”
Recognizing Arguments
It’s important to be able to identify which proposition is the
conclusion of each argument, since that’s a necessary step in
our evaluation of the inference that is supposed to lead to it. We
might even employ a simple diagram to represent the structure
of an argument, numbering each of the propositions it comprises
and drawing an arrow to indicate the inference that leads from
its premise(s) to its conclusion.

Don’t worry if this procedure seems rather tentative and
uncertain at first. We’ll be studying the structural features of
logical arguments in much greater detail as we proceed, and
you’ll soon find it easy to spot instances of the particular
patterns we encounter most often. For now, it is enough to tell
the difference between an argument and a mere collection of
propositions and to identify the intended conclusion of each
argument.
Even that isn’t always easy, since arguments embedded in
ordinary language can take on a bewildering variety of forms.
Again, don’t worry too much about this; as we acquire more
sophisticated techniques for representing logical arguments, we
will deliberately limit ourselves to a very restricted number of
distinct patterns and develop standard methods for expressing
their structure. Just remember the basic definition of an
argument: it includes more than one proposition, and it infers a
conclusion from one or more premises. So “If John has already
left, then either Jane has arrived or Gail is on the way.” can’t be
an argument, since it is just one big (compound) proposition.
But “John has already left, since Jane has arrived.” is an
argument that proposes an inference from the fact of Jane’s
arrival to the conclusion, “John has already left.” If you find it
helpful to draw a diagram, please make good use of that method
to your advantage.
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Logical Fallacies: Errors in Reasoning
Argument: In logic and philosophy, an argument is a series of
statements typically used to persuade someone of something or
to present reasons for accepting a conclusion. The general form
of an argument in a natural language is that of premises
(typically in the form of propositions, statements or sentences)
in support of a claim: the conclusion.

Logical Fallacies
Arguments are the tools of philosophers. They are what
philosophers use to support their positions and to persuade one
another to their point of view. Be careful of arguments that
contain fallacies, however, which are errors in reasoning. The
overall cogency of an argument could be affected, if it contains
a logical fallacy. The fallacies in this Power Point are not
meant to constitute an exhaustive list, but they are some of the
more prominent ones.
Logical Fallacies
Type 1 Reasoning Error: Believing a falsehood (false positive;
believing something is real when it is not).
Type 2 Reasoning Error: Rejecting a truth (false negative; not
believing something is real when it is).
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Two Major Groups of Fallacies
I. Fallacies in Supporting a Claim.
II. Fallacies of Criticism and Response.
5
I. Fallacies in Supporting a Claim
Four Fallacies of Relevance

Fallacies in this group involve premises not relevant to the
conclusions they are meant to support.
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Appeal to Ignorance
(Ad Ignorantiam)
The appeal to ignorance consists in arguing that because a
claim has not been demonstrated to be wrong, the claim is right.
Appeal to Ignorance
Claim: “God exists.”
Claimant has the burden of proof or production to put forth
reasons, evidence, or arguments in support of that claim.
Fallacy: “Can you prove to me that God does not exist?”
Also known as “shifting the burden of proof.”
8
“Of course I believe in telekinesis. No one has ever shown it
does not exist, and that’s good enough for me.”
9
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. The

claimant has the burden of proof.
10
The legislature has passed a law requiring public school
teachers to swear an oath of loyalty to the United States. The
House Speaker summed up the thinking of the legislature.
‘”There didn’t seem to be any reason we shouldn’t have such a
law,” he said. “No one showed us anything wrong with it, so
we concluded it was all right.”
11
The fallacy is also committed in arguing that because a claim
has not been demonstrated to be correct, it is wrong.
“No one has ever proved that decriminalizing drug possession is
socially desirable. So it isn’t desirable.”
12
Appeal to Inappropriate Authority (Ad Verecundiam)
We base much of what we believe on the evidence of
authority, and citing an authority is a legitimate way of
justifying a belief.
13

A fallacy, however, is committed when the authority cited
is not an authority in the proper area. The expertise of the
authority is thus irrelevant to the claim and provides no support
for it.
14
Example: Einstein’s expertise lies in physics--not religion,
politics, or gardening.
In 1921 a rabbi sent Albert Einstein a telegram with the
question: “Do you believe in God?”
Einstein’s response: “I believe in Spinoza’s God, who reveals
himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who
concerns himself with the fate and the doings of mankind.”
14
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Hard Experts
Mathematics
Physics
Chemistry
Soft Experts
Art
Politics
Religion

16
Appeal to Popular Belief (Popularity of a Belief)
(Ad Populum)
This fallacy consists in asserting that a claim is correct
just because people generally believe it is. Such an inference is
in error because we have no reason to take what most people
believe as a reliable indicator of what is true.
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Examples of the Popularity or Unpopularity of Beliefs
“Everyone believes in X.”
“No one believes in X.”
Why is that?
What arguments, reasons, or evidence can the claimant put forth
in support of X?
18
Appeal to Popular Attitudes (Emotions)
(Ad Populum)
Popular attitudes and the emotions associated with them
can be manipulated to incline people to accept claims that have
not been demonstrated.
19

Racial fears and prejudices, patriotic impulses, and the wish to
be associated with a special social group are some sources of
such sentiments and attitudes.
20
“I’ll tell you why I still believe we were right to fight in Iraq.
It’s because I love my country.”
21
“Now look, Sally. You know that Communism isn’t right.
What would your friends at school think if they heard you
talking this way?”
22
Two Fallacies of Inadequate Evidence
Fallacies in this group are arguments with premises that present
relevant, but inadequate, evidence.
23
False Cause (Post Hoc)

This fallacy involves concluding that because one event
occurred before another, the first was the cause of the second.
Causation?
Correlation?
Coincidence?
24
Example of False Cause
“Everytime I wash my car, it rains the following day.
Therefore, washing my car caused the rain to come down.”
25
Example of False Cause
A few minutes after the coach of the Houston Texans made his
speech to the City of London, a devastating explosion occurred.
For the safety of the people who live and work in the City, it is
imperative that the coach makes no more speeches here.
26
“Ever since mayor Smith took office, the economy went south.
Therefore, Smith caused our economy to go down.”
Wearing favorite shirt ⇒ Your team wins
Viewing violent TV shows ⇒ Violent behavior in children
Pornography ⇒ Rape
“Hope you getting a speeding ticket.” (In jest) ⇒ Your friend
gets a speeding ticket.

27
Hasty Generalization
This fallacy consists in generalizing on the basis of an
inadequate set of cases.
Also called insufficient sample, faulty generalization, or biased
generalization.
28
“All politicians are dishonest.”
“All people on welfare are lazy.”
“All lawyers are greedy.”
29
Four Fallacies of Illegitimate Assumption
Fallacies in this group are tied together by the fact that each
invokes some illegitimate assumption.
30

False Alternatives
The fallacy consists in giving arguments that present
alternatives as exhaustive and exclusive when they are not.
False alternatives are used to make us choose between restricted
alternatives when other choices really exist.
31
“Either you’re for us or you’re against us. It is obvious you
aren’t for us. So you’re against us.”
Neutral?
No knowledge of the issues?
32
“Either we cut spending or increase the deficit.”
Raising taxes?
33
“Either we have much more capital punishment or keep putting
murderers back out on the street.”
Mandatory life imprisonment?
Rehabilitation?

34
Loaded Question (Complex Question)
This fallacy consists in attempting to get an answer to a
question that assumes the truth of an unproved assumption.
35
“So how many times did you beat your wife today?”
“Mr. President. How long will you continue to lie to the
American people?”
“Are you lying now or were you lying then?”
“Did you see the gun?”
“Did you see a gun?”
36
Begging the Question (Petitio Principii)
A “question” is an issue, and a question is “begged” when
reasons justifying an answer to it are only apparently presented
in an argument.
You assume the very thing that you’re asked to prove.
37
“Paranormal phenomena exist because I have had experiences

that can only be described as paranormal.”
38
Person A: The Big Mac is the tastiest burger in the world.
Person B: Why do you say that?
Person A: Just because.
39
The conclusion restates part or all of the meaning of a premise.
“Freddie is a murderer because Freddie wrongfully killed
someone.”
40
A premise is used to support a conclusion while the conclusion
is at least implicitly appealed to in support of the premise (also
called circular reasoning.)
A because B, B because C, C because A.
41
Example of Circular Reasoning
Three thieves pull off a successful heist and steal four

diamonds, but they can’t decide how to divide their haul.
Eventually the first thief says: “I should get two diamonds, and
you two should get one each, because I’m the leader.” The
second thief says: “Wait a minute, why are you the leader?”
The first thief replies: “I must be the leader; I’m getting the
largest share of the haul!”
42
Slippery Slope
The mistaken idea behind this fallacy is that when actions
can be arrayed along a continuum, justifying the first action is
equivalent to justifying the most extreme ones.
43
“Our employees have asked us to provide lounge areas where
they can spend their breaks. This request will have to be
refused. If we give them lounge areas, next they’ll be asking
for a swimming pool and sauna. Then it will be tennis courts,
football fields, and a fitness center.”
44
II. Fallacies of Criticism and Response
Four Fallacies of Criticism

45
Against the Person (Ad Hominem)
The fallacy consists in rejecting the claim by offering as
grounds some personal characteristics of the person supporting
it.
46
“You should not accept Dr. Smith’s proposed cure for cancer,
because she is an active member of the Communist Party.”
But compare: “Dr. Smith says that businesses and companies
should be privately owned by individual citizens, and that the
government should not try to regulate them. However, Dr.
Smith is a communist.”
47
Exception to
Against the Person fallacy:
We may legitimately question the reliability of a person in a
particular set of circumstances (and hence, we would not be
committing this fallacy) such as conflict of interest, vested
interest, etc.

48
A chemical company’s representative assuring us the company’s
pesticide is harmless.
A manufacturer claiming her product is safe to use.
A bureaucrat asserting his department is underfunded.
49
Pooh-Pooh
To pooh-pooh an argument is to dismiss it with ridicule as
not worthy of serious consideration. It is a refusal to examine
an argument seriously and evaluate it fairly.
50
“We don’t have to waste time dealing with Mr. Johnson’s claim
about the elections being rigged. He’s just a sore loser.”
Logging company’s response to environmental group’s
insistence that the world’s tallest tree not be chopped down.
51
Straw Man
The fallacy consists in misrepresenting an opponent’s
claim or argument so that it is easier to criticize or so obviously
implausible that no criticism is needed.

52
“The theory of evolution boils down to the idea that human
beings are descended from apes.”
This statement presents no theory that any serious scientist
holds.
53
Name Calling (Loaded Words)
When we apply judgmental words like sleazeball,
incompetent, idiot, morally corrupt, venal, avaricious, and
decadent to people, policies, or practices, we must justify the
application.
54
Two Fallacies of Defense
Definitional Dodge
This fallacy consists in redefining a crucial term in a claim to
avoid acknowledging a counterexample that would falsify a
claim.
Definitional Dodge
All men are mortal.
Suzy is not a man.
Therefore, Suzy is not mortal.

“Doctors recommend that you should start your day with a good
breakfast. I had a very good breakfast this morning when I ate
bacon, fried eggs, and pancakes.
55
56
Two Fallacies of Defense
The Exception that Proves the Rule
Someone defending a claim commits this fallacy by dismissing
apparent counterexamples as no challenge (or hand waves those
challenges away).
57
Exception that Proves the Rule
Homer: “All animated series are short-lived. They don’t last
very long.”
Marge: “But aren’t you forgetting long-running shows like The
Simpsons and South Park?”
Homer: “But those are just exceptions that prove the rule.”
Exception that Proves the Rule
Of course, Homer could argue back and say that the
counterexamples given by Marge are not compelling
counterarguments and do not really contradict his initial
statement. In this case, however, it may be hard for him to
make this argument, since these are two long-running shows.

59
Last Words
Errors in reasoning are always difficult to avoid and often hard
to detect. Knowing the names of a few prominent kinds of
fallacies may be helpful, but it is no substitute for constant
vigilance and ready skepticism.
60
Bibliography
The information in these slides come from The Elements of
Reasoning, by David Conway and Ronald Munson.
Plato: "Apology" (Trial of Socrates)
How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I
cannot tell; but I know that they almost made me forget who I
was—so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have hardly
uttered a word of truth. But of the many falsehoods told by
them, there was one which quite amazed me;—I mean when they
said that you should be upon your guard and not allow
yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say
this, when they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened
my lips and proved myself to be anything but a great speaker,
did indeed appear to me most shameless—unless by the force of
eloquence they mean the force of truth; for is such is their
meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way
from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken
the truth at all; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not,
however, delivered after their manner in a set oration duly
ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall
use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment;

for I am confident in the justice of my cause (Or, I am certain
that I am right in taking this course.): at my time of life I ought
not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the
character of a juvenile orator—let no one expect it of me. And I
must beg of you to grant me a favour:—If I defend myself in my
accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I
have been in the habit of using in the agora, at the tables of the
money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be
surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am
more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first
time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of
the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were
really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his
native tongue, and after the fashion of his country: —Am I
making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner, which
may or may not be good; but think only of the truth of my
words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the
judge decide justly.
And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first
accusers, and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I
have had many accusers, who have accused me falsely to you
during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus
and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way.
But far more dangerous are the others, who began when you
were children, and took possession of your minds with their
falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated
about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath,
and made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators
of this tale are the accusers whom I dread; for their hearers are
apt to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence
of the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me
are of ancient date, and they were made by them in the days
when you were more impressible than you are now—in
childhood, or it may have been in youth—and the cause when
heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And
hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my

accusers; unless in the chance case of a Comic poet. All who
from envy and malice have persuaded you—some of them
having first convinced themselves—all this class of men are
most difficult to deal with; for I cannot have them up here, and
cross-examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with
shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no one
who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was
saying, that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the
other ancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my
answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long
before the others, and much oftener.
Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to clear
away in a short time, a slander which has lasted a long time.
May I succeed, if to succeed be for my good and yours, or likely
to avail me in my cause! The task is not an easy one; I quite
understand the nature of it. And so leaving the event with God,
in obedience to the law I will now make my defence.
I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation
which has given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has
encouraged Meletus to proof this charge against me. Well, what
do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors, and I will
sum up their words in an affidavit: 'Socrates is an evil -doer, and
a curious person, who searches into things under the earth and
in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and
he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.' Such is the nature
of the accusation: it is just what you have yourselves seen in the
comedy of Aristophanes (Aristoph., Clouds.), who has
introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and
saying that he walks in air, and talking a deal of nonsense
concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either
much or little—not that I mean to speak disparagingly of any
one who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very
sorry if Meletus could bring so grave a charge against me. But
the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with
physical speculations. Very many of those here present are
witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then,

you who have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any
of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many
upon such matters...You hear their answer. And from what they
say of this part of the charge you will be able to judge of the
truth of the rest.
As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher,
and take money; this accusation has no more truth in it than the
other. Although, if a man were really able to instruct mankind,
to receive money for giving instruction would, in my opinion,
be an honour to him. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and
Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the
cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their
own citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and
come to them whom they not only pay, but are thankful if they
may be allowed to pay them. There is at this time a Parian
philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I
came to hear of him in this way:—I came across a man who has
spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias, the son of
Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him:
'Callias,' I said, 'if your two sons were foals or calves, there
would be no difficulty in finding some one to put over them; we
should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably, who would
improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and
excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you
thinking of placing over them? Is there any one who
understands human and political virtue? You must have thought
about the matter, for you have sons; is there any one?' 'There
is,' he said. 'Who is he?' said I; 'and of what country? and what
does he charge?' 'Evenus the Parian,' he replied; 'he is the man,
and his charge is five minae.' Happy is Evenus, I said to myself,
if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate
charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and
conceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.
I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, 'Yes,
Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations which are
brought against you; there must have been something strange

which you have been doing? All these rumours and this talk
about you would never have arisen if you had been like other
men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be
sorry to judge hastily of you.' Now I regard this as a fair
challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the reason
why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to
attend then. And although some of you may think that I am
joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of
Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of
wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I
reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to
that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the
persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom
which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and
he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my
character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to
interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For
the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a
witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of
Delphi—he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of
what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early
a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the
recent exile of the people, and returned with you. Well,
Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings,
and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him
whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he
asked the oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I
was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no
man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is
in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.
Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you
why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said
to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the
interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom,
small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am
the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that

would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought
of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could
only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god
with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man
who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.'
Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom,
and observed him—his name I need not mention; he was a
politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was
as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help
thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought
wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried
to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not
really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his
enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me.
So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I
do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful
and good, I am better off than he is,—for he knows nothing, and
thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In
this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage
of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions
to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same.
Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others
besides him.
Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of
the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this:
but necessity was laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought,
ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to
all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle.
And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!—for I must
tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this: I
found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish;
and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will
tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the 'Herculean'
labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last
the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets;
tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself,

you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you
are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some
of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked
what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach
me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to
confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person
present who would not have talked better about their poetry
than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do
poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they
are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things,
but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared
to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that
upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be
the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise.
So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the
same reason that I was superior to the politicians.
At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew
nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many
fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know
many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly
were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good
artisans fell into the same error as the poets;—because they
were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts
of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their
wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle,
whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their
knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made
answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.
This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the
worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to
many calumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always
imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting
in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is
wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of
men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he
is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He,

O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom
is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient
to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any
one, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if
he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that
he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have
no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any
concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my
devotion to the god.
There is another thing:—young men of the richer classes, who
have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they
like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me,
and proceed to examine others; there are plenty of persons, as
they quickly discover, who think that they know something, but
really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined
by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with
me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous
misleader of youth!—and then if somebody asks them, Why,
what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and
cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss,
they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all
philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under
the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the
better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretence
of knowledge has been detected—which is the truth; and as they
are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are drawn up in
battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your
ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the
reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon,
have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf
of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians;
Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the
beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny
all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the
whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled
nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes

them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am
speaking the truth?—Hence has arisen the prejudice against me;
and this is the reason of it, as you will find out either in this or
in any future enquiry.
I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my
accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by
Meletus, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls
himself. Against these, too, I must try to make a defence:—Let
their affidavit be read: it contains something of this kind: It
says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and
who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new
divinities of his own. Such is the charge; and now let us
examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil,
and corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus
is a doer of evil, in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is
only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a
pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really
never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will
endeavour to prove to you.
Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You
think a great deal about the improvement of youth?
Yes, I do.
Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know,
as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are
citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the
judges who their improver is.—Observe, Meletus, that you are
silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather
disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying,
that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and
tell us who their improver is.
The laws.
But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who
the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.
The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.
What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to
instruct and improve youth?

Certainly they are.
What, all of them, or some only and not others?
All of them.
By the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of
improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience,—do they
improve them?
Yes, they do.
And the senators?
Yes, the senators improve them.
But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?—or do
they too improve them?
They improve them.
Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the
exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what
you affirm?
That is what I stoutly affirm.
I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a
question: How about horses? Does one man do them harm and
all the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man
is able to do them good, or at least not many;—the trainer of
horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to
do with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of
horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether
you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the
condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the
rest of the world were their improvers. But you, Meletus, have
sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the
young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about the
very things which you bring against me.
And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question—by Zeus I
will: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good
ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be
easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good, and
the bad do them evil?
Certainly.
And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited

by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law
requires you to answer—does any one like to be injured?
Certainly not.
And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the
youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or
unintentionally?
Intentionally, I say.
But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours
good, and the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your
superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at
my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a
man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very
likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and
intentionally, too—so you say, although neither I nor any other
human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I
do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on
either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional,
the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought
to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for
if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I
only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; but you would
have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now
you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of
instruction, but of punishment.
It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that
Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But
still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to
corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your
indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which
the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or
spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by which
I corrupt the youth, as you say.
Yes, that I say emphatically.
Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me
and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I
do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other

1Kantian Ethics1724-1804Spent virtually all of his life in

1Kantian Ethics1724-1804Spent virtually all of his life in

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1Kantian Ethics1724-1804Spent virtually all of his life in