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MFC )UP
NEWS & INFORMATION
Find more product/supplier information at ••on
Ffenton
Manufacturing &
Supply Chain Group
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Courtesy of:
EHS Today
www.EHSToday.com
CULTIVATING A
CULTURE OF SAFETY
Establishing a culture of safety is not as simple as creating new
workplace
rules. It involves a new way of thinking about fatality and
injury prevention.
By Grover Hardin
T
o build a thriving safety culture, companies need to focus
on both the procedures and processes that guide their
operations, as well as the attitudes and behaviors of every
employee.

It's not as simple as creating new workplace rules. It involves
a new way of thinking about fatality and injury prevention.
Because many EHS professionals now are expected to man-
age a multitude of responsibilities - often without the necessary
bandwidth or support staff- safety needs to become everyone's
responsibility. Safe behaviors should be modeled at every level
of
employment - from the C Suite to the shop floor - across all
func-
tions, from manufacturing to sales to the back office.
By promoting accountability in every aspect of a business,
companies can foster mutual respect, commitment, collaboration
and open dialogue among employees of all levels. These are the
hallmarks of a safety culture.
It's not enough to simply describe safety as a priority - be-
cause priorities often change. Companies need to make safety a
core value, knowing that a safe and healthy workforce translates
to a healthy bottom line.
No One-Size-Fits-All Approach
The foundation of a robust safety culture is a cohesive envi-
ronmental, health and safety management system.
An effective EHS-management system outlines the neces-
sary regulatory requirements and standards for safe workplace
operations, while allowing room for customization. At Kim-
berly-Clark Professional (KCP), we recognize that each of our
mills has a distinctive workplace culture, which is why our
approach
to safety is not one-size-fits-all.

For example, our mill in Corinth, Miss., which manufactures
WypAU-brand utility wipers, employs 135 people along with
another
30 to 50 contracted employees who provide services for our
mill.
Every employee is bound by our mill's safety policy and "Eatal
10"
safety rules, which are unique to our mill but consistent with
similar
tools used at other KCP facilities.
The "Fatal 10" defines the actions that all employees should
not take, as violating them could result in an injury or a loss of
life.
While adhering to the requirements and standards of our
company's
overall EHS-management system, these actions are reflective of
the
distinct risk areas identified as most critical for our mill.
The mill in Corinth has achieved excellent safety outcomes, in-
cluding eight Crystal Eagle awards. The award recognizes mills
that
have achieved a full year without a reportable injury.
However, this success did not come easily. It was the result of a
continuing focus on refining and improving our approach to
safety.
The null opened in 1985, serving primarily as a distribution
center,
and added manufacturing operations in 2001. In that same year,
the
mill launched "Project Cornerstone." The project was created as
a
result of the newly installed manufacturing machinery that

required
bigger and better performance equipment to keep up with
production
capacity. Along with increased productivity, however, came the
in-
creased risk of hand and arm injuries.
In light of the high potential for safety hazards, mill leader-
ship delegated safety responsibilities among the workforce,
which
helped to drive employee accountability.
The next step was to assess our equipment and make sure we
had
the safest equipment possible, including machinery guarding
and electrical-circuitry protections.
Assessing Gaps in Safety
In 2005, mill leadership took a hard look at our approach to
health and safety management. While they acknowledged that
the work force was engaging in many positive practices, they
also noted the lack of an overarching, sustainable EHS system.
To resolve this, our mill conducted a comprehensive audit of
safety policies and procedures. As a result, it became one of the
KCP mills to pioneer an EHS-management-system audit that
assesses our gaps in safety.
Since that time, our mill increasingly has been focused on
safety performance and continuous improvement.
Once this process was put in place, it became extremely
important to convey employee expectations and promote safety
ownership. This began by encouraging safe practices on the

mill floor.
While there always has been a focus on zero injuries, mill
leadership worked to gain a better understanding of which
behaviors were leading to positive-activity-based performance
and which behaviors needed to be improved. This behavior-
assessment process continues to be our focus today.
By assessing the behaviors that have the potential to result
in injuries - instead of simply concentrating on the idea of zero
injuries - our mill has been able to mitigate risks associated
with
safety behaviors and improve safety outcomes year after year.
Continued on next page...
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Elements of a Safety Culture
The mill at Corinth serves as an example of
how to improve workplace-safety outcomes by
using a cohesive EHS-management system to
create a culture of safety.
A true safety culture has a number of fun-
damental components. Here are a few of them:

• Make safety a core value. Companies
must ensure that all levels of the organization
are committed to maldng health and safety a core
value to achieve zero fatalities and injuries. Thus,
leaders must be inspired and committed, and em-
ployees must be engaged and empowered. This
vision should be integrated into every aspect of
work procedures and be evident throughout a
business, from the newest employees to the most
experienced members.
• Identify safety champions. At each site,
companies should give all employees the oppor-
tunity to become involved in safety management.
Safety leaders are vital to engaging all employees
in making safety their primary goal, in improving
safety every day and in fostering safety cultures
at the local level. Likewise, safety teams should
be responsible for educating employees on safety
policies and procedures and helping to create a
work force culture in which safety is a shared
responsibility.
• Provide health and safety training to
everyone. Health and safety should be presented
in a way that employees easily can access infor-
mation and readily engage in helping to guide
workplace improvement. To make sure that
safety stays top of mind, our mill in Corinth
developed the "STOPP" (Stop. Think, Observe,
Plan and Perform) method. This method encour-
ages employees to stop and think about their be-
haviors before they perform a task. Employees
should ask themselves, "What are the hazards
that I am going to encounter on this task?" The

mill developed a hazard-assessment tool to en-
sure that the method is applied consistently. The
tool provides employees a checklist of potential
hazards and a place to categorize the severity of
each hazard.
• View risk management as a perfor-
mance-improvement tool. Risk management
should be treated as a way to improve business
performance, not merely as a necessary cost of
doing business. Investing in safety and health
pays dividends in the form of improved produc-
tivity, higher morale, lower absenteeism and
reduced workers' compensation costs, among
other benefits.
• Organize and measure performance-
quality indicators. Organize performance-qual-
ity indictors around two general groups of mea-
sures: lagging indicators that focus on reactive
measures, and leading indicators that are drawn
from proactive measures. Consisting of a variety
of both lagging and leading indicators, this ho-
listic measurement system ensures that manag-
ers and employees are unified in their efforts to
achieve zero fatalities and injuries.
Visual-Management Tools
Visual-management tools such as safety
dashboards can help communicate progress be-
ing made and potential gaps as defined by lead-
ing and lagging performance indicators.
The dashboards should be positioned in high-

traffic areas so they can be easily referenced. For
optimal effectiveness, dashboards should be uti-
lized at all levels and discussed regularly during
shift changes and team meetings.
The dashboards also can be used to deter-
mine topics for safety meetings and to priori-
tize continuous-improvement activities around
safety issues.
Dashboards are helpful tools for research-
ing, measuring and analyzing the current state
of safety and health within a company and for
gaining a better understanding of the factors that
prevent a work force from performing at its best.
A clear understanding of these barriers enables
a company to make informed decisions about
what risk-mitigation strategies should be imple-
mented once a safety barrier has been identified,
allowing decisions to be proactive versus reactive.
Defining Clear Obligations
Ultimately, trust plays an essenrial role in
Kimberly-Clark Professional's Corinth, MS mill uses tools such
as the task-hazard
assessment to identify, categorize, and evaluate potential
workplace safety hazards.
achieving a culture of safety. Everyone in a team
environment must feel encouraged and comfort-
able when reporting an incident and correcting
unsafe practices, regardless of company hier-
archy.

This can be encouraged through the creation
of safety obligations. At KCP, we call them
"The Three Obligations," and all employees
display them on their badges regardless of their
job titles or responsibilities.
While these obligations are not identical in
all mills and facilities, the basic principles are
the same:
1. I am obligated to refuse to complete any
task that I feel is unsafe.
2. I am obligated to confront anyone perform-
ing an unsafe act.
3. If I am confronted by another regarding the
safety of my own task, I am obligated to
stop my work and discuss it.
Building on these obligations, KCP mill
leaders and employees cultivate trust by discuss-
ing mill-safety goals during safety call-to-action
sessions.
In these sessions, which are conducted in ev-
ery mill, all teams come together to reflect on the
previous year's safety results. After working to-
gether to solve any workplace-safety problems,
facilities move forward from the sessions with a
team plan and individual commitments.
To create a robust safety culture, compa-
nies not only should be removing hazards and
developing safety procedures but also aggres-

sively working to change risk-prone attitudes
and behaviors. Companies achieve this out-
come by improving each employee's situa-
tional awareness and by offering opportunities
for employees to be involved.
When workers embrace safety standards
and practice safe behaviors, they take owner-
ship of their actions, which creates a culture of
safety. And by establishing a culture of safety,
businesses will become more productive, ef-
ficient and profitable. E H S
Grover Hardin is the plant manager for
Kimberly-Clark Professional's Corinth, MS
facility.
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The Hart-Rudman Report
The Hart-Rudman Report called for three innovations. In 2-3
pages, and by using APA sytel formatting, describe these
innovations and discuss any pros and cons which could develop.
��
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—continued on page 11—
—continued on page 13—
IOMAIOMAIOMAIOMAIOMA’’’’’SSSSS
Are You Spending Too Much on
Drug Prevention Efforts? ........... 2
Worker drug use rose for most of 2001,
but your program to prevent it could be
hurting your overall safety effort.
Yes, Behavioral Strategies Work
for Managers, Too ..................... 5

Here’s how to take behavior-based
programs beyond the shop floor and
into the supervisor’s office.
Tackling Workplace Stress Before
Your Company Is Ready ........... 7
Not ready for a comprehensive stress
reduction initiative? There are interim
steps to take.
SADR News Briefs ............................ 8
� Military report warns
against over-hydration
� Ninety-three percent of U.S.
companies now offer some
level of health promotion
� Smoke-free workplaces
encourage smokers to quit
or to reduce consumption
� Is workplace safety an
organizational value at
your workplace?
� Internal workplace violence
fatalities unchanged since Sept. 11
� Bill would set standards for
safety professionals who
handle mold issues

� And more...
SADR Calendar ................................ 15
Two Alternatives
to Using Recordables
to Measure Performance
It’s one thing to acknowledge the limitation of injury statis-tics
for measuring and driving safety performance. It’s
quite another to find viable alternatives. Below is an overview
of two measurement systems from the oil and gas exploration
industry profiled at recent safety conferences. These case
studies provide valuable insight into how two companies are
going about scoring and improving their safety performance
and that of their contractors.
Alternative #1: Measure the positives. We’ve previous-
ly detailed in SADR why companies need to replace lost time
Creating a Safety Culture
In a Low-Risk Environment
Run-of-the-mill business offices aren’t exactly hotbeds
ofworkplace risk, but they do have their unique challenges.
For one thing, when worker injuries are exceedingly rare, it’s
awfully tough for workplace “hazards” to garner attention,
much less act as a catalyst for a strong safety “culture.” One
option? Eliminate top-down safety programs. Instead, within
broad guidelines, let each business location examine its own
safety culture, define its own priorities, and implement its
own safety culture improvement strategies.
A worthy model? This “grassroots” approach is current-
�

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��
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� Companies should input ... any “incident” that
wasn’t planned and either causes—or could have
caused—harm and/or damage.
� Part I is ... to evaluate each corrective action you
or a contractor takes and place it into one of four
categories (see the sidebar, “Four Types of Corrective
Actions—Definitions and Examples”).
� Part II is ... to apply a score to each type of
corrective action. Design a scoring system to fit your
facility, but the general idea is universal—give more
weight to corrective actions farther down the table. For
example: Multiply the number of “Type 0” corrective
actions times zero; multiply the number of Type 1s
times one; the number of Type 2s times two; and the
number of Type 3s times 3. In this scoring scenario: A
department that last month had four type 0 corrective
actions; two Type 1 corrective actions; two Type 2
corrective actions; and three Type 3 corrective actions,
would have an total weighted corrective action plan-
ning score of 15. In this way, scores improve when
you’re more aggressive and effective in your response
to accidents and near-misses.
� The benefit to calculating such scores includes
... being able to see what direction safety is heading. For
example, if your company’s corrective action planning
score is increasing month after month, you can expect

to eventually see these higher scores reflected in fewer
injuries and incident reports. On the other hand, a
company that is making only Type 0 or Type 1 correc-
tions can’t expect to see injury rates fall.
Another benefit: Once a company has a system
such as this in place and is comfortable that it is a good
measure of safety performance, you can use it to com-
pare performance among contractors, departments, and
locations. Finally, when you measure corrective ac-
tions, you are measuring something positive, and so
there is no incentive to hide safety incidents. When you
measure supervisor, department, or contractor perfor-
mance solely on number of incidents, everyone has an
acute incentive to hide them. But when you measure
contractors or departments on what they do about the
incidents, they have an incentive both to report inci-
dents and to make better corrections.
� One thing you can’t forget is ... to measure
whether the corrective actions you plan actually get put
into place. Your score or a contractor’s score improves
with more Type 3 corrective actions. But your scoring
system should subtract points if you or a contractor does
not enact these big corrective plans.
Creating a Safety Culture
In a Low-Risk Environment
—continued from page 1—
ly driving safety success at CNA Insurance (Chica-
go; 312-822-5000; www.cna.com), a financial ser-
vices company, Chief Safety Officer William Phil-
lips told colleagues at the recent American Society
of Safety Engineers’ annual safety conference.
While the company’s approach is not entirely

unique—it resembles efforts to use a strong safety
committee to drive safety—we think there are a few
system specifics that may be helpful to consider.
One difference in the CNA model is that it
empowers safety teams to measure the specific
safety culture at their locations and devise their
own strategies for improving things. Most safety
committees—while they secure participation from
all organizational levels—don’t grant workers this
scope of responsibility.
Where it can work. For the purposes of
control, compliance, and risk reduction, individual
safety programs are unavoidable in workplaces
with significant hazards. Companies need to im-
plement a uniform and specific hazardous waste or
confined space program, for example. But for
CNA, starting a safety process from scratch, “pro-
grams” handed down from the corporate safety
team seemed like a bad way to go about it. For one
thing, such a “top heavy” method ran counter to
how the company did everything else, explained
Phillips. For another, since most workers didn’t
perceive their workplace as even having hazards,
proscriptive programs seemed poised to fall flat.
An alternative in such a scenario is to use
grassroots teams to develop a safety culture at the
same time they install a general set of safety
guidelines, according to Steven Simon, Ph.D., pres-
ident of Culture Change Consultants, Inc. (Larch-
mont, N.Y.; 914-834-7686; www.grassrootssafety.
com). Typically, top-down organizations should
adopt top-down culture change strategies and more
lateral organizations should adopt grassroots strat-

egies, says Simon, who helped CNA implement its
initiative. Teams seemed like a good idea to CNA
because it was an approach they were comfortable
with. “Management understood the team-based
�
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stuff already,” said Phillips.
Can it work for you? The jury is still out on
CNA’s experiment. It’s only two years old, and
while safety teams are currently going strong, you
can’t take the real measure of a safety culture
improvement initiative until the five-year mark.
Nonetheless, we think they’ve hit on a few ele-
ments that other companies might want to emulate
in their goals of raising safety’s profile in the minds
of employees in low-risk office environments.
How it works. The central element to the
CNA model is its safety teams in place at each
business unit. “The idea of setting up teams at each
location is to give them one to two pages of
guidelines, say for ergonomics or life safety, and
ask them, ‘How will you get this done at your
place?’” said Simon. According to Phillips: “We
let them build the how into the safety operation, we
just give them the why.” The team breakdown:

� Senior manager safety team. Even grassroots
efforts need support from the top. They don’t need to
play an active role in the team initiative, but they should
view themselves as the “team sponsor”; that is, they
need to be willing to provide the resources the teams
need to do their work.
� Central safety team (CST). The safety profes-
sionals at CNA develop the general guidelines that the
business units need to implement and secure the neces-
sary resources, provide assistance when needed; act as
a motivator; and monitor the system’s implementation
at all the different locations.
� Guidance team (GT). There is one GT at each
location, comprised of one representative from each
business unit or corporate function at the location. To
use a baseball analogy, said Phillips, this group acts as
the team “manager”; keeping the teams on track, mak-
ing sure everyone knows his or her job, and reporting
back to the CST.
� High-performance safety team (HPST). At
each location, there is one HPST for each business unit
or corporate function. Members are volunteers, serve
one to two years, and participation becomes part of their
jobs and is included in their annual performance re-
views. This is the group that actually “does the work,”
says Phillips.
Each member of a CST, GT, and HPST went
through two days of training to clarify their roles
and responsibilities and to attain skills in assessing
and changing safety culture. In forming the team,

CNA went out of its way to pick people without
safety expertise. Although the company’s ranks
include plenty of loss-control professionals, these
workers don’t participate on the HPSTs. “We want-
ed to keep it team-driven, not run by people who
already know this stuff,” Phillips noted.
In practice. HPSTs receive general guide-
lines from the central safety office and then figure
out the best way to integrate them into their specific
office environment.
For example, the CST might hand teams gen-
eral emergency preparation guidelines, but it’s up
to the different HPSTs to figure out the best way to
make them work at their locations. This acknowl-
edges that—even within the same company—dif-
ferent cultures exist in different work locations. An
HPST at one location may survey its workers and
discover that poor fire drill compliance results
from workers thinking that completing a phone
call with a client is more important. At another
location, however, fire drill compliance may be
high, but the method of accounting for evacuated
employees may be poor.
Using HPSTs as the primary tool for imple-
mentation—rather than a program and instruction
handed down from corporate safety—can address
such differences. The team system can successful-
ly tailor the guidelines, leadership, structure, and
culture building to each facility, says Simon.
Conclusion. As we noted, this strategy is not
entirely unique and resembles efforts several com-
panies already employ. However, as a case study,

it reiterates the critical point that companies whose
workers face fewer risks should be more aggres-
sive in using stakeholders to deliver the safety
process. It’s a higher risk strategy—because it
hinges on workers taking nearly complete owner-
ship of safety—but low-risk office environments
afford the opportunity to take such risks.
Furthermore, if successful, such a system can
develop a thriving safety culture in an environment
where safety is typically an afterthought.
Safety Management
Buildin
ureur©
Three Practical Strategies
By Earl H. Blair
The topic of safety culture hasreceived much attention, and
forgood reason. Research and ex-
perience demonstrate that the level of
safety performance an organization can
achieve is dictated by its culture. Peter-
sen (2001) sums it up succinctly, "The
culture of the organization sets the tone
for everything in safety" (p. 123). Safety
culture is an important subculture stem-
ming from an organization's set of prac-
tices and underlying assumptions.

Cultural Contributions to Disasters
In the few decades, several spectacu-
lar and tragic events have occurred, fol-
lowed by thorough investigations made
available to the public. From these de-
tailed reports, it has been recognized that
organizafional culture and the resulting
safety culture are often implicated as pri-
mary causes in these incidents.
For example, the explosion of the space
shuttle Challenger in 1986 demonstrated
Ijrl H. Blair, Ed.D., CSI', is an associate professor and director
of the
graduate safety management program at Indiana University,
Bloom-
s' lngton. Blair is a former chair of the Department of Safety,
Health and
Environmental Health Sciences at Indiana State University,
Terre
that even a sfafe-of-the-art
organization had cultural is-
sues that affected safety perfor-
mance. The term safety culture
had been recently coined, and
the investigation revealed com-
munication issues at NASA,
including a top-down, com-
mand-and-control culture that
inhibited both engineers from
communicating up the line and

upper management from lis-
tening to communication from
lower levels in the organization.
The BP Texas City refinery
explosion in 2005 was also
thoroughly investigated. Hop-
kins (2008) describes in detail
the cultural issues that contrib-
uted to the tragedy. It is possible that
decisions made at the top levels of BP
contributed more fo the explosion than
did the proximal causes at the Texas City
site. Furthermore, organizations appear
Haute. Before joining academia, Blair was a safety professional
work-
ing in the pharmaceutical, peti'oleum and chemical industries.
He is a
professional member of ASSE's Central Indiana Chapter.
www.asse.org NOVEMBER 2013 ProfessionalSafety 5 9
IN BRIEF
•This article discusses
practical strategies to de-
velop safety culture, includ-
ing short case examples to
illustrate key points.
«Focus is given to the most
important actions leader-
ship can take to build a
safety culture.
•Practical methods are
provided to gain leadership
support and enahle organi-

zations to establish systems
to enhance and sustain the
safety culture. j
to have some difficultly learning from the past (e.g.,
BP's Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010). A learn-
ing culture is desirable for enhancing safety perfor-
mance and prevenfing injuries.
The strategies for building safety culture are rel-
atively simple. However, one should not confuse
simple with easy. This analogy helps illustrate the
distincfion: For overweight individuals, the con-
cepts for losing weight are simple: use more calo-
ries than you consume. However, the experience
of many illustrates this is not necessarily easy to
accomplish. Many distracters, variables and com-
plexities make weight loss challenging for many
people. Likewise, it can be challenging, yet worth-
while, for an organization to systemafically devel-
op its safety culture.
Three Practical Strategies for Building Safety Culture
Strategy 1: Work
Toward Being a
100% Reporting
Culture
One reason organi-
zations do not experi-
ence higher numbers
of reports on minor
injuries and near-hits
is that employees fear

subsequent blame and punishment. It is human
nature to avoid being blamed and to try to stay
out of trouble. For injury prevention, a reporfing
culture should be more highly valued than a pun-
ishing culture that is quick to administer discipline.
Traditionally, many organizations have focused on
reacfive discipline rather than on strategies and
techniques to increase accurate reporting.
Disciplinary procedures are an example of why
it is not easy to build a safety culture. Emphasiz-
ing discipline over reporfing may not contribute to
a better safety culture, since this focus may cause
many incidents to go unreported. Underreporting
may improve the safety record, but it does not con-
tribute to a stronger safety culture.
Employees may also hesitate to report near-hits
and minor injuries because of the extra time, work
and perceived red tape involved. People tend to
avoid extra work, especially if employees are not
sold on the value of reporting for safety. If an or-
ganization does not follow through and respond
rapidly to reports, it devalues reporting. Thus, if an
organization values reporting, it should establish
and use a system that encourages reporting and
appropriate follow-through.
Slogans such as "All injuries are preventable"
create a major obstacle to employee reporfing. As
Geller (2001) suggests, humans cannot be expected
to be error-free. Consider these 12 additional rea-
sons to avoid this slogan:
1) The focus is downstream (injuries).

2) It does not prescribe how to improve the safe-
ty process.
3) It can be a feel-good statement for manage-
ment.
4) M a n y employees do n o t believe it.
6 0 ProfessionalSafety NOVEMBER 2013 www.asse.org
5) It can make people who report minor injuries
feel bad for being an exception to this "infallible
truth."
6) It can lead to underreporting or even nonre-
porting of injuries.
7) It may result in injury management instead of
safety management.
8) It may provide a false image of a site's safety
performance.
9) It can reduce risk percepfions.
10) It can hurt morale.
11) It may reduce employee efforts for safety
since perfection is outside their control.
12) In most cases, it probably is not achievable
over fime.
A disfinction must be made between believing
that all injuries are preventable and repeating it
as a slogan. It is acceptable to hold the belief that
all injuries are preventable. If the belief inspires

management's vision to strive for optimal perfor-
mance, then it could influence positive results. Op-
fimal performance and perfecfion are not the same
thing. Since few employees believe the slogan, and
perhaps many in management do not believe it ei-
ther, the slogan becomes counterproductive.
Four factors encourage a reporting culture:
1) Indemnity: security against disciplinary acfion
as far as practical.
2) Confidentiality: deidenfification on incident
reports.
3) Ease of reporting: user friendly and limited red
tape.
4) Rapid feedback: follow-up and practical, mean-
ingful feedback to all concerned (Reason, 1997).
If employees underreport or do not report inci-
dents, an organizafion may be unaware of many
exposures and risks that exist. Integrity in report-
ing allows an organization to solve the issues and
be proactive in preventing future exposures and
related injuries.
Strategy 2: Develop
Safety Awareness
With Meaningful
Safety Rules
Hopkins (2005) re-
lays the story of a train
wreck that occurred

near the Glenbrook
Station in New South
Wales (NSW) Australia
in 1999. Just beyond the station, the Indian Pacific
train was stopped. A city commuter train com-
ing through the station ran a red light and did not
know the Indian Pacific was stopped just around
the bend ahead. The commuter train slammed into
the stopped train, killing seven passengers.
As with most tragic incidents, the investigation
uncovered multiple causes and influences. Most
immediately prior to the incident, investigators
discovered casual and poor communicafion be-
tween the driver and the signaler.
Several cultural deficiencies also allowed the
tragedy to occur. Hopkins (2005) lists five cultures
fhat permeated NSW Railways and influenced the
incident;
1) a culture of rules;
2) a culfure of blame;
3) a culture of silos;
4) a culture of on-time running;
5) a risk-hlind culture.
The one positive culture was that of on-time
running. This level of service was a focal poinf and
the railway reported a high percentage of success.
However, fhe on-time culture was not counterbal-
anced by a risk-aware culture.

Interestingly, Hopkins (2005) believes the culture
of rules produced several negative outcomes, such
as a deadened sense of risk awareness, a sense of
employee disempowerment and a culture of blame.
This incident is an example of excess regarding safe-
ty rules. NSW Railways' rule-focused culture left its
employees overwhelmed by eight volumes of rules.
As Hopkins states:
This focus on rules tended to deaden awareness
of risks. Moreover, when accidents occurred,
the aim of accident investigations appeared
to be to identify which rules had been violated
and by whom. The obsession with rules led
to a pronounced tendency to blame, (p. 28)
Specifically, the abundant safety rules presented
several problems:
•The organization appeared to hold the illusory
reliance on rules as a means of averting incidents,
and seemed to believe that a rule could be devel-
oped to cover every conceivable risky situation.
•The company had eight volumes of safety rules,
and amendments were circulated weekly for recip-
ients to update their manuals.
•The sheer volume of safefy rules made them
virtually unknowable and impractical in daily use.
•The rules were not written in a user-friendly
format. They were written in convoluted, complex
language designed to cover all possible risks. Each
rule covered several pages and read like a piece of

legislafion, or was vague and difficult to interpret
(e.g., used phrases such as "use extreme caution").
•Rules were cross-referenced in such a way that
even the trainers often did not understand them. In
one case, a person had to reference no fewer than
84 rules to select the correct course of acfion.
•The rules were written by people with no prac-
tical experience in the topics about which they
were writing. Consequently, many rules were to-
tally impracticable.
•Based on all of these factors, mosf employees
had liftle use for fhe safefy rules. They could see
no relafionship between the content of training for
safety rules and acfual task performance.
•Because the rules were impracfical, they were
rarely enforced either internally or by rail inspectors.
Admittedly, this case study reflects fhe extreme.
However, one may recognize symptoms that pre-
vent an organization's safety rules from providing
optimal impact:
1) Are safety rules used primarily to protect man-
agement?
2) Are the rules cumbersome, impractical and
not user-friendly?
3) Does fhe organizafion fend to enforce safefy
rules mosfly affer someone is injured?
The following suggestions for enhancing safefy

rules are based on Reason (1997) and Hopkins
(2005; 2008). Safety rules must be:
1) dynamic;
2) developed with input from end users;
3) practical and relevant;
4) effecfively communicafed;
5) monitored and enforced;
6) regularly modified and updafed;
7) confinually improved.
Strategy 3: Ensure
That Leaders Under-
stand How to Consis-
tently Act to Develop
Safety Culture
Schein (1992) r e -
searched culfure and
leadership exfensively
and concluded fhat:
Culture and leadership are two sides of the same
coin in that leaders first create cultures when
they creafe groups and organizations. . . . The
bottom-line for leaders is if they do not become
conscious of the cultures in which they are im-
bedded, those cultures will manage them. Cul-
tural understanding is desirable for aii of us, but
it is essential to leaders if they are to iead. (p. 15)
Schein (1992) also discusses how leaders embed
and transmit culture. He lists six "primary embed-
ding mechanisms" that create an organization's
climate and six "secondary articulation and rein-
forcement mechanisms" (pp. 230-231).

Primary Culture-Embedding Mechanisms
1) what leaders systematically pay attention to,
measure and control;
2) how leaders react to critical incidents and or-
ganizational crises;
3) observed criteria by which leaders allocate
scarce resources;
4) deliberate role modeling, teaching and coach-
ing;
5) observed criteria by which leaders allocate re-
wards and status;
6) observed criteria by which leaders recruit, se-
lect, promote, refire and excommunicate organiza-
üonal members.
Secondary Articulation
& Reinforcement Mechanisms
1) organization design and structure;
2) organization systems and procedures;
3) organizational rites and rituals;
4) design of physical space, facades and buildings;
5) sfories, legends and myths about people and
events;
6) formal statements of organizational philoso-
phy, values and creed.
To develop a safety culture, emphasis should be

The best
way for
leaders to
learn what
is happen-
ing in the
workplace
is to walk
around,
monitor
and listen.
to Schein's (1992)
first primary mechanism:
What leaders system-
atically pay attenfion
to, measure and con-
trol. Since organiza-
fional culture and
the resulting safety
culture are primar-
ily inOuenced by the
organization's lead-
ers, this strategy is
crifical. One responsi-

bility of SH&E profes-
sionals is to give counsel
and advice to organiza-
fional leaders. While leaders
are often intelligent and well
educated, they may not automafi-
cally understand specifically how they can
best influence the safety culture. Safety profession-
als can give leaders specific information on how to
best develop the safety culture.
From 2001 to 2004, a comprehensive study was
conducted at Indiana University to cross-validate
a safety climate survey (Seo, Torabi, Blair, et al,
2004). Perhaps the most significant finding of the
research was that all other factors on the safety cli-
mate scale were influenced by two factors: manage-
ment commitment and supervisory support. "In
terms of practical implicafions, this finding suggests
that more emphasis should be made on the role of
management commitment and supervisory support
among various aspects of accident prevenfion ef-
forts, considering their substanfial influence on oth-
er dimensions of safety" (Seo, et al., pp. 442-443).
Stewart (2002) states:
Management commitment is undoubtediy the
foundation of safety. Without it, the rest of the agen-
da for exceiience cannot be effective . . . it must
be real, sustained, determined and beiievable. It
means that the ieaders understand safety, believe
in it with a passion, and see that their passion

is embedded in the company's cuiture. (p. 185)
Since management commitment is intangible,
the issue involves determining the visible mani-
festation of management commitment? What
behaviors and activifies can be, and should be,
measured?
Stewart (2002) notes that safety improvement
efforts often do not focus on the most important
things. These are not necessarily the physical or
system deficiencies that are the easiest to see.
Rather, the most important things are the intangi-
ble elements that may be difficult to see and mea-
sure, such as lack of management commitment, a
low level of worker involvement in safety acfivifies
and a failure to enforce safety rules.
Leaders must focus on specific behaviors to
strengthen safety culture (Blair, 2003). Part of the
SH&E professional's role is to influence leaders
to take the right acfions that will affect safety per-
formance. The key is idenfifying what leader be-
haviors have the greatest impact on the journey to
establish a strong safety culture.
How Can Leaders Enhance Safety Culture?
Based on Komaki's (1998) leadership research,
two activities that disfinguish effective leaders from
mediocre or lackluster leaders are the amount of
fime spent monitoring worker performance, partic-
ularly via work sampling, and providing all kinds of
consequences (posifive, neutral, negative); and lis-
tening to employees by providing a milieu that pro-

motes construcfive performance-related dialogue.
A few years ago, management by walking
around became popular. Perhaps leaders can best
accomplish these two activities with leadership by
walking around (LBWA). Leaders cannot effective-
ly perform these activities from their offices. Also,
this is not leadership by wandering around; it is
walking around with purpose. That purpose is to
enhance the safety culture, to talk with employees
about safety, to listen to their concerns and to fol-
low up when corrective actions are needed.
Most companies that practice some form of be-
havioral safety recognize that they must address
behavior at all levels to be effective. Often, employ-
ees provide peer safety coaching and feedback to
improve safe work on the job.
The behaviors prescribed for leaders and man-
agement are more about supporfing the company's
safety efforts, since managers generally do not per-
form work on the floor or in the field. Therefore, it
is often suggested that management develop self-
managed checklists for these supporfive behaviors,
and that they be measured on achieving the be-
haviors as they would be measured for producfion,
quality and cost control.
These checklists can be customized to play to
the strengths of individual leaders, and can help
ensure that they practice LBWA. Consider these
examples of high-leverage activifies for leadership:
1) Conduct safety walkarounds that involve
a) discussing safety with employees; b) asking how

they can help make people safer; and c) focusing
on acfively caring for employees (Geller, 2001).
2) Confirm that safety-related corrective actions
are closed out, and develop a measurement system
to track.
3) Promote and conduct safety coaching.
Figure 1 presents an example of a leadership
self-managed checklist. Based on McSween (2003),
this checklist illustrates different activities or be-
haviors that management can perform to influence
safety culture. Keep in mind the checklist is sim-
ply a guide and should be customized as needed.
Checklist measures should be simple and realistic.
The timefiame for LBWA is contingent on the
industry and should be reasonable. For example, 1
to 2 hours per week, or about 5% of a leader's time
could be devoted to such an activity. This decision
depends on individual context and circumstances.
It may take more fime than this to be most effec-
tive. Leaders are encouraged to view this as an in-
vestment in safety culture rather than as a cost to
the organizafion. Paperwork should be minimized
6 2 ProfessionalSafeiy NOVEMBER 2013 www.asse.org
r
Name:
(e.g., if could be added to scorecards if
fhe organizafion employs a balanced

scorecard approach).
Consider three additional suggestions
for using the self-managed checklist:
1) The checklist in Figure 1 is an ex-
ample of behaviors that could be select-
ed. It is recommended that pinpoints or
behaviors be limited to 3 to 5 behaviors
instead of 10 (or more).
2) An organization should implement
a system to track and confirm that lead-
ers are actually performing the safety-
related activities they have agreed to
perform.
3) Selected behaviors should be tar-
geted for a specific dmeframe (e.g., three
walkarounds per week). The measure-
ment could include a weekly or month-
ly ratio of the number of implemented
behaviors to the number of expected or
planned behaviors.
Leadership by Walking Around:
Benefits for Site Leaders
Leaders can reap safety benefits as
well as benefits beyond safety perfor-
mance when they practice LBWA. For
example:
1) They have a concrete opportunity to
demonstrate that they care.

2) It will help to ensure that outstand-
ing safety challenges are resolved.
3) Employees will see that leaders are
genuinely committed to safety since they
are demonstrating visible, ongoing sup-
port for safety.
4) The practice establishes a hands-on safety ex-
ample for supervisors.
5) Employees will develop greater trust in their
leaders.
6) Leaders have multiple opportunities to en-
force and reinforce the safety process.
7) Leaders will leam what they do not know.
Regarding the last point, the best way for leaders
to learn what is happening in the workplace is to
walk around, monitor and listen. This is far superi-
or to sitting at a computer and reviewing statistics.
At a minimum, it reinforces and adds to collected
knowledge. Most importantly, it develops the rela-
tionship between leaders and field employees.
As noted, the amount of time spent walking
around and engaging in dialogue about safety
need not be lengthy. Each organization and leader
can establish guidelines for their specific situation.
Remember, these activities should be viewed as in-
vestments in safety, nof as costs.
To keep this in perspective, consider how much
a serious injury or poor employee morale costs

because leadership has not developed a culture
of safety. Leaders must have realistic and effective
measures of how they support safety, otherwise
they are guilty of short-term thinking that ignores
safety culture.
Figure 1
Self-Managed Safety
Behavior Checklist
haged Checklist
Date:
Choose 3 to 5 Measures to Focus on
1) Perform safety walkabouts to discuss safety
2) Ensure the closeout of safety-related corrective
actions
3) Conduct safety coaching
4) Promote safety coaching
5) Attend safety related training with team
5) Recognize employees for working safely
7) Provide at least one positive safety feedbaci<
8) Review observation data and its importance in
safety meetings
9) Actively participate in safety activities

10) Compieted checklist turned in at the end of every
work week
Yes No N/A
Leaders who are passionate about improving
safety performance should read Roberto's (2010)
Know Wliat You Don't Know: How Great Leaders Pre-
vent Problems Before They Happen. Safety is all abouf
prevention, and Roberto shows with case studies
and research that the best leaders do not simply
respond to problems, they discern problems before
they become big issues. Roberto demonstrates that
the best way to discover the symptoms that pro-
duce bigger problems is to spend purposeful time
on the floor and in the field, walking, monitoring,
asking, listening and anficipating issues.
Evaluate Existing Safety Culture
Manuele (2008) clarifies a prime way to evaluate
and improve a safety culture. Specifically, Manuele
examines cultural implications that may impede ef-
fective incident investigations, the quality of which
he identifies as an indicator of safety culture.
Siiice I believe that effective incideiit investiga-
tion and analysis are vitai to obtaining superior
safety results, i continue—with compassion—to
encourage safety professionals to undertake
improvements in the investigation process.
Condoning inadequate incident investigation
detines a safety cuiture probiem, one that wili
not be easily overcome . . . in some organiza-
tions a "blame cuiture" has evolved whereby

the focus of their investigations is on individuai
www.ds5e.org NOVEMBER 2013 ProfessionalSafety 6 3
human error and the corrective action stops at
that level. This approach avoids collecting data
on and improving the management systems
that may have enabled the human error, (p. 344)
In making this case, Manuele (2008) borrows
from Whittingham (2004) and illustrates how a
culture of fear can arise from the system of expect-
ed behavior that management creates.
An electrocution occurred. As required in that
organization, the corporate safety director visited
the location to expand on the investigation. Dur-
ing discussion with the deceased employee's im-
mediate supervisor, it became apparent that the
supervisor knew of the design shortcomings in
the lockout/tagout system, of which there were
many at the location. When asked why the design
shortcomings were not recorded as causal fac-
tors in the investigation report, the supervisor's
response was, "Are you crazy? I would get fired
if I did that. Correcting all these lockout/tagout
problems will cost money and my bcss doesn't
want to hear about things like that." (p. 345)
For improvement, Manuele (2008) recommends
starting with a self-evaluation of the culture, and
he suggests commencing with the first step of the
plan-do-check-act process by denning the prob-
lem. He suggests starting with a sample of com-

pleted investigation reports, and counsels to limit
the scope to only those incidents that result in seri-
ous injury or illness. Manuele believes that such a
study need not be time-consuming since the data
already exist.
A safety professional who undertakes such a
study should keep in mind that its outcome is to
be an analysis of the:
•activities in which serious injuries occur, for
which concentrated prevention efforts will be
beneficial;
•quality of causal factor determination and
corrective action taking;
•culture that has been established over time
with respect to good or not so good causal fac-
tor determination and corrective action taking;
•organization levels that are to be influenced
if improvements are to be made.
From that analysis, a plan of action would be
drafted to influence the safety culture, to the ex-
tent that is necessary. Thus, the plan of action
must be well crafted to convince management of
the value of making the changes proposed. . . .
It is much easier for me to write all this than it will
be for safety professionals to get it done. Chang-
es in culture are not easily accomplished. They
require considerable time and patience, and may
only be achieved in small steps, (pp. 346-347)
Gain & Sustain Management Support

Upper management usually says the right words
about safety in company policies and daily rhetoric,
but the disconnect for many employees is the be-
lief that management does not walk the talk. In fact,
in the author's experience, safety perception sur-
veys often reveal a discrepancy between how much
management thinks it is committed to safety (such
as 90% strongly agree) and how much employees
perceive that management is committed to safety
(such as 30% agree). Although managers may feel
they are personally highly committed to safety, em-
ployee perceptions are their reality. If leaders follow
the recommendations for walking around, moni-
toring, coaching, listening and resolving safety is-
sues, then employees will believe that management
walks the talk, genuinely cares about them and is
committed to safety.
As noted, safety professionals can influence
leaders about the things they should do to enhance
safety culture. Sometimes, leaders simply do not
know what they should be doing regularly to im-
pact safety. Based on their own experience, some
leaders may believe that a good safety program
consists of slogans, posters and incentives.
A primary role of safety professionals is to give
advice on how to anticipate, identify and control
hazards and exposures. The safety professional is a
consultant and the best s/he can do is convince up-
per management about the high-leverage activities
that should be measured and regularly reviewed. It
is effective to emphasize the expected benefits for
the organization. SH&E professionals also should

seek to spark leaders' passion for safety. Bench-
marking performance against other companies or
industries that have a strong safety culture is one
place to start.
Crafting a Report to Describe Why & How
Leadership Builds the Safety Culture
The primary way to gain management support for
safety culture is to influence them through commu-
nication. Doing so effectively may be a challenge.
However, if leaders claim that safety is a value, then
they should be willing to listen and act on a safety
professional's relevant recommendations.
This communication can consist of a written re-
port, face-to-face meetings or both. The report
must be clear, concise and succinct, focused on no
more than three priorities. Rather than overwhelm
participants with a long list of needs, be willing to
start small. The SH&E professional might consider
developing a presentation that summarizes or illus-
trates key points in the written report as well.
Strategically, the safety professional must gain
management support and buy-in before such a
meeting. This involves identifying the leaders who
are the most passionate about safety. Meet with
these individuals and describe needs. Having an
advocate can go a long way toward ensuring that
individuals are assigned safety supportive respon-
sibilities and held accountable for follow-through.
The following strategies may be applied to make
the communication effort more eftective. Safety
professionals can select those strategies that are ap-

propriate in their situation (Blair & Spurlock, 2013).
1) Emphasize the organization's legal and ethi-
cal responsibilities regarding safety. Most organi-
zation leaders will respond to information that can
negatively or positively affect company image. The
concept of a strong safety culture is becoming more
visible and more desirable.
6 4 PrafessionalSafety NOVEMBER 2013 www.asse.org
2) Discuss a tragic event in
the industry or a similar in-
dustry. As noted, incident in-
vesfigations often reveal that
basic causes relate to a poor
safety culture. Be proactive.
One does not want to end up
discussing an event that oc-
curred in his/her organization
due to cultural deficiencies.
3) Develop a sense of ur-
gency for safety. Organiza-
tions naturally become urgent
about safety when a fatality
or tragedy occturs, but this is
reactive. Safety profession-
als add value to their orga-
nizations by helping them be
proactive and more urgent about taking preventive
measures.
4) Speak management's language. Focus on the

costs of poor safety management, such as work-
ers' compensation costs and indirect costs. Some
cost reduction may be accomplished through case
management, but a soHd safety management sys-
tem that exists in the culture and not just on paper
will lead to fewer injuries and lower costs.
Conclusion
To successfully implement and sustain efforts
to develop safety culture, each organizafion must
customize techniques to accomplish their chosen
strategies. A starting point for safety profession-
als is to gain upper management support for these
strategies. Managers and employees are likely to
support the strategies if the safety metrics and key
performance indicators are designed to develop
the culture and relationships, and to hold people
accountable for supporting safety.
Three pracfical strategies to enhance safety cul-
ture have been discussed. While a company can
take many other acfions to develop safety culture,
these are three powerful strategies to consider for
enhancing a safety culture:
1) Work toward becoming a 100% reporting cul-
ture.
2) Develop safety awareness with meaningful
safety rules.
3) Ensure that leaders understand how to de-
velop safety culture and consistently act to do so.
Each strategy assumes follow-up to sustain and

infuse it in the culture. Even if employees report
most incidents, little benefit is derived if proactive
measures are not taken to prevent future incidents.
Leaders are less likely to pracfice leadership by
walking around if the company does not system-
atically measure the acfivity.
The concluding question for many readers at this
point could be. Would one or more of these strate-
gies be more powerful for long-term performance
than the current safety strategies being used by the
organization? PS
Sustaining the Effort
to Build a Safety Culture
1) Establish and maintain a safety Scoreboard focused on
leading
safety metrics. These are acfivity measures of fhe safety process
and the measures of support for safety that build safety culture.
Ef-
fective scoreboards include trailing measures, are kept current,
and
are simple to read and understand.
2) Use a risk assessment matrb( to determine priorities for
safety
acfions and interventions.
3) Design ways to insfitutionalize or systematize these culture
development strategies.
4) Consider a system to maintain focus on the important goals,
establish accountability and provide regular ongoing dialogue
for
improvement (FranklinCovey, 2006).

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Reinforcing Ethical
Decision Making Through
Corporate Culture
Al Y S. Chen
Roby B. Sawyers
Paul E Williams
ABSTRACT. Behaving ethically depends on the
ability to recognize that ethical issues exist, to see
from an ethical point of view. This ability to see and
respond ethically may be related more to attributes
of corporate culture than to attributes of individual
employees. Efforts to increase ethical standards and
decrease pressure to behave unethically should there-
fore concentrate on the organization and its culture.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss how total
quality (TQ) techniques can facilitate the develop-
ment of a cooperative corporate culture that promotes
and encourages ethical behavior throughout an orga-
nization.

Key words: corporate, culture, ethics, total quality
Al Y. S. Chen, DBA, is Associate Professor of Accounting
at North Carolina State University, Raleigh. He has
been involved in teaching total quality techniques and
has directed quality improvement projects in industry. He
has published articles dealing with total quality man-
agement in Management Accounting and The
Journal of Accountancy.
Roby B. Sawyers, CPA, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of
Accounting at North Carolina State University. He has
been involved at North Carolina State in efforts to
integrate the teaching of ethics in the accounting and
management curriculum. His research has been published
in a variety of journals including T h e J o u r n a l of the
American Taxation Association, Advantages in
Taxation, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and
Theory and The Journal of Accountancy.
Paul F. Williams, Ph.D., is Professor of Accounting at
North Carolina State University. His teaching interests
include managerial and financial accounting, and
accounting theory. His research interests are in the areas
of critical theory and sociology of knowledge. He has
published articles in Critical Perspectives on
Accounting; Accounting, Organizations and
Society, and The Accounting Review among others.
Introduction
News sources continually report business activi-
ties harmful to individuals, communities and
society in general. Some notable examples
include: questionable decisions concerning
product design that sacrifice quality in an effort

to reduce cost, lack of concern for environmental
damage, and doubtful standards affecting the
safety of employees, customers and other stake-
holders. While many factors certainly contribute
to problems such as these, evidence suggests that
they are primarily caused by the lack of a cor-
porate culture that explicitly promotes and
encourages ethical decision making. Unethical
conduct is not simply an individual decision, but
is also a reflection of institutional culture with
the result that such conduct may be related more
to attributes of the business itself than to attrib-
utes of the individual employee (McCuddy et al.,
1993).
Managers report frequent pressure to com-
promise personal ethics to achieve corporate
goals and to translate moral considerations into
strictly utilitarian terms (Jackall, 1988). This
pressure may lead to employees not "speaking
up" when confronted with ethical issues due to
fear that adverse repercussions will follow, an
event documented and experienced first hand by
Boisjoly (1993) as a consequence of the space
shuttle Challenger disaster. Perhaps one expla-
nation for this pressure is the change that has
occurred in our understanding and acceptance of
the purpose of the management process.
Over 30 years ago, Mautz and Sharaf (1961)
argued that being ethically sensitive rivaled the
importance of being technically proficient (Shaub
et al., 1993). Business has moved far away from
Journal of Business Ethics 16: 8 5 5 - 8 6 5 , 1997.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the

Netherlands.
856 Al Y. S. Chen et al.
this view of management as a moral practice to
the view that it is a value-neutral technical
practice (Francis, 1990). The use of quantitative
decision models like linear and dynamic pro-
gramming, queuing theory and capital budgeting
techniques serve as examples. Exclusive use of
quantitative methods obscures the role of indi-
vidual judgment which may result in business
managers becoming so preoccupied with tech-
nical issues that ethical issues are overlooked
(Shaub et al., 1993). Likewise, the recent wave
of adopting corporate codes of ethics is indica-
tive of top management's desire to standardize
decisions with ethical repercussions.' However,
a reliance on rules and standards results in
managers hiding behind a code of ethics
believing they are ethical if they do not violate
the rules. The role of ideals and professional
judgment in the management process are lost.
Recently, there has been a call for a return to
the view of business as a moral practice in which
managers are concerned about the ethical con-
sequences of what they do and in which the very
practice of management produces these concerns
as internal goods of the practice, i.e..
The fundamental business of business is ethical, the
creation of values that enhance the welfare of
communities, societies, and the world. Thus, ethics

is central to the managerial task; in fact, it is the
task of management (Buchholz, 1989: p. 28).
The transformation of business into a moral
practice requires that individuals see from an
ethical point of view. We argue that this ability
of individuals to respond ethically is related to
the reinforcement and support the organization
provides for ethical behavior. Efforts by other
institutions in society (e.g. higher education and
professional societies) primarily focus on creating
ethical behavior through education processes
directed at individuals (The Bedford Committee,
1986; The Treadway Commission, 1987). How-
ever, these efforts are most effective when they
are reinforced by a sound ethical environment
in the business organization. Organizations often
produce a corporate mentality which encourages
people to behave in ways that are not necessarily
consistent with individual or societal norms. The
more ethical the culture of an organization, the
more ethical will be an individual's decision
behavior (Sinclair, 1993; Ford and Richardson,
1994). Thus, efforts to strengthen the ethical
conduct of employees must occur at the institu-
tional level with, among other things, a focus on
providing a corporate culture that promotes and
encourages ethical behavior and allows employees
to "voice" their concerns.^
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the
potential of total quahty (TQ) techniques for
managing and facilitating the development of a
corporate culture that provides a context for,
promotes, and encourages ethical behavior

throughout a firm.^ In the following section, we
discuss the impact of corporate culture on ethical
sensitivity and ethical behavior. The link between
T Q and ethics is presented next. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion of the hmitations of T Q
techniques.
Ethics and the corporate culture
Ethical sensitivity
Ethical sensitivity is the abihty of an individual
to recognize the ethical nature of a situation in
a professional context (Shaub et al., 1993).
Behaving ethically depends on the ability to
recognize that ethical issues exist, to see from an
ethical point of view. If a situation is not recog-
nized as containing ethical components, moral
reasoning will not be used to address it. However,
individuals do not operate in a vacuum.
Individuals are influenced by organizations and
their common goals and beliefs. Corporations
construct cultures that can exercise good or bad
influences depending on their goals, policies,
structures and strategies (Brown, 1987).
Brown's remark implies that the problem of
ethics is not one of the conduct of individuals.
However, that is the way in which it has most
often been treated. For example, the American
Accounting Association's ethics seminars and case
studies were structured around presenting indi-
viduals with ethical dilemmas that require a
private decision, i.e., ethics is viewed as a private
matter, one of individual choice. As Bellah et al.

Decision Making Through Corporate Culture 857
(1991) argue, this view of ethics is a product of
our American culture's reliance on a Lockean
political and moral discourse of radical individ-
ualism which emphasizes rights and severely
inhibits, if not precludes, our ability to under-
stand how individuals fmd themselves in moral
dilemmas in the first place. The ethics problem
is not one of individual misconduct so much as
it is one of the inadequacy of institutions, the
multinational business corporation being one of
those. For a people who value a democratic form
of life, we increasingly find ourselves enmeshed
in institutions, like the multinational corporation,
which are hierarchial and bureaucratic in nature,
and we seem to lack the moral wherewithal to
understand and reshape those institutions.
The problem of ethics
Perhaps the problem of ethics stems from our
inclination to refer to ethical problems, which
implies there are solutions. This approach to
ethics utilizes a metaphor of science; there is a
problem which means there is a solution. The
philosopher Hillary Putnam (1990: p. 181) argues
that the legal metaphor of "adjudication" is a
more appropriate one. For example, he acknowl-
edges that he accepts the Supreme Court
decision on abortion as a wise one not because
it is the correct solution, but because:
reasonable men and women should agree that it

would have been decidedly Mwwise for the Court
either to (1) read Roman Catholic theology into
the Constitution; or (2) grant that persons have the
right to receive and perform abortions even in the
ninth month of pregnancy.
Another useful metaphor is that of reading
(Putnam, 1990: p. 182), which involves the
acknowledgment that there are better and worse
readings. Putnam's example is that of Hamlet; a
final interpretation of the play is impossible, but
there are some interpretations that are better than
others. What a twelve-year old child may read
Hamlet to mean does not come as nearly to
exhausting the understandings from the play as
those of an adult reader knowledgeable in the
mores and language of Elizabethan England.
According to Putnam, the metaphors of adjudi-
cation and reading do not imply that resolving
ethical disputes means a commitment to an
optimal solution, but they do mean ". . . w e are
committed to the idea of better and worse
opinions. Reading great works of art and reading
life are different but not unrelated activities"
(1990: p. 183).
What is necessary for the adjudication of
ethical issues is a sense of community, which
encourages the communication of and supports
the acceptance of those diverse opinions. For, as
Putnam notes:
When the sense of community is absent or weak,
when individuals feel contempt or resentment for
one another, when the attitude becomes that any

consensus that isn't the one an individual would
have chosen himself isn't binding on him, them
fantasy and desperation have free reign (1990: p.
185).
Corporate cultures can be constructed to
become places in which this strong sense of
genuine community is engendered, in which
"adjudication" and "reading" can occur so that
the ethical assumes an importance along with the
technical.
Corporate Culture. Corporate culture is defined
as "the shared values and beliefs of organizational
members, specifically beliefs about what works
within an organization, and values about pre-
ferred end states and the . . . approaches used
to reach them" (Reidenbach and Robin, 1991:
p. 273). Many argue that ethical behavior stems
from an ethical corporate culture (Fisse and
Braithwaite, 1983; Murphy, 1989; Reidenbach
and Robin, 1991; Sims, 1992; Ford and
Richardson, 1994).'* At a more micro level,
Wimbush and Shepard (1994) suggest that ethical
behavior is related to the ethical climate of an
organization which is a dimension of corporate
climate (culture). The critical issue then becomes
how to create and manage an ethical corporate
culture.'
Managing Corporate Culture. Sinclair (1993)
describes two approaches to managing culture to
improve ethics in organizations, which are the

strong and subculture approaches. The strong
approach is characterized by the creation of a
unitary culture in which values and norms are
shared by all employees. The support and lead-
ership of top management is crucial to create an
organizational culture that evokes a uniform
response to ethical issues.
The subculture approach relies on the view
that common values and norms affecting ethical
behavior are more likely to be found in groups
within an organization than the organization as
a whole. Instead of imposing corporate-wide
ethical values, the culture of the organization is
managed by focusing the values of subgroups
towards goals that are consistent with those of the
organization (Sinclair, 1993). Although different
groups can have different values, organizations
can still benefit by identifying points of consensus
which can form the basis of an ethical corporate
culture. While the strong approach rehes on
management to articulate a set of moral values,
the subculture approach encourages individuals
to develop their own ethical values consistent
with those of the organization (Sinclair, 1993).
Sinclair (1993) recognizes problems with both
the strong and the subculture approaches. Strong
cultures tend to maintain the status quo and may
"drive out dissension producing 'strategic
myopia' and rigidity" (attributed to Bourgeois,
1984; and Lorsch, 1985 by Sinclair, 1993: p. 67).
Strong cultures tend to give individual employees
limited power and may inhibit the organization's

capacity to react and respond to the changing
needs of it stakeholders (Sinclair, 1993). In the
subculture approach, values of a particular group
may never be accepted by other groups resulting
in a conflict of beliefs that leaves top manage-
ment unable to fmd a common basis on which
to build an ethical foundation.
Reidenbach and Robin (1991) describe an
ethical organization as one with a common set
of ethical values accepted by all members of the
organization. This nucleus of values guides the
behavior of individuals when faced with ethical
dilemmas. Individuals can not deal with ethical
issues as they arise without a uniform set of cor-
porate values to guide their behavior. The cor-
porate culture is the vehicle for delivering and
communicating that common set of values.
Cooperative culture
Francis (1990) suggests that working in large,
bureaucratic organizational settings makes the
achievement of professional virtues more diffi-
cult. In contrast, it would appear that working in
organizational settings characterized by a more
malleable, cooperative form of management in
which people engage each other freely in shaping
the culture is more conducive to promoting
ethical awareness and behavior. Sims (1992) rec-
ognizes that organizational culture has a signifi-
cant influence on establishing ethical behavior
in an organization and enumerates normative
recommendations for creating a culture that
supports individual ethical behavior. However,
Sims does not offer an approach that will sys-

tematically aid in the development of a corporate
culture that encourages and promotes ethical
behavior throughout an organization. We contend
that total quality techniques can be used to
provide such a flexible, cooperative culture. "The
principles of total quality . . . provide the nec-
essary structural framework to help . . . employees
and management communicate . . ." (Imai, 1986:
p. 216). An organization incorporating T Q tech-
niques can engender that sense of community
aimed at excellence which has the potential to
make the institution of the business corporation
more ethical as well as making employees ethi-
cally aware. In the next section, we argue that
ethical behavior is an integral part of quality
improvement efforts. We explore proven quality
improvement techniques and discuss the benefits
of applying these techniques to reinforce ethical
decision making through corporate culture.
Total quality and ethics
A revolution is transforming the worldwide
business environment. The growth of interna-
tional competition, the breakneck pace of
technological innovation, and advances in com-
puterized systems have created a new playing
field for business around the world. Many
Japanese firms have emerged as world-class pro-
ducers and have become the focus of studies
aimed at discovering their critical success factors.

Much of Japan's global business success has been
attributed to the implementation of total quality
techniques.^
The application of TQ techniques in the
United States
American industry has rediscovered T Q as it
faces increased global competition and dimin-
ishing quality of its products and services. Today,
T Q techniques have been implemented by over
3000 U.S. organizations in the manufacturing
and service sectors (U.S. GAO, 1991). However,
as U.S. industry has moved to adopt total quality
techniques, most of its benefits have been
discussed in terms of its impact on the quality
of products and services and the efficiency of the
processes employed in the organization. In a
study of the management practices of 20 com-
panies implementing T Q practices, the United
States General Accounting Office found that T Q
techniques resulted in better employees relations,
improved operating procedures, greater customer
satisfaction and better financial performance (U.S.
GAO, 1991). These successes imply that T Q
techniques can be effectively implemented in
U.S. firms. However, in general neither Japanese
or U.S. firms have considered the potential
ethical benefits of a total quality approach to
business.
The quality-ethics connection
It has been argued that a distinctive leadership
style allows Japanese companies to avoid common
ethical problems found in U.S. firms (Taka and

Foglia, 1994). Taka and Foglia argue that this
unique leadership style is largely attributable to
the Japanese societal value system. However,
under the heavy influence of western culture and
value systems over the last century , it is not clear
how the Japanese could maintain a stable, pro-
ductive and ethical work force relying only on
management leadership style. The characteristic
Japanese leadership style endures only if culti-
vated and reinforced by a strong organizational
culture.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that total quality
techniques can be used to develop an ethically
sensitive corporate culture that supports and
encourages ethical behavior in the workplace. As
an examiner for the Malcolm Baldridge National
Quahty Award, Steeples (1994) found a high
correlation between quality and ethics, apparent
in both a company's actions and the actions of its
employees.
Evidence also suggests that corporate catastro-
phes are often the result of cultural failures and
system breakdowns (rather than a lack of indi-
vidual ethical behavior). Steeples (1994) suggests
that a series of system deficiencies caused the
disastrous Chicago flood of 1992 by making it
virtually impossible for individuals to take posi-
tive action. Likewise, Boisjoly (1993) provides a
particularly vivid picture of management failure
at Morton Thiokol when managers succumbed
to NASA pressure and approved the launch of
Challenger, even though engineers advised
against it. The absence of an organizational
culture where people were enabled to voice their

concerns was, according to Boisjoly, what caused
the Challenger tragedy. Boisjoly (1993) suggests
that organizations must develop and foster top-
down support for teamwork and information
flow based on the cornerstones of responsibility,
authority and accountability, the key tenets of a
total quality approach to management.
T Q provides a model for creating socially
responsive companies that build ethical expecta-
tions into systems and provide organizational
support to employees so that they can behave
according to those expectations (Steeples, 1994).
The reliance of T Q on ethical behavior is man-
ifested in comments by Ishikawa, one of the
world's foremost authorities on quahty control.
I am an advocate of quality control based on belief
in people's goodness. If a person does not trust his
. . . subordinates and imposes strict control and
frequent inspection, Jie cannot be a good manager.
His control is based on the belief that people are
by nature evil, and such a system simply does not
work (Ishikawa, 1985: pp. 65-66).
Ishikawa's view is reinforced by the management
concept "Kaizen" which emphasizes continuous
improvement in all business activities and focuses
860 Al Y. S. Chen et al
on improving the quality oi people (Evans and
Lindsay, 1993). It is a cooperative approach aimed
at facilitating continuous quality improvement

through better communication among workers
and managers.
Based on the successful implementation of T Q
techniques in U.S. flrms, we explore the impli-
cations of using these techniques to reinforce
ethical decision making through the corporate
culture. The next section discusses specific
methods by which total quality techniques can
be used to raise employees' ethical awareness and
to create a cooperative corporate culture.
Ethical implications of TQ techniques
Traditional, bureaucratic organizational forms are
often characterized by strict departmentalization
of job functions that create barriers to effective
communication and planning. In addition, the
outcome focus of management by objectives
sends a message to middle managers that what is
important is achieving those outcomes, regard-
less of how it is done. A T Q approach to business
emphasizes continuous improvement of the
processes of an organization and breaking down
organizational barriers through structural changes
that promote better communication and a greater
sense of community (Brassard, 1989). In addition
to changes in the organizational structure, the use
of T Q management tools can develop and
enhance the planning skills of managers, and help
identify internal opportunities for improvement.''
This section discusses how T Q techniques can
both achieve world class excellence in the
manufacturing and service processes of an
organization and improve an organization's
ethical culture.

A total quality approach to managing culture
to improve ethics includes fundamental aspects
of both the strong and subculture approaches
discussed by Sinclair (1993). However, a total
quality approach integrates and extends the
methods, avoiding the felt lack of personal
responsibihty and the lack of discernment created
in the strong approach. It also avoids the lack of
a focused organizational commitment to ethics
that often accompanies the subculture approach.
Customer focus
A key concept in the T Q philosophy is satisfac-
tion of the customer. However, T Q adopts a very
broad definition of customer which includes
not only traditional consumers of products or
services but also stockholders, the community,
co-workers, and others who are directly or
indirectly affected by the product or service. This
recognition of multiple stakeholders brings with
it certain ethical responsibihties that may not be
readily apparent. These include obligations to
communities affected by mergers and acquisitions
(which may result in layoffs), responsibilities to
consumers affected by advertising of dangerous
products (i.e. cigarettes), and responsibilities to
host countries affected by the presence of
multinational companies.
Total cost management (TCM) has been used
by many Japanese firms as a business paradigm
for managing all company resources and the
activities that consume those resources with a
focus on stimulating and managing change. Chen

and Zuckerman (1994) argue that, under the
T C M paradigm, companies must consider the
entire environmental impact of their products by
looking for substitutes for inputs that are haz-
ardous and for processes that can reduce the gen-
eration of waste. Combining a focus on multiple
stakeholders and T C M offers a systematic
approach for continuously improving operations
and reducing waste throughout the product life
cycle. Firms will find such integration desirable
to reduce costs, reduce environmental liability,
and minimize adverse community concerns over
their operations.
Viewing the community as a stakeholder sheds
new light on practices such as plant closings and
environmental pollution. Treating co-workers as
customers implicitly emphasizes the need to
respect one's co-workers and therefore may
increase worker's sensitivity to ethical issues
arising out of authority/subordinate work rela-
tionships and work-place safety. This responsi-
bility to multiple stakeholders has been used as
justification for whistle blowing. However, the
task of ethical management is to anticipate the
pressures which lead to the unethical behavior
and provide adequate channels of communica-
tion within an organization so that whistle
blowing is not necessary (Bowie and Duska,
1990).

to address the welfare of foreign workers that are
in any way associated with their companies or
products (Zachary, 1994).
Top-down support
A T Q approach to management recognizes the
necessity of top-down support for effective orga-
nizational change. It is essential that direction and
attitude are seen to emanate not only from
written policy but from actual behavior of top
management. The development of an ethical
corporate culture depends on the tone at the top
as well. Top executives must live up to the ethical
standards they are espousing and support ethical
behavior in others. Of course, positive organiza-
tional change requires participation and com-
mitment from everyone in an organization.
Many companies implementing T Q tech-
niques emphasize the importance of creating a
safe work environment. Top management is the
key in establishing a safety-first mind set in these
organizations. Chen and Rodgers (1995) note
that Milliken and Company's top management
consider minimizing accidents and reducing
hazardous working conditions more important
than investing in new production technology.
Meetings throughout the organization typically
start with announcements of safety procedures
and reports. Concerns for each other are given
the highest priority. Subsidiaries' performance is
evaluated based on the minimization of safety
incidents as well as on productivity. In order to
thrive in the highly competitive textiles industry,
Milliken's strategy is to produce high quality

products with total customer satisfaction at
competitive costs. Such a customer-focused
philosophy emphasizes safety considerations
during the entire product life cycle.
As manufacturing facilities and suppliers of
U.S. based multi-nationals are shifted overseas,
more and more companies are being confronted
with new ethical problems stemming from
worker safety issues, harsh working conditions
and the exploitation of women and children in
the workplace. Top management at Levi Strauss
& Co., Nordstrom Inc., Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and
Reebok International Ltd. have all taken steps
Participation and communication through teamwork
Increasing participation, better access to infor-
mation, and breaking down barriers to commu-
nication are fundamental goals of T Q (Roth,
1993). T Q is based on two-way communication,
top-down and bottom-up. Top management can
not lead effectively without delivering the quahty
message through well managed communication
strategies. However, continuous process improve-
ment is typically not led by top management but
rather is initiated and driven from the bottom-
up through effective feedback and communica-
tion mechanisms like employee suggestion
programs.
Chen and Rodgers (1995) note that active
participation and open communication are
encouraged through the use of teams. Teamwork
is essential to encourage interaction across
functional areas. This interaction is perhaps the

key mechanism in explaining TQ's effect on
ethical sensitivity. Interacting subgroups are
influential in shaping corporate culture. As dis-
cussed in Mathews (1988), work groups can
sometimes take on family-like relationships. As
the overlap between work and one's personal life
becomes more interwined, employees are more
likely to consider the impact of their actions on
others in the organization.
Communication is also enhanced through the
use of suggestion boxes and opportunity for
improvement programs. Encouraging employees
to submit suggestions for improvement provides
an opportunity for management to involve staff
in decision making and problem solving. When
workplace teams have the authority to approve
the implementation of those suggestions without
management involvement, employee empower-
ment is also enhanced. Responding to and acting
on employee suggestions provides employees
with a voice and is an important source of overall
job satisfaction.
Employee empowerment
A T Q approach to management recognizes and
utilizes the potential of employees, encouraging
them to make decisions and assume responsibility
over the processes of the organization. Integrated
with customer focus, genuine employee empow-
erment is essential to reach TQ's goal of

customer satisfaction. Employees must be given
authority to make decisions and handle customer
disputes on the spot in order to make things
right. The empowerment of employees that
results in continuous improvement of the quality
of the products and services of a company also
gives workers authority and responsibility to take
action when confronted with ethical dilemmas
such as product safety. Just as quality is the
responsibility of every individual in an organiza-
tion, ethics is the responsibility of all employees.
In a Toyota assembly plant in Japan, each worker
along the production line is empowered to stop
production if quality problems arise (Womack et
al., 1990).* Employee empowerment systems such
as this require the trust of coworkers in the entire
organization and allow people to develop the
"skills" of a responsible citizen.
Balanced incentive programs
The dominance of financial rewards in the tra-
ditional workplace is a key obstacle to trans-
forming business into a moral practice (Francis,
1990). If performance evaluation systems are
based solely on financial measures and rewards,
workers and managers are encouraged to take
actions that lead to favorable individual evalua-
tions, but that may be detrimental to the orga-
nization's overall goals. Coye (1986) suggests that
it is important to incorporate ethical considera-
tions into performance evaluation systems. Firms
employing T Q techniques motivate workers
primarily through a balanced mix of financial and
non-financial factors including job satisfaction,
control and authority, opportunities for contin-

uous education and personal growth, and peer
recognition for goal achievement. The reward
structure can also be used to encourage concern
for others which engenders ethical behavior
through the explicit recognition of the impor-
tance of quality and safety issues within a
company.
Levi Strauss & Co. provides both financial
and psychic rewards to motivate employees.
Employees are evaluated by subordinates as well
as superiors. Incentive pay of workers in sewing
plants is tied to team performance, rather than
individual performance. One-third of an em-
ployee's evaluation is based on "aspirational
behavior" including such issues as valuing
diversity, managing ethically, communicating
effectively and empowering employees (Mitchell
and Oneal, 1994). At Milliken, rewards are
largely based on employees' competence, educa-
tion and skill levels (Chen and Rodgers, 1995).
Educational programs provided in Milliken's
training programs allow motivated employees to
improve themselves and the quality of the
company's work force. Production associates are
paid based on the number of different job skills
they can perform, consequently employees are
rewarded for learning cross-functional skills.
Just as the quahty improvement and operating
and efficiency benefits of T Q require a flexible
approach characterized by an ongoing and co-
ordinated effort by management and employees,
the ethical benefits of T Q should not be
expected to come about over-night or to develop

in isolation. T Q is more than a set of indepen-
dent components and the successful development
of a cooperative culture promoting and encour-
aging ethical behavior requires an integrated
process of continuous improvement.
Conclusions, limitations and implications
In The Power of Ethical Management, Blanchard
and Peale (1988) suggest five principles of ethical
power for organizations - Purpose, Pride,
Persistence, Perspective, and Patience. The T Q
concepts discussed in this paper provide a
cohesive framework incorporating these elements
and can create a corporate culture promoting and
encouraging ethical behavior. When employees
are empowered and actively participate in
decision making they will feel proud of their
work and of the organization and will be more
aware of ethical issues. In all successful T Q
implementations, top management must be
committed to continual enhancement of quality
as well as ethical behavior throughout the
organization. Decisions must be made in an
environment that encourages the consideration
of a multitude of values, not only dollars and
cents. Perspective and patience means ap-
proaching decisions with a broad and long-term
view in balancing results with how those results
are achieved.

Limitations
In this paper, culture has been viewed as a
manageable trait of an organization. However,
Hammond and Preston (1992: p. 800) suggest
that "there is a danger in treating culture . . .
not as something that infuses the organization,
but as something to be managed and set aside so
that various techniques . . . may be brought to
the fore." Culture and technique are sometimes
viewed as separable (Hammond and Preston,
1992) but historical and cultural contexts must
be considered in interpreting practices and
implementing techniques (Kondo, 1990). Care
must be taken in importing successful Japanese
techniques without reservation. Future research
is required in order to examine the potential of
cross-cultural transfers of Japanese management
techniques.
The Japanese culture and management philos-
ophy have both positive and negative ethical
implications. While Japanese corporations
avoid many ethical problems arising in the
United States, Japanese companies face their own
problems with gender inequity, uneven societal
wealth distribution, and exclusionary practices
arising from the merging of politics and business.
While U.S. companies can learn from the
Japanese experiences with total quality tech-
niques, Japanese companies can learn from their
U.S. counterparts as well.
Implications
The implementation of a total quality approach

in business has many benefits. By integrating the
functions of an organization and by connecting
quality and ethics, T Q techniques can help
institutions "produce what is of value to cus-
tomers and provide what is valuable to society"
(Steeples, 1994: p. 75). The quality of the work-
place will be improved as friction between
employees is reduced through better communi-
cation, more effective teamwork, and the recog-
nition of co-workers as customers. Under the
increasing threat of litigation and increased
government regulation, the business organization
itself will benefit from increased ethical aware-
ness throughout the organization.' Society in
general will benefit as employees and the orga-
nizations they work for are better prepared to
identify and address product safety, environmental
and other issues in an ethical manner.
Notes
' Berenbeim, 1992 reports that 84 percent of U.S.
companies surveyed had an ethics code with 45
percent enacting them since 1987.
" While Boisjoly, 1993 recognizes that ethical
behavior requires personal integrity and responsibility,
unless organizations also give individuals a voice,
disasters like the Challenger accident can still occur.
•* We do not argue that T Q techniques inevitably
create a more ethical organization, only that the
potential inheres in them.
•* Critics of the view of corporate culture as a deter-
minant of ethical behavior argue that "it may serve
to camouflage dubious practices" (Sinclair, 1993: p.
67). Weiss, 1986 suggests that codes, credos and other
artifacts of organizational culture can discourage

individuals from taking personal responsibility for
ethical decisions in the workplace.
' At a more basic level, one can question whether
culture can be managed at all or is simply something
that an organization "is". For a commentary on this
view, see Sinclair, 1993.
' Although often attributed to the Japanese, quality
control using statistical methods was initially devel-
oped by Walter Shewhart and Bell Laboratories in the
late 1920s and early 1930s. Shewhart's student, W.
Edwards Deming introduced statistical quality control
to America's defense industry during World War II.
Statistical quality control techniques were first used
by Japanese industry during the post-war reconstruc-
tion period. With the assistance of Joseph M. Juran,
the Japanese subsequently formed a consortium of
universities, industry and government to engage in
research and disseminate knowledge of quality
control. T Q techniques have been used successfully
by Japanese companies for over four decades, helping
them become world leaders in industry.
' A discussion of these management planning tools
(brainstorming with affinity diagrams, ranking issues
with prioritization matrices, identification of root
causes and logical links among critical issues with
interrelationship diagrams, etc.) is beyond the scope
of this paper. See Imai, 1986, Goal/QPC, 1988 and
Brassard, 1989 for a description and explanation of
how these tools can be used to help implement the
techniques discussed in this paper.

' Interestingly, Womack et al. (1990) report that the
production line is almost never stopped by workers
because the quality problems are solved in advance
and the same problem never occurs twice.
' For example, the Federal Sentencihg Guidelines for
organizations that took effect on November 1, 1991
may hold companies responsible for federal crimes
committed by employees. For a discussion of the
effect of these guidelines on corporate behavior, see
Rafalko, 1994.
References
American Accounting Association, Committee on the
Future Structure, Content, and Scope of
Accounting Education (The Bedford Committee):
1986, 'Future Accounting Education: Preparing for
the Expanding Profession', Issues in Accounting
Education 1(1), 168-195.
Bellah, R. N., R. Madsen, W. M. Sullivan, A. Swidler
and S. M. Tipton: 1991, T7ie Good Society (Vintage
Books, New York, NY).
Berenbeim, R. E.: 1992, 'The Corporate Ethics Test',
Business and Society Review (Spring), 77-80.
Blanchard, K. and N. V. Peale: 1988, The Power of
Ethical Management (William Morrow and
Company, Inc., New York, NY).
Boisjoly, R. M.: 1993, 'Personal Integrity and
Accountability', Accounting Horizons 7(1), 59-69.
Bourgeois, L.: 1984, 'Strategic Management and
Determinism', Academy of Management Review 9(4).

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