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1. PHI1010S: Term Essay
Topic 4: “An unjust, unworkable and over-
demanding theory of ethics.” Is this a fair assessment
of utilitarianism? Give detailed reasons for your
answer.
Nicole Dunn
DNNNIC007
Tutor: Dr Tom Angier
Monday 5th
Arts 203
Word Count: 2187

2. Introduction
John Stewart Mill famously summarised utilitarianism as “the greatest good for the greatest
number.” The theory identifies human happiness as the goal of any action and aims to provide
a moral metric that quantifies outcomes on a scale of utility. In this essay, I will formalise and
explain positive act utilitarianism, as made by Bentham. Secondly, I will analyse prominent
objections pertaining to justice, workability and demandingness. These sections conclude that
utilitarianism contravenes justice at great cost to minority interests, is practically unworkable
and requires supererogation. Rule utilitarianism is then evaluated as a possible solution to the
aforementioned concerns. Ultimately, I will conclude that rule utilitarianism does not escape
the refutations of act utilitarianism because it either dissolves into act, or is forced to abandon
the principle of utility altogether. . .. .
This essay will be divided into five distinct sections:
1. The Utilitarian Argument
2. Justice and Minority Rights
3. Workability
4. Demandingness
5. Rule Utilitarianism: a possible solution?
The Utilitarian Argument
Act utilitarianism (henceforth utilitarianism) holds that ‘the good’ consists in the only ideal
that they believe to be intrinsically valuable: human happiness. This ‘state of well-being’ is
distinct from hedonistic pleasure, which is a mere sensation. The theory advocates that an act
is morally required if it does more to improve overall happiness (or utility) than any other
action that could have been done.1
Mill famously summarises this position as “the greatest
1
Mill, J. S. 1863. Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son and Bourn pp. 10‐11

3. good for the greatest number,” that is, utilitarianism is a maximising, consequentialist theory
that weighs up the utility of actions so as to determine their morality.2
The maximising quality of utilitarianism is often misunderstood; the moral action is not simply
the action that produces the most happiness in isolation, but the action that also minimises
pain. The best way to describe this nuance is that the theory calculates net happiness and
utility; so even if one action produces more happiness than another, if it also produces more
suffering, the second action is morally required.3
Additionally, the theory is not strictly
majoritarian; if the suffering of the minority far outweighs the happiness of the majority, then
the course of action that favours minority interests is morally required.4
Importantly, utilitarianism is concerned only with the consequences of action. This is
intuitively appealing; when justifying our actions, we often point to the good that they do. The
theory is also appealing because it is impartial; each person’s happiness is counted equally,
regardless of their position or relation to the moral agent. This happiness is measured on a
quantitative scale and the result is aggregative. Essentially, a happy majority reduces to many
happy individuals, and an action that maximises this happiness with minimal pain is a moral
one.
Justice and Minority Rights
The most prominent objection to utilitarianism is that it contravenes justice; the fair treatment
of individuals. The maximising and aggregative qualities of the theory mean that it is possible
for minority interests to be sacrificed for the ‘greater good.’ In utilitarianism only the sum total
of pains and pleasures is considered, not their distribution. Thus, even though the balance of
2
Bentham, J. 1994. ‘Of the Principle of Utility’ in Peter Singer, Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 306
3
Landau, R. 2010. The Fundamentals of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 121
4
Ibid, p. 122

4. happiness might be positive, it could be disproportionately distributed in various societies.5
For
example, a slave society might produce the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number
if only a few people were enslaved. Simply put, if enough people can benefit from a particular
action, then it should be deemed moral. Thus people become a means to the happiness of the
majority; it is permissible to torture the families of terrorists to prevent attacks, to bomb
civilians to stop a war and violate the rights we often take to be inalienable.
The leading utilitarian response is that these scenarios are extremely rare, and often they do not
in actual fact maximise utility. The more subtle consequences of these actions, such as killing
the innocent, mean that on balance less utility is generated than by alternatives.6
These may
include psychological and sociological effects, a weakened justice system and dangerous legal
precedent.7
However, even if these situations are rare, it is logically possible to conceive of
situations where killing creating significant harm to one group results in greater aggregative
utility, and thus the utilitarian would be forced to accept it.
Moreover, this response seems to suggest that utilitarians rely on an effective judicial system.
The ‘subtle consequences’ that they speak to usually involve being caught for committing an
act or weakening an existing institution of justice. The question then, is what about situations
of anarchy, or situations where an individual is guaranteed to not be caught? In the absence of
legal redress is seems that the utilitarian would condone all sorts of intuitively immoral actions
such as a man who spies on naked women, a thief who uses property better than the rightful
owner and a doctor who euthanises an old, homeless man to harvest his organs in order to save
the lives of five young children. Because these actions are never found out, and therefore result
5
Smart, J.J.C. 1973. ‘Utilitarianism and Injustice’ in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and
Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p. 70
6
Landau, p. 146
7
Ibid, p. 148

5. in an overall balance of good consequences, a utilitarian would be compelled to deem them
moral.8
More broadly, the exclusive forward-looking approach of utilitarians ignores backwards-
looking considerations; obligations incurred through actions in the past. The fabric of society
often relies on such obligations, in the form of jobs, directives and contracts. These
considerations form the basis of principles that we value, such as promise-keeping and loyalty.
Because utilitarianism is inherently future orientated, it overlooks moral duties incurred in the
past.9
Workability
Another challenge to utilitarianism is that it is fundamentally unworkable, that is it cannot be
practically applied in our everyday decisions. The arguments presented in this regard are two-
fold: firstly that our inability to predict the consequences of our actions means that we cannot
accurately make the utilitarian weigh up, and secondly that the utilitarian calculus does not
account for qualitative differences and egoistic biases.
Because of the consequentialist nature of the theory, making a moral decision requires us to
accurately predict all the foreseeable consequences of our actions. However, this immediately
raises the problem of imperfect knowledge and temporal scope. The consequences that the
utilitarian judges the morality of our actions by are the consequences that actually occur, in
both the short and (very) long term.10
Realistically, we do not always know the consequences
of our actions at the time of making a decision. Often, the consequences of our actions occur
far beyond the stretch of or foresight; there are even consequences emerging today of actions
8
Rachels, J. and Rachels, S. 2012. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (7th ed). New York: McGraw Hill pp. 114‐
115
9
Rachels & Rachels, p. 115
10
Landau, p. 121

6. that occurred centuries ago such as the crucifixion of Jesus and the colonisation of African
nations. According to utilitarianism, we are morally responsible for all the consequences of our
actions, regardless of temporal scope; in fact, we are responsible for the consequences
resulting from the initial consequences. Because it is impossible for us to conceive of these
vast exponentially branching consequences, the utilitarian calculus fails.11
Utilitarians attempt to refute such claims by stating that people can reasonably expect certain
consequences by calling on past experience to inform their judgements. However my actions
are judged not for their expected consequences but for the consequences that actually
materialise. Therefore, regardless of whether I have optimific expectations, and thus moral
intentions, if in reality my action results in less utility than a possible alternative, my action
would be deemed immoral.12
This seems incompatible with our common-sense conception of a
moral person; a person who believed that they were making a moral decision but had bad
consequences is deemed immoral, while an action of ill-intent that ‘accidentally’ generates
good consequences would be deemed moral. For example, a bystander than attempts to save a
drowning child by putting herself at risk and failing would be regarded as equally moral to
another bystander who does not bother to try.
Secondly, utilitarianism gives no consideration to qualitative differences between options. It is
difficult to conceptualise a trade-off between intensity and extent, or intensity and probability
or comparing happiness to suffering.13
For example, I may find it difficult to weigh the utility
of allocating funds to a WWF initiative that combats deforestation versus an NGO that delivers
food aid to starving children. Utilitarians respond by pointing to the fact that we make
decisions between two qualitatively different values all the time; for example I weigh might up
11
Ibid, p. 123
12
Landau, pp. 122‐123
13
Ibid, p. 140

7. the value of freedom versus security when choosing whether or not to marry.14
However, while
it is true that I may be equipped to decide between alternatives concerning my own happiness,
it does not follow that I am able to discern which course of action generates the greatest utility
for everyone. In fact, this may even suggest than when calculating utility, people tend to have
an egoistic cognitive bias; they are able to clearly identify which action makes them happiest
and thus weigh this disproportionally against an abstract idea of the happiness of distant
others.15
Thus, the unworkability of the theory is not merely a concern about convenience, but that in
principle it is seemingly impossible to make these calculations.
Demandingness
Besides infeasibility, utilitarianism seems to be an overly demanding theory. It claims that we
are morally required to act in such a way to bring about the best consequences. As a result, we
are not only morally responsible for the acts we do to maximise happiness but the acts that we
could have done to maximise happiness, as well as the acts that we could have prevented
others from doing that decrease overall happiness. Thus, utilitarianism places a negative
responsibility that suggests that we would have to give up most of, if not all, of the things that
make our lives special, but moreover that we may even have to commit intuitively immoral
acts, such as killing one innocent person so as to save ten.16
Moreover, utilitarianism seems to erase the distinction between obligation and supererogation.
Supererogation is the class of actions that go beyond the call of duty; acts that are morally
14
Ibid, pp. 135‐136
15
Dryer, D. 1975. ‘Utilitarianism, For and Against.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 4, No. 3 p. 555
16
Williams, B. 1973. ‘Negative Responsibility and Two Examples’ in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams,
Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 94‐95

8. good although not required in the sense that obligations are required. According to
Utilitarianism, we must always act so as to maximise the happiness of the majority, regardless
of self-sacrifice.17
Thus, there is no such thing as morally permissible self-sacrifice that goes
beyond the call of duty. A sacrifice that maximises net happiness is morally required, and a
sacrifice that does not is considered at best wasted, at worst immoral, rather than
supererogatory. The impartial nature of the theory compounds this demandingness, for we are
morally prohibited from favouring the happiness of the people we love. Thus, it appears that
utilitarianism is an excessively demanding moral theory that would make living a moral life
virtually impossible.18
Rule Utilitarianism: a possible solution?
In attempt to overcome the aforementioned objections, a new branch of utilitarianism emerged.
Rule utilitarianism, distinct from act utilitarianism, does not evaluate individual acts according
to the utility that they generate, but rather by whether they conform to general utility-
maximising rules. These rules are arrived act by evaluating, in the event that the rule was
universalised, then at least as much good would be produced as by everyone's always
conforming with any other set of rules.19
Rule utilitarianism certainly seems to mitigate the problems of workability and
demandingness; the inability to predict consequences or make expedient decisions is catered
for by providing an immediately accessible set of ideal rules that individuals can engage to
decide the outcome of any moral decision. Similarly, rules can be established to guard against
overly-demanding moral obligations. However, rule utilitarianism fails to adequately guard
17
Rachels & Rachels, p. 116
18
Ibid, p. 117
19
Barnes, G. 1971. ‘Utilitarianisms.’ Ethics. Vol. 82, No. 1: p. 57

9. against violation of justice by resulting in a dilemma where either it must sacrifice its
foundational principle of utility, or it must allow exceptions to the rule.20
This dilemma needs to be considered in a case where breaking a general-maximising rule
results in disproportionately more utility. Such a case may be lying to protect a family member
from hurt or breaking a promise to attain some reward. Should the rule utilitarian abide by the
general rule, he/she would be violating the principle of utility, for an alternative course of
action would result in greater happiness. To justify this action as moral, the rule utilitarian
would have to concede that morality stems from the rule itself and not from the principle of
utility; rendering the theory anti-utilitarian. This appears to be rule-worship; the rule utilitarian
is sacrificing the only ‘intrinsic good’ for convenience and contradicting the basis of the
theory. Alternatively, the rule utilitarian could break the rule, allowing exception and thus
uphold the foundational principle. However, any exception would be in a case where an
alternative act yields greater utility. Thus, an act would need to be evaluated for the utility that
it generates; ultimately collapsing rule utilitarianism into act.21
Conclusion
Utilitarianism is an unjust, unworkable and over-demanding theory of ethics. In order to
uphold the principle of utility, minority interests will often be sacrificed as a mere means to
utility. The theory is fundamentally unworkable because we are unable to predict the
consequences of our actions and the scale of happiness is incommensurable. Utilitarianism
demands supererogation and imposes a negative responsibility on us which is near impossible
to live by. Finally, rule utilitarianism, although it mitigates workability and over-
20
Ibid, p. 58
21
Kerner, G. 1971. ‘The Immortality of Utilitarianism and the Escapism of Rule‐Utilitarianism.’ The Philosophical
Quarterly. Vol. 21, No. 82: pp. 46‐47

10. demandingness, fails to defend the utilitarian position because it either abandons the
foundational principle of utility, or collapses into act.
Works Cited
Barnes, G. 1971. ‘Utilitarianisms.’ Ethics. Vol. 82, No. 1: 56-64.
Bentham, J. 1994. ‘Of the Principle of Utility’ in Peter Singer, Ethics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 306-312.
Dryer, D. 1975. ‘Utilitarianism, For and Against.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 4,
No. 3: 549-559.
Kerner, G. 1971. ‘The Immortality of Utilitarianism and the Escapism of Rule-Utilitarianism.’
The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 21, No. 82: 36-50.
Landau, R. 2010. The Fundamentals of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mill, J. S. 1863. Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son and Bourn.
Rachels, J. and Rachels, S. 2012. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (7th
ed). New York:
McGraw Hill.
Smart, J.J.C. 1973. ‘Utilitarianism and Injustice’ in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams,
Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 67-73.
Williams, B. 1973. ‘Negative Responsibility and Two Examples’ in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard
Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 93-100.