A Palestinian Declaration Of Independence Implications For Peace

52
Middle east Policy, Vol. XVii, No. 1, sPriNg 2010
© 2010, the author Journal compilation © 2010, Middle east Policy council
i
n an israeli-Palestinian peace pro-
cess most commonly described as
“moribund,” the Palestinian author-
ity (Pa) recently raised a diplomatic
ripple by publicly proposing to make a
“unilateral declaration of independence”
for a state of Palestine within the 1967
armistice borders of the gaza strip and
the West Bank (including east Jerusalem).
in challenging the diplomatic stalemate,
the proposal struck a range of observers
as positive, suggesting an innovative way
to rekindle the diplomatic process and
hope of an eventual peace agreement. yet
the implications of this proposal are more
complicated than they appear.
Publicly, the reasons for issuing a
unilateral declaration of independence
(Udi) appear to be tactical. it could
redeine Israel’s occupation as invasion
and thus re-legitimize Palestinian resis-
tance, potentially triggering more effective
international intervention. it could give the
Palestinian side more leverage by allowing
it to escape the disabling status of a non-
state actor. It could reconigure the “peace
talks” as negotiations between two states,
rather than leaving statehood forever con-
tingent on irreconcilable differences about
inal-status issues. At the least, by opening
a new stage with attendant unknowns, it
could help prop up the PA’s disintegrating
standing with the Palestinian people for
another year or two by raising some hope
for new diplomatic openings. although the
principal beneiciaries of this maneuver
may be Pa elites, preserving the Pa could
be welcomed by the entire international
community. since the great majority of
world states currently have diplomatic
relations with the Pa and international
diplomacy operates through its ramal-
lah ofice, just preserving the PA could be
seen as desirable, whether its activities and
negotiations are effective or not.
thus, as a diplomatic maneuver, the
proposition (or threat) to issue a Udi has
its own uses. the question explored here is
whether a Udi, if actually issued, is likely
to serve international security by contrib-
uting to a stable peace. this question re-
quires some forward projection about what
kind of Palestinian “state” a Udi is likely
to generate. in the highly unlikely event
that it impels israel to withdraw wholly
from the occupied Palestinian territories,
it could conceivably assist in the creation
of a viable Palestinian state that would
A PAlestiniAn DeclArAtion of inDePenDence:
imPlicAtions for PeAce
Virginia Tilley
Dr. Tilley is a political scientist specializing in the comparative and
international politics of racial and ethnic conlict and serves as a chief
research specialist in the Democracy and Governance Programme at the
Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa.

53
tilley: a PalestiNiaN declaratioN of iNdePeNdeNce
satisfy Palestinian national demands, or
at least defuse those demands suficiently
that the conlict drops off the international
agenda (including the agendas of terror-
ist groups). if a Udi instead permanently
seals the PA’s current condition of extreme
vulnerability and dependency within a
fragmented territory — a condition that
inherently leads to anti-democratic and
repressive governance — then it is a
formula for a leadership crisis, Palestinian
insurrection, and continuing unrest and
militancy throughout the Middle east.
Weighing the likelihood of these sce-
narios requires identifying and assessing
the factors that shape them. this project
can beneit from historical consideration
of a similar attempt, the project to estab-
lish separate states for black africans in
apartheid south africa. ideological sensi-
tivities regarding this comparison should
not deter this study. comparative politics
across world regions is always a compli-
cated undertaking, and comparative conlict
resolution is more complicated still, but
these two cases are clearly close enough
to warrant the attempt. Both involve cases
where a dominant state, self-identiied with
a particular ethnic or racial group, premised
its survival on politically and physically
excluding an indigenous population of
ethnic others in order to sustain an over-
whelming titular majority. in both cases,
this perceived imperative inspired the state
to award the unwanted population a form
of self-governance in part of the territory.
Both are highly unequal conlicts, in which
a world-class military confronts a demili-
tarised indigenous civilian population. the
two conlicts are also contemporary, having
assumed their modern parameters through
decisive events in 1948, such that the
evolving context of international politics,
law and human-rights norms is the same.
last but not least, israel and south africa
were close allies throughout the apartheid
era and shared considerable expertise and
consultation about their common demo-
graphic and security predicaments.
Hence the factors that shaped the
outcome of apartheid South Africa’s proj-
ect to develop “homelands” for its black
population are pertinent to identifying and
assessing factors likely to steer the long-
term impact of a Udi in Palestine. the fol-
lowing discussion is structured into three
sections: a review of the annapolis ap-
proach to Palestinian state-building, a brief
summary of the south african Homeland
or “Bantustan” history, and an assessment
of the implications for Udi.
frAmeWorK for A UDi
all observers agree that some break-
through in the so-called “peace process” is
needed. the oslo accords, which estab-
lished the Palestinian interim governing
Authority (PA), exhausted hopes for a inal
agreement after the failed camp david
summit of 2000 and the outbreak of the
second intifada. in 2002, the oslo frame-
work of “stages” was effectively replaced
by the simpler “roadmap” agreement, de-
veloped by the Bush administration, which
called openly for a two-state solution. the
roadmap replaced all previous frameworks
and remains relevant to this day; it also
comprised the basis for UN security coun-
cil resolutions endorsing a two-state solu-
tion.1
By 2007, however, the roadmap in its
turn was recognized as failing to make any
headway on the thorny inal-status issues:
Jerusalem, settlements, borders, water and
the return of Palestinian refugees. the com-
ment by dov Weissglass that the diplomatic
process had gone into “formaldehyde” after
Israel’s withdrawal of Jewish settlements
from gaza in 2006 had proved precise.2

54
simply threaten to reproduce the failed oslo
process, in which international funds sup-
ported Palestinian institution building from
1995 until 2002, when israel attacked and
wrecked the infrastructure so laboriously
built up. Moreover, by 2007, it was clear to
all observers that international support for
the Pa had had the primary effect of spawn-
ing a culture of rampant corruption, more
clearly fostering Palestinian disillusionment
and political alienation and fragmenta-
tion, as expressed in rising popular support
for Hamas, than
improved capac-
ity for nation- and
state-building.
as the PrdP
promised to cor-
rect these ills, the
Udi promised to
bypass the crip-
pling inal-status
disagreements
that have blocked
creation of a Pal-
estinian state, now seen as the magic bullet
for solving the Palestinian problem.
But in fact, in bypassing inal-status
issues, the proposed Udi bypassed crucial
questions about what kind of independence
could be created. the thrust of the annap-
olis process indeed focused more on how
reform and development could help recon-
solidate power for the discredited ramal-
lah-Pa led by Mahmud abbas than on how
capacity building could lead to meaningful
sovereignty. an exemplar of technocratic
planning, the PrdP laid out three general
aims.4
The irst was to restore the Palestin-
ian economy in the West Bank and gaza
strip through various development and
institution-building projects, which the
Pdc supported by a total of $7.4 billion in
pledges. the second aim was “to maximise
in late 2007, growing international
concern prompted the Bush administration
to launch yet another framework, termed
here the “annapolis process.” this process
was not merely a new stage in israeli-Pales-
tinian negotiations. launched at a one-day
conference in annapolis, Maryland, on No-
vember 27 and linked to a Donor’s Confer-
ence in Paris that december, the annapolis
process redirected international action away
from negotiations toward inancial sup-
port for one side of the conlict: Palestinian
state-building.
international
conidence in this
approach was
encouraged by
the PA’s elabo-
rate Palestin-
ian Reform and
Development
Plan (PrdP), an
ambitious devel-
opment scheme
composed by the
appointed government of salim fayyad.3
The stated assumption at the Paris Donor’s
Conference (PDC) was that irmer inancial
footing for the Pa, and more effective state
institutions, could eventually translate into
an independent Palestinian state in line with
the two-state “vision” afirmed by UN Se-
curity council resolutions 1397 and 1515.
Not publicly announced at the time
was that Fayyad had appended a coni-
dential addendum proposing a unilateral
declaration of independence for a state of
Palestine after two years. although this
addendum had no formal international
guarantees, privately it helped to assure an
international community already suffering
serious donor fatigue that their inancial
support had a conceptual horizon. With-
out such a horizon, the fayyad Plan could
[the Annapolis process] effectively
depoliticizes the conlict by
converting it into a Palestinian
project to earn international
recognition as a state, not dissimilar
to the old league of nations
mandate and Un trusteeship and
decolonization systems.

55
community. the Palestinian govern-
ment is open, inclusive, transparent
and accountable. it is responsive to
citizens’ needs, delivers basic services
effectively, and creates an enabling
environment for a thriving private
sector. Palestine’s human resources
are the driving force for national de-
velopment. the Palestinian economy
is open to other markets around the
world and strives to produce high-
value-added, competitive goods and
services, and, over the long term, to
be a knowledge-based economy.
despite this statement (and 140
pages of associated detail provided by
the PDRP), at the Paris Donors’ Confer-
ence, french President sarkozy held that
the character of the Palestinian state was
“rarely deined” and summarized the vi-
sion with a stronger emphasis on security:
an independent and democratic
Palestinian state, which Palestin-
ians, wherever they may be, will see
as their own. a state in which the
Palestinians can build their future
together and freely deine their
destiny. a peaceful state that will be
a reliable partner for its neighbours,
irst and foremost Israel. A sovereign
state in terms of its territory and its
resources, controlling its borders and
enjoying contiguity between gaza,
the West Bank and east Jerusalem. a
state with a rule of law, with strong
and independent institutions that will
ensure the security of its citizens,
enforce law and order, combat the
militias and establish a single armed
force for a single authority. a modern
state developing an open economy
and eficient infrastructures for the
Palestinians. in short, a politically and
economically viable state, that of the
Palestinian nation.6
the resources available to the Palestinian
authority” with the nominally principled
goal of restoring Palestinian political unity.
the third aim was “to contribute to the
Palestinian institution-building program in
preparation for statehood.”
state-building, Palestinian unity and
economic development are, taken sepa-
rately, of incontestable value to building
a workable peace process. grouped as
a package, however, these aims became
expressly factional in supporting the abbas
government to reclaim exclusive author-
ity over the entire Palestinian population
in the occupied territories. this goal was
stated explicitly at the Pdc and in related
reports including the World Bank report,
which held the Hamas government in
gaza to be illegal and stipulated that the
Palestinian people must be uniied “behind
President abbas.”5
still, the agreed goal at Paris was a vi-
able Palestinian state. the PrdP proposed
a “Vision” of this state that emphasized
Palestinian national life:
Palestine is an independent arab state
with sovereignty over the West Bank
and the gaza strip on the pre-June
1967 occupation borders and with
east Jerusalem as its capital. Pales-
tine is a stable democratic state that
respects human rights and guarantees
equal rights and duties for all citizens.
its people live in a safe and secure
environment under the rule of law,
and it promotes equality between men
and women. it is a state which values
highly its social capital, social coher-
ence and solidarity, and identiies
itself with arab Palestinian culture,
humanistic values and religious
tolerance. it is a progressive state
that values cordial relationships with
other states and people in the global

56
in 1993, the name remains familiar to
most people because they became the most
notorious expressions of apartheid rule.
termed “Homelands” in apartheid law,
they were the ultimate method by which
the apartheid regime attempted to pre-
serve white supremacy in south africa. in
their earlier formulations in the 1950s and
1960s, the Homelands were designed to
provide “self-government” for black south
african “peoples” and “tribes” in discrete
areas of the country, in order to secure
their permanent exclusion from any claim
to civil rights and equality in white south
africa. By the 1970s, under international
pressure, the model evolved to propose
that the Homelands would become actual
independent “states,” providing self-deter-
mination to so-called black “nations.”7
the
white regime called this solution “grand
apartheid”: permanent separation of the
races through partition.
the ten Homelands for the black or
Bantu population did sometimes cor-
respond roughly to historical territories
associated with the country’s African
language groups.8
But they were artiicial
creations, and in the 1950s many black
south africans had no personal or family
association with any of them. to real-
ize their proposed national “character,”
the apartheid regime therefore forcibly
transferred millions of black people out of
white-designated areas into their ascribed
Homelands, causing immense human
suffering. the borders of the Homelands
were a patchwork, moreover, to accommo-
date existing white farms, industries and
transportation grids (see map). thus, most
Homelands consisted of enclaves separat-
ed by white-controlled areas that remained
under the exclusive administration of the
powerful apartheid government. as white
areas included the best land, and develop-
Missing from both visions was any
discussion of how the Pa would obtain
essential authority from israel, the oc-
cupying power, to implement the PdrP,
although this had been the stumbling block
of the oslo process. the annapolis process
indeed removed the question of Israel’s
obligations from the ambit of international
debate. the only international pressure that
israel has received in this context is regular
but fruitless calls for a settlement freeze, as
the West Bank settlements are recognized
clearly to preclude the minimal geographic
contiguity for a viable Palestinian state.
Otherwise, Israel’s prerogatives and
conditionalities regarding its own actions
and obligations in the occupied Palestinian
territories have not only remained unchal-
lenged but now are implicitly contingent
on the PA’s successful implementation of
the PdrP. this approach effectively depo-
liticizes the conlict by converting it into
a Palestinian project to earn international
recognition as a state, not dissimilar to the
old league of Nations mandate and UN
trusteeship and decolonization systems.
thus the technocratic, factional and
depoliticized annapolis process is the basis
for the Ramallah PA’s proposal for a public
Udi. ostensibly, this approach bypasses
the failures of previous processes, including
the oslo process. But, just as the oslo ac-
cords generated the Pa itself, they generated
problems of path dependency that tightly
constrain the PA’s future. To illustrate how
such path dependency can operate, the next
section compares the situation of the Pales-
tinian interim governing authority to the
Bantu Homelands of apartheid south africa.
“self-GoVerninG HomelAnDs”
although popular knowledge about the
Bantustans in apartheid south africa has
faded since they were juridically dissolved

57
the apartheid regime expressed the
rationale for creating separate independent
black “states.” frequently cited is a speech
to the south african Parliament by Henrik
Verwoerd in 1961:
… we again unequivocally state the
policy of the development of the
different race groups. the Bantu
will be able to develop into separate
Bantu states. this is not what we
would have liked to see. it is a form
ment within the Homelands was deliber-
ately kept dependent on the white econo-
my, the Homelands became infamous for
subjecting black people to endemic land
shortages, unemployment and grim pov-
erty leading to misery, malnutrition and
soaring mortality rates. they also became
notorious for their authoritarian crony
leaderships, which were appointed and
propped up by the white regime, belying
token electoral mandates.
U.s. central intelligence agency, 1986: 800481 (543001) 1-86.

58
scope of this study. But aspects of their
design can suggest the similar predica-
ment now faced by the Pa. that design
changed over time as the political envi-
ronment evolved, and black governance
went through a progression: black “areas”
could be declared black “territories” run
by a black “board,” which could then
be given a government designed by the
apartheid regime and decreed “self-gov-
erning,” and inally advance to “indepen-
dent.” only four of the ten Homelands
went through the full cycle.
in the range of its powers and limita-
tions as well as its ostensible status as a
proto-state, the Palestinian interim self-
government authority is roughly compa-
rable to the “self-governing” Homelands,
as the following discussion will illustrate.
relevant to forecasting the impact of a
Udi, however, is what happened to the
“self-governing” Homelands when they
obtained notional independence.
ideally, this question would call for
a broader spectrum of research than is
possible here, so this article focuses only
on their juridical frameworks. The PA’s ex-
istence traces to a series of agreements in
the 1990s, but its institutional design and
scope of authority were principally elabo-
rated in 1995 in the “israeli-Palestinian
interim agreement on the West Bank and
the gaza strip” (hereafter interim agree-
ment). comparing Palestinian “interim
self-government” as established by the
interim agreement to the “self-govern-
ment” arranged for black south africans
by apartheid legislation suggests that,
rather than breaking free of israeli occupa-
tion and generating a viable independent
Palestinian state, a Udi is more likely to
wedge the Pa into the culminating stage of
a different political trajectory entirely.
of fragmentation which we would
not have liked if we were able to
avoid it. in the light of the pressure
being exerted on south africa there
is, however, no doubt that eventually
this will have to be done, thereby
buying for the white man his free-
dom and the right to retain domina-
tion in what is his country, settled for
him by his forefathers.
this mission to sustain white suprema-
cy was based not merely on economic mo-
tivations but also on the premise of white
cultural superiority, which required that
white society be protected from the inher-
ently backward and anti-democratic cul-
tural propensities of black africans. But
the public rationale for these actions was
glossed as progressive pluralism: eleven
racial nation-states living peacefully side
by side. in fact, the Homelands strategy
relected two projects of the apartheid
regime that secured black disadvantage.
The irst principle was public and codiied:
separate development (one translation of
“apartheid”), meaning that black people
could not be allowed to contribute to south
Africa’s national political and economic
life because the black and white races
could not lourish and coexist peacefully
in one country. the second principle was
not stated but was expressed indirectly,
through the state’s policies to retain control
over key attributes of the Homelands: that
no black Homeland should ever obtain
authority or power that could negatively
affect white wealth or power.
Many other laws and policies con-
tributed to the internal workings of the
Homelands, or Bantustans, such that
a comprehensive portrait even of their
legal structure, let alone the myriad poli-
cies associated with them, is beyond the

59
tion (Plo) can conduct foreign relations
on behalf of the Pa, but the interim agree-
ment provides that treaties, agreements
and cooperation arranged by the Plo are
binding within areas under Pa jurisdiction
only in the following cases:
1. Economic agreements, as speciically
provided in annex V of this agree-
ment (that is, subject to approval by
the Joint economic committee in
which israel has a veto)
2. agreements with donor countries for
the purpose of implementing arrange-
ments for the provision of assistance
to the council
3. agreements for the purpose of imple-
menting the regional development
plans detailed in annex iV of the
doP [1993 declaration of Principles]
or in agreements entered into in the
framework of the multilateral
negotiations
4. Cultural, scientiic and educational
agreements.10
these provisions mean that neither the
Pa nor the Plo can conduct an independent
foreign policy in areas under the authority
of the Pa regarding economic, political,
diplomatic and security affairs. all such
policy questions are subject to the joint
committees in which israel holds a veto.
Plenary Power
the Black Homelands constitution act
expressly prohibited the Bantustan gov-
ernments from amending or passing laws
without the approval of the white apart-
heid government of south africa, which
retained plenary power over all laws and
policies within the Homelands. Various
provisions ensured this, usually by mak-
ing Homeland legislation contingent on
“local and Private” Authority
the Bantu Homelands constitution
act No. 21 of 1971 restricted black self-
government to matters of a “merely local
or private nature.” they had no powers
over defense, trade, their own borders or
anything with cross-border dimensions.
Within their territories, Homeland govern-
ments were given authority over agricul-
ture, education, the population registry, the
land registry, business and liquor licences,
trafic and local courts, and so forth. But
they were prohibited from making laws
concerning the postal service, public
communication and airwaves (telegraph,
telephone, radio and television) as well as
transportation out of the Homeland (“rail-
ways, harbors, national roads and civil
aviation”). they could build local roads
and other public works, but not roads or
bridges out of their territories. they could
develop industry with links outside the
Homeland, but only industry that the white
government approved. they were also
prohibited from making any law concern-
ing the entry of non-citizens into their
territories: this was controlled by apartheid
border oficials (who used this authority to
enforce segregation and keep out sympa-
thetic whites and potential allies).
annex iii of the interim agreement
similarly accorded the Pa nominal author-
ity within its assigned territories regarding
40 categories of civil affairs: agriculture,
banking, education, electricity, isheries,
forests, land registration, the civil registry,
the postal service, telecommunications,
water and sewage, and so forth9
— al-
though all these areas are subject to review
by various joint committees, as discussed
later. the Pa has no authority outside ar-
eas a and B and cannot engage in foreign
relations; it operates as a local government
only. the Palestine liberation organiza-

60
veto on any changes to present practices
regarding access and distribution, while
israel retains ownership of all water and
sewage infrastructure. similarly, the Pa
was given authority over telecommunica-
tions within the “areas” under its jurisdic-
tion, but any digging for or installing new
equipment requires prior israeli approval,
removing any autonomy from such au-
thority. authority over the electric grid is
undercut by geography: completely sur-
rounded by israeli territory, the Pa cannot
arrange external connections without con-
necting to Israel’s grid, and connections
remain Israel’s sole prerogative.12
as in the
Homelands, the Pa has no authority in any
sphere that has cross-border dimensions:
for example, the Pa is allowed to provide
satellite services for any domestic pur-
pose, but not international service.13
the
PA’s authority over transportation includes
licensing and route management but not
road building, and it cannot connect to is-
rael’s national road grid, even where these
roads pass through areas under its control.
Demilitarization
Black Homeland governments were
charged with keeping public order, which
included policing criminality but also
repressing dissent. Homelands awarded the
status of “self-governing” were required to
cooperate with the apartheid government
to ind and arrest opponents of apartheid
but were prohibited from forming or oper-
ating “military units” or operating factories
to produce arms, ammunition or explo-
sives.14
the Homeland governments had
no authority over the police and security
forces of the apartheid government, which
could enter their territories at will to main-
tain “public peace and order” as well as
“internal security and the safety of the area
concerned.”15
the approval of South Africa’s president, a
minister, a special committee or sometimes
Parliament. the “self-governing” Home-
lands could not even change the design or
procedures of their own governments, in-
cluding electoral laws or the qualiications
of voters, without this approval.
Under the terms of the interim agree-
ment, the Pa is similarly circumscribed,
although through a more subtle mecha-
nism. on paper, the Pa has a range of
“rights” regarding essential civil affairs.
When the agreement was signed, however,
israel held exclusive plenary power over
all civil matters in the occupied Palestinian
territories, administered by the civil ad-
ministration and Military government. the
civil administration was dissolved with
the signing of the interim agreement, but
the framework of military law remained in
place pending transfer of authority to the
PA. The Interim Agreement speciied that
this transfer would be determined through
consultation by joint committees, com-
posed equally of israelis and Palestinians,
which would take decisions by consensus.
this system made the transfer of power
subject to israeli veto and gave israel a
determining say over any new policy the
Pa may wish to initiate. additional proto-
cols and restrictions illed the gaps in this
arrangement to ensure that the Pa has very
little latitude for independent decision mak-
ing on civil governance and development
except in areas of no interest to israel.
for example, all decisions regarding
economic development must be reviewed
and approved by the Joint economic
committee (Jec). even externally funded
projects from international donors to the
Pa must be approved by the Jec.11
israel
retains its prerogatives over the water sup-
ply because the consensus rule in the Joint
Water committee constitutes an effective

61
the republic shall not regard a
citizen of the transkei as an alien in
the republic and shall by virtue of his
citizenship of a territory forming part
of the republic of south africa regard
him for all external purposes in terms
of international law as a citizen of the
republic and afford him full protec-
tion according to international law.20
The same Act provided that the lags
of the Homeland and the republic of
South Africa ly side by side.
the interim agreement established
much the same liminal state for the Pa.
The “State of Palestine” has a lag, an
anthem, and a president, as well as min-
istries, a legislative assembly, police and
security forces and a Basic law. But the
“self-government authority” has no
sovereignty. While israel does not claim
formal sovereignty over the West Bank and
gaza strip, it retains effective or empirical
sovereignty by holding absolute authority
over their borders, trade, natural resources,
public planning, public works and infra-
structure, industrial development, air- and
cyberspace, security, the implementation
of foreign treaties or agreements and hu-
man movement. thus, the areas allotted to
the Pa function as autonomy zones within
territory that is the state of israel in all but
name.21
(indeed, informally israel does
name these territories as part of israel by
posting maps on government websites that
do not show them and subsume their land
areas into israel proper.22
)
electoral mandates
the Black Homelands constitution
act provided that Homeland governments
have an electoral mandate. “Bantu areas”
all had legislative assemblies composed
of Homeland citizens, and held elections
the Pa is similarly limited in its
police authority to keeping civil order
and repressing dissent. israel has some-
times permitted Pa security forces limited
military capacity, notably in the attempt
to unseat the Hamas government in gaza,
but it tightly monitors and controls these
supplies.16
the Pa has no authority over
israeli police or military forces operating
in Palestinian zones. it also has no author-
ity over israeli citizens and Jewish settlers
(whether or not they are israeli citizens),
even when they are in Palestinian zones.17
Mirroring the Bantustan arrangements as
well as colonial concessions elsewhere,
israel retains sole criminal jurisdiction
over israelis (including Jewish settlers who
are not citizens) in Palestinian territory and
over Palestinians suspected or accused of
offences against israelis.18
appeals regard-
ing Israel’s prerogatives over Palestinian
detainees in such cases are, again, referred
to a joint legal committee.
liminal status
Under apartheid law, “self-governing”
Homelands functioned as autonomy zones
within the republic of south africa.
sustaining this status served the apartheid
state in three ways: it ensured that none of
the Homelands could secede and obtain
true independence; it ensured that the
south african government could control
their development to suit white business;
and it prevented any foreign power from
developing independent relations with
them (a concern also informed by the cold
War).19
the Bantu Homelands citizenship
act of 1970 expressed this liminal status of
the Homelands by providing that Home-
land citizens remain under the authority of
the south african government for “exter-
nal purposes”:

62
law makes no provision for either eventu-
ality, a new assembly cannot be elected and
a new president cannot be certiied. Rather
than leave the Pa with no president at the
expiration of the current president’s term,
the Pa has turned to clauses in the Basic
law regarding states of emergency that pro-
vide for presidential rule by decree and has
appointed a new cabinet and extended the
term of President Abbas indeinitely. These
measures clearly eradicate any electoral
mandate and therefore the legality and le-
gitimacy of the Pa within Palestinian Basic
law. But as nothing in the interim agree-
ment actually requires an electoral mandate
for the Pa, the collapse of Palestinian Basic
law has not resulted in diplomatic with-
drawals of support, and the ramallah Pa
continues to receive international recogni-
tion as the representative of the Palestinian
people in the territories. thus, as in the
south african Homelands, the democratic
mandate for the Pa — so central to Pales-
tinian political culture — has been exposed
as a temporary contingency by the inter-
national community to consolidate legiti-
macy for a Palestinian “self-government
authority” now functioning effectively as a
Homeland executive.
separate Development
although not rooted in the same
doctrine, the PrdP strikingly mirrors
the strategy of “separate development,”
promoted by the apartheid government. a
common translation of apartheid (liter-
ally, “separateness” in afrikaans) is indeed
“separate development,” and this term
dominated government discourse about
the Homelands. Physical separation of
the races was deemed essential to avoid
miscegenation as well as political demands
by black people for democratic rights, but
this imperative required black economic
contested by political parties. But the
internal composition of the assemblies was
also determined by the (white) president of
apartheid south africa. the constitution of
the “self-governing” transkei, for example,
provided that the 110 assembly members
consist of 65 traditional chiefs and only 45
members elected by popular vote. since
the executive — a cabinet and a chief
minister — were elected by the assembly,
this arrangement empowered the apartheid
regime to steer the choice. the author-
ity of the assembly to make laws was, in
any case, undercut by the plenary power
of the president to review and approve all
legislation, so the electoral mandate was
intrinsically hollow. the president also ap-
pointed the High courts for the Homelands
so that no independent juridical check on
the executive could develop. as a conse-
quence, black presidents of the Homelands
governed at the pleasure of the white gov-
ernment and were, in the main, correctly
understood as apartheid stooges.
the interim agreement also provided
the Pa with an electoral mandate by estab-
lishing rules and procedures for “direct,
free and general political elections” of a
legislative assembly and a “Raees” (head
or president).23
these provisions were later
supplemented by democratic checks and
balances provided by the Palestinian Basic
law, including an independent judiciary.
these rules provide, for example, that the
president of the Palestinian authority can-
not take ofice unless his or her election is
ratiied by the popularly elected Palestinian
National council. yet the crisis with Hamas
in gaza in June 2008 exposed the intrinsic
weakness of these rules. since that time,
the elected council has been unable to form
a quorum, and the split between Hamas in
gaza and fatah in the West Bank blocks
conditions for fair elections. as the Basic

63
ine development in the Homelands was
indeed counterproductive for the govern-
ment’s goal of sustaining a cheap black
labor supply for the mines and protecting
white farmers and businesses from black
competition. Hence white domination,
expressed through the power of the state,
locked Homeland economies structurally
into dependent relations with white indus-
try. Black migrant labor was thus secured
for the white-owned mines and industrial
zones strategically positioned in white
areas just across the Homeland borders.
Weakness and dependency were built into
the Homeland system. the self-governing
Homelands could collect local taxes and
fees for a revenue fund, but currency,
banking, the stock exchange, customs and
excise duties all remained in the control of
the white government.25
external trade was
controlled by the white government, and
any economic deal that involved a business
or agent outside the Homelands required
approval by the white minister in charge.
as discussed earlier, the interim
agreement effectively reproduces the
Homeland development dilemma by mak-
ing all economic development as well as
civil affairs subject to israeli approval.
as israel also wishes to protect its own
economy from competition and wishes
permanently to impede population mixing
(in order to preserve a Jewish majority),
israeli governments have strong disincen-
tives to relax current restrictions on Pales-
tinian trade, agriculture and industry even
in the context of a peace agreement. thus
israel is actively motivated to preclude
the Pa from obtaining the authority and
conditions necessary to the PRDP’s project
of Palestinian separate development, as the
plan’s dificulties over the last two years
have illustrated.
and political development as a logical
corollary. a major study commissioned
by the south african government in 1955
to examine the practicalities of separate
development endorsed the general logic:
…separate development of the euro-
pean and Bantu communities should
be striven for, as the only direction in
which racial conlict may possibly be
eliminated, and racial harmony pos-
sibly be maintained. the only obvious
way out of the dilemma lies in the
sustained development of the Bantu
areas on a large scale.24
as international pressure rose against
the regime’s racist policies, however, the
doctrine of racial separation was recast as
fulilling black Africans’ rights to self-
determination. thus the chairperson of the
Bantu affairs commission summarized the
strategy in1968:
The government’s policy is, there-
fore, not a policy of discrimination on
the grounds of race or colour, but a
policy of differentiation on the ground
of nationhood, of different nations,
granting to each self-determination
within the borders of their home-
lands — hence this policy of separate
development.
apartheid propaganda promoted
separate development to the world through
ilms and photo displays showing hard-
working black people in crisp uniforms
learning skills in well-equipped new
factories in their Homelands. the apart-
heid regime was never willing, however,
to invest the funds necessary to develop
industry in the Homelands, and its geo-
graphic and legal constraints defeated
agricultural development. enabling genu-

64
dilemma, which can be solved by the PA’s
repressing Palestinian resistance. Nor are
the PA’s woes precisely a consequence of
internal Pa fallibilities, which might be
addressed through reforms and develop-
ment. rather, the rules and procedures that
deine the PA intrinsically foster repressive
and anti-democratic tendencies, as well as
corruption and fragmentation. the resulting
instability does not favor israel, but Pales-
tinian corruption and fragmentation do, as
these become tools of lasting value to israel
in draining Palestinian nationalist energies,
forestalling united and coherent Palestinian
political opposition to Israel’s settlement
policies, and securing Israel’s prerogatives
in its mission to remain a Jewish state.
facing a powerful antagonist motivat-
ed in such ways, any state-building project
will ind that repression and corruption
trace to the design and limits of the system,
not to individual or party laws. Inscribing
that design into statehood does not alter
those propensities: it concretizes them.
for this reason, the aNc harshly rejected
“independence” for the Homelands. its
rejection also illustrates possibly the most
dangerous effect of a Homeland approach:
political fragmentation. autonomy zones
constructed by powerful host states are
inherently divisive: some players will
embrace the potential they believe can be
twisted to better uses, others simply seek
personal riches and power, and others
reject a situation they see as perilous and
co-optive. thus the Homeland process
generated splits and even civil wars within
black african groups that fell into differ-
ent political camps about accepting the
project, and the last and ugliest ighting
of the anti-apartheid struggle was in the
Homelands. in the 1990s, when apartheid
was collapsing, thousands died in battles
between the aNc and the inkatha free-
ProsPects for inDePenDence
of the ten black Homelands in apart-
heid south africa, four were eventually de-
clared “independent” by the government.
ostensibly, this transition rendered them
separate sovereign states, albeit geographi-
cally nested within the host body of south
africa. some obtained small military
forces, and their lags lew alone. Bo-
phuthatswana even maintained an embassy
in the only other country to recognise it,
israel. some Homeland leaders argued that
independence could enable various federal
approaches that would ultimately normal-
ize relations with south africa, open the
borders, and give the Homelands some true
capacity to serve their populations.26
But the Homelands’ intrinsic weak-
nesses, deliberately infused into their
original design and geographic placement,
did not change after independence. their
incapacity to represent and serve the inter-
ests of their populations, and their inherent
propensity to foster cronyism, nepotism,
corruption and dictatorship, were direct
consequences of their structural condition:
“states” nested within a powerful country
whose perceived self-interest lay in sustain-
ing racial separation as a matter of national
survival and protecting the mines, busi-
nesses, agriculture and industries of its “na-
tion” — white people of european descent
— from black african competition.
this discussion has touched on some
key conditions imposed on the Pa by the
interim agreement that mirror restrictions
placed on the Homelands. these restric-
tions might be seen as “interim” in Pales-
tine: a stage of Palestinian state-building
that can eventually support a two-state
solution. the similarities to the Homelands
tracked here, however, suggest that Israel’s
present policies to conine and weaken
the Pa are not simply born of a security

65
South Africa’s need for black labor was
a major component in breaking down the
Homelands system. With less dependency
for Israel, Palestine’s prospects for gaining
more genuine sovereignty, which would
clearly present problems for israel, are cor-
respondingly dimmer. a second major dif-
ference is Palestinian politics. fragmenta-
tion, which plagued black african politics
in south africa, is certainly mirrored in the
split between fatah and Hamas about ac-
cepting or buying into the oslo framework
of “areas” and “interim self-government
authority.” But the Plo, a corollary to the
aNc, also bought into the system and has
not yet rejected it. thus Palestinian opposi-
tion to the plan, even as popular distaste
and suspicion rise, lacks strong leadership
that can cut across ideological barriers;
indeed, it suffers now from various forms
of internal censorship.
this difference contributes to a third
major difference in the two cases: inter-
national reaction. enabled partly by the
PLO’s buy-in, Israel’s project to create
ethnic autonomy enclaves in Palestine, in
order to sustain an overwhelming Jew-
ish majority and a “Jewish character” in
israel, has obtained international support
instead of the international opprobrium
that ultimately defeated a corollary project
in south africa. Many factors contribute to
this difference, as discussed elsewhere.27
the annapolis process presumes a Pales-
tinian state-building project of real worth,
but the international community has never
wished to accept the political challenges of
compelling israel to provide the minimal
conditions that could allow the Pa to es-
cape the South African Homelands’ violent
fate. the events of 9/11 dramatically sig-
naled that the entire international commu-
nity, and not only Israel’s neighbors, must
reconsider how long this support can be
dom Party headed by chief Buthelezi of
KwaZulu Homeland. Bitter ighting, with
hundreds killed, broke out in the ciskei.
Hundreds were killed or wounded as
police ired into demonstrations against the
Homeland president in Bophuthatswana.
conclUsion
this article can offer only a brief
exploration of a comparison that clearly
requires further analysis. still, this initial
perusal of their legal similarities suggests
that “self-government” in the south afri-
can Homelands and “self-government” in
the Palestinian territories have suficiently
strong similarities that such work should
be done urgently to clarify them and indi-
cate their signiicance for a peace settle-
ment. this research is centrally relevant to
the concern raised here: the signiicance
for international security if the leadership
of a Palestinian “state” — now conigured
on terms close to those of the south afri-
can Homelands — declares independence
unilaterally. this study suggests that a Udi
in the West Bank and gaza strip is much
more likely to wedge the Pa permanently
into an untenable situation conducive to
Palestinian political fragmentation, anti-
democratic trends, upheaval and potential
insurrection, and therefore a continuing
climate of instability — associated with
terror networks, among other ills — for the
entire international community.
several differences are important to
mention. for example, it is often pointed
out that south africa was heavily moti-
vated by the project of capturing black
labor, while israel has worked to detach
itself from such dependency. this brief
study suggests, however, that this factor is
likely to leave conditions in the Palestinian
homeland more onerous rather than less,
as the contradictions raised by apartheid

66
that they must liberalise their régime,
the whole country would boil over at
once. South Africa is a ine country,
but it has gone beyond the point of no
return. its future will be massacre and
destruction.28
the future of south africa was not
massacre and destruction. But neither was
its happier future achieved by international
support for policies that the apartheid re-
gime believed essential to white society’s
welfare and survival. Hindsight conirms
that it was the universal rejection of forced
racial separation, and not attempts to
defuse black resistance to separation, that
achieved a stable peace in south africa.
if different principles apply in Palestine,
then these must be swiftly identiied and
tested and not merely assumed from po-
lemical assertions by one side or the other.
the brief exploration of the similarities
broached here between the Homelands and
the emerging parameters of a Palestinian
state indicate that this comparison, at least,
can no longer be delayed or discredited by
polemical denunciations of the comparison
as inapplicable. the international stakes
involved in a project to create an enclave
state for Palestinians in parts of Mandate
Palestine are clearly too high.
sustained without inheriting even more se-
rious trouble than it has generated to date.
on this point, it may be worthwhile to
recall debates in Britain’s parliament about
apartheid. in those days, parliamentarians
were arguing about the boycott of south
africa in ways that today would be embar-
rassing to recall. yet some were prescient.
for example, Viscount samuel said,
the white Nationalists … think they
should be admired because they are
vigorous and have been successful in
preserving their white empire. Money
is lowing in, and white settlers are be-
ing attracted to south africa from Ke-
nya, from rhodesia, from the United
Kingdom, even from the continent.
every man who goes strengthens the
white hold on south africa, and in my
opinion, this is wrong.
Before such a situation we stand
helpless. We are watching a greek
tragedy, the descent of a pigheaded
people down to disaster. let us not
fool ourselves: it is too late today
for peaceful change in south africa.
there is no white political party that
can unseat the Nationalist govern-
ment. there is no alternative white
government for south africa. even
if the Nationalists were convinced
1
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1397 (2002) afirmed in its chapeau [preliminary statement]
“a vision of a region where two states, israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized
borders.” as it is not clear what legal weight a UN “vision” carries, UNsc resolution 1515 (2003) reaf-
irmed this vision and added an operative paragraph: “2. Calls on the parties to fulil their obligations under
the roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two states living side by side in
peace and security”.
2
in 2004, dov Weissglass, formerly chief of staff to Prime Minister ariel sharon, famously commented to
Ha’aretz that the withdrawal from gaza “supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will
not be a political process with the Palestinians;” see Ha’aretz, weekend magazine, october 8 2004.
3
Palestinian National authority, Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, 2008–2010; available at: http://
www.mop-gov.ps/web_iles/issues_ile/PRDP-en.pdf.
4
final statement of the chair and co-chairs at the International Donors’ Conference for the Palestinian State,
december 17 2007.
5
World Bank, Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and development: Report for the Pledging Confe-

67
rence, Paris, december 17, 2007: available at : http://siteresources.worldbank.org/iNtWestBaNKgaZa/
resources/294264-1166525851073/Parisconferencepaperdec17.pdf.
6
Speech by M. Nicolas Sarkozy, president of the French Republic, at the International Donors’ Conference
for the Palestinian state, december 17, 2007.
7
to avoid generating a “black” majority, the apartheid regime in south africa regrouped the black population
into “peoples” deined by linguistic and ethnic criteria.
8
the Bantustan territories were roughly congruent with areas designated in the 1917 land act for black land
ownership. the land act was enacted shortly after afrikaner nationalists assumed political leadership in the
newly constituted republic of south africa.
9
interim agreement, annex iii, article 4.
10
interim agreement, article 9 (5).
11
interim agreement, annex V, Protocol on economic relations, article ii.
12
interim agreement, annex iii, article 10 (2).
13
interim agreement, annex iii, article 36 a (2) and B (2), respectively.
14
Black Homelands constitution act, chapter 1, para. 4(b).
15
Black Homelands constitution act, chapter 1, para. 4(d).
16
interim agreement, article XiV (3 and 4): except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestin-
ian Police described in annex i, and those of the israeli military forces, no organization, group or individual
in the West Bank and the gaza strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce
into the West Bank or the Gaza Strip any irearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any
related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in annex i.
17
The Interim Agreement speciied that “Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security,
as well as the responsibility for overall security of israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal secu-
rity and public order”: chapter 2, article X (4).
18
interim agreement, annex iV “Protocol concerning legal affairs,” article 1 para. 2(2) and article 4
respectively.
19
Apartheid discourse conlated black resistance to apartheid with world communism, as a strategy to
discredit the aNc, consolidate white domestic loyalty to the regime, and obtain international support used
primarily for repressing black resistance.
20
Bantu Homelands citizenship act, article 2(4); see also transkei constitution act, Part iii, section 7(3).
21
on the distinction between juridical and empirical sovereignty as it is relevant to israel-Palestine, see
Virginia tilley, “Have We Passed the tipping Point? Querying sovereignty and settler colonialism in israel-
Palestine,” in ilan Pappé, ed., Peoples Apart: Israel, South Africa and the Apartheid Question (i.B. taurus &
co., ltd, 2010, forthcoming).
22
See, for example, “Israel in Maps” on the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s website at www.mfa.gov.il/
Mfa and the Map of israel listed by the israeli Ministry of tourism at http://www.goisrael.com/Nr/
rdonlyres/1eB6Bdea-aeB9-428d-ae39-2561a8d7ffa2/8631/Mapofisrael.pdf.
23
interim agreement, annex ii, article 1(1).
24
Summary of the Report on the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within
the Union of South Africa (Pretoria: the government Printer, 1955), p. 194. this report is often called the
“tomlinson report” after the chair of the committee.
25
Bantu Homelands constitution act (#21) of 1971, chapter 1, article 4.
26
see, for example, a thesis for federalism by Kaiser daliwonga Matanzima published upon assuming his
new post of President of the newly “independent” transkei Homeland, Independence My Way (Pretoria,
foreign affairs association, 1976).
27
see discussion in Virginia tilley, The One-State Solution (University of Michigan Press, 2005), pp.
100-103.
28
Hansard 19: Hl deb 22 July 1964, Vol. 260, pp. 639-800 at 702. “Nationalists” refers to the National
Party, which endorsed white supremacy in south africa. elected to power in 1948, it was the principal politi-
cal agent in constructing and enforcing the apartheid system until 1990.

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